

The Riches of Gods Love

unto the Vessells of Mercy,

CONSISTENT WITH

His Absolute Hatred or Reprobation
Of the Vessells of Wrath.

O R

A N A N S W E R

UNTO A BOOK ENTITLED

*Gods Love unto Mankind, Manifested by Disproving
His Absolute Decree for their Damnation.*

I N T W O B O O K E S

The First being a Refutation of the said Booke,

As it was Presented in Manuscript by Mr H O R D
unto Sir NATH: RICH.

The Second being an Examination of certain Passages inserted
into M. H O R D S Discourse, (formerly Answered) by an
Author that conceales his Name, but was supposed to be
Mr M A S O N, Rector of *Andrews-Underhaft* in London.

By that Great and Famous Light of Gods Church,

WILLIAM TWISSE D. D.

And Prolocutor of the late Assembly of *D I V I N E S*.

Whereunto are annexed Two Tractates of the same Author in Answer
unto D. H. The one concerning Gods Decrees Definite or Indefinite.
The other about the object of Predestination.

TOGETHER WITH

A Vindication of D. *TWISSE* from the exceptions of
Mr *JOHN GOODWIN* In his *Redemption Redeemed*.

By HENRY JEANES Minister of Gods Word
In *CHEDZOL*.

Rom. 9. 20. *O Man, who art thou that repliest against God, shall the thing formed, say
to him that formed it, why hast thou made mee thus?*

v. 21. *Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same Lump to make one vessell
to honour, and another unto dishonour.*

OXFORD,

Printed by L. L. and H. H. Printers to the University, for *Tho: Robinson*.

Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII.



OF All those weighty parcells of Gospell truth, which the *Arminians* have chosen to oppose, there is not any about which they so much delight to try and exercise the strength of fleshly reasonings, as that of Gods eternall decree of Reprobation: partly because the Scripture doth not so abound in the delivery of this Doctrine, as of some others, lying in a more immediate subserviency to the obedience and consolation of the Saints, (though it be sufficiently revealed in them, to the quieting of their spirits who have learned to captivate their understandings to the obedience of Faith) and partly because they apprehend the Truth thereof, to be more exposed to the riotous opposition of mens tumultuating carnall Affections, whose help and assistance they by all meanes court and solícite in their contests against it. Thus the Author of the Book entituled (*Gods love to Mankind*) being desired to render a reason of the change of his Faith, in passing over to the Tents of the *Arminians*, he drawes forth only this one poynt to make shew of for the hinge of his alteration. Many Learned men know with what applause that Book of his was received and divulged, by that whole Generation which had then wrapped up the ball of their Errors promoted by it in the gilded covering of Preferment, & carried it away before them. They being by providence removed from that station and conjunction unto Power, whence they had their effectuell influence on the *Earth*, God foresaw (if he may be allowed to foresee) what reinforcement upon other hands their Abominations would receive, and therefore in his tender love made provision for his Church before hand, as by others, so in especiall by the renowned Author of this Treatise, whose paines herein, intended by him for the conviction of them, with whom after much forbearance God intended to take another course, are now seasonably brought to light, to stop the mouthes of another Generation risen up in their stead, (enemies of Gods Sovereignty and Grace) untill He shall be pleased to deale otherwise with them. *God is not mocked, that which men sow they shall reap.* It is well known what *spheare* this Learned Author moved in; how farre elevated above any possibility of my reaching the least esteeme to him or his labours: This (being desired by my worthy and Learned friend the Publisher, to expresse my thoughts upon its perusall) I shall take the boldnesse to say, that this Treatise of our Author, comes not any whit behind the choicest of those other eminent Workes of his, wherein in this cause of God, he faithfully served his Generation. I doubt not but it will appeare to the Reader, that he hath dealt with the Adversaries of the Truth, in their chiefeest holds, advantages and strengths, putting them to shame in the calumnyes and lyes which they make their refuge.

IOHN OWEN

Viccan. Oxon.



TO THE WORSHIPFULL,
And his Honoured Uncle,
MICHAEL OLDISWORTH Esquire,
And a Member of the PARLIAMENT
Of the Common-wealth of ENGLAND.

SIR,



Have often heard you professe a deep dislike of the unnaturall vanity of the English Nation, in preferring strangers in all callings above such of their own Country men, as farre surpassed them. And of this unjust partiality, no profession hath tasted in a greater measure, than that of Divinity; for of our Ministers, such whom God hath best fitted with parts and Learning for the discussing of controversies, have been so undervalued in comparison

of some Forraine Divines, whose Learning was little better than systematick; as that they languished in their private studies, and had dyed in obscurity, unlesse the fame of their great abilities had been eccho'd over unto us by the generall applause of all Christendome. Nay this sometimes hath not awakened us unto a due estimation of them. Dr Ames was looked upon abroad, as one that amongst Protestant writers had few, either superiors, or equals, for subtilty in Logick, and Scholasticall Divinity; and yet he dyed an exile from his Native Soyle, so that his Tombe might have had that inscription upon it, which *Scipio* by his will appoynted to be on his; *Ingrata Patria ne ossa mea quidem habes*, Unthankfull Country, thou hast not so much as my Bones. Of how great reputation this our Author was beyond the Seas, I had rather you should heare from the able and judicious *Rivet*, than by mee, who am censured by some (who I am sure much overvalue their own judgments) to have too high and admiring thoughts of him. *Rivet* (in his Epistle prefixed unto a late Book of D. *Twisses* against *Arminius* and *Corvinus* &c.) will assure you that ^a *The most Learned men in the whole Christian World, even those who are of the adverse party, doe confesse that there was nothing yet extant more accurate, exact, and full, touching the Arminian Controversies, than what was written by D. Twisse.* ^b As also That he (if any one) hath so cleared and vindicated the Orthodoxe cause from objected absurdities, and the calumnies of adversaries, as that out of his labours, not only the Learned, but also those who are least versed in controversies, may find enough whereby to disentangle themselves from the snares of Opposites. Indeed there is none almost that hath Written against *Arminianisme* since the Publishing of any thing of Dr *Twisses* on that Subject, but have made very honourable mention of him, and have acknowledged him to be the mightiest man in these Controversies, that this Age hath afforded.

^a De auctore, ejus Methodo, Scholasticâ disputandi formâ, acumine & accurate, judicium lectoribus relinquo; quibus præverunt Doctissimi ex toto orbe Christiano viri, etiam ex iis qui in contraria sunt parte, parentes, nihil accuratius, nihil exactius & plenius in hoc argumento hæcenus proditum fuisse.

^b Hoc saltem omnibus pijs placere debet, quod usq; & ubiq; in bonam causam fuerit intentus; eamque, si quisquam alius, ab absurdis objectis, & adversariorum calumniis, ita vindicavit, ut ex illius labore habeant non docti tantum, sed etiam minus exercitati, quo se possint extricare laqueis adversantium. *ibid.*

c Cicero de
Senectute.


d Heylins
Geography
& Torshells
Hypocrite.

And yet this Worthy and able Combatant for the Truth and Cause of God, was here at home designed unto Ruine, as I have found in a Manuscript under his owne Hand. This I grant was by the *Canterburian Faction*, but withall I could tell strange Stories of the neglects that were heaped upon him by some, who were (I believe) Zealous (I am sure forward) Sticklers for a Reformation. These Men (me think) should blush at the ingenuous Testimony, which Bishop *Hall* (though dissenting from him about Church Government) gave of his eminent worth in a Letter of his to Mr *W. S.* by way of Approbation of a small piece of Dr *Twisses* Entituled, *The doubting Conscience Resolved &c.* The Doctor ever declined conference by word of Mouth, as out of modesty, so because he thought the more deliberate way of the Pen, to be quieter, and fitter too, for the bolting out of the Truth: And hereupon he spake not much in the late *Assembly of Divines* at Westminster. This, some (who talked their shares) interpreted as an Argument of the former weakness, or at least present decay of his intellectualls. But as (^c) *Sophocles*, when his Sonnes brought him into question for Dotage, is reported to have recited a Tragedy of *Oedipus Coloneus*, which he had last written, and had in his Hands, and to have demanded whether that seemed the Verse of a Dotard, or no. So our Doctor could have stop'd the Mouths of these bold censurers by Publishing very Masculine and Vigorous pieces that he Penned in even his most declining Age. I may wish, but I doe not expect, to Live so long, as to see any thing Published touching this Argument more convincing the adversary, than this Elaborate and Weighty Discourse; and yet some, who are Perk'd up into places, unto which their parts and gifts bare no proportion, have very lately bespattered it as lame, imperfect, and I know not what. But the best of it is, this their detracting from it, is not likely to be any disadvantage to it; for it was so farre from working that mischievous effect, which it seemes they intended, as that it begat in those who heard it, and unto whom it was afterwards reported, only an admiration, and a serious indignation at the immodest impudence of such raw young men, who are no better skill'd in Polemicall Divinity, then the mock ^d Council of the Great Duke of *Muscovie* are in State affaires, which is made up of the gravest and seemliest men of all *Musco*, and the adjoining Citties, richly apparelled out of the Wardrobe; which to forrainers, not knowing this fraude, appeare so many Princes, and Noble men; but indeed are meane and unqualified persons, and of no more ability, than so many pictures in a faire-wrought hanging, that serve only to cover a Wall. But I appeale from the rash and unrighteous censures of these presumptuous Novices, unto your more knowing and candid judgement, who as you highly revered this our Author whilest living, so have you ever since his death borne a zeale unto his memory, and therefore I am assured that this Book of his will find with you, not only a favourable, but also a gratefull acceptation; and the same confidence I have concerning all rationall, Learned, and Orthodoxe men, unto whose reading I commend it, and that unto the blessing of the Almighty; and so I rest,


Your deeply obliged,

And most Humbly devoted Nephew,

HENRY JEANES.



TO THE READER.



*I*N the days of our Henry the 8th the whole Convocation offered unto St Thomas Moore the sum of foure thousand pounds at the least, thereby to recompence, in part, the paines, and travailes he had taken, in writing for the defence of the Romish faith; which my Author miscalls the true Catholicke Faith. Now the undertakings of St Thomas Moore for the Popish cause, are not worthy to be named the same day with the performances of

Doctor Twisse against the enemies of God's grace, both Jesuites, and Arminians; I was therefore (I confesse) transported with a just both sorrow and indignation, when I could not prevaile with any (though I solicited diverse) to adventure upon the Printing of this following Worke of his, without a large supply towards the charge thereof. ^a His Latine

Workes have rendred him so renowned in forraine Churches, as that they have looked upon him as the Bradwardine of the Age. The States of West-Friesland, unto whom he was no otherwise known, than by his Answer to Arminius his Book against Perkins, offered him the greatest preferment that a Minister in that Country is capable of, viz. the place of a Professor of Divinity in the University of Franeker, and took order for defraying the charges of his journey, and transportation of his family; and were this Book, that I now present unto thy view (unto which there is not in the English Tongue any peere for solidity, and accuratenesse in Scholasticall Divinity) translated into Latine,

I am perswaded that Outlandish Divines would have such an estimate of it, as St Jerome had of certaine Bookes of the Martyr Lucian written with his own hand, which he valued as a precious jewell; or as ^b Beza had of a Commentary of Mr Rollocke upon the Romans and Ephesians; concerning which Lives. he wrote unto a friend, that he had gotten a treasure of incomparable value. It was therefore very strange unto me, that there should be any knowing and sober persons who should either despaire or doubt of the acceptation thereof; But my wonder would have been swallowed up of a greater amazement, if I had known that, of which I was since by a good hand informed, that this active, unwearied, and victorious Champion of Gods grace, lived in great want even whilst he was Prolocutor of the late Assembly of Divines. Nay which is

Rivet. Inde factum est ut Guilielmus Twissus, vir doctissimus, & in controversiis illis exercitatissimus, causam illam Dei, contra renascentem Pelagianismum, tanquam alter Bradwardinus, iterum defendendum sumplerit, & Librum illum Arminii tam decantatum non esse invincibilem, accurato & luculento scripto probaverit, nihil omitendo quod non excusserit, usq; ad minutissima. Quod opus quam fuerit acceptum, ex eo colligi potest, quod, quamvis sic magnæ molis, duabus editionibus distractis tertia nuper prodiit apud eundem Typographum, qui primam curaverat. Hoc labore notus & celebris factus Author in transmarinis regionibus, &c.

stranger yet, that he was slighted by some of his owne calling; who, if they had not much forgotten themselves, would (seeing they swam in all plenty) have imitated (in some degree at least) that forementioned example of the gratefull munificence of a Popish Convocation unto S^r Thomas Moore. D^r Ames, in his Preface to the Diocesans Tryall of that Worthy Divine M^r Paul Baine, tells us, that the said M^r Baine, was all his life after his silencing pressed with want, not having, as he often complained unto his Friends, a place to rest his Head in, which me thought (saith D^r Ames) was an upbraiding of the Age and place where he lived with base Regardlesnesse of piety and learning. If I should apply the like censure unto those that neglected this our Author (the Glory of his Age, and Ornament of his Nation) I should not be over bitter. He is now above any recompence to be made unto him in his owne Person by us; but we may expresse a gratefull Memory of him, as unto his Children, so unto the Issue of his minde, His Bookes. I speake not only for the entertainment of those that are Extant; but for bringing into the light those Pieces, that lye in the Hands of his Children; which are likely to be Buried in Dust, and Perpetuall Oblivion. If I had but halfe that Interest in great Personages, which diverse of my Brethren in both the Universities, & in the City of London have, I should apply my selfe with an undeniable importunity, to perswade them unto so good, and great a Worke, which will Purchase them a precious Memory with the Godly and Learned in all future Ages of the Church. I have but one thing more to say of the Booke, before I take my leave of Thee: If any Arminian whatsoever will give a Just, Full, and Scholasticall Answer unto It, I shall by God's helpe returne him a Reply; For 'tis De Causa Dei (as Bradwardine Entitles his Booke) And in defence of God's Cause I shall feare no Colours. But if the Ignorant Paper-blurrers of the Time shall Snarle, and Snap only at some few Passages, they are not to expect, that so much as any serious notice should be taken of them.

Thine,

In all the obligations of Charity and Truth

HENRY JEANES.



T H E
FIRST BOOK
IN TWO PARTS:

WHEREOF,
THE FIRST
Containeth a Consideration of those Reasons for
Which Mr H O R D (as he pretended) First questioned
the truth of Absolute Reprobation.

THE SECOND
Examineth those Arguments against the Abso-
luteness of Divine Reprobation, which M. H O R D
took to be of a Convincing Nature.



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THO: ROBINSON.

Anno Salutis M. DC. LIII.



A Table of the Principall Matters contained in this Treatise, wherein the Answer unto Mr *Mason's* Additions is referred in such order, as that it is made aptly to *cohere with the refutation of M. HORDS* DISCOURSE.

AN examination of the Epistle to the Reader. lib. 2. p. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
The maine *Ζητούμενον* or Question in these Controversies propounded and
stated, together with the different opinions of Remonstrants and Contra-
Remonstrants, both Supralapsarians, and Sublapsarians concerning it, examined.
lib. 1. pag. 1, 2, 3. &c. usq; ad p. 14. and p. 32, 33. usq; ad p. 40. l. 2. p. 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12.

The absolute decree cleared from Mr *Hord's* reasons both inducing, and
convincing.

1. And first to begin with those, for which (as he pretended) he first questioned the
truth of absolute Reprobation, where the absolute decree is vindicated from the
charge.

1. Of Novelty. lib. 1. p. 40. &c. usq; ad p. 60. l. 2. p. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19.

2. Of Unwillingesse to abide the tryall lib. 1. a p. 59. ad 84. l. 2. p. 19, 20.
21, 22.

3. Of Infamie. lib. 1. a p. 83. ad p. 91. l. 2. p. 22, 23, 24.

4. Of Affinity with the old and exploded errors of the Stoicks, and Manichees
lib. 1. p. 92, 93. &c. usq; ad p. 102.

2. Those arguments against the absolutenes of Divine Reprobation according to
both the upper and lower way, which Mr *Hord* tooke to be of a convincing nature,
are examined,

1. Mr *Hord's* or Mr *Mason's* arguments against the upper or Supralapsarian way
are answered. lib. 2. p. 25. &c.

Where,

1. The upper or Supralapsarian way is vindicated from the dishonouring of
God in two particulars.

1. It doth not charge him with mans destruction. lib. 2. a p. 25. ad
p. 51.

2. It doth not charge him with mens finnes. lib. 1. a p. 14. ad 28 l. 2. a
p. 51. ad 116.

2. The upper or Supralapsarian way is cleared from the overthrow of Re-
ligion, and holy Life, and that in foure particulars.

1. It maketh not sinne to be no sinne. lib. 1. p. 10, 28, 29. l. 2. a p
110. ad 121.

2. It taketh not away the conscience of sinne. lib. 1. p. 29, 30. l. 2. p.
117, 121, 122.

3. It taketh not away the desert and guilt of sinne. lib. 1. p. 10, 30, 31,
32. l. 2. p. 122, 123 &c. usq; ad p. 131.

4. It maketh not the whole circle of mans Life a meere destiny. lib. 2.
p. 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133.

2. Those pretended convictive arguments against absolute Reprobation which
proceed as it is stated according to the Sublapsarian or lower way. lib. 1.

p. 103. &c.

And

And it is fully and clearly evinced that the Sublapsarian Doctrine is not repugnant unto. 1. Testimonies of Scripture. 2. Attributes of God. 3. End of the Word, and Sacrament, with other excellent gifts of God to men. 4. Holy and Pious endeavors, 5. The Grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved.

1. The Sublapsarian Doctrine concerning absolute reprobation is not repugnant to Scripture. lib. 1. p. 103, 104. &c.

Particularly, not to *Ezek.* 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turne from his way & live: turne ye, turne ye from your evill wayes; for why will ye dye o House of Israel. lib. 1. p. 103 &c.

Nor to *Ezek.* 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turne your selves and live ye. lib. 1. p. 103, 104, 105, 106.

Not to *Rom.* 11. 32. For God hath concluded them all in unbelieve, that he might have mercy upon all. lib. 1. p. 107, 108.

Not to *Iohn.* 3. 16. God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son &c. lib. 1. p. 108, 109, 110.

Not to 1. *Tim.* 2. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the Truth. lib. p. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115.

Not to 2 *Peter* 3. 9. --- not willing that any should perish but that all should come to Repentance. lib. 1. p. 115, 116, 117.

Not to those conditionall speeches which are in 1 *Cron.* 28. 9. And 2 *Cron.* 15. 2. And *Gen.* 4. 7. And *Heb.* 10. 38. lib. 1. p. 117, 118, 119, 120.

2. The Sublapsarian Doctrine &c. is not contrary unto Gods Attributes; to the clearing of which, a discourse premised concerning Gods Attributes in generall is refuted. lib. 1. p. 121, 122, &c. unto p. 128.

This done, our Author comes to shew in speciall, how that the Sublapsarian Doctrine doth not oppugne,

1. God's Holinesse. lib. 2. p. 133, 134. &c. unto p. 147.

2. God's Mercy. lib. 1. p. 128, &c. unto p. 145. l. 2. p. 147, 148.

3. God's Justice. lib. 1. a p. 145. ad 171. l. 2. a p. 149. ad 156.

4. God's truth or sincerity. lib. 1. a p. 171. ad 187. l. 2. a p. 156. ad p. 167.

3. The Sublapsarian doctrine not contrary to the use and end of God's gifts to men. lib. a p. 187. ad 222. l. 2. p. 166, 167.

4. The Sublapsarian Doctrine not prejudiciall to piety and a Godly life. lib. 1. a p. 221. ad 255. l. 2. p. 167, 168, 169 170.

5. The Sublapsarian Doctrine no enemy to true comfort. lib. 1. p. 255, 256 &c. usq; ad finem.

By this Table (Reader) thou maist correct the mistitleing of pages, as lib. 1. p. 86, 87, 88, 89. 90. & lib. 2. p. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. & p. 52, 53, 58, 59. & a p. 133 ad p. 147.

READER


I would advise thee to begin with the examination of those Arguments against the absolutenesse of Divine Reprobation (which Mr *Mason* and Mr *Hord* tooke to be of a convincing nature) by which Method in Reading thou wilt the sooner meet with that abundant satisfaction, which this worke will yeeld, as touching this controversy, unto all that are capable or desirous thereof.

THE FIRST PART.
CONTAINING
A CONSIDERATION
of those Reasons, for which
M^R H O R D
(as he pretended) first Questioned
THE TRUTH OF
ABSOLVTE
REPROBATION.



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for T. R. Anno 1653.




T H I S
T R E A T I S E
D I V I D E S I T S E L F E
I N T O T W O P A R T S,

VIZ. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1. \text{ An Introduction.} \\ 2. \text{ A Discourse.} \end{array} \right.$

I. The Introduction.

SECTION I.

S I R,



Have sent you here the Reasons, which have moved me to change my Opinion in some Controversies, of late debated between the Remonstrants and their Opposites. I doe the rather present them unto you,

1. That I may shew the due respect, which I beare your Worship, with my forwardnes to answer your desires, as I can, with regard to Conscience.
2. That you may see; I dissent not without cause, but have Reason on my side.
3. That if I can be convinced, that my Grounds are weake and insufficient, I may think better of my Opinion, which I have forsaken, then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my Motives, I shall proceed in this Order,

- 1 I will state the Opinion which I dislike.
- 2 I will lay down my reasons against it.

Touching the first your Worship knows these two things very well;

- 1 That the main *ζητούμενον*, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are Ordered.
2. That the Men which have disputed these things may be reduced to two sorts or sides.

The first side affirmes, that there is such an absolute decree, proceeding from the good pleasure of God alone, without the consideration of mens finall Unbeliefe, and Impenitency, as, by which he casteth men off from Grace and Glory, and shuts up the farr greater part of men (even of those that are called by the Preaching of the Gospel to Repentance and Salvation) under invincible and unavoydable sin and damnation.

The other side, disavowing any such decree, say, that the Decree of God to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbeliefe, both avoydable by Grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessary.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

VVorthy Sir, according to your desire to take into Consideration this writing directed unto you, at length I have gotten some leasure from other employments, to addresse my selfe to give you satisfaction in this particular.

- 1 That I may shew my selfe answerable to that respect which you have deserved at my hands; and not so only, but to my zeale of Gods truth, which hath deserved much more at the hands of us both.
- 2 That you may the better discern which of us two, whom you put to conferre, doth maintain the cause of Gods truth, and hath the best reasons on his side.

As for the change of Opinion here mentioned, such Professions are nothing strange. But whether such a Profession be in truth, or in pretence, and rather liberty taken to manifest that Opinion, which formerly hath been cherished: as also with what conscience voyd of all carnall respects, such a change or manifestation is made, it belongs not unto us to judge, but to leave that unto God, who tryeth the hearts and reynes. Sure we are, the heart of man is full of deceitfulness, both to deceive others, yea and to deceive our selves, the more need there is to be jealous over our selves, and to carry a watchfull eye over our own soules, and whether we have chang'd a former way, or at the first chose one or other way, and continue to imbrace that, whereof we have been at first informed; not to despise, but in the feare of God, to practise that holy counsell of the Apostle given to the Corinthians, a famous Church, and such as were destitute of no spirituall gift. Prove your selves, whether you are in the Faith, examine your selves: know ye not your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be Reprobates? as also to consider how indifferently we carry our selves, in using means to inform our selves in the way of truth, and whether they be not such as doe discover our chiefe care hath been to bring our judgements about, to the imbracing of that way (whether Truth or Error) which formerly we did effect. Certaine it is, that Heresies must be, and that to this end, that they that are approved may be made manifest. And Illusions shall have their course, when the truth of God is not imbraced with love, whatsoever be the pretence of our disaffecting it, whether harshnes to affections, or discrepency to carnall reason. And when such judgements have their course, Who are priviledged from being seduced? Let our Saviour speake in this, So that if it were possible men should deceive the very elect. Upon what may we be assured to stand firme in time of such temptation? Let the Apostle answer us in this, when after the effectuall working of Satan in them that perish, he comes neere to them to whom he writes in the way of comfort thus, But we ought to give thanks alway to God, for you Brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto salvation through sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. Like as before he did conclude unto himselfe their election, from observation of the work of their Faith, the labour of their Love, and the patience of their Hope. And the greater is the comfort which hereby is ministred unto us, the greater should be our care, to informe our selves aright, in the doctrine thereof, and especially to have an eye unto it, that we doe not shape it in such a manner, that like as it is impossible we should have any assurance thereof, so it will prove equally impossible we should draw any comfort from thence.

1. But is it so, as here it is put upon you, that you knew very well indeed, that the main *Сутъевов*, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered?

I assure you, if you knew this, you know more then I doe. I had thought rather that the resolution of the Point concerning Predestination, had depended upon the resolution of the Point touching Grace efficacious, then the contrary. As namely, if Faith be confessed to be the gift of God, and that not with respect to any thing in man, it followeth herehence, that Predestination unto faith, and reprobation from faith

faith, must proceed meerey upon the good pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of ought in man.

There was a time when *Austin* thought, that God elected some to bestow the Holy Ghost upon them, that by working that which is good, they might obtain everlasting life: and who were those whom he thus elected? namely such as whom he foresaw would believe: and what was his reason for it? surely this; *Quod ergo credimus nostrum est, quod autem bona operamur, Illius est, qui Credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum; quod profecto non dicerem, si jam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter dei munera reperiri quæ dantur in eodem spiritu.* Marke I pray the manner of his Retraction, I would not have said (so) if at that time I had known Faith to have been amongst the gifts of God, which are given in the same spirit. So then as soon as *Austin* came to acknowledg, that Faith is selfe was the gift of God, he therewithall came off from affirming, that *Quem sibi crediturum esse præscivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam consequeretur.* And like as before he maintained, that God elected some (to wit, Believers) to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that by working good workes, they might obtain also everlasting life; so now having found that Faith also, is the gift of God, he was accordingly to maintain, that God elected some to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that both by believing, and working good workes, they might obtain everlasting life: so that no longer was the foresight of Faith, to precede election in *Austins* opinion, to wit, after once he knew Faith to be the gift of God. And accordingly in his Book *De Prædestin. Sanctorum*, addressing himselfe to the rectifying of the *Massilienses* in the poynt of Predestination, wherein they did not as yet discern the truth of God: *Adhuc in questione caligant de Prædestinatione sanctorum. Cap. 1.* And againe, *Si quid de Prædestinatione Sanctorum aliter sapiunt (Deus) illis hoc quoq; revelabit. Ibid.* Marke I pray you what course he takes to rectify them herein. *cap. 2. Prius itaq; fidem quæ Christiani sumus donum dei esse debemus ostendere:* and whereas he had performed this task very sufficiently before, manifesting by divers pregnant passages of holy Scripture, that Faith was the gift of God, and the *Massilienses* did elude them by such a distinction as this, Faith may be considered two waies, either as touching *Initium*, the first beginning of it; or as touching *Incrementum* the augmentation thereof; and accommodating this distinction said, The passages of Scripture alledged by *Austin* proceeded as touching the Augmentation of it, which they willingly granted to be the work of God; but not as touching the initiation of it, which they still maintained to be the work of man. Therefore *Austin* addresseth himselfe in that discourse of his, to prove that the very Initiation of Faith, is the work of God, and not the Augmentation only. His words are these, *Sed nunc iis respondendum esse video, qui divina testimonia, quæ de hac re adhibuimus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus, ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo: tanquam fides non ab ipso donec nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis ex merito quo cœpit à nobis.* And likewise in the 19. cap. of the same Book, having propounded the opinion of the Pelagians, namely that because God foresaw that we would be holy and unblameable before him in love, therefore he elected and predestinated us in Christ, before the foundation of the World; and shew'd how this opinion, contradicts that of the Apostle *Ephes. 1. 4, 5.* where it is said, that, *God elected us in Christ, and predestinated us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love:* and perceiving withall how the *Massilians* did avoid this as nothing contrary to their Tenent (though contrary to the Pelagian Tenent) forasmuch as they maintained not, that God foresaw any thing but our Faith, and therefore God elected us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love, (for these were their words) *Nos autem dicimus nostram Deum non præscisse nisi fidem & ideo nos elegisse -- ut etiam sancti & immaculati gratia atque opere ejus essemus;* what course doth *Austin* take to beat them off but this, namely to prove, that, Like as *Holines* so Faith also, and that as touching the Initiation thereof, is the work of God. thus: *Sed audiant ipsi in hoc testimonio, ubi dicit, sortem consecuti sumus, prædestinati secundum propositum qui universa operatur. Ipse ergo ut credere incipiamus operatur qui universa operatur.* So that it is cleer in the opinion of *Austin*, that to take both himselfe and others off from premising the foresight of Faith unto Gods election, it is sufficient to prove that Faith is the gift of God, the work of God both touching the augmentation, and touching the first introduction thereof. And thus evincing the condition of Predestination, as excluding all foresight of Faith, from the condition of Predestination, as being throughout the work of God in man, rather then taking a contrary course, as if the main *ὑπόθεσις* were,

August. de Præd. Sanct. c. 3. Fidem elegit Deus in præscientia ut quem crediturum esse præscivit, ipsum eligeret cui Sp. sanctum daret ut bona operando vitam æternam consequeretur. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 23.

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what is the condition of Gods decree of Predestination, as here it is pretended and supposed. And albeit it is commonly received of all sides (as if it were without question) that Faith is the gift of God: yet we find practises on foot, for the working of a manifest innovation herein. For not to speak of their interpretations of their own meanings, as, in what sence they say God workes Faith in us; it is apparent the Remonstrants now a daies, doe as good as professe, that Faith is not bestowed upon us for Christs sake, in as much as they deny that Christ merited Faith for us. For when the Author of the Censure passed upon the Remonstrants Confession, disputeth thus, *At si hoc tantum meritis est Christus tum Christus nobis non est meritis fidem nec regenerationem*: the Remonstrants in the Answer hereunto, forthwith confesse it in these words, *Sapè ita est. Nihil ineptius, nihil vanius est quam hoc Christi merito tribuere. Si enim Christus nobis meritis dicatur fidem & regenerationem, tum fides conditio esse non poterit, quam a peccatoribus Deus sub comminatione mortis eternæ exigeret.* And by the way marke, I pray, that not any difference is put between Faith and Regeneration; manifestly signifying thereby, that as they grant it to be the work of man to believe, so we are commanded to make our selves a new heart.

Apol. pro Confes. Remonst.
Fol. 95. p. 1.

Ezech. 18. 31

And as for ordering of the decrees, which here is added to compleat the main *ζήτημα*, as here is pretended; that in my opinion, is so farr off from being the main *ζήτημα*, as that it is not to be accounted any *ζήτημα* at all Theologicall, but meerly Logicall. Let the condition of the decrees be rightly explicated according to Divinity, and we shall have no need at all of Divinity for the right ordering of them. A meer Logicall faculty by light of nature, will serve for this. For the decrees whereof we treat, are meerely *Intentiones rerum gerendarum*. Now for the ordering of these in what kind soever, we have received Rules of the Schooles, never yet that I know contradicted by any; namely, that they are to be ordered according to the condition of the things intended, which are but two, to wit, the end and the means; and all doe attribute priority to the intention of the end, and posteriority to the intention of the means. It is true, men may erre, in designing the right end, as also, in designing the right means, and these errors are to be discovered, and the truth cleered by that science, whereunto the consideration of the end and means belong, and not by Logick. But agreement being made concerning the end and means, there is no doubt to be made, but that according to the most received Rules of Schooles, the end must be acknowledged both first in intention, and last in execution, and contrarily the means last in intention and first in execution.

2. But come we to the Decrees themselves, & the different opinions thereabouts, which follow in the next place. Now here I looked for different opinions about decrees, in the plural number, but I find the relation extends no farther then to one decree, and that of Reprobation. So at the first entrance reasons are promised, even in this writing, to be exhibited of *chang of opinion in certain controversies* in the plural number, when in the issue, all comes but to one controversy, and that about Reprobation. Yet the Scripture speaketh fully of Election, sparingly of Reprobation in most places, leaving us to judge thereof, by consequence from the doctrine of Election. Yet some passages we have (I confesse) that give light and evidence to both alike. For like as it is said *Acts 2. last.* that God added daily to the Church such as should be saved. so *2 Cor. 4. 3.* it is said, *If our Gospell be hid, it is hid to them that are lost*, and as it is signified *Math. 24. 24.* that Tis impossible seducers should prevaile over the elect. so *2 Thes. 2.* both as much is signified ver. 13. and also expressed ver. 10. 11. that they shall prevaile among them that perish: and the *1 Cor. 1. 18.* we are given to understand joyntly, that the preaching of the Crosse is to them that perish foolishnesse: but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. and *Rom. 9. 18.* that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardneth whom he will. And like as *Acts 13. 48.* we read that, as many believed as were ordained to eternall life; which phrase of ordaining to eternall life, I conceive (under correction) to be all one with the phrase of *Writing our names in Heaven.* *Luke 10. 20.* and writing us in heaven. *Hebr. 12. 23.* and this phrase I take to be all one with the writing of us in the Book of life. So on the other side we read, that *Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the World should wonder when they beheld the Beast, and not so only but worship him also.* But give we every vessel leave to vent that liquor whereof it is full.

Revel. 17. 8.
Revel. 13. 8.

I come to the consideration of the different opinions here proposed, concerning the decree of Reprobation; and herein, I will endeavour to open a clear way to the right

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right understanding of the truth, that your judgement may have the more free course in discerning it, and withall, to represent unto you, the unreasonable carriage of our Adversaries in the setting downe of our Tenent, whereby you may guesse, what you are to expect from them prosecuting against it. And herein I will insist upon these particulars. The first shall be the Things Decreed. The second the Cause of this decree. The third, the Persons on whom this Decree doth passe. The fourth shall be that claw of Unavoydable Sin, and Damnation.

1. The Things Decreed are here said to be, *The casting off from grace and glory, and the shutting of men up under Damnation.*

Now I pray observe here in the first place, that, *by casting off from grace and glory*, we mean no other thing, then the not giving of grace and glory; and by grace, we mean the grace of Faith and Repentance, the grace of Regeneration. For like as in Election God purposeth (we say) to give this grace unto some, which is the same with shewing mercy on them. *Rom. 9. 18.* as we suppose; so on the other side, God purposeth to deny this grace unto others, which in Scripture phrase is to harden them; that being made opposite to Gods shewing mercy. *Rom. 9. 18.* And for the farther clearing of the termes we say, that God by giving Faith and Repentance, doth cure that infidelity and impenitency, which is naturall unto all, as being borne in sin: and by not giving this grace of Faith and Repentance unto others, God leaves their naturall infidelity and impenitency uncured. And if this Author means ought else by *shutting up under sin*, then the not curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency, he doth us wrong, and what he means thereby I know not. As for *shutting up under damnation*, that is not our phrase, but we love to speak in plain tearmes, and say, that God doth purpose to inflict damnation on them whom he Reprobates.

Thus much for the clearing of the tearmes, as touching the things Decreed.

Secondly, observe I pray, which is of principall consideration, that here we have no cause at all specified, why he refuseth to give them grace; cunningly leaving it to an improvident Reader to conceive, that the cause of the decree, which is here specified, to be the meer pleasure of Gods will, is indifferently applyable to the *not giving of grace and glory*, and to the *shutting up under damnation* as the cause thereof, which is a notorious imposture, yet I doe not think this Author guilty of it, but others rather, who abuse their wits by cunning courses, to deceive the hearts of the simple. Amongst the Fallacies observed by Aristotle, there is one called *Fallacia plurium interrogationum*, as when many things are put together, and an answer is required to be made, either affirmatively or negatively to them all, as if they were but one; when indeed the answer cannot be made aright, without distinction of the things demanded, the one whereof perhaps requires an answer affirmative, the other negative. As for example, to instance as touching one of the Controversies here declined: We are often demanded, whether every one that heareth the Gospell, be not bound to believe that Christ died for him? Now I say this phrase *Christ died for me* includes many things, as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ; may be conceived to be many. But let these benefits be distinguished, and we shall readily answer to the question made, and that perhaps differently, as namely, affirmatively to some, negatively to others; as thus, Doe you speak of Christs dying for me, that is, for the pardon of my sins; and for the salvation of my soule: I answer affirmatively and say, I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner; as God hath ordained, to wit, not absolutely but conditionally, to wit, in case I doe believe and repent. For God hath not otherwise ordained that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation, by vertue of Christs Death and Passion, unlesse I believe in him and repent. But if question be made, whether I am bound to believe that Christ died for me, to procure faith and repentance unto me; I doe not say, that I am bound; or that every one who hears the Gospel, is bound to believe this.

Nay the Remonstrants now a daies, deny in expresse tearmes, that Christ merited this for any at all. I am not of their opinion in this; but I see clearly a reason manifesting, that Christ merited not this for all, no not for all and every one, that hears the Gospel. For if he had, then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or conditionally. Not absolutely, for then all and every one of them should believe *de facto*, which is untrue; for the Apostle saith; *Fides non est Omnium*: Nor conditionally, for what condition I pray can be devised, upon the performance whereof, God for Christs sake should give us faith, and repentance? In like sort, if I am demanded whether

Censura Censura.

² Thes. 3.

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whether God did decree, of the meer pleasure of his will, to refuse to give grace and glory unto some, and to inflict upon them damnation. To this I cannot answer at once, there being a Fallacy in the demand. But distinguish them, I answer and say, that, as touching the poynt of denying grace, God doth that of his meer pleasure; but as touching the denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation, he doth not decree to doe these of meer pleasure, but rather meerly for sin, to wit, for their infidelity and impenitency, and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them. So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated, is the decree of God partly to deny unto some, and that of his meer pleasure, the grace of Faith and Repentance, for the curing of that infidelity and hardnes of heart, which is naturall unto all, and partly to deprive them of glory, and to inflict damnation upon them, not of his meer pleasure, but meerly for their small continuance in sin, to wit, in infidelity and impenitency, and all the fruits that proceed therehence.

2. Now as for the cause of this decree, as likewise of all the decrees of God, when any of our Divines say, that it is the meer pleasure of God, as in some places it is expressed of some decrees, let them be understood aright; not as if they distinguished between the decree of God, and the good pleasure of his will; for we know full well, that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will, what decree soever it be: but hereby we only exclude, all causes from without, moving God to make any such decree; like as when it is said, *Deuteron. 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor chuse you, because ye were more in number then any people, but because the Lord loved you*, as much as to say, *The Lord loved you, because he loved you*. Where we cannot soberly devise any distinction between love and love, as between the cause and the effect; only hereby is excluded all cause from without. Now we are ready with open face to profess, that of the Will and decree of God, there neither is, nor can be any cause from without: all things from without being temporall, and the Will of God being eternall, and the Will of God *quoad actum Volentis*, being the very Essence of God; For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One, whereby he is said to Be whatsoever he is, as wee doe conceive variety of perfections in God, yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God; and by this one indivisible Act, he both knowes all that he knowes, and willeth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth. Man when he willeth any thing, as likewise an Angel when he willeth ought, they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object: but it is not so with God, in whom there is no accident. And therefore *Aquinas* was bold to profess, that never any man was so mad, as to profess that merits were the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating: and why so? why surely upon this ground, because predestination is the will of God: and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God, as touching the act of willing, so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. His words are these in the same place; *Sic inquirenda est ratio prædestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divine voluntatis. dictum est autem supra, quod non est assignare causam divine voluntatis ex parte actus volendi*. But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestowes, like as *Janſenius* interprets that place *1. John. 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father*, to wit, of the effect of the Fathers love; and we commonly say, that Passions are attributed unto God not *quoad Affectum*, but *quoad Effectum*: in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed, as *1. Thej. 4. 3. This is the will of God, even your sanctification*, that is, this is willed by him. Therefore *Aquinas* distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God, one *quoad actum volentis*, and so it hath no cause from without; another *quoad res volitus*, and so it may have a cause. So likewise in predestination as considering it either *quoad actum Prædestinantis*, and so it hath no cause, or *quoad effectum Prædestinationis*, and so it may have a cause, as there he professeth, both touching the will of God in generall, and touching Predestination in speciall. Of the will of God in generall, thus; *Non est assignare causam voluntatis divine ex parte actus volendi, sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud*. And of predestination in speciall, thus; *Sed hoc sub questione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus prædestinatio habeat aliquam causam; & hoc est quæverè utrum Deus præordinaverit se daturum effectum prædestinationis alicui propter aliqua merita*. Now thus we acknowledge of predestination, both in the way of a meritorious cause on Christs part, and in the way of a disposing cause on our part. For God we say, hath predestinated to bestow upon us, both grace and glory for Christs sake: where Christ is made a meritorious cause of grace and glory,

Aquin. 1. q. 23. art. 5. Nullus fuit ita infans mentis ut diceret merita esse causam Divine Prædestinationis ex parte actus Prædestinantis.

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but not of the act of predestination. And farther we say, that God hath predestinated to bestow glory upon us, as a reward of grace, as a reward of faith, repentance, and good workes: and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace, *doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light*, Coloss. 1. 12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any, we say there is no cause thereof on mans part, For he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom. 9. 18. and he hath called us with an holy calling not according to our workes, but according to his own purpose and grace. 2 Timoth. 1. 9.

Now let us apply this to reprobation, which is the will of God, as well as predestination, and if there can be no cause of predestination *quoad actum Prædestinantis*, because there can be no cause of the will of God *quoad actum volentis*; Who seeth not, that by the same reason, there can be no cause of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*? And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestination *quoad actum prædestinantis*; it must be as mad a thing to maintain, that any merits of the creature, can be the cause of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*. And this doctrine Aquinas applies expressly to Reprobation it selfe, upon the 9. Rom. Lect. 2da, at the end of these words *Præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis*: but how? *ex parte actus reprobantis*? nothing lesse, but rather *ex parte effectus*; and what effect? not the denying of grace, but only as touching the inflicting of punishment: thus, *Præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte pænæ quæ præparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniendum malos propter peccata quæ à seipsis habent non à Deo.*

And farther we prove this, both by cleare evidence of Scripture, and cleare evidence of reason, and thirdly by as cleare a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine, and particularly of the Author of this discourse.

First by cleare evidence of Scripture. Rom. 9. 11. Where the Apostle proves, that Election stands not of good workes, by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time, when that Oracle, *The elder shall serve the younger*, was delivered; together with the present condition of Jacob and Esau, answerable to that time; thus, *Before the children were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said to Rebecca, The Elder shall serve the Younger, Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good workes.* Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election, by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation, in proportion, thus, *Before the Children were borne, or had done Good or Evill, it was said to Rebecca The Elder shall serve the Younger, therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation, stands not of evill workes: that is, like as good workes are not the cause of Election, so evill workes are not the cause of Reprobation, to wit, quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the very act and eternall decree of God it selfe.*

Secondly, observe, I pray, whether my reason be not as cleare; If God upon the foresight of sin, doth ordain a man unto damnation; (thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner) then this is done either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God: Not by necessity of nature, as it is confessed; and the cause is evident, for undoubtedly he could annihilate them, and so he can the holiest creature that lives, as all sides confesse. Therefore it must be by the constitution of God: but neither can this hold. For if so, then God did constitute, that is ordaine, that upon the foresight of sin, he would ordaine men unto damnation. Where observe that the act of divine ordination, is made the object of divine ordination: as much as to say, he did ordaine to ordaine, or he did decree to decree: Whereas the objects of Gods decrees are alwaies things temporall; as for example, We say well, God did decree to create the world, to make man out of the earth, to send Christ into the World, to preserve us, to redeeme us, sanctify us, save us. But Gods ordination or decree is an act eternall, and cannot be the object of his decree or ordination. I challenge all the Powers of darknes to answer this, and to vindicate the Tenent, which I impugne, from that absurdity, which I charge upon it, if they can.

O but some will say, it's very harsh to say, that God of his meer pleasure doth ordain men unto damnation.

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I am content to doe my endeavour, to remove this scandall out of the way of honest hearts, yea and out of the way of others also.

First therefore consider, is it fit to resist the evidence of divine truth, because it is harsh to mens affections?

Secondly, Wherein consists this harshnesse? Is it in this, that nothing is the cause of Gods decree? and will nothing temper the harshnes of it, unles a thing temporall as sinne, be made the cause of Gods will, which is eternall and even God himselfe? But let us deale plainly, and tell me in truth, whether the harshnes doth not consist in this, That the meer pleasure of Gods will, seems to be made the cause, not of Gods decree only, but of damnation also; as if God did damne men, not for sin, but of his meer pleasure. And this I confesse is wondrous harsh, and yet no more harsh then it is untrue, though in this jugling world, things are so carried by some, who will both shuffle, and cutt, and deale themselves, as if we made God of meer pleasure to damne men, and not for sin, which is a thing utterly impossible: damnation being such a notion, as hath essentiall reference unto sin. But if God damne no man but for sinne, and decreed to damne no man but for sinne, what if the nicer pleasure of God be the cause of this decree; what harshnes I say is this? As for example, Zimri or Cosby perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together, so going as it were quick to Hell, never fearing the judgements of God, untill they felt them. If we say, God decreed they should be cut off in this sin of theirs, and be damned for it, What harshnes I pray in this, though God made this decree of meer pleasure? For is it not manifest he did? For could he not if it had pleased him, have caused them to outlive this sin of theirs, and given them space for repentance, and not space only, but ~~grace~~ also for repentance, seeing as Austin saith, *Quantumlibet praeberit Patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis aget Penitentiam.*

Contr. Julian.
Pelag. lib. 5.
cap. 4.

Now I pray, what is become of the harshnes of this our Tenent as is pretended? And the truth is, the harshnes lyeth not here, though our Adversaries would faine draw it hither, but rather on the other part of reprobation, as it denotes Gods purpose for the denying of grace, to wit, the grace of Regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance: but on this part, they are not very forward to cry out upon our Tenent, as favouring of harshnes, but themselves rather driven to such straites, as either to deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God (wherein the Remonstrants now a daies, are come so far as cleerely to professe, that Christ merited not faith and Regeneration for any; whence it followeth, that if God doth give faith and repentance unto any, yet it is not for Christs sake that he gives it,) Or being demanded how it comes to passe, that God gives it not to all, if his meer pleasure be not the cause of this difference, as namely in shewing mercy unto some, when he hardens others, they are put upon this shift to say, that if they would believe, God would give them faith, if they would repent God would give them repentance; and one that I have had to deale with, on this very argument, spares not to professe that God doth work in man *in Velle, credere, & resipiscere, modo Velit.*

One thing I had almost pretermitted, and that was, to represent the insatiate condition of this declaration, to wit, as touching the Authors Tenent in opposition to ours, as in saying, *that Gods decree to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbeliefe;* For this continuance must be understood of finall continuance therein, least otherwise the contradiction to our Tenent be not duely expressed. Now the foresight hereof is made to precede Gods casting men off for ever: but from what? surely from grace and glory, in contradiction to our Tenent as here it is shaped; and consequently in election, the foresight of finall perseverance in faith and repentance, must be shaped to precede Gods giving grace, to wit, in another world, as if the other world were appoynted for the giving of grace to some, and denying it another; and that the giving of the grace of faith and repentance, and denying it unto others, was after the one hath persevered in faith and repentance, and the other in infidelity and impenitency unto the end in this World. For this is it we meane by grace, when we say, God in Election destines it to one, and in Reprobation decrees to deny it unto the other; and in contradicting us it is fit they should use our termes in our meaning, unles they expresse the contrary, and give a reason of it.

3. As for the Persons on whom this decree passeth, and the aggravation there mentioned, namely of *submitting up the greater part of men, even of those that are called,*
under

Decree of Reprobation Examined.

9

under sinne and damnation, This is confessed on all hands, That the greatest part of men are reprobated, even of those that are called; and our Saviour hath expressly given us to understand, *That many are called but few are chosen.* And it is without question, that if it be lawfull for God to deale thus with one, it is as lawfull to deale so with the greatest part, yea with all. And experience justifieth that the greatest part of them that are called doe not performe true faith and repentance: and if they did and dye therein, then the greatest part of them that are called, should be chosen. Whereby it is manifest, that God doth not give Faith and Repentance, unto the greatest part of them that are called; and consequently, it is nothing strange, that he shuts up the greatest part of them that are called under Damnation. So that in true account there is no weight at all of aggravation in this. Like as you have read in *Newes from Parnassus*, that when the French and the Spaniard weighed their powers in the ballance, and the French being found to weigh 25 Millions, and the Spaniard but 20: He thinking to help the matter, and to make himselfe as weighty as the French, clapped into the scale the Kingdome of Naples and the Dukedome of Milan; but beyond his expectation, the scale proved never a whit the more weighty then before, but lighter rather.

4. As for the last claw, to help the matter with a couple of Epethetes of *invincible sin and unavoidable damnation*; one of these might have sufficed to be expressed, seeing undoubtedly Damnation is no otherwise avoidable by man, then by avoiding sin the cause thereof. For it is undenyable that man dying in sin, his damnation is unavoidable by the whole power of nature.

But as for the avoydablenes of sin, the Author of this Discourse acknowledgeth it no otherwise then by grace; and we willingly professe, that all sin is avoydable by grace. But by the way it is implied, that such a grace is afforded unto all reprobates, whereby they may avoyd that infidelity and impenitency for which they are damned. But this we deny. For if this were true then all Reprobates were enabled to believe, to repent, to please God, to discern the things of God, to be subject to the Law of God; but to say this, is directly to contradict the Word of God, which professeth of some, that *They could not believe Ioh. 12. 39.* of others that *They cannot repent, Rom. 2. 5.* Of all naturall men, that *They cannot discern the things of God*, as which seem foolishnesse unto them, *1 Cor. 2. 14.* of them that are in the flesh, that *They cannot please God, Rom. 8. 8.* of *φεινηται οδον* the affection of the flesh, that *'tis enmity against God, and it is not subject to the Law of God, nor can be, Rom. 8. 7.* And of the Israelites in the Wildernesse for forty years together, *God had not given them eyes to see, nor eares to heare, nor an heart to perceive, Deutron. 29. 4.*



INTRODUCTION.

SECT. II.



THE first side is divided; for

1. Some of them present man to God, in the decree of Reprobation, considered and looked upon out of, or above the Fall, and make the Will of God, without any consideration of sin in man Originall or Actuell, to be the cause of his eternall Rejection, that so he might shew his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over him; in appointing to heaven or hell, whom he pleased: and this way goe *Calvin, Beza, Zanchinus,*

Piscator, Gomarus.

That way seems to charge God very deeply, and to make him the prime and principall cause of mens everlasting ruine, and the author also, not only of the first sin that entred into the world, but of all other sins likewise, that are successively committed therein, as meanes

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Sueton. Edit.
Lugd. 1532.
pag. 171.

Ibid. p. 175.

to bring men by a course and colour of justice, to those lamentable ends to which he had from eternity appointed them: and so by good consequence, it makes the pure and holy God, to be unholy, and ascribes unto him, farre greater cruelty, then can be found in the most bloody and barbarous Tyrant in the World. Suetonius in the life of *Tiberius* (one of the veryest Butchers of all the Roman Emperours) reports of him, that having a mind to put the two sonnes of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death, *Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur*; He used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. And a little after he saith of the same Emperour, that (because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins) he caused certain little maides to be deflowred by the Hangman, that so they might afterwards be strangled. This cruelty of *Tiberius*, exceeded the bounds of humanity, and yet it comes as short of that, which this way laies to the charge of God, as a temporall death comes short of an eternall, and the power of man in drawing men to offend, comes short of that irresistable power, which the Almighty is able to use, in the producing of sin.

Besides, it takes from men all conscience of sin, and makes sin to be no sin. We use to say, *Necessitas non habet legem*, Necessity hath no law. Actions in themselves evill, if an absolute necessity bear sway in them, are transgressions of no law, and consequently are no sin (for sin is a transgression of the law) and men when they doe them, they have no reason to be forry for them. The Tragedian could see this, where he saith, *Fati ista culpa est, Nemo fit fato nocens*, when one evill action is done, the doer is not in fault, but the decree that necessitates him to doe it.

L. 2. contra
Iovin.

It takes away likewise from good and evill actions, that defect which they naturally carry with them of Rewards and Punishments, as Saint *Hierome* tells us, *Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur, alioqui ubi necessitas est nec damnatio nec corona est*. Where necessity domineers, there is no place for retribution; and therefore none are drawn by the adamantine chains of necessity to virtues or vices, but left free to the choyce of their own wills. When *Zenô* his servant was punished by him for a fault that he had done, he told his Master out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten, because he was *Fato coactus peccare*, constrained so to doe by his undeclinable destiny; and certainly, if malefactors could not chuse but play their rude pranks, they could not be justly punished for them. For all just punishments suppose a possibility of avoyding those offences, of which they are the punishments.

T W I S S E.

Consideration.

THIS Authors pretence being only to oppose that Tenent, which maintaines that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not presuppose the foresight of final perseverance in sin, you may well marvaile to what purpose this comes in about the different condition of man, considered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in *Adam*, it being a question of another nature and meerly Logically, to wit, about the ordering of Gods decrees of Creation, Permission of the fall of *Adam*, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The resolution whereof, depends upon the right distinction of these decrees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Resolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, must consequently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schooles, namely thus, The intention of the end is first, then the intention of the means: so that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permission of Adams Fall and Raising therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it must be confessed, that the decree of Salvation must be first, then the decree of Creation, permission of sin, and of raising out of sin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permission of sin, and of final perseverance therein be the means; it must be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, &c. But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permission of all to sin in *Adam*, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of Gods glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with manifest reason doth justify. For God being the supream efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even there where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evill; it doth therewithall give to understand, that what is signified by, *To the day of evill*, doth not denote the end of Gods actions (that before being expressed to be God himselfe, *God made all things for himselfe*, not for acquiring anything unto himselfe, for he is so perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but for

for the manifesting of his own most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifestable without this) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a meere man, is capable of. And herehence we conclude, that in case the end is such as hath been specified, and all these actions following, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting Gods glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one formall notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the severall parts thereof bespeaks them all; and consequently they are all to be considered, as making up the object of one formall decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is first intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angell, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission of sin, and Damnation unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formall decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creatures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sinne.

And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrell about the different consideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a Schoole point only, touching the right stateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of Gods decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blasphemies, nothing can free them, but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any such confidence, able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conscience of it, yet if it doe, that is more then I know. And only to these two ends doth this aliene discourse of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; namely, to shew the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to those aspersions of blasphemy on the first way, as also to make way for a third in part, which comes to be considered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the second way.

Yet *Arminius* in his Conference with *Junius*, might have informed him of three opinions concerning the object of Predestination, dividing the fruit of these into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being considerable two waies, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call *the Masse created, but not yet corrupted*; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation also, which we commonly call *the Masse not yet created, or Mankind not yet created*. As touching the most harsh way of these three, upon examination of *Arminius* his twenty arguments against it, I find nothing worth the speaking of, but meere suggestion of flesh and blood, which yet being duely pondered, doe discover most shamefull nakednes.

His arguments against the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of predestination, I have proposed and answered in my *Vindiciæ gratiæ Dei, lib. 1. De Prædestin. digress. 5.* if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I shall be ready to consider what he saith, as God shall give opportunity.

And in *Junius* you shall finde, how he laboureth to reconcile them, but very obscurely. *Piscator* also sets hand to the same work, and carryeth himselfe therein (as his manner is) very clearely, by distinguishing three acts in Predestination. The first whereof he will have to presuppose Mankind not created; for it is the decree of creating man to different ends. The second, he will have to presuppose Mankind created, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting *Adam* to fall, and all Man-

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kind in him. The third and last he will have to presuppose Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raising some out of sin, wherein they are conceived and borne, and leaving some therein. As for the Angells it is without question, that election and reprobation divine had course concerning them, as well as concerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Masse could be the object of divine Predestination in their election and reprobation.

As for *Arminius* his ordering of Gods decrees in opposition to these waies taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, pag. 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in *Adam*, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in *Adam*, he takes into consideration only, the divine decrees of saving sinfull man.

1. The first whereof is, *Whereby he decreed to make his Sonne Christ a Mediator, Redeemer, Saviour, Priest and King, by his death to abolish sin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly lost) and by his power to communicate it. And this decree he saith is absolute.*

2. The second is, *Whereby he decreed to receive into grace such as believe and repent, and those persevering unto the end, to save in Christ, for and by Christ: but such as believe and repent not, to leave under sin and wrath, and to damne as aliene from Christ.* Where observe, 1. This decree of saving such as believe and repent, he calleth a decree absolute, yet this decree passeth upon no particular persons: such a decree is reserved for the last place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favour, unless they believe and repent: Whereby it is manifest, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of Gods grace and favour: for they must be performed before they are received into Gods grace and favour.

3. The third is, *Where by he decreed sufficiently and efficaciously to administer the means which are necessary to faith and repentance.* This decree whether he conceives it to be absolute or no, he doth not specify; nor whether he decreed to administer them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angells, nor whether by means he understands the Gospel only, and we have cause to doubt thereof. And lastly, which is most obscure, he doth not explicate what he means, by sufficient and efficacious administration. Only he adds, that in this administration, he carries himselfe according, 1. *To his Wisdom, which shewes what becomes his mercy and severity, and 2ly to his Justice, whereby he is ready to follow the prescript of his Wisdom.*

4. The fourth and last is, *Whereby he decreed to save and damne certain particular persons.* Now whereas our Divines generally, what way soever they took, had a care out of their Logick and Philosophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of some end, or of some means tending to an end, this seems to have been no part of *Arminius* his care. This order of his, I have ranlaked in my *Vindicie. lib. 3. digress.* 2. And if this Author think good, he may answer thereunto, and doe his best to qualify the absurdities wherewith I charge that order of his.

But as touching the embracers of this first way, whose names he expresth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwise of *Calvin*, and they represent their reasons for it, out of his own words such as these, *De eternâ Dei Prædestinatione. pag. 970.* speaking of *Pighius*. *Augustinum ridet (saith he) ejusq; similes hoc est pios omnes, qui deum imaginantur postquam universalem Generis humani Ruinam in personâ Adæ præciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum destinasse, & pag. 710. Cum de prædestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordium esse constanter semper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adâ mortui sunt atque damnati.*

As for *Beza*, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predestination, but can this Author represent unto us, any place out of *Beza*, wherein he should affirme, that God doth decree to damne any man but for sin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predestination to death? In his Questions and Answers he professeth the contrary. pag. III. *Postremò non dixi exitium istorum (he speaks of Reprobates) esse finem deo decernenti propositum, sed gloriam ipsius. Neque etiam simpliciter dixi istos esse exitio destinatos, sed justo exitio destinatos dixi.* And in his Book *De eternâ Dei Prædestinatione* contrâ *Sebastian. Castell's* ad argument. *Castell. 2. pag. 346. Quamobrem etiam illud quoque probavimus, nos ita loqui non solere, & quanquam à Deo simpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, sed idcirco ut ipsius justa condemnatione Dominus justitiam suam patefaciat.*

As for *Zanchy*, *Peter Baro*, that caused such perturbation in Cambridge about this ve-

ry argument, he denyes this to have been the opinion of Zanchy, *In summa trium de Prædestinatione sententiarum*; his words are these, *Aliera sententia est Augustini, posterior etiam Sohni Heydelbergenfis Theologiæ Professoris, & aliorum quorundam Protestantium, ut Zanchii, atque etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter se consentientes, ut sit prædestinatio ab Adami tantum lapsu accipienda.*

And as touching *Piscator*, he handles the question about the object of Predestination in a small Treatise, annexed to an answer of his to *Hemingsius*, *De Universali Gratiâ*; and inquires whether the object thereof be *Humanum genus nondum conditum*, or *conditum*, but *nondum corruptum*, or both *conditum* and *corruptum*; and his resolution is, that in the decree of Predestination, there is place for all these considerations, according to three severall acts comprised therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and so drawes in to one all three opinions.

As touching *Gomar* in the last place, I have seen little or nothing of his; but when *Lubbertus* in his Book *Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorstii* pag. 807. had professed, *Massam consideratam esse a Deo, non ut integram, sed ut corruptam*; and was charged by *Vorstius* as delivering that which was contrary to the doctrine of *Calvin*, *Beza*, and *Gomar*, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but saith he, *Illorum dicta quæ quibusdam aspersuscula videntur, lenio, & in commodissimum sensum interpretor.*

But be it so, that all of them made *Humanum genus*, not *corruptum*, no nor *integrum*, but *nondum conditum* the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that doe so; and was not Dr *Whitaker* also, whom very wisely this Author conceales? This renowned Professor in the University of Cambridge, in a Publique exercise, his *Concio ad Clerum*, professeth, what *Paul* speaks *De luto & figulo non posse melius exponi quàm de Massâ incorruptâ*: and that *Bucer* understands it thus, *Bucerus per Massam intelligit primam humani generis originem ex quâ homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus est.* And he disputes at large, that there is no cause of reprobation, and that neither sin actuall, nor sin originall is the cause thereof, and professeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a daies we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papiſts and Schoole Divines, this great light of Cambridge, spares not to make honourable mention of Schoolemens solid discourse on this point, saying, *Hanc sententiam Scholastici si nullam egregie solide pertractarunt præsertim qui insigniores sanioresq; habiti sunt. Lombardus ait, ut prædestinationis nulla merita sunt, ita nec reprobationis.* Now the doctrine which he saith the Schoolemen handle so solidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author seems here to impugne, as when he saith, some make the will of God without any consideration of sin in men, originall, or actuall, to be the cause of their eternall Rejection; for Dr *Whitaker* expresseth it thus, *Hic igitur isto modo explicatis, sequitur tertiam opinionem solummodo & necessario veram esse, æquè reprobationis ac prædestinationis causam esse dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiæ divinæ munus est omnia ad fines istos certa ratione certisq; mediis ordinare.* Only as touching the end here mentioned, That so he might shew his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaseth, that I find not in Dr *Whitaker*. He saith plainly that God predestinated unto death, whom he would, and because he would: *Deus igitur ad mortem prædestinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit:* (which phrase I willingly confesse I like not so well) but that the end thereof is to manifest his absolute and unlimited dominion and power, he saith not; and *Beza* in the places before mentioned, referres it to the manifestation of Gods justice, as the end thereof. And like as he saith, *certissimum est damnationem nunquam nisi propter Peccatum infligi*; so I should think it nothing lesse certain; that God doth not ordaine any man to be damned, but for sin, especially considering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an essentiall reference to sin.

Now since I have found such a Champion as Dr *Whitaker* for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cause to feare the sharp censures of any professors in the Country? Were he alive, I presume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of making God, the Prime and Principall cause of mens everlasting ruine; he would I think require a little more learning in the Criminators, then to expresse himselfe so crudely. For without all question, God is the prime and principall cause, nay the sole cause of mans everlasting ruine in genere causæ efficientis, though this excludes not a meritorious cause of his own damnation on the creatures part, as Dr *Whitaker* professeth in the words formerly alleadging, acknowledged, *Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum.*

And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to justify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predestination and reprobation, yet no mans reprobation is made by God, *citra considerationem Peccati*

Supra-Lapsarians make not God

Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and of finall perseverance therein, and lastly of damnation for sin, are not decrees subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the same end, which is the manifestation of Gods glory, in the way of vindicative justice.

And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the first sin and of all sins; As I find by Dr *Whitakers* discourse in his *Cygnæa Concio*, that were he alive he would answer hereunto, That this Author takes his aime much amisse, considering, that the effect of Reprobation is not sin, but the permission of sin, and Gods means to the end intended by him, to witt, the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, is not sin, but the Permission of sin; according to that of *Aquinas*, alleadged by the foresaid Doctor thus, *Sicut Prædestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpâ.* And as I discern no unholinesse in Gods permitting of sin, so neither doe I discern any cruelty therein. But Dr *Whitaker* well perceived that this course of Gods countells, would seem injurious; and therefore after he had proposed his last argument drawn from that of the Apostle, *Rom. 11. ô altitudo!* thus, *Vltimò illa Apostoli exclamatio, ô altitudo, hanc sententiam confirmat. Neq; enim tantæ altitudinis est ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odisse homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati sunt; immò rationi convenientissimum est ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod est nature sue contrarium.* But marke wherein the depth the Apostle speaks of, consists in his judgement; *Ibi demùm infinitum & Abyssus est divinæ discretionis, quando sine peccati ratione quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & felicitatem prædestinantur, ut omnis ratio discretionis ad solam dei voluntatem referatur.* And because he knew full well that this mysterious depth of Gods counsell, would seem very harsh to carnall affections, as favouring of cruell and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes expresse notice of it, and that in *Austins* language, saying, *Iniquum videtur (Augustinus ait) ut sine ullis bonorum malorumq; operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiatq; alterum;* whence he concludes according to *Austin* thus, *Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumq; odit sine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malorum. Hoc videri possit alicui iniquum, sed est æquissimum, quia sic Deo visum est. Neq; Augustinus affirmare veritus est, eos Apostoli verbum evacuare qui iudicium divinæ discretionis ad opera reducunt prævisa aut præterita;* and so concludes the main point he insists on; thus, *Non est igitur peccatum originale causa æternæ reprobationis, nedum actuale.* So that both *Austin* and Dr *Whitaker*, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harsh an accent this truth sounds in the eares of men; yet because the word of God doth testify this truth unto us, it becomes all Christian hearts to submit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reason of it: Though I know full well, some are so violently carried with the zeale of their own way, that they spare not to professe, that they will sooner deny that there is a God, then yeeld to that which the Contra-Remonstrants teach; which for ought I know, is no other then this which Dr *Whitaker* taught and Preached publicly in the University of Cambridge, being at that time *Professor Regius*. And seeing we acknowledge the seeming harshnes of it, as well as our Adversaries, yet because we find it revealed in Gods word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therence conclude that it is *æquissimum*. Doth it become any one to take the course this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this course of God, and the courses of *Tiberius*, as also by a saying of *Zeno's* servant, to cry it down as *iniquissimum*, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not reach it? Is this a Christian course? is this Theologicall? is this Scholasticall? Yet in my judgement the harshnes lyeth not here, to wit, in the point of Gods purpose to inflict damnation; considering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintaine that God did ever purpose to inflict damnation, but for sin. Or if there be any harshnes therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree, of punishment and everlastingnes thereof, God holding them everlastingly as it were upon the rack and in quick sence of torment. And yet we maintaine without contradiction amongst Christians, that it is just with God to doe so for one act of drunkennes or adultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of punishment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harshnes in my opinion, is most pregnant to bring forth distast on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpose of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of meer pleasure; for like as he shewes mercy on whom he will, so the Scripture testifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only *Austin* and Dr *Whitaker* and our Divines generally doe take

take notice, how unfavoury this doctrine is in the judgement of flesh and blood, especially in comparing it with Gods ordinary course of complaining of men for their disobedience, even of those whom himselfe hath hardened, but the holy Apostle also Rom. 9. 19. Thou wilt say then, and is it so, doth God harden whom he will? Why then doth he yet complaine? For who hath resisted his will? Now in this case, how doth the Apostle stop the mouthes of such, but thus; O man, who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour?

But let us come to the consideration of the Parallel here made between the counsells of *Tiberius* and the counsells of God. This consists of two parts, according to a double story of *Tiberius* taken out of *Suetonius*.

The first is his dealing with *Drusus* and *Nero*, the two sonnes of *Germanicus*, these *varia fraude induxit ut contitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur*, he used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. What these cunning contrivances are, it is specified by *Suetonius*; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it stands him upon, to represent what those cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes unto God, to draw them to sinne against God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from sinne (as he did the Angells that stood, when their fellowes became Apostates, the cause whereof *Austin* resolves into *amplius Adjutorium* given by God, either in their creation or after: *De Civit. Dei. lib. 12. cap. 9. Isti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utriusque boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se nunquam casuros certissimi fierent, pervenerunt.*) so likewise that Gods permission is enough to prostitute any man unto sinne. And not our Divines only, but *Arminius* also and others. *Arminius Exam. pag. 152. Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, secus permissio non fieret.* And *Pag. 157.* thus he defines the permission of sinne, *Permissio peccati est suspensio omnium impedimentorum quibus positum peccatum non fieret.* Now let any sober man judge, whether herehence it followeth not necessarily *necessitate consequentiae & suppositionis*, that sinne shall be, to wit, upon the removing of all those impediments upon the position whereof sinne could not be; considering that an impediment of sinne in this case and in *Arminius* his phrase is every thing *quo posito peccatum non fuerit*. *Vorstius* in like manner, in *Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. Fateor quidem permissione jam posita in actu necessario etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, idque ob necessariam talium relatorum ad se invicem habitudinem, atque in arguendo mutuam quandam xxiiv quae ferre non potest ut unum sine altero reipsa sit, nedum ut alterum extra se quidquam verè agat, altero ne quidem adhuc existente, nedum verè patiente, aut contra.* *Navaretus in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 9. §. 2. maintaines, Posita permissione infallibiliter sequi quod permittitur.* *Austin* himselfe supposeth as much where he saith, *Ad omnipotentissimam suam bonitatem pertinere, potius bona ex malis elicere, quam mala esse non sinere.* For hereby he gives to understand, that God permits sinne with a purpose to work good out of evill. Now this manifestly implies, that upon Gods permission of sinne, sinne shall exist. Nay how can this be avoided, unlesse we deny that God alone, is he that keepes us from running into sinne, and maintaine that man can doe this of himselfe, without that speciall grace of God, whereby he keepes us from sinne: yet in the Council of *Palestine*, it was concluded, that Gods grace was required to every act, and *Pelagius* himselfe was driven to subscribe thereunto, and to anathematize those that denied. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is necessarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, *I will cause them to walk in my statutes, and keep my judgements and doe them: Ezech. 36. 28.* or whether it be only such a Cooperate grace, as some now a daies blush not to professe as whereby God workes in us, *ut Velle bonum modo Velimus*, this I can shew under the hand of a zealous Partizan for *Arminius*. Now I hope there is no such cunning contrivance in the permission of sinne.

Farther, there are certain occasions & opportunities offered for the committing of sin in the course of the World: We willingly ascribe unto God the administratiō of these,

and so doth *Arminius*; and that not of Occasions only, but of Arguments also inciting unto sin, *Disput. Pub. Theſ. 9. De Iuſtitia & Efficacia providentia Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipſum tum vicioſitatem eius. Efficientia quæ circa initium conſideratur vel impeditio vel permiſſio eſt; cui addimus adminiſtrationem argumentorum & occaſionum ad peccatum incitantium.*

Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto ſin then all theſe, & that is by the practiſes of Satan, who goeth about like a roaring Lyon ſeeking who he may devour. How coms he to have ſuch liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thouſand years and more if it pleaſe him? The Devills ſometime beſought our Saviour, that he would not ſend them into the deep; ſurely they acknowledged thereby his power to ſend them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like ſo many roaring Lyons, to devour the ſoules of men by provoking unto ſin. As for thoſe that *Tiberius* ſet about *Drusus* and *Nero* to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devill and his Angells for the practiſing of provoking courſes? But *Tiberius* bid his ſervants to provoke *Drusus* and *Nero* and not to ſpare: but can any ſay truly that we maintaine that God bids the Devill to provoke this Author, or any ſuch *Arminian* ſpirit to make ſuch parallels as theſe? Yet *1 Kings 22.* we read when a wicked ſpirit offers his ſervice to God to intice *Ahab* that he might goe and fall at *Ramoth-Gilead*, & that by becoming a lying ſpirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, ſaying, Goe forth and doe ſo; but alſo tells him, thou ſhalt entice him, and ſhalt alſo prevaile. That was a great deale more then was in the power of *Tiberius*, or his infligators, or the Devills themſelves. And did not *Ahab* deſerve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellowes, have deſerved ſo much at the hands of God, as to have a lying ſpirit put in the mouthes of them, on whom they depend for reſolution in poynts of Divinity, and that they prevaile with them alſo? And why may not he alſo be thus given over to illuſions to believe lies? Nay, what doe we talk of deſert in this? Did not the Devill provoke *Eve* and *Adam* to ſin againſt God in *Paradiſe*? Could not God have kept the Devill off? Why did he not? *Cur non interceſſit & circumſcriptorem colubrum cohibuit?* to ſpeak in *Tertullians* phraſe. Doth it not manifeſtly appeare, that it was Gods will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto ſin? & why not? Is it lawfull for a man to lay a bait of gold and ſilver in his ſervants way to try his fidelity, and whether ſuch a provocation will make a breach upon his honeſty; and ſhall not ſuch a courſe be lawfull unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of tranſgreſſing. And to ſerve God while we are not tempted to ſin againſt him, is a poor commendation: If thou faint in the day of adverſity thy ſtrength is ſmall, ſaith *Solomon. Job. 1. 11.* Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and ſee if he will not blaſpheme thee to thy face; as much as to ſay, Let but *Iob* be in this manner provoked, and ſee whether he will not blaſpheme. What is the Lords anſwer? Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himſelfe ſhalt thou not ſtretch out thine hand. Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One meſſenger comes and brings tydings, ſaying, The Oxen were plowing, and the Aſſes feeding in their places, and the Sabeans came violently and took them, yea, they have ſlaine thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. Upon the neck of him comes another, ſaying, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy ſheep and thy ſervants, and devoured them, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. Upon the back of him comes a third ſaying, The Caldeans ſet out three bands, and fell upon the Camells and have taken them and ſlain thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, & I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. After all theſe coms a fourth, ſaying, Thy ſonnes and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldeſt brothers houſe, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wilderneſſe, and ſmote the fowre corners of the houſe which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have *Iob's* uprightneſſe thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing ſo upright as *Iob* (whatſoever be the conſequents thereof) unto tranſgreſſion, though it be even to the curſing of their King and their God? as *Iſ. 8. 21.* He that is afflicted and famiſhed, ſhall goe to and fro in it, and when he ſhall be hungry he ſhall even fret himſelfe and curſe his King and his gods and ſhall look upward: and *Revelations 16. 21.* There fell a great haile like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blaſphemed God becauſe of the Plagne of the haile, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. Yet *Iob* continued in his uprightneſſe, his wicked Wife perceived it; though ſhee her ſelfe was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to ſin againſt God, then *Joſeph* was by the temptation

Prov. 24. 10.

tation of his wanton Mistris : though *David* fell fowly and shamefully, provoked thereunto by the sight of *Bathsheba*, and did not God by his providence bring him to the sight of *Bathsheba*, as he brought *Shimei* and *David* after this together, as *Arminius* and his complices confesse, when *Shimei* railed on him? A great provocation to so great a Person as *David*, if not to bid, yet at least to suffer *Abishai* to cut off that dogges head, as he called him; yet *David* would not suffer him, and why? Let *David* himselfe answer; *The Lord, saith he, hath bidden him to curse David. It may be the Lord will render unto me good, for his cursing this day.* He fell not foule upon God, though acknowledging his just providence herein. And to make a Parallele between the courses of God, and the courses of *Tiberius* that monster of men, in taking a course with *Drusus* and *Nero* to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might destroy them: Thus *David* was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as *Drusus* and *Nero* were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he fare the worse for this, but no doubt found cause to blesse God for his grace, in restraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or spirit, like as formerly he blessed God for the good counsel of *Abigail*, whereby he was restrained from shedding blood, and that his own hand did not save him. And if it be not lawfull for us to provoke another unto sin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawfull for God to provoke? One is provoked by prosperity to corrupt his waies, another by adversity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blasphemy? What then? shall not God be acknowledged to be the Author both of prosperity and adversity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before professe what should be his providence towards the Jewes? and that in this very kind of provoking them. *Deuteron. 32. 21. They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealousy with those that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish Nation.*

But let us consider more distinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it consists, that we may be the better able to judge in what case we may safely attribute it unto God, and in what case not; that so we may neither ascribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both these courses being equally blasphemous, and so reputed among Schoole Divines.

Now Provocation in the most usuall phrase of Scripture is by way of exasperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwise taken when man is said to provoke God. And in the same sense it is delivered in the particular fact of *Tiberius* here mentioned. But when a resemblance is here made between the particular course of *Tiberius* and the courses of God, Gods provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of sin, whether it be by way of exasperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the severall passions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved severall waies to sin, amongst which the passion anger is but one. And as it is said of the wrath of man, that it workes not the righteousness of God; so it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the *1 Chron. 24. 1.* it is said that *Satan provoked David to number Israel.* That was not by way of exasperation and moving in him the passion of anger, by the working upon some other passion, whether pride or curiosity: and therefore though it be rendred by the word, Provoked, yet in the Originall the word used signifieth properly to tempt. But consider we provocation according to the propriety thereof in the first place, by way of exasperation.

Now consider, I pray, whether the Ministers of *Tiberius* did more exasperate *Drusus* and *Nero*, then God exasperated *Jonah*. *Jonah. 4. 7.* For having prepared a Gourd and made it to come up over *Jonah*, that it might be a shadow over his head, and deliver him from his griefe; & *Jonah* being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worme when the morning rose the next day and it smote the Gourd that it withered. And God proceeded farther then this. For when the Sun did arise, God prepared also a fervent east wind, and the Sun beat upon the head of *Jonah*, that he fainted and wished in his heart to dye, and said it is better for me to dye then to live. And not only so, but justified himselfe in this his impatience. For when the Lord said unto him, *dost thou well to be angry for the Gourd?* *Jonah* stoutly answered, *I doe well to be angry to the death.* It's true, *Jonah* brake not forth into blasphemies, against God, as it seems *Drusus* and *Nero* did against *Tiberius*. *Jonah* was better brought up under the wings of God then so. Gods grace preserved him from such excesse, but that the Ministers *Tiberius* set about them, did more provoke them by exasperating courses, then God did in like manner provoke *Jonah*, it doth not appeare: but had *Jonah* hereupon broken forth into blasphemies, had *Jonah's* sinne been excusable or Gods course blameable?

Supra-Lapsarians make not God

Revel. 16. 21. we read of a great hayle that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blasphemed God because of the plague of the hayle, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. And Isai 8. 21. The Lord prophecyeth, that, He that is afflicted and famished, shall goe to and fro, and when he shall be hungry, he shall even fret himselfe, and curse his King and his Gods and look upward. such plagues are the work of God, for there is no evill in the city but the Lord hath done it. Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occasion to blaspheme. And *Tentatio probationis* was never yet that I know denyed unto God, to try whether they will blaspheme God or no. To this end Satan desired to have an hand on Job, yet not so much to try whether he would blaspheme or no, but being confident he should bring him to blaspheme. Job. 1. 11. stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. The Lord gave him leave, and Job acknowledgeth the Lords hand in all that Satan did, saying, The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job sinned not nor charged God foolishly. Satan desires yet farther liberty, saying skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but save his life. So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and smote Job with sore boyles from the sole of his foot unto his crowne, and he took him a potsherd to scrape himselfe withall, and he sate down among the ashes, Then said his Wife unto him, Dost thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curse God and dye. She manifested the inward corruption of her irreligious heart. Job might have brought her to a forme of godlines by his pious courtes in his family, but litle power of godlinesse doth appeare upon her. For as Solomon saith, If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small. It seems her heart was sowed with Atheisme, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather then by divine providence, and consequently it was all one, whether a man did blesse God, or curse God, and a madnesse to make a conscience of walking in integrity, and that in Iobs case at this time, whether he did blesse God he must dye, or whether he did curse God he could but dye, and better it was for him thus impoverished, thus afflicted, to dye then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it seems she never had but a tast of them, and that tast never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a fore temptation, the very gates of hell playing upon him with their greatest Ordinance to batter (if it were possible) his shield of faith. But what is Iobs answer. Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What shall we receive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evill? In all this did not Iob sin with his lips. The worke of Satan in the impoverishing of Iobs estate, and afflicting his person, cannot be denied to be Gods work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan sin in all this? As our Saviour saith that he was a murderer from the beginning, and as St. Peter saith, The devill goes about like a roving Lyon seeking whom he may devour; to who can make doubt but these courtes practised against Iob, were fruits of his murdering and devouring disposition? And all sides now a daies confesse, that the act of the most flagitious sin committed by man or Angell, is the work of God in the way of a principall efficient cause, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the sinfulness of the act, either of the Devill or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt Iob: but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheisticall proposed by his Wife, this was the greatest danger in the consideration thereof to corrupt his soule, for that is it alone that workes upon the will to incline it. And as for their sinning herein, that proceeded from the want of Gods feare, according to that of Abraham. Genes. 20. 10. I said surely the feare of God is not in this place, therefore they will slay me for my Wives sake. And albeit God engageth himselfe towards some, for the putting of his feare in their hearts, that they shall never depart away from him. Ierim. 36. 40. yet he hath not engaged himselfe thus farre towards all. For the Apostle plainly professeth, that, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth Rom. 9. 18. and hardning we know is denying the feare of God, either as touching the habituall infusion thereof, or as touching the actuall excitation thereof after it is infused. Yet I deny not bnt obduration and excecration are sometimes promiscuously used, the one for the other, because of the strict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, Austin spares not to professe, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his secret providence lib. 9. Confess. cap. 8. *Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? nonne protulisti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex oculis provisionibus tuis & uno icu putredinem il-*

lam prædidiſti? And whereas *Bellarmino* endeavoureth to blaſt the evidence of this place giving testimony unto Gods ſecret providence in evill, I have endeavoured to ſhew the vanity of his diſcourſe in my *Vind. Grat. Dei lib. 2. Crim. 3. digreſſ. 2. cap. 13.* And in what congruity can it be ſaid, that God bid *Shimei* to curſe *David*, but that in the ſame analogy of faith, it may be ſaid, that God bid *Iobes* Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greateſt provocation, *Tiberius* his Miniſters Provocation of *Drusus* and *Nero*; or *Shimei's* provocation of *David* rayling on him to his face, the Subject blaſpheming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was nothing inferior, only here was the difference; *Tiberius* gave ſuch commandment to his Miniſters ſo to provoke *Drusus* and *Nero*, God gave no ſuch commandment (in proper ſpeech) unto *Shimei*, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, *Thou ſhalt not ſpeak evill of the ruler of thy people.* But Gods ſecret providence, whereby he makes uſe of all his creatures in what condition ſoever he finds them, even of Devils and wicked men, to ſerve his turne by them, either in the way of judgement, or in the way of mercy, and ſometimes for triall of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phraſe called Gods bidding or commanding. And indeed it is farre more effectually then his commandment. And *Auſtin* by pregnant paſſages of holy Scripture convinced of this truth, ſpareth not to profeſſe as much in theſe words, *His & talibus testimoniis divinatorum eloquiorum quæ omnia commemorare nimis longum eſt, ſatis quantum exiſtimo manifeſtatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunque voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſua miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio utiq; ſuo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap. 21.* And touching this particular caſe of *Shimei*, inquiring about the interpretation of it, ſee I pray, how he reſolves concerning it. *Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis ſapiens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Idè dictum eſt, dixit ei dominus: Nam ſi jubenti obtemperaffet Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus eſſet, ſicut ex hoc peccato poſtea novimus eſſe punitum.* And he proceeds farther to ſhew the reaſon of this divine providence. *Nec cauſa tacita eſt, cur ei Deus juſto modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc eſt, Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miſerit vel dimiſerit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die iſto.* And hereupon concludes. *Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atq; adjumentum bonorum. Sic uſus eſt Iuda tradente Chriſtum. Sic uſus eſt Iudeis cruciſigentibus Chriſtum, & quanta inde bona præſtitit populis credituris? Qui & ipſo utitur diabolo peſſimo, ſed optime ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non ſibi, quia omnia ſcit antequam fiant, ſed nobis quibus erat neceſſarium, ut eo modo ageretur nobiſcum.*

De Grat. & lib. arbit. cap. 20.

But let us proceed to provocations unto other ſins, not in the way of exaſperation, but in the way of allurements. *Achan* was a covetous perſon, at the ſacking of *Jericho*, it was his hap to light among the ſpoyle, upon a goodly Babylonish garment, and two hundred ſhekells of ſilver, and a wedge of gold of fifty ſhekells waight. Was not ſo faire a prey, a ſore temptation to a covetous perſon? How was *Demosthenes* taken with a rich bowle that was ſhewed him by *Harpalus*, but there was great danger in it, I confeſſe, yet if deſire of prey doth ſometimes overrun the ſent, may it not as well overcome the feare of danger, eſpecially conſidering the opportunity of ſecrecy to convey it cloſely into his Tent and hide it there? I ſaw, ſaith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lye hid in the earth in the miſt of my Tent, and the ſilver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and conſequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to provoke *1 Chron. 21. 1.* And is it not juſt with God, to bring any man into ſuch temptations of what kind, or in what degree ſoever (ſeeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Saviour to teach his Diſciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that *He will not lead us into temptation?* And what cauſe hath *Achan* to complaine of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himſelfe? Was this prey that he ſeized on, the only ſpoyle of that great Citty? Were there no Babylonish garments but that one, no more ſilver or wedges of gold, but that *Achan* lighted on? Yet they refrained, ſome out of the feare of God, that refrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from ſinning againſt him: others though not out out of a feare of God, yet out of the feare of puniſhment, were moved to beware how they tranſgreſſed. For albeit, *Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas, ſed contumacia*, as * *Auſtin* *Epist. 28.*

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writes, yet feare of punishment oftentimes restraines from committing capitall crimes, though this restraint be not gracious; and considerations of lesse force then these doe prevaile many times with carnall men, both to abstain from evill, and to doe that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Gospell of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor revered man, yet he would doe the Widdow justice to ease himselfe of her importunate solicitations where with she molested him.

Come we to provocations unto sinne of another nature, in satisfying the concupiscence of the flesh. *David* arising out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the Kings Pallace, from the rooffe he saw a Woman washing her selfe: and the Woman was very beautifull to look upon: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not just with God, it were in vaine for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not feare any such temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of Gods justice in the course of his providence. *Paul* the Apostle, least he should be exalted out of measure, through the abundance of revelations (made unto him, which were very dangerous to puff a man up, and make him swell in the conceit of his own worthinesse being admitted into the secrets of God) was sometimes exercised with a thorne in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him. But the feare of God was alive in him, and stirred up his faith to pray unto God three times that it might depart from him: and the Lord made him a gracious answer, not as yet to deliver him, but to support him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord said unto him, my grace is sufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weaknesse. This answer put heart into *Paul*; Therefore, saith he, will I very gladly rejoyce rather in mine infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Mark I pray, Rather, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exercising him, but rather rejoyce to be thus exercised, for as much as this same should doe him no harme; for by vertue of Christs power dwelling in him he should have the victory. Secondly, it should doe him good in preserving him from being exalted out of measure through the abundance of revelations. Therefore, saith he, I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in anguishes for Christs sake; for when I am weak then am I strong. And had not *Joseph* as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchaste motions of his wanton Mistris, should be provoked unto unclean courses, as *David* had to perswade himselfe, that it was Gods will by the rayling of *Shimei* he should be provoked unto revenge; that so by the power of his grace, strengthening them against such provocations, they might come forth of their severall temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more resplendent then before? *Joseph* was a faire person and wellfavoured Genes. 39. 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustfull eye. Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either *Prædonem alienæ castitatis* or *Prædam suæ*. But *Joseph* had a gracious and a chaste heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chastity, but being a congruous baite to the lustfull appetite of his Mistris, it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon. And as *Austin* said of Gods providence concerning *Shimei*, *eius voluntatem proprio vitio suamalam in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto & occulto inclinavit*. Who seeth not, that the like may be said of Gods dealing with *Joseph's* Mistris? and that without all aspersions of unholinesse unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts, what will be the issue but uncleannesse: *Rom.* 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? even their Women did change their naturall use into that which was against nature, vers. 27. and likewise also the Men left their naturall use of the Women, and turned in their lust one toward another; and Man with Man wrought filthinesse, and received in themselves such recompence of their error as was meet. Here we have a strange course of Gods providence in punishing sin with sin. For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another, in a most unnatural and abominable manner, are said to receive such recompence for their error as was meet. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any sin? Is it to doe that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to doe that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked *Paul*, as a foole to boast himselfe, as himselfe expresseth it, for he adds, ye have compelled me. But this cannot be affirmed of *Tiberius* his ministers in provoking *Drusus* and *Nero*. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much lesse can it be said, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither doe I think that any of our adver-

ries (as malevolent as they are) dares impute any such crimination unto us, as if wee attributed any such discourse unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke unto sin? Is it to doe somewhat upon the consideration whereof, mens passions being moved, they cannot but sin. But this in like sort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of those provocations which were made upon *Drusus* and *Nero* by the praefises of *Tiberius*. Or is it the doing of somewhat, whereupon occasion is taken to sinne, to blaspheme? this hath no colour of truth in it. For even man without all transgression may doe many things, whereupon occasion is taken of doing evill; and therefore we distinguish of *Scandalum datum* & *Acceptum*. Nay, though man knowes offence will be taken upon the doing of some things, yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he must doe them, what occasion soever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I must abstaine from the doing of them, in case I know offence will be taken thereat, and that thereby I shall lay a stumbling block in the way of my Brother. For *Paul* professeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother. But no such obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how some will abuse his mercies, others grow worle and worse by his judgements, breaking forth into blasphemy thereupon: yet no wise man will say that God is the more unholy in the shewing of mercy, and in the execution of judgement. He professeth in plain termes, that to them who feare him he will be a sanctuary, but as a stumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel, and as a snare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of Ierusalem, *Isai. 8. 14.*

As for the last clause of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of *Tiberius* his course in this, namely that so he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of justice. Undoubtedly I should think the putting of them to death was just in case they did convitiate their Prince whatsoever their provocations were. For hereby they deserved death, yea everlasting death and damnation. His sin was in causing them to be provoked hereunto, and so also it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that *fame necavit*, he famished them. I know *Tiberius* was cruell enough, but by the story it seems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; first to intend their deaths because he saw the affections of the people towards them, be-like for *Germanicus* his sake, a worthy man according to those times. For when he found that in the beginning of the yeare, vowes were made on their behalfe, to wit, for their preservation he dealt with the Senate, that such rewards ought not to be tendred, but towards such who were of experience and of ripenesse of age: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being discovered, he laid them open to every mans criminations, *variâq; fraude inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, accusavit per literas, amarissimè congestis etiam probis, & judicatos hostes fame necavit.* And anon after, the same Author discovers the reason of all this, to wit, that seeing *Germanicus* was but his adopted Sonne, and one *Drusus* by name was his naturall sonne, and his own sonne *Drusus* being dead, leaving a sonne *Tiberius* behind him, he desired to make him as his naturall sonne his successor in the Empire. *Ælium Sejanum ad summam potentiam non tam benevolentia propeverat quàm ut esset cujus ministerio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotemq; suum ex Druso filium naturalem ad successionem Imperii confirmaret.* Sure we are God hath no need of any such politique courses; neither hath he need of any pretext of justice to take a mans life from him. It is confessed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holiest Angel by power absolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from sin, as I think no wise man will deny, surely it is in his power to refuse to keep any reasonable creature from sin. For certainly though *Adam* were created in innocence, yet he preserv'd him not in innocency, but left him to himselfe, having exposed him to Satans temptations. The Angells had no Satan to tempt them; God preserved the elect Angells from sinning, and how? let *Austin* speak in this particular; either by giving them *maiorè amoris divini mensuram* in their creation then their fellowes; or by giving them *amplius adjutorium* after their creation. And in particular concerning *Adam*, the same Author professeth that God gave him, *Possè si voluit*, but he gave him not, *Velle quod potuit*. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the deniall of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entring of sin into the World, and that wonderfull work of the incarnation of the sonne of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as also for the manifestation of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of sin, and in the way of justice by the punishing of sin. Let *Arminius* be heard in this, Who confesseth that

that God in the storehouse of his wisdom and power, hath not only sufficient impediments of sin, but efficacious also, by the use whereof, sinne would certainly and infallibly be hindered: His words are these, *Præter illa sufficientia, impedimenta etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiæ & potentiæ thesauro, quibus productis ceritè & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur.* Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the sinne of Adam, as of hindering any mans sinne else from the time of Adams fall. And as certain it is that God would not make use of any of these impediments, though it is apparent these impediments *Arminius* speakes of, are of such a nature as whereby sinne would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedome of mans will, as appears by all his instances following of this kind, shewing how God did efficaciously hinder the finnes of many. And indeed it is evident in reason and such as cannot be denied, unlesse a man will say, that whatsoever course had been taken by God to preserve him from sinne, without prejudice to the freedome of his will, yet neverthelesse he would have sinned: which is in so high a degree absurd, as manifestly to contradict the very light of nature. For seeing Adam in the state of innocency was naturally indifferent, as well to stand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to stand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in respect of this indifferency it cannot be said, that upon every occasion or temptation unto sin, he would have yielded thereunto. For such a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philosophers acknowledge that of three sorts of contingents, one sort is of such which they call, *Contingentia æqualiter*, that is, such as fall out as often one way as another. And what are these? surely all such and none but such as are subject to a mans free will. And even of Esau borne in sin (so was not Adam) *Austin* thinks it strange, that any man should deny, but that there was a course to have called him as effectually, as he called Jacob, had he been pleased to have used it. Now hereby it manifestly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courses, exasperating courses to draw them unto sinne, let him but withhold those efficacious impediments of sin, which are in the storehouse of his wisdom and power, as *Arminius* acknowledgeth, and sinne hereupon shall enter. For the permission of sinne (by *Arminius* his distinction of it) is the suspension of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a safe course to judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we should conclude even of permission of sin, that like as it becometh not us to permit sinne if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the same manner it becometh not God to permit any sinne, seeing it lyeth in his power to hinder it. *Sed iudicia ejus* (saith *Austin*) *multa abyssus. Nos certè, si eos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus: quàm verò innumabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, quæ utiq; si voluisset nulla ratione permitteret.* In the 2 Kings 2. 26, 27. we read of a desperate course of the King of Moab, that finding the battail to be sore against him, first tryed with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldest sonne that should have reigned in his steed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the sight of which barbarous part of his strook grieve into the hearts of the children of Israel, so that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore shall we condemne God, for sending Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, his only sonne, his sonne Isaac? In the 16 Judg. we read a strange story of Sampson whose faith is commended Hebr. 11. For there we read how he dyes, his heart flaming with desire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prayes unto God to assist him, that he might be avenged of the Philistins for his two eyes. O Lord God I pray thee think upon mee, O God I beseech thee strengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistins for my two eyes. And again, Let me loose my life with the Philistins: & he bowed himself with all his might, and the house fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; so that the men that he slew at his death, were more then they which he had slaine in his life. For both the house it selfe was full, and upon the roofof it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a strange massacre wrought by Sampson an Israelite upon the Philistins, at that time when the Israelites were in subjection to the Philistins who were their Lords, as sometimes Pharaoh was. For the men of Judah admonished him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind Sampson. Knowest thou not (say they) that the Philistins are rulers over us? Wherefore then hast thou done thus unto us? to wit, in taking such courses as might well provoke the Philistins to root out the Israelites. Yet neverthelesse he comes sparkling with zeale to destroy many thousands of them, yea the Princes with the rest, and well pleas'd to destroy himselfe with them, to be avenged of them

them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without some speciall & prophetically instigation & animation received from the spirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawfull? which without Gods warrant, could be no lesse then abominable & most damnable sins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate *Herod*, & *Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel to do what they did against our Saviour, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein such things are prohibited. And nevertheless the Apostles in their pious meditation with one voyce professe, that, *All these were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to doe those things which Gods hand, and Gods counsell had predestinated to be done:* and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the most barbarous facts committed by *Tiberius*, or any other monster of nature, I know no reason. And as touching shamefull courses, no lesse abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as these here mentioned of *Tiberius* were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apostle professeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the lusts of their own hearts, to the committing of such abominations, and also that herein they received such recompence of their error as was meet; and the error which God avenged in this manner what was it, but such wherein *Tiberius* was as deep, as those whom the Apostle speaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beasts, and of creeping things. And they were but *πῶς ἀτιμίαις* into which God delivered up *Tiberius*, and to such God delivered up them of whom the Apostle speaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of *ἀδίκημα & νόστος*, into which God gave them up, that so they might receive that recompence of their error as was meet.

I come to the second instance here made of *Tiberius* his cruelty, which he compares to those courses, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himselfe. Now this hath long agoe been objected by *Bertius*, in his Preface to the Conference of *Arminius* with *Iunius*; I say objected by him unto *Piscator*, & thereunto *Piscator* also hath answered long agoe. And whereas *Bertius* hath replied and allowed *Piscator* a year for putting in his answer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would interpret it as a confession of his insufficiency, to make good the cause maintained by him. *Piscator* answers, that he had no need of so long a time as he prescribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the space of two or three daies he addressed himselfe to an answer thereunto, and within a month finished it. Now if the Author of this discourse were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuse him, if otherwise he might have, with more credit, occupied himselfe in the answering, at the least, of some chief particulars, whereupon *Piscator* stands, for the justifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, then hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years agoe proposed and set forth to the judgement of the world. But I am content to take into consideration, how Scholastically and judiciously he carrieth himselfe in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, because it may be that this odious comparison he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which follows with the more propitious affectio) then he doth of the strength of ought that follows, whatsoever he doth or may pretend to the contrary, to the point the.

Tiberius commanded the Virgins to be deflowered, that they might be strangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were disposed to strangle any, certainly he hath no need to have the deflowered first. For it is now a daies confessed even by *Arminius* himselfe, that God can lawfully annihilate the holiest creature that lives, and that without all respect to sin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more then strangulation; this causing only a dissolution between the body and soule, but annihilation, setting an utter end to body & soule by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had *Tiberius* only permitted the deflowering of them, where he might have hindered it, though this were a foule part in him, yet I hope no Christian will say, it is a foule part in God, to permit any act never so flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; especially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of mans will: and that this is in Gods power *Arminius* acknowledgeth and supposeth at large in his *Examen* and Treatise there *De Permissione*. But *Tiberius* commanded the Hangman to deflower them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the ravishing of any, the murdering of any, or any other sin whatsoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under

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penalty of everlasting death? yet it is true, the word of God expressly professeth out of the mouth of *David*, that *God* had *Shimei* to curse *David*, and that he bid the evil spirit to seduce *Ahab*, that he might goe up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be strangled I confesse, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be slain there. But this is a figurative speech, and signifies not properly any command of God, but rather denotes the secret operation of Gods providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for those as well as Devils, God knows how to make use of, to serve his own turne. And *Austin* professeth, *Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumq; voluerit, sive ad bona, pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum iudicio utiq; suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem iusto*: And, touching the particular of *Shimei*, writes thus, *eius voluntatem proprio suo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto, & occulto inclinavit*. As for *Tiberius* his causing the little maides to be defloured, that might be done without their sinne, they might be ravished, and in that case, that might be their sorrow but not their sin. And as for the hangmans fault, in this, he was not excusable by *Tiberius* his causing him to defloure them; For *Tiberius* his causation herein extended no farther then to command them. And I hope it was no just excuse for the people of Israel in their Idolatrous courses, that therein they did but keep the statutes of *Omri*, and all the manner of the house of *Ahab*, *Mic. 6*. Yet neither doth God command any man to doe that which his Law forbids, or to sin against him. And farther we acknowledge with *Austin*, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expose any man to sin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to every thing that is pleasing in his sight. *Heb. 13. 20*. to cause us to walk in his statutes, and judgements, and to doe them, *Ezech. 36. 28*. yea, to keep us from presumptuous sins, and that they get not the dominion over us. *Psal. 19. 14*. yea, to deliver us from every evill work, *2 Timoth. 4. 18*.

But perhaps some may say, Our doctrine is that God willeth sin to be committed for which men may and shall be punished; like as *Tiberius* would the Virgins should be defloured, that they might be strangled.

And I answer, that *Arminius* himselfe professeth that, *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere*, God would have *Ahab* fill up the measure of his sinne, that he might be condignely punished. And why may we not say as well, that God would have *Tiberius* to fill up the measure of his sinnes? And yet like as *Tiberius* would have the Virgins to be defloured that they might be strangled; so *Ahab* would have *Naboth* accused of blasphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and so put to death and stoned; and all these things were done under colour of Religion. Yet *Arminius* in reference to these very courses, spares not to profess, that God would have *Ahab* to fill up the measure of his sinnes, yet doth not *Bertius* upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Again, the same *Arminius* professeth that in their ignominious handling of Christ, God would have the Jewes, *progreſſi sunt*, proceed so farre as they did proceed. And was it not Gods will in like manner, that the Gentiles should proceed as farre as they did in the same businesse? Now we know full well by the story Evangelical, how farre they went in their mischievous courses against the Son of God. For *Judas* betrayed him, and the high Priests both hired *Judas* hereunto, and suborned false witnesses against him; and both the Herodians and Souldiers mocked him, and the people urged *Pilate* to crucify him, and to dismiss *Barnabas*, and *Pilate* yeelded to the peoples desire, took order to have him first scourged, then crucified. And if it may be truly and piously said, that in these ignominious usages of the Son of God, they went as farre as God would have them to goe; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that *Tiberius* also in these his barbarous courses, went as farre as God would have him? Neither doth *Arminius* give himselfe to qualify the harshnesse of these his affirmations. We say that whatsoever comes to passe, it is Gods will it should come to passe, as *Austin* expressly professeth, *Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit*, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profess the same. But withall we explicate it as *Austin* doth in the words following, by adding the different manner, how they shall come to passe by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to passe, namely good or evill; thus, *Vult fieri*, but how? *vel sinendo ut fiat* (to wit in case they are evill) *vel ipse faciendo* (to wit, in case they are good. So then good things God will have come to passe by his effectiō, evill things only by his permission. And *Bellarmino* opposing our Divines to the uttermost

uttermost of his power in this particular, being convicted in conscience by the evidence of truth is driven to confesse; *Bonum esse ut malum fiat Deo permittente*, It is good that evil should come to passe by Gods permission, or Gods permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins should be defloured and impiously he willed it. God willed that Davids Concubines should be defloured, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, *I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of all Israel and before the sunne*. And this constupration of Davids Concubines served for the chastising of David, as Arminius professeth, *Inserviit castigando Davidi; & omnes pœnæ habent Deum auctorem*, All punishments have God for their author; they are the words of the same Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cause the Virgins to be defloured and strangled. But what Christian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for causing the Children of the Sodomites, some in their Mothers wombe, some hanging upon their Mothers breasts, to be consumed with fire and brimstone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflouring of those Virgins, that they might be strangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinne, that so he might accumulate unto himselfe wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I presume, he would not have ascribed any such will unto God, as he doth in expresse termes. Although he well knew the vast difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporall, but Gods power extends to the execution of vengeance eternall. Now I find a story immediatly following this very story alleadged by this Author out of *Suetonius* expressing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would destroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: *Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi*, when they desired to dye, he caused them to live by force; *Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat ut cum audisset unum e reis anticipasse eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evasit*, For he accounted death so light a punishment that when he heard one of the condemned persons to have anticipated it, he cryed out *Carnutius* hath escaped me; for that was the condemned persons name. And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one desired to suffer betimes, he answered him, *Nondum tecum in gratiam redii*. I doe not as yet beare these so much good will. Now, why may not some Atheistickall person track the steps of this Author, and in this particular exaggerate the hainousnesse of Gods holy courses as favouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, because he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternall torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courses in Tiberius inferior unto these are accounted abominable, cruell, and impious; how much more (if this Authors argumentation be of force) those courses which the word of God hath informed us to be the courses divine, infinitely beyond the courses of Tiberius in the way of severity and rigour? As for the power of God in producing sinne, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years agoe it was delivered by *Austin*, that *sinne hath no efficient cause, but deficient only*. But when the creature sinneth, he sinneth in doing that he ought not to doe; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to doe; or in not doing what he ought to doe, or not in what manner he ought to doe it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and humane is found only about the act substrate unto sinne; and all sides now a daies acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concurrence, though difference there is about the manner of the concurrence: and particularly these; Arminius will have Gods concurrence to an evil act, to be every way as much as his concurrence to a good, and that he concurs to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evil act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a double concurrence to every good act that is not supernaturall, as touching the substance of the act; One to the producing of the substance of the act, another to the producing the goodnesse thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a naturall man may abstaine from lying, stealing, whoring, blaspheming; but no naturall man can abstaine from these in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God, and that such a love as is, *Amor Dei usq; ad contemptum sui*, the love of God to the contempt of himselfe: For this manner of performing it is supernaturall.

Supra-Lapsarians make not God

Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concurrence, to the substance of any naturall act. We say God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the first cause to move the second, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves naturall agents to doe that which they doe, necessarily; so he moves all rationall agents to doe that which they doe, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian tenent to the contrary, namely this, that God workes in man *à Velle modo velit*, as absurd an assertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in speaking of the secret providence of God in evill, doe expresse themselves in phrases of a very harsh accent in the judgement of flesh and blood, but herein they doe nothing exceed sobriety, forasmuch as usually they contemper themselves to Scripture phrase rather within the compasse thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blasphemy is usually imputed unto them without all feare or wit; not considering, that herein they impute blasphemy to the language of the Holy Ghost. As for example.

What an horrible sinne is it for Kings and Princesto imploy their power and authority, not for the supporting of the Kingdome of Christ, *by whom Kings reigne*, but for the supporting and establishing of the kingdome of Antichrist, as in the Martyrdom of Gods Saints, delivered over to the secular power, to that end, and that by censures Ecclesiasticall? Now if we should say that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to imploy their power for the supporting of Antichrist, we should be censured for blasphemers. Yet the Holy Ghost spares not to professe, that *God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beast, untill the words of God be fulfilled.*

In like sort, from the first Preaching of the Gospell unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are disobedient unto it, and stumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we should say that they who thus disobey, and stumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, such as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blasphemers, and to professe that they will rather deny that there is a God, then hold with the Contra-Remonstrants. Yet S. Peterudgeth not to professe, that *Christ is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word of God, being disobedient, whereunto also they were ordained.*

1 Pet. 2.8.

When we professe that not any thing in the world comes to passe but *Deo volente*, God willing it, We are censured as Blasphemers, in professing that God doth will that which is evill, and sinne; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. professe as much, and *Austin Enchir. 95. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit*: but the Apostles with one voyce (as touching the contumelious usages of the Sonne of God, both by Jewes and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their pious meditation poured forth before the face of God, professe, that, *Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand and Gods counsell had before determined to be done.*

In like sort, when we speak of Gods giving men over to illusions to believe lies, or others to vile affections, and to uncleannesse through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves, which consisted in this, that, *The Women did change their naturall use into that which is against nature; and likewise the men, leaving the naturall use of the Women, burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men working that which is unseemely, and receiving in themselves the recompence of their error which was meet*: and observe herehence, that it is just with God to punish sinne with sinne. And as it hath been observed before us, from the daies of *Austin*, who when *Iulian* the Pelagian said, this was done, *deserendo*, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but professe that God doth thus, the Scripture expressly testifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, *deserendo*, or *alio modo sive explicabili, sive inexplicabili*, it matters not. An Arminian spirit spares not to joyne himselfe with *Iulian* the Pelagian in affronting *Austin* thus discourting out of the word of God, and to professe, that that doctrine of Gods punishing sinne with sinne is a common error; whereas the Apostle professeth in expresse termes, that, *Herein they received such recompence of their error as was meet*: and what is recompence here but punishment? and wherein consisted it, but in defiling themselves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly testifies, saying, *Men with men working that which is unseemely, and receiving in themselves such recompence of their error, as was meet.* And Arminius spares not to professe, that, *Omnis pena Deum authorem habet*. Wherein yet we concurre not with Arminius. Wee deny that *Omnis pena habet Deum authorem*. It is true that *Pena positiva*, not of all punishment

nishment that consists in privation, such as sinne is; For *Malum*, as *Austin* long agoe pronounced, *non habet causam efficientem* but *deficientem*. Yet we confesse that God could keep any man from any sinne, but if he will not, this is not sufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of sinne; that is, when he failes of doing that which he ought to doe. But God is bound to none to preserve him from sinne, any otherwise then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and so also on the other side, He hardneth whom he will.

Yet I have given no instances in any passages of the Old Testament, which give plentiful testimony of Gods secret providence of evill; the evidence whereof did wring from *Austin* this confession. *Contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia commemorare possemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto iudicio Dei fieri perversitatem cordis ut non audiat quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & sit ipsum peccatum precedentis pena peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati utique peccatum est. Venit tamen ab ea cecitate cordis, quæ occulto iudicio Dei, sed tamen iusto, etiam pena peccati monstratur.* And in his Book *Dé Grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 20.* inquiring how it is said that the Lord bid *Shimei* to curse *David*; *Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis sapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curse David? Who is wise and he shall understand? Non enim iubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malum in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si iubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea novimus esse punitum.* Neither saith he, is the cause concealed, why God thus dealt with *Shimei*, *Hoc est cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit* (I expresse it rather in *Austins* words then mine own, because the adversaries of Gods truth, think it enough to passe the censure of blasphemy upon ought that we deliver herein.) Now the cause was, *Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuatur mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die isto,* That God may see my humility saith *David*, and recompence me good for his cursing this day. *Ecce quomodo probatur* (thus *Austin* goes on) *Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem atque adjumentum bonorum.* Thus, (saith he) he used *Iudas* betraying Christ, thus he used the *Jewes* crucifying Christ; and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that should at any time believe? Who also useth the Devil himselfe, though most wicked, yet he useth him optimè most holily, for the exercising and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himselfe who knowes all things before they come to passe, but to us, who had need that after such manner God should proceed with us. The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of *Abalom* to confound the counsell of *Achitophel*, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. *Who would not tremble at the consideration of these judgements divine, whereby God workes even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendring unto them according to their deserts.* Then making mention of *Rehoboam* his despising the counsell of the Antients, as also that 2 *Chron. 1.* how God stirred up the spirit of the Philistines and Arabians against *Ioram*, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it wast. Here, saith *Austin*, it is manifest that God doth raise up enemies to lay such countries wast, whom he judgeth worthy of such punishments. But yet, saith he, will you say they came not up by their own will, or did they so come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture saith, namely, that God stirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God stirred up their spirits to come; which also, saith he, may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God stirred up their spirit, and also they came up by their own will. *Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum:* For the Almighty doth worke in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth no how to work any thing unjustly. Unto these he addeth variety of other testimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, *Hæc & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quæ omnia commemorare nimis longum est, quantum existimo manifestetur, Operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumque voluerit sive ad bona pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem iusto.*

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. III.

Besides it takes from men all conscience of sinne, and makes sinne to be no sinne; we use to say, *Neceſſitas non habet legem*, Necessity hath no law, &c. *ut est in superiori Sessione; usq; ad finem Sessionis.*

T W I S S E

Consideration.

THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the first place in the 16th reason of Arminius; whereby he laboureth to disprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predestination to be the Masse of mankind not created; as appears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, &c. and it is the first particular of six, mentioned in that sixteenth reason of his. And why should he divide it from the rest, and not clap them together, into this ranke of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and adde Arminius his other nineteen reasons herunto to the same purpose; if himselfe be privy to the cause thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will consider it. Now it proceedeth upon suppositon, that such a necessity of sinning is brought upon man by this decree, as stands in opposition unto liberty. Whereunto I answer,

1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no necessity at all of sinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not curing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that naturall infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being *conjecti in necessitatem peccandi*, through the sinne of Adam; as *Corvinus* confesseth, they being his own words. Now let every sober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God findes in a man uncured, be to bring a necessity of sinning upon him.

2. Secondly, we answer, that notwithstanding that necessity of sinning whereupon all are cast, as *Corvinus* speaketh, yet there is no sinne committed by a naturall and carnall man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blaspheming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkenness, gluttony, rayling, and in generall, every sinfull act being freely committed, by every one by whom it is committed, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of these sinfull acts, but is forborne by divers naturall and carnall men, and therein they doe abstaine from the committing of it freely. And yet we say, that even in abstaining from these acts, they doe not abstaine from sinne, for as much as they doe not abstaine from them in a gracious manner, and all by reason of that originall corruption which remaines uncured in them, untill such time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration.

3. But because I imagine this Author lets fly at randome, and keeps not himselfe to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing professe with *Austin* that, *Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit*, *Enchir.* 95. Therefore I answer in the third Place, That the necessity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudiciall to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their severall operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a daies it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries, very confidently to presume and presuppose, that upon the will of God, passing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a necessity, standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rationall agents; and no marvail, for *sic facitavit Hercules*, Arminius the great Champion of their cause, his learning served

served him to doe so before them. As if the contumelious usages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were not performed freely, but by meer necessity opposite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all these were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe what Gods hand and Gods counsel had predestinated to be done. *Acts* 4. 28. And in like sort, they that through disobedience stumbled at the word of God, did not freely disobey the Word, because Peter professeth of them in expresse termes, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the same manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdomes to the Beast, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghost saith, that God put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to consent and give their Kingdomes to the Beast.

Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles set forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having professed that, *God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsel ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe*; to prevent such like objections as this Author fashioneth, forthwith adde, *Yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.* And Austin in his Book *De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr.* where he speaks as freely of Gods effectuall Providence working in evill, as no where more, in so much as our Adversaries take great exceptions against his speeches (such as formerly delivered) and that in expresse termes: His main drift notwithstanding, and scope in that Book is to prove, that notwithstanding the divine operation, in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the lesse free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather than too little, unto that which is evill; according to that he writes also elsewhere, *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia.* And if Gods operation pre-judiceth not the liberty of the creature, much lesse the will of God. For though not any thing comes to passe unlesse God willeth it, whether it be good or evill, yet with this difference as Austin in the same place professeth, *He will have that which is good come to passe by the effecting of it, but evill only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo.* Epist. 28. Enchirid. cap. 95.

But though Austin and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragædian, as this Author saith, could see the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of these saw. And is not this a pretty Comedie, that a Tragædian and Zeno's servant must be brought in, and that in a confidential supposition to our face, not Divines only both ancient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forsooth, that what comes to passe by the will of God, and by the effectuall operation of God, doth not come to passe freely; and consequently, that the doctrine (which maintaines that evill comes to passe by the will of God, as the crucifying of Christ by the predestination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardning of Pharaoh's heart, so as not to let Israel goe, God professeth to be his work) takes away all conscience of sinne? All this I say is as cleare (if we believe this Author) as that Seneca's Tragædies are the Oracles of God. And I pray consider, must it not take away as well all conscience of righteousness, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedience; unlesse we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unlesse we deny that God is he, *Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight*, that God is he that putteth his own spirit in us, and causeth us to walke in his statutes, and to keep his judgements and doe them?

Yet what doth Seneca speak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tragædian under the terme of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine administration of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? Austin I am sure thought otherwise in more places then one, in Psalm. 31. on these words, *Pronunciabo adversum me*, He blames those who when they are found in their sinnes say, *Fatum mihi fecit, stellæ meæ fecerunt*, But saith he, *Quid est fatum? Quæ sunt stellæ? certè istæ quæ in Cælo conspicimus; & Qui eas fecit? Deus. Quis eas ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluisti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem*: Then he tells of others, who said that *Mars facit Homicidam, Venus Adulterum*. So that *Fatum* with them were second causes, which we all know in their operations, doe both work by necessity of nature, and have no power to maintain the free will of man; and in Psalm. 91. *Quæris ab illo quid sit Fatum, & dicit stellæ mæ. Quæris ab illo, quis fecit stellæ, quis ordinat stellæ; non habet quid tibi respondeat nisi Deus.*

*Ephes. 5. 8.
2 Timoth. 2.
Acts 11. 18.
Heb. 13. 20.
Ezech. 30. 28*

It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto *Austin*, as if his doctrine favoured of it; and what doth he answer thereunto? *Nec sub nomine gratiæ Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.*

Yet because we are to give the Devill his right; With what conscience could this Author professe of this *Fatum* of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conscience of sinne, seeing it did not take away the conscience of sinne in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the same Author within a few lines after. For there she professeth, that if God the creator of all, should make his wrath break forth against her, and strike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no sufficient punishment for her sinnes. Queen *Iocasta*'s words are these.

*Non si ipse mundum concitans divum sator
Corusca jæva tela jaculetur manu
Unquam rependam sceleribus pænas pares.*

Shee justifies God and condemnes her selfe, notwithstanding her former words used only as it seems, to pacify the furious moode of her Sonne and Husband *Oedipus*. Will not such one day, rise up in judgement against many Christians, who unlesse themselves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are so apt to condemne God of injustice, and justify themselves, as needing not to have any conscience of sinne? And which is most strange, they acknowledge Fate in this case to be such, as that it necessitated even God himselfe; as appears by the last Chorus.

*Fatis agimur, cedite Fatis,
Non sollicitæ possunt curæ
Mutare rati stamina fusi.
Quicquid patimur mortale Genus,
Quicquid facimus venit ex alto:
Servatq; sua decreta colus
Lachesis durâ revoluta manu.
Omnia certo tramite vadunt;
Primisq; dies dedit extremam
Non illa Deo vertisse licet,
Quæ nexa suis currunt causis.
It cuiq; ratus prece non ullâ
Mobilis ordo, multa ipsum
Timuisse nocet, multi ad fatum
Venere suum dum fata timent.*

But as I said before, whatsoever they conceived of Fate, and howsoever they fashioned it, their opinion thereof did not exspectorate all conscience of sinne in them, or urge them to justify or excuse themselves in their courses. For it appears both of *Oedipus* and *Iocasta*, that they not only condemned themselves, but became selfe executioners of punishment upon themselves for their foule crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himselfe unworthy to see the light; and the other destroying herselfe. Though whatsoever they or the Poets that set them forth conceived of Fate, in this case of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devills, and his illusions that abused them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt most justly; when in a wicked curiosity they desire to know, what shall become of them and their children: the Devill gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards sets his wits on work to accomplish them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himselfe, and so much the more forcibly holds them in his snares.

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sinne, which is as much as to say, all desert of sinne on the one side; so it may be extended to shew, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as *Hierome* saith, that where such necessity is, *nec damatio, nec Corona est*. But *Austin* hath spent an whole Book in prooofe of this, namely; that grace consists with freedom of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with freedom

dome of will unto that which is evill. But that in the state of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a servant unto sin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unlesse withall he deny Originall sinne with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of *Grevincovius* that great Arminian, that, *Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & testibus convinci potest.* And indeed this Authors discourse bears strongly this way, whatsoever Protestation in shew of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his discourse stands for freedome of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evill. And albeit there is so little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conscience of sinne) that it seems to be added only to make way for this sentence of Hierome, which yet is nothing to the purpose, unlesse he can prove, that Gods decrees doe bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himself herein and in farre different manner from Hierom's expression, though he placeth *Corona* in opposition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of sinne preceding: but the other, to wit, *Corona*, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience preceeding thereunto. But this Author sticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one side, as well as to evill actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteousness, as evill actions are of damnation. And withall he will have no more to decree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, then he doth the infidelity, and impenitency, and disobedience of another, least this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chaine, of necessity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wisdom thinks it fit, they should be left to their own choyce, whether they will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very confidently presume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and doe any good work; which is as good, as in expresse termes to professe, that there is no originall sinne at all; Notwithstanding so many expresse testimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, *John 12.* of some that, *They could not believe.* *Rom. 2.* of others that, *They could not repent.* *Rom. 8.* of all that are in the flesh, that, *They cannot please God.* *1 Cor. 2.* of the natural man that, *He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them;* of the Israelites in the Wildernesse, that, *God had not given them an heart to perceive; nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare unto that day.* *Deutr. 29. 4.* But these passages of holy Scripture, seem to have no place in this Authors consideration, if so be they have in his Creed. This bed is something too short for him to stretch himselfe thereon; and therefore he desires to change his lodging; and to passe from the desert of good actions, to the desert of evill actions, which he formerly insisted upon, and he tells a story of *Zeno's* servant most suitable to his Iambick taken out of *Seneca*, though he quotes the place of neither.

Well, *Zeno's* servant, he saith, when he was punished by his Master for a fault that he had done, told his Master out of his own grounds, that he was unjustly beaten, because he was; *Fato coactus peccare:* and hereupon making his reckoning without his hoste, concludes that, Certainly if Malefactors could not chuse but play their rude pranks, they could not be justly punished for them: Wherein he tells us what the servant said; but what the Master answered, thereof he saith just nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant said? Nothing lesse, but shapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lye thereon more softly. If we may believe *Diogenes Laertius* who reports the story, the Servants answer was not *Fato coactus sum peccare*, but *Fatale mihi erat furari.* For he took his servant playing the theefe, & though the servant took advantage from his Masters doctrine of Fate, to frame an Apology for himselfe, yet would not *Zeno* permit him to enjoy thereby any priviledge from stripes. For, *servum in furto deprehensum verberavit.* A manifest evidence that even in his opinion, the destiny he maintained was no just excuse for sinne. And to meet him in his own plea, when he said, *Fatale mihi erat furari,* & cedi inquit: this was the answer he made to his servant, which answer of his this Author either conceales, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed *Chrysippus* the Stoick, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall, yet denied not the liberty of mens wills, as appears in *Cicero de Fato*, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And *Plutarch* likewise in his book *De Fato* professeth as much. *Fatum omnia continet, sicut etiam videtur, neq; tamen propterea omnia necessario eveniunt; sed unumquodq; suo natura modo.* Neither did *Zeno* conceive hereby all place to be taken away for persuasion, as appears by his answer to *Crates*, when he took him by the cloake to draw him away from *Stilpo*, saying, *O Crates, commodissime auribus Philosophum teneas. Cum igi-*

ut persuaseris, tum illum trahere. Nam si per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud eos, sed animus apud Stoilponem erit. Neither were any Philosophers more studious of Morality then the Stoicks, They wrote *De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, deq; primâ estimatione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus*, as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Austin de Civit. Dei cap. 9. professeth of the Stoicks, that, though *Omnia Fato fieri contenderent*, yet, *Non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent*. And more then this, whereas the Stoicks were so jealous of maintaining the liberty of mens wills, that they denyed them of all other things to be subject to necessity. Austin professeth that their feare, of subjecting the wills of men unto necessity, in this respect was a causelesse feare. Ibid. cap. 10. *Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt, causas rerum ita distinguere ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent; itaq; in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent libere, si subderentur necessitati*. And then proceeds to shew, that there is a certain necessity nothing prejudiciall to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in subjection thereunto. And that necessity he describes to be this, as when we say, that, *Necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat*; his words are these; *Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est, ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis*. Herein Austin professeth to goe beyond the Stoicks, in acknowledging a necessity whereunto the will of man is subject, and that without detriment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgement, it would better become a Christian Divine, to informe both himselfe and others out of the Word of God, and rest thereon for the discovery of the nature of Providence and Predestination divine, then to goe a forraging among Poets and Stoicks, for the justification of his own, in point of Christian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Opposites.

INTRODUCTION.

SECT. IV.

THese absurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the same side willing to decline them as rocks and precipices, doe leave that Way, and present man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall sinne; and say, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne, did decree the greatest part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy, for the manifestation of his severe Justice.

But notwithstanding this difference among themselves, they agree well enough together. For this little jarre is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may see in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Remonstrants have these words. *Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem respexit in hoc decreto nondum creatum, vel creatum & lapsum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non pertinet libenter alii alios equitate Christiana toleramus*. After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted Gomarus to goe the Supralapsarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For these are their words, *An Deus in eligendo consideravit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant (viz. the Delegates aforesaid) non esse necessarium ut definitur, modo statueretur Deum in eligendo considerasse omnes homines in pari statu*. And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both say.

1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall, or actuall.
2. That the final impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree.

These two things are the *maxima gravamina* that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way. But because this last is chosen by the most, and latest maintainers of the absolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the easier to be defended, I will set down the conclusion which I dislike in their way and words.

God hath absolutely purposed from eternity, of his meer will and pleasure without any consideration of actual continuance in sinne and unbelieve, utterly to cast off from grace and glory, Millions of men considered in the fall (even those whom he calls to repentance and solvation by the Preaching of the Gospell) for the manifestation of his severity and Justice.

That all mankind is involved in the first sinne and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternall death, I confidently believe. But that God did absolutely intend to leave men in that woefull state for ever, and upon this only sinne, to build a peremptory decree of the unavoidable damnation of the farre greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be perswaded.

Having thus plainly laid down the position, which I deem to be false, I come now in the next place to deliver my reasons against it, which are of two sorts:

1. Such as first made me to question the truth of it.
2. Such as doe for the present convince me that it cannot be a truth.

T W I S S E

Confideration.

HERE breaks out the main reason, that moved this Author to represent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predestination, that so a way might be opened unto him at pleasure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the prooffe of his criminations, he might the better ease himselfe of the burthen thereof, by shewing the dissent of other Divines of the same profession from the former in this particular, making choyce rather to shape the object of Predestination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, lying in the masse corrupt by the fall of Adam. For surely it is to be presupposed, that they did not dissent from their former friends without some reason, and this Author makes bold to insinuate, that these absurdities mentioned by him were the reasons: As when he saith, *These absurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the same side willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices doe leave that way.* But that these were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor so much as adventureth upon the prooffe thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to supply that by his forwardnesse, to take it upon trust; as if this discourser by his morall carriage, might winne the opinion of so much worthinesse, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the darke, *quicum in tenebris miles.* And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a middle opinion between these, namely, of those who make the object of predestination the masse of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon *Junius*, and appeals to his *Theses*, as giving evident testimony thereunto. Now there is no shew or colour of reason, why, to avoyd the absurdities premised by this Author, any man should decline the first way, and embrace the second, which is the way of *Junius*. And this I conceive to be the main reason, why this second way is altogether dissembled by this Author, or by the spirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every sorry consideration to serve his turne in the way of motive, learning to represent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongst our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the justification of his absurdities charged upon the first way, from the mouthes or practice of our Divines, at least in appearance: and some colour hereof he findes by declining the first way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the first way and falling upon the second. Therefore he thought it a part of his wisdom altogether to dissemble the second, and to represent the opinion of those Divines who decline the first (yea and second too) and fall upon the third. But suppose *Junius* had preferred the third way and not the second, Had he done it out of a desire to decline the absurdities here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet be set not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintaines all these considerations to have their place in Predestination, and therefore makes *Hominem communiter consideratum* the object of predestination, which as it is a notion abstract from all the three speciall notions of *nondum conditum*, or *conditum*, but *nondum corruptum*, or *deniq; corruptum*, so it is indifferently applyable unto them all. And indeed *Piscator* resolves the question about the object of Predestination, namely, that as Predestination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, so the object must necessarily be mankind *not yet created*; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in *Adam*, so the object (as he thinkes) must be mankind *created*; but *not yet corrupted*; and lastly as it includes the decree of chusing some out of that corrupt masse, and refusing others or leaving them in it. so the object of his judgement must be mankind *both created and corrupted*. And Arminius himselfe professeth, that the twenty reasons wherewith he disputeth against the first way, may also be accommodated against the other waies. And albeit the followers of the second and third way doe think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the

absurdities wherewith the other waies are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of *Iunius*, as before I mentioned. *Moulin* indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subliſt in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Maſſe the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes God decree of damnation, he premiſeth thereunto, the foresight of ſmall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is *Moulin* ſound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concur with him, we ſhould not thing trouble our ſelves to take him off from his concurrence with *Moulin* in that particular of reprobation. And wee of the firſt way are willing to profeſſe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for ſinne and ſmall perſeverance therein; nor ſo only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of darnation precede the conſideration of ſinne, and ſmall impenitency; though we doe not make the conſideration of ſinne to precede the intention of darnation, as *Moulin* doth. And to my underſtanding, other reaſons there are, which caſt Divines upon the third way, then the declining of theſe absurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of juſtice, doe preſuppoſe ſinne. And whereas *Arminius* in his conference with *Iunius*, produceth five reaſons againſt the firſt way, no leſſe then foure of them proceed on this manner; The firſt thus, *Prædeſtinatio eſt voluntas Dei de illuſtrandâ ſua gloriâ per miſericordiâ & juſtiâ: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo.* The third thus, *Prædeſtinatio eſt pars providentiæ adminiſtrantis & gubernantis humani generis; ergo poſterior naturâ actu creationis vel propoſito creandi. Si poſterior actu creationis vel propoſito creandi hominē, jam homo prædeſtinationis obiectum non eſt conſideratus, ut nondum conditus.* His 4th argument is this, *Prædeſtinatio eſt præparatio ſupernaturalium bonorū; ergo præcedit communicatio naturalis, & propterea creatio in naturâ ſive actu, ſive in decreto Dei.* His laſt reaſon is of the ſame nature thus, *Illuſtratio ſapientiæ Dei per creationē prior eſt illuſtratione ſapientiæ Dei quæ eſt adminiſtratio prædeſtinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo creatio prior eſt prædeſtinatione.* To all which reaſons of his, I have answered in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Prædeſtin. digreſſ. 5.* in ſeverall chapters. Only the ſecond argument of *Arminius* inſiſteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the firſt and ſecond way, and embarking our ſelves in the third. But how freed? ſurely only ſo farre, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, ſuppoſing *Adams* fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning *Adams* fall. But nevertheleſſe it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted *Adam* to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the firſt way, acknowledge no other Providence divine concerning the ingreſſe of ſinne, as ſinne, into the world, but in the way of permiſſion. Sinne as ſinne admitting no cauſe efficient, but deficient only. And it is utterly impoſſible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in forbearing to doe what he doth not, ſhould in any culpable, or juſtly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon Gods permiſſion it followeth, that ſinne ſhall be committed by the creature; We readily profeſſe it doth. This *Vorſtius* acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not *Arminius* himſelf deliver it expreſſly, where he ſaith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, *Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum?* This he delivers without all qualification of the neceſſity mentioned, which we doe not. And this alſo *Navarretius* a Papiſt profeſſeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jeſuite that oppoſeth him in this. And if any man inferre herehence, that then God determining to permit ſinne, did determine that ſinne ſhould enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did ſo ordaine, namely, that ſinne ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion. *Non aliquid fit (ſaith Auſtin) niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo.* And *Bellarmino* profeſſeth, that, *Bonum eſt mala fieri Deo permittente:* ſo that herein God doth not will evill, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of *Bellarmino*; and that in the heat of his oppoſition againſt our Divines in this particular. And *Arminius* is expreſſe in ſaying, *Voluit Deus Achabum meſuram ſcelorum implere.* And what is this but, *Peccata peccatis cumulare?* And though the Jeſuits and Arminians doe with all their force reſiſt, yet it evidently followes from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of ſinne, dictated by *Arminius* himſelfe. For efficacious grace with the Jeſuits, conſiſts in the congruity

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei. l. 12. c. 7.

Lib. 2. de Adminiſtr. grat. & ſtat. peccati. c. 14.

Exam. p. 162.

congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof consists in this, that God foreseeth that upon the confession thereof sinne will be avoided. Now what is the reason why God grants such a grace, whereupon he seeth sin will not be avoided; and denies such a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knowes full well that sinne would be avoided; but because his pleasure is, that sinne shall be committed by his permission, and not be avoyded, although he hath given them grace sufficient to avoid it, as they say, and it was most true of *Adam* in the state of innocency. In like sort doth *Arminius* distinguish of, *Peccati impedimentum sufficiens & efficax*, Efficacious hinderance of sinne, is that whereby God seeth sinne will be avoided; sufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withall he confesseth, that God in the Promptuary of his wisdom, hath not only such impediments as are sufficient to the avoiding of any sinne, but such also, as whereby any sinne would indeed be avoided, were he pleased to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit sinne, he doth not grant such impediments. And is not this a manifest evidence, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe (to wit, as often as it doth come to passe) by his permission? But suppose all our Divines that embrace the third way, doe imagine the absurdities here spoken of, to be justly chargeable upon the first way. Yet as he thinks them in an error, while they conceive they can with ease avoid these absurdities by their third way, let him be pleased to conceive, they may as well be in an error, in thinking them justly chargeable upon the first way; and consequently their opinion is nothing sufficient to justify, that they are unremoveable by them that embrace the first way.

It is true there is no cause of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I shewed in my digressions *De Prædestinatione Digress.* 1. seeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of Gods grace, or of his sovereignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and consequently, to make whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessels of wrath; but equally they stand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of Gods decrees of creation, permission of the fall of *Adam*, giving grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it to others, and finally saving some and damning others, whereupon only arise the different opinions, as touching the object of predestination and reprobation, it is meerly *Apex Logicus*, a poynt of Logick. And were it not a meer madnesse, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, meerly upon a poynt of Logick? Thus have I justified the improbability and utter unlikelihood, that ever any schisme will be made in the Church of God, upon these nice and meer Logickall differences, in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei*, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a passage that hereafter he representeth therehence, and that farther into the Book then these my digressions are upon the point of predestination, but is content to take no notice thereof, least it might hinder the course of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are said unanimously to agree, and which he calls *maxima gravamina*. It is true they doe agree herein, but it may be in a farre other sense, then he is willing should be taken notice of. For as for the first,

1. That the moving cause of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall.

1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election; but only the will of God; so no sinne or evill work of man is the cause of reprobation, but only the will of God.

1. That so it is of election, the Apostle both

1. Saith, Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth.

2. And proveth thus, Before *Esaue* and *Jacob* were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said, The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Workes (that is of good workes) but of him that calleth.

2. That so it is of reprobation, I prove by the same argument of the Apostle, thus, Before *Esaue* and *Jacob* were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore reprobation stands not of workes (that is of evill workes) but of the meer pleasure of God.

1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods course of calling in the point of Election, as the Apostle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon them.

Sinne not the cause of Reprobation.

them. For as the Apostle afterwards professeth, *He hath mercy on whom he will.*

2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the same Apostle professeth, saying, that God hardneth whom he will.

2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversaries desire to confound, least their cheating carriage should be discovered, as formerly I have shewed.

For Predestination and Reprobation, may be considered either *quoad Prædestinantis & Reprobantis actum*; or *quoad Prædestinationis & Reprobationis terminum*, as much as to say, *quoad res prædestinatione & reprobatione preparatas*, that is, either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man (saith Aquinas) was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination. And why so? Because the act of predestination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (saith he) I have shewed, that there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act also of Gods will? This cannot be denied: and herehence it followes, that like as there can be no cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, so there can be no cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to say, that merits were the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so it is no lesse madnesse in his judgement, to maintaine that either sinne originall or actuall, can be the meritorious cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.

And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity? Why surely these. 1. Predestination and Reprobation are eternall, but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall; but impossible it is, that a thing temporall, can be the cause of that which is eternall. 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very essence of God even God himselfe; and therefore to introduce a cause of Gods will, is to bring in a cause of God himselfe. 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election, then either they are so of their own nature, or by the meer constitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the constitution of God: but this cannot stand neither. For if by the constitution of God, then it would follow, that God did constitute, that upon foresight of mans faith he would elect him, that is, ordaine him to salvation. And what I pray is to constitute? Is it any other then to ordaine? And herehence it followeth, God did ordaine that upon foresight of mans faith, he would ordaine him unto salvation: Whereby the eternall ordination of God, is made the object of his eternall ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporall, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall. In like sort I dispute of reprobation: if sinne be the cause thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cause thereof, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confesse: if you say by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordaine, that upon the foresight of mans sinne, he would ordaine him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to consider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and shewed that thus they can have no cause.

But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas professeth and we professe with him. As for example to begin with election.

The things decreed or destined to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both these may have a cause: For both Grace is the cause of glory; and Christs merits are the cause both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly understood. For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurke, thereby to shut their eyes against the evidence of truth. For no marvail if men be in love with their own errors; and in proportion to the love of error, such is their hatred of Divine truth opposite thereunto. Now by grace, we understand the grace of regeneration, whereby that

that naturall corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindnesse of mind and hardnesse of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through originall sin, is in part cured. More distinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we say God bestowes on whom he will, finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency. For so the Apostle tells us, that, *God hath mercy on whom he will.* And as God bestowes it on whom he will, not finding any cause in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine constitution, moving him to bestow this grace on any. So the Apostle 2 *Timoth. 1.9.* *God hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace.* And indeed we being all found dead in sinne, what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and repentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then should grace be bestowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraise (as *Bellarmino* acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Palestine: and *Pelagius* himselfe was driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise they had condemned him also. Rom. 9. 18.

But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not bestow this on whom he will, finding men equall without any moving cause thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cause in man by constitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some, and not on others. For God hath made a gracious promise, that whosoever beleeveth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and repentance unto death shall be saved, and whosoever beleeveth not and repenteth not shall be damned. So then though men are equall in originall sinne, and in naturall corruption, and God bestowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equall in morall condition; and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner, to bestow glory & solvation on who he will. For he hath tyed himselfe by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none, but such as dye in the state of grace. Yet, I confesse, some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & bestows these graces on who he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phraise of bestowing this or that on whom he will. For when God bestowes faith and repentance, he findes them on whom he will bestow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the bestowing of glory he findes them, on whom he bestowes that, farre better then others:

Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and these are two.

1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and repentance, whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured.

2. The denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The first of these, to wit, the denyall of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it must needs be so, in case God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apostle professeth, that as *God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardneth whom he will.* And as God denies this grace to whom he will, so did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a difference considerable: For albeit God hardneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithstanding, like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that sinne whether originall or actual, wherein he findes them, when the ministry of the word is afforded them: so likewise it cannot be denied to be just with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he findes them uncured. But yet because God hath not made any such constitution, namely, that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, shall be so left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly said, as to cure it in whom he will, so to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equall in originall sinne, and consequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitency. So wee may justly say, there is no cause at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the meer pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference. And if any list to contend hereabouts, we shall be willing to entertaine him, and conferre our strength of argumentation on this point.

2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the second thing decreed in reprobation, there is alwaies found a cause motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denyall of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleasure of his will; & that

by

Whether finall impenitency & damnation of rep. be necessary.

by reason of his own constitution, having ordained that whosoever continueth finally in infidelity, in profane courses, and impenitency shall be damned. And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sence (as formerly I have shewed) that God saves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he bestowes on whom he will; yet in no congruous sence can he be said to damne whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of sinne, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he workes, but sinne and the evill thereof he only permits, not causeth it. And lastly, as God doth not damne whom he will, but those only whom he finds finally to have persevered in sinne without repentance: so neither did he decree to damne, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sinne without repentance.

Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; *The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall*: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We say that reprobation doth signify, either a purpose of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpose of inflicting damnation. And each may be considered, either as touching the act of Gods decree, or as touching the things decreed. We shew how the Article holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.

1. As touching the things decreed,

1. As touching the deniall of grace, We say, That God decreed of his meere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any motive cause hereunto found in one more then in another.

2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We say, That God decreed to inflict damnation on some, not of his meere pleasure, but meerey for their finall perseverance in sinne without repentance.

2. As touching the very act of Gods decree, We say, Nothing in man could be the cause hereof, but the meere pleasure of God, as *Aquinas* professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, & as I have shewed, because both are eternall and the act of Gods will, which is God himselfe; and withall to devise a cause hereof, is to cast our selves upon an unavoydable absurdity, as namely to say, That God did ordaine that upon the foresight of this or that in men, he would ordaine some of them to salvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harshnesse of the Tenent, consists chiefly in confounding these different considerations, whereby a colour is cast, as if we maintained that God did decree to damne men of his meere pleasure and not for sin.

2. As touching the second which is this, *That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary, and unavoydable by Gods absolute decree*. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoydable by Gods absolute decree; whereas it is without all question, that supposing impenitency to be finall, damnation is unavoydable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whosoever dies in impenitency shall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that originall corruption wherein all are borne? I perswade my selfe they doe not. *Corvinus* professeth of all, That by the sinne of Adam, they are, *conjecti in necessitatem peccandi*. Then againe doth he maintaine that any is able to cure this but God. It seems he doth not by that which followeth, where he signifieth that God (in his opinion) did not absolutely intend to leave men to that woefull estate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If so, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impossible God should not doe that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of justice. But nothing more manifest, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certainly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is mans fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to say, if man would doe somewhat which he may doe, then God would give him repentance. Here is good stuffe towards; and undoubtedly, this is the criticall point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how carefull the greatest Rabbies amongst the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifestly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given *secundum merita*, according to some good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synode of Palestine above 1200 years agoe; Nay what will you say, if their doctrine hereabouts

in the issue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, *ut Velle credere, modo Velit, ut Velle respicere, modo Velit*, as I can shew it under the hand of one? and I have cause to suspect that it comes also from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deal with. And in this case it shall not be true that God shews mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he shall shew mercy on whom man will. And like as when, a question is made, why such a man is rewarded by the Magistrate, no wise man will answer because it is the pleasure of the Magistrate so to reward him, but rather represent the cause on mans part, why he was rewarded: so if God shews mercy in giving repentance according to some preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it shall not be said, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reason on mans part is to be represented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet these Petitions he calls *maxima gravamina* on the part of Reprobation.

And will he not give us leave to propose in proportion hereunto, our *maxima gravamina*, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the meer pleasure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreseen, that is the moving cause of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and repent, and no man hath more cause to be thankfull unto God, for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I speak of reprobate men; but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angels. And as touching that which they call grace subsequent, which is only Gods concurrence, seeing God affords that to any sinfull act, they may thank themselves, rather then God for that, like as for Gods concurrence unto any act of sinne. These doctrines are no *gravamina* to the tender consciences of our Adversaries.

The doctrine opposit to this which here he dislikes must needs be this, God hath not absolutely purposed from eternity of his meer will and pleasure, but upon consideration of actuall continuance in sinne and unbelieve, to cast off men from grace and glory. Now this actuall continuance in unbelieve I presume must be finall; and upon the consideration hereof, God casts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? surely from the grace of faith; otherwise it stands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the issue comes to this, Whom God foresees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they shall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foresees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they shall not repent unto death. This is the sober and savoury doctrine of these impugnors of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a spirit of giddinesse possesseth them in this.

It is without question (I think) that God leaves many in that woefull estate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any specification wherein it consists) the guilt whereof is eternall death; and seeing that if he so leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended so to leave them. All the question is, Whether God did absolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he professeth his dislike of Gods absolue intention hereof, so dealt clearly, and shewed how he did intend so to leave some, as namely upon what condition, or upon foresight whereof, and withall given some proove of his assertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we say, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this state. For the terme, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he speaks of some or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woefull state, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expressly called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Reprobates, I doe not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And *Austin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4.* speaking of the *Non prædestinati*: *Illorum neminem* (saith he) *adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque penitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorem patientiam, sive non impariem præbeat*: and if not unto repentance, then certainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then againe, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turkes and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woefull estate. If none are left but all are saved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternall death, for which not any suffers? And you may guesse by this whether this Authors Pretence of acknowledgement of naturall corruption be not only from the teeth outward.

If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this wofull estate, and suffer eternall death for that naturall corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this wofull estate absolutely or no. For I professe willingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Divine foresight of any thing in them, to put a difference between some and others.



II. The Discourse it selfe, consisting of

1. *Motives inducing,*
2. *Arguments convincing.*

1. Motives inducing.

DISCOURSE.

SECT. I.

The first
Motive.

THe Reasons of the first sort are these foure which follow.

1. The Novelty of it. I cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of grace among them against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 years after Christ: nor the Lower way till the time of S. Austin, which was above 400 years after him.

They did all generally agree upon the contrary Conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved, and to have repented which repented not, and that there was no decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any sonne of Adam.

Lib. 3. Instit.
c. 22. sect. 1.

This that I say M. Calvin himselfe doth ingeniously acknowledge, speaking of election, and reprobation, according to Gods foreknowledge, *Necq; hac vulgo recepta opinio solius vulgi est, habuit enim seculum omnibus magnos Auctores*; The Opinion of a conditionall decree hath had great Authors in all ages.

Beza in Rom.
11. v. 37.
Prosper in e-
pist. ad August.

Reverend Beza speaking likewise of the same opinion, speaks to the same effect in these words; *In quem errorem sanè turpissimum Origenes Veteres pleriq; tum Græcos, tum Latinos adegit*, Into which most foule error Origen drew many of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines. But Prosper amongst the rest S. Austins Scholler doth very clearly witness it, *Pene omnium (saith he) patrum inveniri et unam sententiam qua propositum est, Prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperunt, ut ob hoc Deus alia vasa contumelias, alios bonis vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusq; præviderit, et sub ipso gratia adiutorio, in qua futurus esset voluntate et actione præciserit*. All did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according to his foresight of their actions, not otherwise.

To these Testimonies let me adde two or three particular instances for the farther clearing of the newnesse of it.

Minutius Felix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they hold an inevitable event of things, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoidable destinies, and nor their ill choyces in these words. *Quicquid agitis ut alii Fato, ita vos Deo aditis: Iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem*. The objection he thus answers. *Illud Fatum est quod de unoquoq; Deus factus est*. Christians hold no other Fates then Gods decrees, *Qui cum universam præciserit materiam pro meritis et qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat; et ita in vobis non genitura præstitur, sed ingenii natura punitur*. God that foreknew all men and their actions did accordingly determine their retributions.

Hier. ad Gal.
cap. 1. 15.
Idem ad cap.
1. Mal.
Id. lib. 3. con-
tr. Pelag.

S. Hierome an eager opposer of the Pelagians in many places of his writings hath the same thing. *Ex præscientia dei evenit ut quem justum futurum scit prius diligat quam oriatur, ex utero et quem peccatorem adierit antequam peccet*. To the same purpose he speaks in another place, *Dilectio et Odium Dei vel ex præscientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus, aliqui novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit, quæ creavit*. And in his Book against Pelagius he saith, *Elegit Deus quem bonum cernit*. The summe of all which he speaks is but this, that there is no decree of damning or of saving men, but what is built upon Gods foreknowledge of the evil and good actions of men.

I will shut up my instances with the judgement of the Councell of Arles against the Pelagians in the year 490. or thereabout. This Councell subscribed to the Letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Prædestinarian, and made the Anathema's and curses which he therein denounced against him and such like, to be their own; some of which were these, *Anathema illi qui dixerit, illum qui perierit non accepisse ut saluus esse possit*, and againe, *Anathema illi qui dixerit, quod uas contumelia non possit assurgere ut sit uis in honorem.* *Synod. Arelat. 34. contra Lucedum. Bin. Tom. 2. part. 2. fol. 639.*

By this and the like speeches which I have met with in the Ancients being convinced, that the doctrine of absolute reprobation (and election too) was unknown unto them, I begin to call it into question. For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Councells the rules of my Faith (because they are but men and therefore subject unto error) yet I honour their gray haire, and their grave assemblies, and doe vehemently mistrust those doctrines which they never approved or taught, but disliked and condemned.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

AS touching the pretence of Antiquity; I find many are very apt to make plausible use of this, when either indeed, or at least in their imagination, it seems to serve their turnes. And because I am put upon it, I will speak somewhat of it in generall, and then proceed to consider it as it is applyable to the present occasion.

As concerning the first, I find no small equivocation in the word Ancient: For if we compare an ancient man with a younger, in all probability the ancient is likely to be more wise then the other; because he hath more experience, by reason of the length of his daies; according to that of *Job. 12. 12.* Amongst the ancient is wisdom, and in length of daies is understanding. But this holds not of that which is ancient, as it signifies that which goes before another. For it is well known, that youth goeth before old age; yet no man will say, that the opinions of men in their youth, are more likely to be sound, then the opinions of riper age. Neither doth any man call or account youth Antiquity. Yet our Fathers we call our Ancients, because they have gone before us, but little reason there is in my judgement, to count their faith the more sound by reason of such Antiquity; no more then why the opinions of man in his youth, should be reputed more sound, then the opinions of his age. For as there is a youth in man; so there is to be acknowledged a youth of the world; and so likewise of the Christian World, even of the Church of God. The Holy Ghost speaks in this language. For even they who were the great Ancestors of the Jews in the daies of Jeremy, are called the youth of Israell, as the youth of Gods Church. *Jerem. 2. 2. I remember thee with the kindnesse of thy youth, and the love of thy marriage, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness, in a land that was not sown. Israel was as a thing hallowed unto the Lord, &c. Ezech. 16. 60. I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the daies of thy youth.* In like sort the Ancients counting them immediately from the Apostles daies, are the very youth of the Church Christian. Now like as it is not to be expected that a man should have as great perfection of knowledge in his youth, as in his age; so neither is it to be supposed, that the Church of Christ should have as great perfection of knowledge in her youth as in her age. This is to be understood *cæteris paribus*; otherwise there lies a double exception against it: the One in the way of Gods extraordinary mercy, the Other in the way of Gods extraordinary judgement. For God may extraordinarily inspire a young man with the spirit of Prophecy, and so make him wiser then the aged. Such was the condition of Gods exuberant grace in the daies of the Apostles, enduing them with power from on high; not only to instruct them with all spirituall wisdom and understanding in the mysteries of the Gospell, but enabling them also to expresse it in diverse languages, that so they might be able Ministers of Christ, to carry the glad tidings of salvation over all the World. On the other side, the sinnes of the Christian world not embracing Gods Truth with love

A Vindication of the absolute decree

love, may deserve at the hands of God, that he should give them over to illusions to believe lies. Then no marvaile if our former light set in obscure darknesse, and degenerate daies come in place of better and more noble times; which may more easily come to passe, considering that the light of the Gospell is a spirituall light of faith, no naturall light of reason; though even this naturall light of reason comes to be amended and perfected by that light of grace.

But it may be said, that They who lived neer the Apostles daies, are like to be better acquainted with the truth of God then wee. I have found some to please themselves in this conceit, and it runns smooth and glibb, and it seems very plausible to winne approbation. But as *Austin* saith of some things, that *acutule sonant*, but *discussa reperiuntur obtusa*: so many times it falls out, that reasons plausible at first, when exploration comes, prove very unsound; like the fruit *Solinus* writes of, which grew about Sodome, Faire to the eye, but being crushed *in cineres abeunt & vanam fuliginem*. And for the discovering of the emptinesse of this reason, I proceed thus.

When you say of those Ancients, that they were neer to the Apostles. I demand whether the meaning be, they were neer to the times of the Apostles, or neer to the Persons of the Apostles, or neer to the word of the Apostles. The former two, doe nothing at all conduce to the perfection of Christian knowledge, or soundnesse of faith. For certainly both Jews and Heathens professed enemies to the crosse of Christ were as neer to their Times and Persons as believing Christians, but they were not so familiarly acquainted with their word. But as touching familiar acquaintance with the word of the Apostles, as also the embracing of it by faith: Nothing I trust hindereth us from being as neer to the Apostles, as the Ancients were. Nay it is well known, that as touching divers peeces of the books of the New Testament, we receive them for Canonically, which many of the Ancients doubted of. And as touching divers books concerning the times of the Old Testament, they are discovered unto us to be Apocryphall, which to many of the Ancients were not.

But it may be said, that these Ancients to whom they pretend so much reverence (which indeed is but reverence to themselves, and to serve their own turnes) were so neer to the Apostles, that they not only were partakers of their writings, but of their Preaching also by word of mouth? To this I answer.

1. That it is a very rare thing to meet with any such now adaies, unlesse it be some counterfeit Author: neither doe I find any such alleadged by any, least of all by any Arminian, who yet upon my knowledge doe discourse after this manner, as touching their neernesse to the Apostles.

2. But suppose there were any such, and they should tell us what they heard preached by the Apostles, shall we take their relations for Oracles, and make the word of God to consist, partly of that which is written by them, and partly of that which is not written, but delivered by word of mouth, and commended unto us by tradition? Then farewell the doctrine of Protestants concerning the rule of faith, that it is only the written word; and let us with the Papists, joyne thereunto traditions to make up a compleat Rule of Faith.

It may be farther said, that by reason of their neernesse to the Apostles, they may be better acquainted with the meaning of the word written.

To which I answer; if so, then either from the Apostles own mouths, or by relation from others. Of any that report what they heard from the Apostles own mouths, they alleadge none. If they did, what were this other then to bring in Tradition to be a Rule, if not of faith, yet of interpretation of Gods word, which is as foule every way as the former, considering that soundnesse of faith, is grounded upon the soundnesse of interpretation of Gods word. If only by relation from others, the same exceptions lye against this and over and above, this must be of somewhat farre lesse authority then the former: it being so difficult a matter to report from another without adding somewhat of his own, whether it be much or little, as *Chaucer* speaketh.

Lastly, let the Commentaries of these daies, be compared with the Commentaries of the Ancients, and let the indifferent reader judge, which of them are most true, most learned, most substantiall. So that I suppose, I may be bold to conclude, that this reason drawn from the neernesse of the Ancients to the Apostles, how plausible soever it seems at first sight, yet indeed is of no force.

Now to the contrary we have these reasons.

1. Like as it is fit every man should profit in the knowledge of God more and more, as long as he lives: so in all likelihood, the Christian world doth profit more and more, as they draw neerer to the end of the world, excepting those times of Gods judgements in giving the world over to illusions to believe lies. *Austin* did profit, as in other points of Christian knowledge, so in this as concerning Predestination, and blames the Massilienſes for not profiting with him. *De Predestin. lib. 1. cap. 4. Videtis quid tunc de fidei & operibus sentiebam, quamvis de commendanda dei gratia laborarem; In qua sententia istos fratres nostros esse nunc video: quia non sicut legere libros meos, ita curaverunt proficere mecum.*

2. We have more means and helps for our furtherance in Christian knowledge, then they had, and that in divers respects. First, because we enjoy their labours, they enjoyed not ours, nor the like before them. So that by the reading of their writings we soon attain to that knowledge which they had, they communicating it unto us; and it were very strange we should adde nothing thereunto; especially considering that *Veritas* was wont to be accounted *temporis filia*: and *Aristotle* accounts it an easy thing to adde; Any man saith he may doe that, *τὸ ἐκθέραι τῶ τεχνῶν*, and thus, saith he, Arts come to their perfection *ἕως ῥηθνασιν ἢ τεχνῶν ἐμδδσς*. A tall man is able to discover much farther then a Dwarf, but let a Dwarf be advanced upon the shoulders of that tall man, and he will discover much farther then he. Let then those Antients goe for tall fellows in the discovery of Christian truth; let the Divines of moderne ages be but Dwarfs, as the Children of Israel seemed to be, but Grashoppers in comparison of the Canaanites, especially to the sonnes of *Anack*; yet if by their pious labours and industries, which they have with much ingenuity communicated unto us, they suffer us to get upon their shoulders, shall not we though Dwarfs, be enabled hereby to discover somewhat more then they? The Eagle is a fowle of great strength and soareth high, the highest of all Kites and Haukes, yet let her carry a Wren along with her on her shoulders in her aëriall ascensions, when she is weary and can fly no higher, can it seem strange, if the Wren carried thus high by this *Anakim* of fowles, presumes of her own strength to fly a little higher then she? or is this any glory to the Wren, or disparagement to the Eagle?

2. Secondly Have not we better helps of Art then they, especially as touching the knowledge of the Tongues, and Logically resolutions of the Text. The Latine Fathers most of them were little acquainted with the Greek; neither Latine nor Greek Fathers were usually much acquainted with the Hebrew: *Origen* amongst the Greek, and *Hierom* amongst the Latine, had not their fellows for this.

3. Lastly, the Ancients in their daies were not so put unto it as the latter; Nothing did more quicken them, or doth us, then contentions with Heretiques. And therefore look how they were exercised with Heresies, so it is to be expected they were best seen in those Articles of Faith, which were most shaken by Heretiques. This both *Austin* and *Gregory* take notice of; and *Austin* is most frequent herein, some passages to this purpose I shall relate hereafter. Now before *Pelagius* his daies, the Fathers were much exercised in opposing the Manichees, and accordingly gave themselves to the maintenance of Free-will, as *Aniarius* observes by the relation of *Sixtus Senensis*. But *Pelagius* was the first that opposed Gods grace; and therefore those Fathers that contended with him, gave themselves chiefly to the maintenance of Gods grace. Bibl. l. 5. annot. 101.

And now am I come to the treating of Ancients no longer in generall, but in a speciall reference to the doctrine of predestination. Now herein the Papists themselves (who in other points labour to beat us down with nothing so much as with the noise of Antiquity) are willing to confesse that in the point of grace and predestination we need not trouble our selves, with inquiry after the doctrine of the Ancients before *Pelagius* rose, and that upon the ground before mentioned, to wit, because they were nothing exercised hereabouts. As for example *Bellarmino*, *De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. lib. 1. c. 14.* having proposed diverse passages of the Fathers favouring, as it seemed, the doctrine wherewith *Pelagius* troubled the peace of Gods Church, makes *Austin* to answer for him, *Veteres Patres qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, questionem istam nunquam accurate tractasse, sed incidenter solum, & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò* (saith *Bellarmino*) *in fundamento hujus sententiæ, quod est, Gratiam Dei non prævenire ab ullo opere nostro, sed contrà ab illâ omnia opera nostra præveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad salutem sit in nobis, quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosi-*

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sum & Nazianzenum: yet he takes a course to reconcile them to the truth; so doth Sixtus Senenius *Bibl. Sanct. lib. 6. Annota. 251.* so doth Alvarez. *dē Auxil. lib. 5. disp. 37.*

Again consider. The decrees of predestination and reprobation are secret, neither doe they appeare of what condition they are, but by the manner of their executions. Now their executions doe consist partly in bestowing salvation on some, and inflicting damnation on others; partly in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. As touching salvation and damnation we willingly professe, that the salvation of men of ripe years, doth alwaies presuppose Faith and perseverance therein; and the damnation of others doth alwaies presuppose finall perseverance in sinne unrepented of. But we deny that hereence it followeth, that either faith precedes the decree of salvation, or sinne precedes the decree of damnation, or the prescience of either. That faith cannot precede election, nor sinne reprobation, is evident; For as much as election and reprobation are eternall, but faith and sinne are things temporall: but that which is temporall cannot precede that which is eternall. Neither doth it follow, that because faith precedes salvation, therefore faith precedes the decree of salvation. For it is faith existent in time that precedes salvation; but no Divine will say that faith existent in time, precedes Gods decree of salvation, unlesse it be some such as maintaine with Vorstius, that Gods decrees are not eternall. In like sort, it is sinne existent in time, that precedes damnation; but no wise Divine will say, that sinne existent in time precedes Gods decree of damnation; the former being a thing temporall but this decree eternall. Lastly, neither will it follow that because faith precedes salvation and sinne damnation, therefore the foresight of faith, is antecedent to the decree of salvation, and the foresight of sinne is antecedent to the decree of damnation. For no Enthymeme of this nature is found, but so farre forth as it is reducible into a good Categorical Syllogisme, whereof these Enthymemes are uncapable. For Enthymemes reducible unto good Syllogismes must agree, either in their Subjects or in their Predicates, but these doe not. Again all the termes in a good Enthymeme must be expressed in that Syllogisme whereunto it is reduced. But each of these Enthymemes consisteth manifestly of four termes; as in the first, these, Faith, and the Foresight of faith, Salvation and the Decree of salvation; Of the second, these, Sinne, and Foresight of sinne, Damnation and the Decree of damnation; and consequently that Syllogisme whereunto either of these quaternary of termes is clapt, cannot be good; For no Categorical Syllogisme is good that consisteth of foure termes. As for the reducing of them into a Syllogisme Hypothetically, such Reductions were never heard of in the Schooles of the learned; and that for just reason; because that is no course to justify the soundnesse of the Enthymemes, but a meer begging of that which is in question. As in case a man should reduce it thus; If faith be precedant to salvation, then the foresight of faith is precedant to the decree of salvation; But faith is precedant to salvation, Therefore it is precedant to the decree of salvation. In this Hypothetical Syllogisme, the consequence of the Major is the very Enthymeme which is in question, for the substance of it and consequently no proving of it, but a mere begging of it. Yet notwithstanding we doe not deny, but that God did decree that no man should be saved, but such as being of ripe years, should be found to persevere in faith unto death; none should be damned, but such as should be found finally to persevere in sinne. The other execution of these decrees consists (as I said) in the bestowing of the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. Now the question is, Whether God be indeed the author of faith and repentance, yea, or no; and because the Arminians dare not professedly deny this. (though lately they are come so farre as professedly to deny that Christ merited it) therefore let the question proceede about the manner how God bestowes it, as namely, whether he bestowes it of his meer pleasure on some, denying it to others, or, Whether the reason why God bestowes it on some and not on others, be, because God findes some good work in one, which he findes not in another. This question being decided, it will clearly appeare, whether predestination proceeds upon the foresight of ought in man, yea or no. For if God of his meer pleasure doth bestow faith on one, and not on another, it followes undeniably, that God predestinated him hereunto absolutely, and of his meer pleasure, without consideration of any future work of man. But if God bestowes faith on man upon consideration of some precedent work of his, which, was not

not the work of God, then (and not otherwise neither) it will follow, that upon the consideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith; or predestinate faith unto him. So that if we desire sincerely and ingeniously to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the absoluteness of predestination, we should state the question as touching Predestination unto faith, and not as touching Predestination unto salvation. For we all confesse that God predestinated no man unto salvation, but such as he foresaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe sooner or later. And therefore the main question between the Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predestination, and whether there were not another decree of Predestination besides, as namely, whether God did not decree to bestow faith on some, and deny it unto others. And secondly to inquire, Whether this decree of bestowing faith on some, did not proceed according to Gods good pleasure, without consideration of any different work in man. And the most compendious resolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himselfe in the bestowing of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his meer pleasure he hath not mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance, and of his meer pleasure, denyes the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whosoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their suffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the first Synode that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had disturbed it, namely, *Gratiam non dari secundum merita*, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, *Gratiam non dari secundum opera*. Lastly, all of us now a daies consent, as touching Gods concurrence to the substance of every act of the creature whether good or evill. Now let this Author or any other, represent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to answer particularly, according to this Authors text.

*De Grat. &
lib. Arbitr. f.
6. c. 5.*

He cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. Belike he can find reprobation evitable; a strange phrase either way. These attributes applied to damnation doe carry a faire sense with them, damnation being a work of God wrought in time, and undoubtedly may be avoided, may be incurred for the time to come. But reprobation is eternall as God himselfe, and how that should be fancied to be of an avoidable condition for the time to come, I cannot comprehend, unlesse this Author be of their opinion, who desire to shape Gods decrees of a revocable nature, as being both to impute unto him an impotent immutability, as some are pleased to phrase it.

But leave we reprobation unavoidable, take we the absolute nature of it into consideration: this he cannot find in all Antiquity. But consider I pray, he pretends these motives, as inducements to change his former opinion: so then belike, he stood sometimes for reprobation absolute; but did he find any footing in Antiquity for it, what time he embraced it? if he did formerly embrace it, notwithstanding he found no footing in Antiquity for it, why should he now relinquish it, for finding no footing in Antiquity for it? Belike the older he waxeth, the more he groweth in love with Antiquity. Again when formerly he did embrace the doctrine of absolute reprobation, upon what grounds did he embrace it? was it because he was in hope he should hereafter find Antiquity for it? or was it only for the authority of them who brought him up in this opinion? What sorry grounds are these to build a mans faith upon? Yet this is not our course to impose Articles of faith on any, but rather to endoctrinate them out of the word of God. If then a mans Christian faith be built upon the Word of God, is it a Christian course to renounce it, or to question the integrity of it, because he finds no footing in Antiquity for it? What then shall become of the faith of Laicks, and such as are unlearned? Must the writings of the Fathers be translated into all vulgar Languages, and the unlearned addict themselves to the study of them, least otherwise their faith prove a wavering faith, for want of finding Antiquity to favour it? Belike the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, are no part of Antiquity, in this Authors more mature judgement. But if formerly the doctrine of absolute reprobation were received upon the evidence of Gods word, as it is fit the faith of every Christian should be grounded thereupon, especially the faith of a Divine called to be a Teacher of others; I should think there were no just cause of alteration, but upon discovery of the error of those grounds, whereupon formerly it was builded; and the discovery hereof alone, were chiefly to the present purpose, namely,

namely to shew just cause of change of mind', & alteration of judgement, but no such course doe I find taken here. These motives and reasons here proposed, may carry a shew of reason, why a man being yet to chuse his faith in these particulars, possessed with neither way, but indifferent, might preferre one way before another, one opinion before another, but nothing sufficient to justify a change, unlesse the weaknesse of former grounds be laid open. For it may be that the former grounds might be such as upon due comparison would be found to overweigh these pretences. For upon view that I have taken of the discourse following, I find not one argument drawn from those places of Scripture that treat of election and reprobation; these I find are purposely declined as so many rocks, as if the Author feared to make shipwrack of his errors (pardon my boldnesse in so naming them, *Austin* is my precedent in this saying, *Hoc scio contra istam prædestinationem quam secundum scripturas defendimus, neminem nisi errando disputare posse*) but in the mean time while he fears to make shipwrack of his errors, let him take heed least he make shipwrack of a good conscience.

*Aug. de don.
Persev. c. 19.*

Rom. 9. 18.

*De dono Per-
sev. 19.*

*Bellar. de grat.
& lib. arbit.
l. 6. c. 5.*

But proceed we with him about the inquiry what footing this doctrine finds in Antiquity. He saith he cannot find it; but it is more then I find that ever he made any convenient search after it, his whole discourse hereupon is of so hungry a nature. The absolutenesse of election and reprobation, we conclude in Christian reason from Gods absolute carriage in giving and denying grace, understanding thereby the grace of regeneration. Now the absolutenesse herein, as we suppose, consists in bestowing this grace on some, and denying it to others, according to the meer pleasure of the Lords will. Now hath not the Apostle (more ancient then all the Antiquity he speaketh of) professed in expresse termes, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth?* What need we seek farther amongst the Ancients for the justification of this? And that mercy here is meant, such a mercy in bestowing faith on some, which is denied to others, in converting the wills of some unto good, when others are not converted, I could prove by variety of places out of *Austin*, whose authority in this case is farre more worthy, then all the authority this Author produceth. Neither is this the voyce of *Austin* only, but of *Ambrose* also in that famous saying of his *Quem vult religiosum, facit*, so much magnified by *Austin*. And not *Ambrose* alone, but *Nazianzen* also, and *Cyprian* are alleaged by him, as concurring with him in the foundation of the doctrine of predestination, which he makes to be the freedome of Gods grace in converting whom he will. And which is farre more then this, yea farre more then all that can be produced to the contrary, by the very Prayers of the Church every where in use, he justifies the generall concurrence in that which he accounts the foundation of predestination. As when their common course was to pray unto God, that he would be pleased to convert unto the faith of Christ the hearts of Heathens; and wherein did this conversion consist, but in giving them faith and repentance: manifestly giving us to understand thereby, that the whole Catholique Church did concur in this Article of Faith, that it was in the power of God according to his free grace, to convert whom he would unto the faith of Christ, and consequently not to convert whom he would. For if there were any cause on mans part, why he doth not convert some converting others, then there were also on mans part, a cause why God doth convert some not converting others, and consequently grace should be given according unto works, that is in the phrase of the Ancients, *Gratiam dari secundum merita* (as *Bellarmino* acknowledgeth) which was ever accounted expresse Pelagianisme, and was as expressely condemned in the Councel of Palestine above 1200 years agoe, and *Pelagius* himselfe was driven to subscribe unto it, by shamefull dissimulation so to prevent Anathematization of his own person.

But the upper way (saith this Author) was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers for 600 years. Here breaks forth another reason of this Authors (or his that directed him) cunning carriage in distinguishing the two waies of our Divines in maintaining the absolutenesse of election and reprobation, to wit, that in the course of his discourse he might serve his turne with both, and where Antiquity served not his turne against the one, yet might it serve his turne, as he thought against the other. But the truth is, there was no such question at all ventilated in those daies, as touching the object of predestination, no nor in Austins neither, nor many hundred years after, that I know. And no marvell; For it concernes the ordering of Gods decree aright, which is meerly Logicall, as I have shewed in my *Vind. Grat. Dei*. Its true that *St Austin* doth usually accommodate that of *St Paul*, *Rom. 9. 21.* concerning the Masse, unto mankind

mankind considered in *Massa damnata* as he commonly calls it, that is, in the corrupt Masse; but not alwaies, but sometimes he speaks of it, and accommodates it cleerely unto the Masse of mankind uncorrupt, yea, as yet not created, as there I have shewed. And as for the right ordering of Gods decrees, and the right stating of the object of predestination and reprobation, We desire no better, nor other ground then that of the Apostle, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*, that is, he cures infidelity and hardnes of heart in whom he will, by bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in whom he will by denying faith and repentance unto them. And as for the rigour of this Tenent (as it is commonly accounted) of making the Masse of mankind not created the object of predestination, I have already shewed the vanity of that conceit and denomination; for as much as hereby neither is the decree of damnation made to precede the consideration of sinne, no nor of finall impenitency in any moment of nature, nor in any moment of nature is the decree of salvation made by mee, to precede the consideration of finall perseverance in faith and repentance. But whereas some, who are most rigid indeed in their discourse, make the decree of saving some and damning others to precede the decree of creating and permitting of sinne both originall and actuall; others who are most dissolute, make the decree of creating and permitting of sinne, to precede the decree of saving some and damning others, My Opinion is equally removed from these extreames, and conceives none of these decrees to be either way subordinate, but all coördinate and simultaneous, as being decrees only of various means, tending to one and the same end; thus God doth decree both to create some, and to permit to sinne, and finally to persevere therein, and to damne them for their sinne, to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice vindicative. On the other side, God doth decree to create others, and permit them to sinne, and raise them out of sinne by faith and repentance, and reward them with everlasting life, to the manifestation of his glory, in the way of mercy mixed with justice.

Farther consider that as touching predestination it selfe, there was no question moved thereabouts in the Church of God, before the daies of Pelagius; and what credit can they get, who consult with them in such points, wherein they were not exercised. For we find by experience, that to contend with Heretiques hath been an ordinary means in the course of Gods providence, for the more diligent inquisition after the truth of God and happy discovery thereof. *Sancta Ecclesia* (saith Gregory) in *Epist. lib. 7.* *suâ semper eruditione instruitur, dum Hæreticorum questionibus impugnatur.* And Austin in like *epist. 3.* manner, *Didiscimus*, saith he, *singulis quasq; Hæreses intulisse Ecclesiæ proprias questiones,* *De don. Pers. cap. 20.* *contra quas diligentius defenderetur scriptura divina, quam si nulla talis necessitas cogeret.* And on the other side, before question hath been moved on a poynt, the Fathers have delivered themselves somewhat improvidently, whereupon Heretiques have taken advantage to countenance their errors by the writings of the Ancient. This Hierome observes in the poynt of Arrianisme, proving thereby, that the Ancient *Apolog. 2.* *Writers before the Arrian Heresy arose, were no competent judges in that poynt.* *adv. Ruffin.* *Si me causas vitiorum* (saith he) *in Patrum Scriptis nescire respondero non statim illos Hæreticos judicabo. Fieri enim potest ut vel simpliciter erraverim, vel alio sensu scripserint, vel a Librariis imperitiis eorum paulatim scripta corrupta sunt, vel certè antequam in Alexandria quasi demonium Meridianum, Arrius nasceretur. Innocenter quædam & minus cautè locuti sunt & quæ non possunt perversorum hominum calumniam declinare.* Marke it well, Before Arrius like a Devill from the South rose up, the Fathers delivered some things innocently, yet lesse warily, and such as cannot avoid the calumny of perverse persons. Upon the same ground it is, that Austin excuseth Ticonius, and that in the same particular wherein he approached nèere to Pelagianisme, to wit, before the Church of God was acquainted with that Heresy; his words are these, *Sed non erat expertus hanc Hæresin Ticonius quæ nostro tempore exorta multum nos, ut gratia Dei quæ per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum est adversus eos defenderemus, exercuit; & secundum id quod ait Apostolus, Oportet Hæreses esse ut probati manifesti fiant in vobis, multò vigilantiores diligentioresq; reddidit: ut adverteremus in scripturis Sanctis, quod ipsum Ticonium minus attentum, minusq; sine hoste sollicitum, fugit, etiam ipsam scilicet fidem donum illius esse, qui ejus mensuram unicuiq; partitur.* Ticonius considered not that saith it selfe is the gift of God, neither was he so carefull to look into the truth of this; and why? surely because he had no enemy to put him to it, as being not acquainted

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Aug. de Præd.
sanct. l. 1.
cap. 14.

acquainted with the error of Pelagius. But this Heresy, saith he, arising in our daies, hath put us upon the defence of the grace of God, which is given us through our Lord Jesus Christ, and hath made us more watchfull and diligent to observe, that even faith it selfe is his gift, who distributes to every one a measure thereof. Hence it is that the same Austin, when Prosper signified that those of Marseilles would rest contented if he could make good the opinion which he maintained in the point of predestination, out of the Writings of the former, and more ancient Divines, returns for answer, that there was no need hereof, considering that They living before this Heresy was known, (to wit, of Pelagius) were not at all put upon the discussing of this question, which surely they would have done, had they been constrained to make answer to any such as the Pelagians were. See his own words, *Si hujus sententiæ defensionem ex divinatorum eloquiorum nos præcedentibus Catholicis tractatoribus promerem, profectò hi Fratres quibuscum nos agimus, acquiescerent. Hoc enim significastis Literis vestris.* This was Prosper's motion; now mark Austin's answer. *Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum questione versari, quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur.* Charity did suggest unto him, this would have been their course, had they been exercised with Pelagius, as he was. For it was his own case. For there was a time when himselfe thought, that albeit holiness and good works consequent to faith together with salvation, were the work of God, yet faith it selfe he conceived to be the work of man; to wit, before he was exercised with Pelagius as appears, Liber Propositionum ex Epistolâ ad Romanos. *Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujusq; in præscientiâ, sed fidem elegit in præscientiâ, vel quem sibi crediturum esse præcivit, ipsum elegit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam consequeretur.* For he professeth in the words following that he then conceived, *Nostrum esse credere*, to believe was a work of our own. Afterwards he retracteth this, *Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25.* professing, I had never said this, had I known faith it selfe to be the gift of God, *Si scivissem fidem ipsam inter Dei munera quæ dantur per Spiritum Sanctum reperiri. Nam quamvis credere & operari utrumq; nostrum sit propter liberum voluntatis arbitrium & quæ non nisi volentibus nobis fiunt, utrumq; Dei donum est qui & credere, & velle, & perficere subministrat.* The Papists themselves, notwithstanding the great devotion they pretend towards the Ancients, yet are driven to devise what may be said to excuse them; as in the very point of Free-will they desire to excuse Chrysostome. *Sixtus Senensis, Bibliothec. lib. 5. annotat. 101. Vel dicendum est sicut etiam Annianus in Præfatione Commentariorum Chrysostomi in Math. annotavit Chrysostomum interdum naturæ nostræ vires plus æquo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manicheis & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserabant vel naturâ malum vel sati violentia ad peccandum compelli.* Nay what think we of Vossius himselfe, from whose labours it is, and nothing of their own, that our Arminians would seem to breath so much Antiquity. This Vossius professeth, they mistake him that taketh him to be of any other opinion in the point of predestination, then Austin was of. *De Historicis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17.* Yet doth he acknowledge that Austin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines who went before him, in the point of predestination. *Histor. Pelag. pag. 655. Patres Græci & Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, ipse aliquandiu Augustinus, verba Apostoli interpretari solent de electione quorundam ad salutem secundum fidem & pietatem prævisam; & aliorum reprobatione æterna ob præscientiam malorum operum quæ in vita acturi essent. Sed Augustinus (here comes in the Adversative) rejectâ hâc opinione existimabat Apostolorum loqui de quorundam electione ad vitam, aliorum item præteritione, non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ratione, siue bonorum, siue etiam malorum quæ personalia forent.* And which is more then this, *Pag. 653.* professeth a third interpretation of that passage *Rom. 9. 11, 12, 13.* differing both from Austins interpretation, and from that of the Fathers Greeke and Latine that went before him, and makes it disputable, which is truest, though this third opinion hath no footstep amongst the Ancients, and thus he carrieth himselfe, notwithstanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity. And to vindicate Austins interpretation, as well as the rest, from countenancing absolute reprobation, he calls in to help at a dead lift, the doctrine of the Jesuits, concerning Scientia Media. And I desire upon no better termes to contend then this in Scholasticall Divinity, whether this doctrine be not a most unsober invention without all ground. And whereas

whereas Vossius acknowledgeth Austins opinion to be for the absoluteness of election (and he professeth himselfe to be of Austins opinion.) I dare appeale to any learned Divines sober judgement, whether this doctrine of *Sciencia Media* doth not equally justify the absoluteness of reprobation, as the absoluteness of election. Yet after all this, I would not have any think, that I reject any of these ancient Fathers, that seem to be most opposite to Austins opinion in the point of predestination. I think they may be fairely and Scholastically reconciled without acknowledging so much difference between them, as Vossius maketh, and that by such an interpretation as sometimes is admitted by Vossius himselfe, of his own phraise of his own distinction, though he dreames not of the applyable nature of the same to the will of God in predestination. His distinction is of *Voluntas Dei antecedens, & voluntas consequens*; and this he makes equivalent to that other distinction of the will of God, to wit, *Absoluta & Conditionalis*. Now this Conditionall will of God he interprets not *quoad actum volentis*, but *quoad Res volitas*: Like as Doctor Jackson professeth in expresse termes, that the former distinction of *voluntas antecedens & consequens*, is to be interpreted, namely, *quoad res volitas*, and not *quoad actum volentis*. Now according to this construction, there is no difference between them and Austin, nor the least impediment to the making of the will of God, both in predestination and reprobation to be most absolute. For though sinne be acknowledged to be the cause of the will of God in reprobation *quoad res volitas*, that is, in respect of the punishment willed thereby, this hinders not the absoluteness of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*. And unless we understand the Fathers thus, we must necessarily charge them with such an opinion, whereof Aquinas is bold to professe, That never any man was so madde as to affirme, to wit, that any merits should be the cause of Predestination *quoad actum predestinantis*. And why so? to wit, because predestination is the act of Gods will, and there can be no cause of Gods will *quoad actum volentis*. Now who seeth not that by the same reason there can be no cause of divine reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*; for even reprobation is the act of Gods will, as well as predestination, and every way it must be as madde a thing to devise a cause of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*.

They did all generally agree, saith this Author, upon the contrary conclusion. Now the contrary Conclusion to *absolute and unavoidable reprobation* is to maintain conditionall and avoidable reprobation; but this is not the contrary conclusion here specified by this Author, but rather that damnation was avoydable; such is his loose discourse; whereas there is no question at all concerning damnation, whether it be conditionall or absolute. We all confessing, that like as salvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years, but upon the performance of faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein; so damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any, but upon their finall perseverance in sinne. In like sort as touching the possibility of salvation, not one Divine of ours, that I know, denyes the possibility of any mans salvation while he lives in this World. Doctor Jackson indeed hath an opinion, that a man may proceed so farre in sinne in this life, that the doore of repentance may be shut upon him. We have no such opinion; We acknowledge, that as God calls some at the first houre, so may some be called at the last houre of the day, yea the Thiefe upon the Crosse, yea, *inter Pontem & Fontem*. In a word, We say plainly, that it is possible for any man at any time to be saved by grace giving repentance: without repentance none can be saved; which is, I presume, without question between us. In like sort it is possible for any man to repent, provided that God be pleased to give him repentance, and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not. Therefore the Apostle instructs Timothy after this manner, *The servant of the Lord must not strive, but must be gentle towards all men, apt to teach, suffering the evil, instructing them with meeknesse that be contrary minded, et cetera*, if at any time God may give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill, of whom they are taken Prisoners to doe his Will. Here is clearly an acknowledgement of a possibility of repentance, sooner or later, but upon the gift of God, not otherwise. The contrary opinion whereunto, this Author seemeth in this passage very strongly to favour of, but alleageth not one Father for the prooffe of it, to give us some document of his judicious

carriage in the survey of the Fathers which here he pretends to have been made by him, and that with very great ostentation; Yet I seem to be very well acquainted with the spirit that breatheth here; and I wonder the passages of the Ancients to this purpose (which yet I am perswaded are nothing to the purpose) are not collected out of Doctor *Usher's* discourse *In causa Godeschalci* inscribed to *Gerardus Vossius*; and I doubt not but the issue will be this, that God is ready to give all men repentance in case they performe somewhat; and so the grace of repentance shall be given according to mens works, which was condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine, and ever since accounted no better then flat Pelagianisme. And which is worse then this, as that which stands in opposition to common sense, they will be driven to professe, that God is ready to give a reprobate repentance, in case he will repent, yea the very will to repent, in case he will repent. This desperate resolution I have already found by experience, and if I be not deceived, breathed by the very same spirit that breatheth here.

At length we are like to receive an account of this Authors judicious survey of the Ancients out of *Calvin* and *Beza*. *Neg, hæc vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est; (saith Calvin.) habuit enim sæculis omnibus magnos auctores.* To this I answer,

1. That this is farre from justifying, that absolute reprobation, and absolute election had no footing in Antiquity, that the Upper way was never taught for the space of 600 years, nor the Lower way till the time of *S^t Austin*. Though in all ages it had great Authors to impugne it, yet it might also have in all ages as great Authors to maintain it, and more too, for ought these words of *Calvin* in his opinion doe manifest to the contrary.

2. Albeit not some but all had maintained election and reprobation to proceed according to foreknowledge of mens works, yet this nothing hinders the absolute-nesse either of election or reprobation. For consider, it is one thing to speak of election unto grace, another to speak of election unto glory; one thing to speak of reprobation, as it signifies a purpose to deny grace, another thing to speak of it, as it signifies a purpose to inflict damnation. It was never known I think, that any maintained, that God upon the foresight of mens faith, did elect them unto faith, or purpose to give them faith; or that God foreseeing men would not believe, nor repent, did decree that they should neither believe nor repent. Upon which brainlick conceit our Arminians are cast now a daies, and all the embracers of *Scientia Media*: But many of them professed indeed that God did decree to bestow salvation upon them whom he foresaw would finally persevere in faith and repentance; and to damne those whom he foresaw would finally persevere in infidelity or impenitency. We acknowledge as much as they, but still the way is open to enquire of the order of these, namely, Whether the foresight of faith and repentance were before the decree of salvation, or after it, or simultaneous with it: Whether the foresight of infidelity and impenitency were before the decree of damnation, or after it, or simultaneous with it; but where is any such question to be found amongst the Ancients? We willingly professe that God did not purpose to bestow eternall life on any of ripe years, but as a reward of their faith and repentance and good workes; that God did not purpose to inflict damnation on any of ripe years, but as a condigne punishment of their finall infidelity and impenitency; and the Ancients who maintained that God decreed to save some and damne others, according to his prescience of the piety of the one, and impiety of the other, had no other meaning that I know, or this Author is able to make good, or any other, as I am perswaded.

3. But let us farther enquire what those Ancients thought concerning faith and repentance; as whether they thought them to be the gifts of God, or no; dares this Author or any Arminian deny, they maintained them to be the gifts of God, the Scripture being so full and expresse for this? Secondly, enquire what their opinion was concerning the manner how God gave faith to one, and not to another, as 'tis manifest he did not, he doth not give it to all; as namely, whether it was of the meer pleasure of God, that he converted some, and not others; or whether he bestowed faith on some, and not on others, because he found those some to have prepared themselves for the receiving of faith, not so others. If it was of the meer pleasure of God, it manifestly followeth, that election unto grace and reprobation from grace, was absolute: which is the main thing in question in these our daies. For we who are accounted most rigid herein, doe not affect to say, That God decreed to save whom

whom he will, or to damne whom he will; but to the contrary we say, God decreed to save none, but such as believe and repent, and to damne none, but such as dye in infidelity or impenitency; but we professe willingly, that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance on whom he would, and deny it to whom he would, the Scripture being expresse, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. And *Austin* is most frequent in this profession, and this is that Grace which he acknowledgeth to be the foundation of predestination, and wherein both *Cyprian*, and *Nazianzene*, and *Ambrose* did agree with him. And *Ambrose* in speciall fort he magnifies for this profession. And *Calvin* hereupon observes, that whereas the Pelagians charged him, with differing from the ancients herein: *Valet Augustini testimonium*, saith he, *apud eos, qui libenter in Patrum autoritate acquiescunt. Quamquam non patitur Augustinus se a reliquis disjungi, sed claris testimoniis divortium hoc cuius invidia gravabant eum Pelagiani, ostendit falsum esse. Citat enim ex Ambrosio (lib. de Prædestin. sancti. cap. 19.) Christus quem dignatur vocat (here is the criticall point of this question concerning the absoluteness of election and reprobation) Item si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Sed Deus quos dignatur vocat, & quem vult religiosum facit. Si ex Augustino integrum volumen contexere libeat, lectoribus ostendere promptum esset mihi non nisi ejus verbis opus esse: sed eos prolixitate onerare nolo.* This was *Calvins* judgement, as touching the judgement of Antiquity in this.

4. Yet I confesse there was a time when *Austin* did not conceive faith to be amongst the gifts of Gods spirit, but being exercised with the Pelagians, he came to acknowledge the speciall grace of God in this; and hereupon made faith an effect of predestination, and not any precedent thereunto, and doubts not, but the Fathers would have expressed as much, had they been exercised with the Pelagians as he was; for so much he signifies unto *Prosper* as before I shewed, and withall shewes how in the foundation of predestination they agreed with him, in as much as they agreed in the nature of grace, acknowledging the conversion of the heart to be the gift of God; And not they only, but the whole Catholique Church, as appeared by their common prayers, that God would convert the hearts of Infidells; and to say, that God doth not convert the hearts of men according to the meer pleasure of his will, but according to mens preparations, is clearly to maintaine that God gave grace according unto works, which doctrine was generally exploded as meer Pelagianisme.

5. Suppose they did all acknowledge the decree of election and reprobation, to be conditionall, yet if they interpreted this conditionally, not *quoad actum Volentis*, but *quoad Res volitas*, this is nothing opposite to the absoluteness of election and reprobation *quoad actum elegantis* and *reprobantis*, but only *quoad res volitas*, to wit, salvation on the one side, and damnation on the other side. And we willingly acknowledge that God hath not ordained that salvation or damnation shall befall any man but in case they believe and repent, or refuse to believe, or repent. Now that the Ancients did in this manner understand *voluntas conditionata* in God, *Vossius* himselfe (upon whom our Arminians doe most depend as touching the authority of the Ancients) doth improvidently, and ere he is a ware, confesse. *Hist. Pelag. pag. 638.* his words are these. *Aliqua absolute vult & simpliciter: quomodo creare mundum voluit & extremo die volet resurrectionem carnis. De qua voluntate intelligi debet illud, Psal. 115. 3. Deus noster in celo, quæcumq; voluit facit. & Apost. ad Rom. 9. 19. Voluntati ejus quis resistit? Aliqua item vult cum conditione quæ idcirco in effectum non prodeunt nisi conditione impleta: quomodo omnes homines salvati vult, sed per & propter Christum fide apprehensum. Atqui non omnes fide apprehendunt Christum, sed absq; penitentiâ ac fide plurimi de hoc mundo decedunt. Quo respectu tales in æternum statuit damnare. De conditionatâ illâ voluntate extant longè plurima apud Veteres Scriptores. Aliqua hoc loco ascribemus.*

Such indeed are *Beza's* words upon that of the Apostle, *Who hath given first unto God?* Rom. 11. 35. *Est autem etiam hic locus (saith he) diligenter observandus adversus eos qui fidei, vel operum prævisionem faciunt electionis causam. In quem errorem sanè turpissimum. Origenes veteres plerumq; tum Græcos tum Latinos adegit donec, tandem Dominus Augustinum per Pelagianos ad hunc agnoscendum & corrigendum errorem excitaret.* The first part this Author conceales, it being by *Beza* delivered as touching election; and this Author deales purposely on reprobation only. The latter part likewise he passeth by; for *Beza* confines this which he saith of the Ancients to a certain time, namely, the time preceding the troubles raised by *Pelagius*. But this Author had rather it should runne at randome without any determination; and then againe, the mentioning of *Austin* raised by God

A Vindication of the absolute decree

upon occasion of Pelagius his doctrine, to take notice of this error, and correct it, he well saw was like enough to blast all the shew he makes of the Ancients, especially considering how that Pelagian faction was not by Austin only, but by the Catholique Church of those daies beaten down. And it is well known how the writings of Austin were countenanced, and how many Councells of those daies, made decrees against the Pelagian Heresy. And for both these passages, it seems he was beholding to Vossius in his Pelagian History, *Lib. 6. Theſ. 8.* which is this, *Græci Patres semper, Patrum verò Latinorum illi-quæ ante Augustinum vixerunt, dicere solent, eos esse prædestinatos ad vitam, quos Deus pie recteq; victuros prævidit, sive ut alii loquantur quos prævidit credituros, & perseveraturos, &c. Quod ita interpretatur ut prædestinatio ad gloriam facta dicitur, secundum præscientiam fidei & perseverantiæ.* And next unto some passages alledged out of Origen he brings in these two passages of Beza and Calvin. Now it liked not this Author to take his course to begin with Clemens Alexandrinus, and his Scholler Origen, as Vossius doth: For albeit Origen was a man for his learning of great authority in the Church of God, in such sort that it was wont to be said, that *Origenis ingenium Ecclesiæ Sacramentum*, and no marvail if many followed him, and 'tis usuall even with Hierome in his Commentaries to follow him. Yet after his death, his Writings were found at length to have a very ill favour in the Catholique Church. And amongst other foul opinions found in him, one nearly concerning this very particular we have in hand, was that which Vossius there delivers in this manner, *Veterum multorum opinio est, putasse eum animas corporibus vel prædestinatorum, vel reprobatorum uniri pro iis quæ bene vel male egissent ante conditum corporeum hunc mundum.* Judge I pray whether here be not a sweet nosegay for the Divill, as touching the foresight of works, not to come, but of works past before they were borne, and thereupon their soules united either to bodies predestinated unto life, or reprobated unto death. Yet Vossius would not have us think either Origen deceived by Clement (which no man ever said that I know, neither doth Vossius pretend any such thing) or that Chrysostome was deceived by them, or those that followed, by him, all this seems to be delivered only to crosse Beza, who professed the Greek and Latine Fathers were deceived by Origen. Yet it is well known of what estimation Origen was in the Church, none of the others like him; but what is his reason? because forsooth Irenæus lib. 4. cap. 76. professeth that God did destinate heaven to them that should believe; and to them which should not believe, hell. But could he be ignorant that Fulgentius professeth the selfe same, lib. 1. *ad Monimum*; namely, *Deum prædestinasse ad regnum quos ad se præcivit misericordiæ prævenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiæ subsequentis auxilio esse mansuros.* Yet this very Author in his Preface professeth that Fulgentius amongst others, albeit they maintained that God did destinate no others to salvation, then such as whom he foresaw by the pure gift of his grace, would have the beginnings of faith, and a good will, and persevere in good, yet notwithstanding they withall maintained, that this prescience divine of their faith and perseverance, did flow from Gods absolute decree to save them. Nay Austin himselfe in Joän. Tract. 42. (as Hunnius and others allage him, and I find it true) hath these words of those of whom our Saviour saith, *Therefore you heare not, because ye are not of God; Præcogniti erant quid non fuerant credituri eâ fide quâ solâ possint a peccatorum obligatione liberari;* and afterwards saith, *secundum hanc prædestinationem loquutus est Dominus.* But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himselfe acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from Gods absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from Gods absolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin alleageth out of him, *si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos.* Yet am not I of Vossius his opinion in this. I say rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, proceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods foreknowledge of another mans finall perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment

ment of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the criticall question in this point consists in this, Whether the granting of grace, or deniall of grace, be not meerely of the pleasure of God, and not according to any different dispositions in man; by grace understanding grace effectually to the working of faith and true repentance. And unlesse the Ancients be shewed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God dispenseth his effectually grace for the working of them, not according to the meer pleasure of God, but according to the different dispositions of men; all that they talke of the Ancients in this point, is meerly vaine and to no purpose.

But I come to *Prosper*, whose relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greatest moment. Now to this I answer.

1. To say that, *Penè omnium par invenitur & una sententia, qua propositum & prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperunt*, doth not prove that there is no footing amongst the Ancients for absolute predestination. Neither doth *Vossius* allage halfe so many Fathers for this opinion, as were those Bishops who joyned with *Cyprian* in decreeing the Rebaptization of Hereticks.

2. This seems to be related by *Prosper*, not so much out of his own opinion, as by way of an objection proposed by the *Massilienses*, desiring *Austin* to shew how it is to be answered. *Illud etiam* (saith he) *qualiter dilucitur quæsumus demonstres quod retractatis Priorum hac de re opinionibus, penè omnium invenitur par & una sententia, &c.* And this is farther evidenced by these words of *Prosper*. *Obstinationem suam vetustate defendunt ut ea quæ de Epistolâ Pauli Romanis scribentis, ad manifestationem divinæ gratiæ prævenientis Electorum merita proferuntur, a nullo unquam Ecclesiasticorum ita esse intellecta ut nunc sentiuntur, asserunt.*

3. Observe, When *Prosper* urged them to expound those passages in *S^t Paul*, after what meaning they thought best, they forthwith professed ingeniously that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by *Prosper* are these, *Nihil se invenisse quod placeret.*

4. *Bellarmino*, *De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14.* takes notice of this objection drawn out of *Prosper* and answereth it, according unto *Austin* in this manner, *Augustinus ipse in libr. de Bono Persev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, questionem istam nunquam acurate tractasse sed incidenter solùm & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò in fundamento hujus sententiæ quod est, Gratiam Dei non præveniri ab ullo opere nostro; sed contrà, ab illo omnia opera nostra præveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad salutem, sit in nobis quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Nazianzenum.* So that it appears hereby, that *Austin* did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the *Massilienses* pretended so much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predestination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predestination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine *Pelagius* grounded his opinion concerning predestination. And *Austin* himselfe sometime thought that God, *quem sibi crediturum esse præcivit, ipsum elegit, cui spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam æternam consequeretur:* and why so? because forthwith he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which saith he, I had never said, had I known faith it selfe to have been amongst the gifts of the holy Ghost. *Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25.* and therefore *De Prædesti. Sanct. cap. 1.* in his answer to the Letter of *Hilarius*, mark what course *Austin* takes for the justifying of his own doctrine concerning predestination. *Prius fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum Dei esse debemus ostendere.* And *Bellarmino* in the place above cited professeth, that *Austin* did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, *Gratuitæ prædestinationis sententiam & fidem in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ semper fuisse. Neq; olim* (saith he) *defendi potest prædestinatio ex operibus prævisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio quod non sit illi à Deo; quod sanè* (saith he) *Patres omnes cum summâ consensione rejiciunt.* In like sort, *Junius* in his answer to *Baro* for the justifying of gratuitous predestination, counts it sufficient to prove, *Fidem esse donum prædestinantis & miserentis Dei ex prædestinatione ipsius.* And adds saying, *Hoc omnes Patres uno consensu ex Christo & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipse Justinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Gravissimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac aliqui palestrâ non ita exercitatus) ut sequentia secula. Stromat. lib. 2. Basilidis & Valentini dogma esse dicit, quod fides*

à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination according to the prescience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternall life, but such as coming to ripe years should believe in Christ and repent; no man unto eternall death, but such as should finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvation, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to professe that, *Nemo fuit ita insanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam prædestinationis divine quoad actum prædestinantis.* And 'tis a good rule that Gerson gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, *De Vitâ Spirituali animæ Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quòd Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non omnes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improperietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio.*

5. We know what answer Austin himselfe makes unto this, *De Prædestin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Hæresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum questione versari, quod procudubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur.*

6. As before I shewed, Fulgentius himselfe maintaines predestination to be *secundum præscientiam*; yet Vossius acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absoluteness of predestination.

7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintaine the divine decree of conferring grace to have been *secundum præscientiam*, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phraise is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianisme, and condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine.

As for that of Minutius Fœlix, We deny that God doth, *sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem.* We doe not say, *Genitura pleuitur*; we say that in every one who is punished by God, *ingenii natura punitur*; Wee confesse that *Fatum illud est quod de unoquoq; Deus fatus est*; and that *pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat.* Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouthes of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israël, were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and Gods councill predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was nothing prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills.

As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appeare, that the point of predestination comes in question between them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his *Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae*, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine *Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.*

I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have professed in saying, that predestination is *secundum præscientiam*; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absoluteness of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintaine, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the meer pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardned others; the case is cleare, that he maintained absolute election unto faith. As for Gods decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly professe, that God decreed to save no man but upon his finall perseverance in faith and piety; to damne none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salvation, then the contrary. And the generall and most received rule of Schooles is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, *ex Præscientia futurorum nascitur dilectio vel odium.* I confesse he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, *vel ex præscientia vel ex operibus.* And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are commonly

commonly said to be attributed to God, not *quoad affectum* but *quoad effectum*, and so they may fairly stand for salvation and damnation, which proceed *ex operibus* in Hieroms phraise. But admit he means hereby, *decretum salvandi* which rising *ex præscientia fidei*, must presuppose the decree of giving faith to precede. I answer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of speech, and here is place for Gersons rule, *Sancti non semper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis*. And the rather because Hierome we never find exercised in this Controversy. And it is against common reason, that faith should be intended before salvation. And lastly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge a motive cause of Predestination *quoad actum prædestinantis*: which Aquinas professeth against, as a thing impossible; namely, that there should be a cause of God will *quoad actum volentis*; Nay he is bold to say that, *No man was so mad to say that merits are the cause of Predestination quoad actum prædestinantis*.

The last part of this Authors performance in the poynt of Antiquity is the Council of Arles, subscribing as he saith, the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian (for so he styles him) and in his Epistle he insists upon two Anathema's, the one this, *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui perit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit*. The other this, *Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas coniunctiæ non possit assurgere, ut sit vas in honorem*.

First, I will answer as touching the Anathema's themselves, then as touching the credit and authority of this story.

1. As touching the Anathema's. The first proceeds as well of him that is baptized and afterwards periseth, as of him that is a Pagan and never was baptized, and periseth in his Paganisme, as the Anathema it self witnesseth, if it be repeated at full, thus, *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui perit non accepisse, ut salvus esse possit, id est, vel de baptizato, vel de illius ætatis Pagano, qui credere potuit & noluit*. By which latter clause it appears, that *accipere ut salvus esse possit*, is no other then to receive *Possibilitatem credendi* (I say *Possibilitatem* not *Potentiam*, because I find this is *Faustus* his usuall phraise, as it was the phraise of *Pelagius* before him) and this is as much as to say, that every man hath power to believe if he will. Now observe I pray, This kind of power is meere nature, not that which we commonly call Grace, whereby we understand something distinct from nature. And Austin acknowledgeth both, *De Gen. contr. Manichæ. lib. 1. cap. 3*, that all men, *possunt credere si velint*; and that this is no more then is signified by that naturall illumination wherewith God enlightens every man, when he comes into the world, *Iohn 1.9*. And, *De Prædest. Sanct. cap. 5. Posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, nature est hominum. Fidem verò habere, sicut & charitatem habere gratiæ est fidelium*. And more then this, the state of the question between *Pelagius* and the Catholiques of those daies is so proposed by Austin, as not at all to consist about the possibility of believing or doing any good work, but meere about the willing & doing of it. In so much that Austin professeth, that if *Pelagius* would acknowledge the will and doing of good to be from God, as he did the possibility hereof to be from God, there should be an end of all controversy between them, and *Pelagius* should be received as a good Catholique. This appears in his book, *De Gratiâ Christi contra Pelagium & Celestium cap. 6*. *Pelagius* his words were these speaking of God *Qui ipsius voluntatis & operis possibilitatem dedit. Hanc autem possibilitatem* (saith Austin) *in naturâ eum ponere de verbis ejus superioribus clarum est. Sed, ne nihil de gratiâ dixisse videretur, adjunxit, qui & ipsam voluntatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio*. Now this *adjutorium possibilitatis*, in what sense he delivered it, Austin professeth to be obscure, both as touching the nature of it, and as touching the manner how he conceived the nature of man to be aided thereby; but in other places, saith he, where he speaks more plainly, it appears to consist in giving a law, and affording instruction. Now by the way mark Austins observation upon these words of *Pelagius*; *Qui & ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio; non ait*, saith Austin, *ipsam voluntatem vel ipsam operationem, quod si diceret, non abhorre à doctrinâ Catholicâ videretur*. Now, *voluntatem adjuvari*, in Austins meaning, is, *Voluntatem preparari à Domino ut velit*; & *operationem adjuvari* is, *voluntatem corroborari ne frustra velit*. The one operation he calls grace prevenient, the other subsequent, according to that, *Nolentem prævenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit*. And cap. 25. of the same Book, *Non solum Deus posse nostrum donavit atq; adjuvat, sed etiam velle & operari operatur in nobis*, whereby it appears that *Voluntatem atq; operationem nostram adjuvari à Deo*, is *Deum operari in nobis & velle & operari quod bonum est*; which if *Pelagius* had acknowledged he had been received for a Catholique. So that

he excepted not against him for acknowledging *Possibilitatem volendi*, atq; *agendi quod bonum est*.

As touching the second Anathema, I say that *Vas contumeliae* may be taken in a double sense: either to signify a vessel deserving contumely, deserving wrath; or to signify a Vessel ordained to contumely, and to the suffering of eternall wrath. In the first sense, there is no question but a man may change from being a vessel of contumely, or a vessel of wrath, into the condition of a vessel of honour; but in the second sense, it is as impossible there should be any such change, as it is impossible there should be any change in God, whereof I think there is no question: and both *Faustus* and *Lucidus* might take the praise in the former sense: but if they did take it in this latter sense, dares this Author justify them?

2. Now I come to the credit and authority of this story concerning the Councell of Arles; and

1. I say, suppose it be a truth; yet about the yeare 494. there was a Roman Councell wherein *Gelasius* and 70 Bishops with him justify the writings of *Austin*, and *Prosper*, and condemne the writings of *Cassian* and *Faustus*, by whose procurement it is here pretended the Bishops of Arles subscribed this Epistle of *Faustus* unto *Lucidus*. And the Fathers of this pretended Councell of Arles are not reckoned up above sixteen.

2. The credit of this story lyeth wholly upon *Faustus* his relation and his honesty therein, a man infamous in the Church for oppoling *Austin* and his doctrine of grace and predestination, as appears by the Writings of *Fulgentius*, *Petrus Diaconus*, *Alchimus Auitus* and others. *Ado Viennensis* in Chron. ad ann. 492. writes of him thus. *Faustus ex Abbate Monasterii Licinensis apud Regem Galliae Episcopus factus, Pelagianorum dogma destruere conatus* (which yet may be made apparent to have been meerly in pretence) *in errorem unde qui ejus sensus in hac parte Catholicos predicant, sicut Germadius de Viris illustribus scribens, omnino errant. Ita enim liberum arbitrium tam Augustinus quam ceteri Catholici in Ecclesia Dei docent ut illuminatio, virtus & salus illi à Christo, per Christum, & in Christo sit. Faustus vero iste ita liberum Christianorum arbitrium docere conatur, ut illuminatio, virtus & salus non à Christo, sed a natura sit. Contra hunc scribit beatissimus Auitus Viennensis Episcopus lucidissima fide ejus redarguens errorem; similiter & Joannes vir eruditissimus Antiochenus Presbyter. Isidore in his Book De Viris illustribus, testifies that Fulgentius wrote seven Books against Faustus, Qui mirâ calliditate Catholicus videri volebat cum Pelagianus esset. Auctor quoq; Vitæ 5^{ti} Fulgentii testatur à Sancto Fulgentio refutatos libros duos Fausti de Grat. & Liber. Arbitrio. And Petrus Diaconus in his Book De Incarnatione & Gratiâ Christi cap. ultim. Anathema dicit Libris Fausti, And this Bellarmine, de Script. Eccles. writes to admonish them, who in these Letters contend, that Faustus was a Catholic.*

Farther observe the Bishops who are pretended to have subscribed *Faustus* his Epistle to *Lucidus* are numbered these.

<i>Auxianus.</i>	<i>Faustus.</i>	<i>Patens.</i>
<i>Claudius.</i>	<i>Julianus.</i>	<i>Paulus.</i>
<i>Euphronius.</i>	<i>Leucadius.</i>	<i>Pragmaticus.</i>
<i>Eutropius.</i>	<i>Megetius.</i>	

But the Bishops that were assembled at the Councell of Arles are These.

<i>Agricii nomine Cataphronius.</i>	<i>Galliani nomine Melerius.</i>
<i>Celestinus.</i>	<i>Joannis nomine Desiderius.</i>
<i>Cesarus.</i>	<i>Julianus.</i>
<i>Constantini nomine Leontius.</i>	<i>Maximus.</i>
<i>Contumeliosus.</i>	<i>Philagrius.</i>
<i>Cyprianus.</i>	<i>Prætextatus.</i>
<i>Eucherius.</i>	<i>Proitianus.</i>
<i>Florentius.</i>	<i>Severi nomine Cataphronius.</i>

Thus they are reckoned up on both sides by *Vossius*, amongst whom there is but one name common. To help this, *Vossius* deviseth a 4th Council of Arles and that the Bishops mentioned to have subscribed *Faustus* his Epistle, to be the Bishops assembled in the 4th Council of Arles, and not those whom we read to have been assembled

at the Third. But that any such Bishops were assembled at a 4th Councell of Arles he brings no evidence, that I find; but his own conjecture is the best ground for this. And all this pains is taken to save *Faustus* his reputation in this. And the reason that moves *Vossius* to conceive that this subscription was not a meer fiction of *Faustus*, is this; Because forsooth if this had been a meer fiction of *Faustus*, surely *Maxentius* in opposing him, would not have failed to have cast this in his teeth. *Binius* is eager in the defence of these Episcopall subscriptions, but withall confesseth, that either *Faustus* himselfe, or some in his name, practised to countenance his Books also by the authority of those Bishops. *In fine* (saith he) *hujus Commentarii & Libelli, ipse Faustus, vel alius quis dolose addiderat hæc verba, In quo quidem opusculo post Arelatensis Concilii subscriptionem, novis erroribus deprehensis adjici aliqua Synodus Lugdunensis exegit, ut scilicet* (saith *Binius*) *aliquo furo venditari posset quasi scriptum de gratiâ & libero arbitrio Commentarium duæ Synodi recepissent & approbassent.* Now if such were the dishonest art of *Faustus* in counterfeiting this, why might he not be as dishonest in counterfeiting the former Episcopall subscriptions also? And if *Vossius* his reason to save *Faustus* his credit, were of force in this, why should it not be in force in the other also? For *Maxentius* we doe not find to have excepted against his fidelity, more in the one then in the other? And why might not *Maxentius* be ignorant of them both? And in *Biblioth. Sanct. Patrum.* there is an admonition added to *Faustus* his Epistle to *Loentius*, *ex Indice Expurgat. M. Script. Pelatii*, wherein though *Faustus* his epistle to *Lucidus*, is acknowledged to have been approved by the Episcopall subscriptions in the Councell of Arles, yet as touching *Faustus* his mendicating authority from those Fathers to his books, *De Grat. & Lib. Arbit.* The Author thereof spares not in plain termes to give *Faustus* the lye in these words. *Neutiquam tamen ullus ob id existimet ab utroq; Concilio approbatos tres libros Fausti de Gratiâ, ut ipse mendaciter innuere videatur in ea quæ his subjicitur, præfatoriâ Epistolâ ad Episcopum Leontinum &c.* But can *Vossius* shew that *Maxentius* did cast this juggling course of *Faustus* in his teeth?

But it seems that *Vossius* had no great need to trouble himselfe in the vindicating of *Faustus* his reputation in pretending the subscription of Bishops to his Epistle written to *Lucidus*. For how doth it appeare that *Faustus* is the author of any such pretence? It is true, in the Epistle it selfe that he wrote to *Lucidus*, he professeth that he kept a copy of it, to shew to that assembly of Bishops, *Hujus Epistolæ exemplar mecum retineo in conventu Sanctorum Antistitum, si ita necesse fuerit, proferendum*: by the way observe that this resolution of his, was not absolute, but *si ita necesse fuerit*, and this necessity he signifies wherein it did consist, namely in case *Lucidus* by his silence, did give testimony of his continuance in his error, as he calls it, His words are these, *Quod si eam subscripam transmittere nolueris, aperte adhuc te in errore persistere ipso silentio comprobabis, ac perinde jam necessitatem mihi facies ad personam tuam publicis conveniibus exponendam.* Now as for that which followes after the end of the Epistle, *Et subscripserunt Episcopi, qui ordine subsequuntur qui in eâ quoq; Synodo adfuerunt.*

Auxanius in Christi nomine Episcopus, Relegi & subscripsi

Faustus exemplar Epistolæ meæ Relegi & subscrip.

Paulus Episcopus in Christi nomine, Rel. & subscrip.

Eutropius &c.

Observe the admonition subjoyned by *Henricus Canisius*. These subscriptions, saith he, are not in the Manuscript. *Hæ subscriptiones non sunt in Manuscripto Codice.* Consider I pray the fair issue of this Authors learned pretence of Antiquity, he honoureth the gray haire of *Faustus*, and those grave assemblies mentioned by him whereof we have no certainty; but how honoureth he the grayer haire of *Austin*, & of all the Assemblies against the Pelagians, that you may guesse, though he concealeth it. And herein his devotion to this kind of Antiquity, where he thinketh it will serve his turne, he is content you should conceive it doth exceed the devotion of *Calvin* and *Beza*, yea and of *Austin* also; whose answer to *Prosper* he is content to passe by as not favouring so much of piety in his judgement, but the Massilientines zeale of the Ancients represented by *Prosper* unto *Austin*, that is suitable to his humour, he relieth that well, and so well that he thinks it fit vehemently to mistrust those doctrines which, they never approved, but disliked and condemned. Yet of any condemnation other then what is implied by *Faustus*, a man infamous, and whose

Writings were condemned by 70 Bishops, he makes no mention. And before Austins daies, and the daies of Pelagius, the Ancients were not exercised with any controversy hereabouts. And was their non-approbation of his doctrine, concerning absolute predestination, any motive to Austin vehemently to mistrust the truth thereof? I think he will not say it was; and therefore I hope he will give *Calvin* and *Beza* leave, never a whit the more for that cause, to mistrust the same doctrine, in granting the Ancients to have conceived predestination to proceed *secundum præscientiam* according unto foreknowledge, he is content to conform himselfe to their judgement; but in mistrusting the contrary doctrine, hereupon you must give him leave to follow his own, or any, rather then not *Calvins* or *Beza's*, but even Austins also, though never so much magnified by the Church of God, and his writings countenanced especially against the Pelagians, and the contrary condemned, by other manner of Councells then Arelatenſe 3^d, and Lugdunenſe. I remember when Epicurus was demanded why, seeing he followed Leucippus so much, he did not follow him throughout, made this answer saying, I doe as a man that is a thirst when he takes the cup to drink, for he drinks what will serve his turne, and sets the rest by: so you must give this Author leave to represent his devotion to gray haire, so farre as they serve his turne, and no farther. Yet I have shewed how Austin maintaines, as touching the Ancients that went before him, that they concurred with him in *fundamento prædestinationis*, which he accounted the doctrine of Free grace, and cites to this purpose *Cyprian*, *Ambrose*, and *Nazianzen*, and by the common prayers of the Church, that God would convert the unbelievers unto the faith of Christ; that the same doctrine, which was in his judgement the foundation of predestination, as he maintained it according to the Word of God, was generally received in the Church of God.

Before I part from this, I think fit to adde something concerning the stile here given to *Lucidus*, before the revocation of his pretended error; for here I find him stiled the Predestinarian. Now I presume this Author, that pretends so great reverence to gray haire, and so much prefers Antiquity before Novelty, hath good ground for this his denomination of him, and that out of Antiquity. Now I desire he would be pleased to communicate unto us, his learned reading in Antiquity for this; and the rather, because in the whole story of the businesse between *Faustus* and *Lucidus*, I find no mention of any such attribute given to his person, or to the doctrine (reputed by *Faustus* erroneous) maintained by him. The terme *Prædestinatus* qualifying a person, I find first in *Arnobius* junior, and from that time I find not the *Prædestinati*, or *Prædestinarians* mentioned till the daies of *Hincmarus*, about the year of our Lord God 850. And as for the story of the Predestinarian Heresy, which this Author licks his lipps at, the originall whereof is referred to the year 415 by *Sigibertus*; it is very strange, that in Austins daies it was not known unto him, or being known, not taken notice of by him, nor by *Prosper* neither after him. And *Alphonsus à Castro* in his Book *contra Hæreses*, professeth that the Author of this Heresy he found not, neither in *Sigibert*, nor in any other; because indeed not one of those who wrote of Heresies makes mention of this Heresy, besides *Bernard of Lutzenburg* in his Catalogue of Heretiques; and he saith no more of it, then what *Sigibert* mentioneth in his Chronicle. And withall he addes, that after this error was buried, by the space of almost a thousand years, it was revived by *John Husse* the Bohemian. Whereby it appears, that *Alphonsus* was not of this Authors opinion in censuring this *Lucidus* for a Predestinarian. And the first that I find to intimate so much is *Hincmarus* about the year 850. In like sort *Præcælus* acknowledgeth that, *Quis eorum Dux & institutor fuerit, nescitur*. But *Gerardus Vossius* hath herein helped us with this conjecture, referring the originall of this Heresy to the Monks of Adrumetum; and Bishop *Usher* in his *Historia Godescalci* saith, *Vossius* was the first that charged those Adrumetine Monks to be the author thereof. Yet if I be not deceived, he might be beholding to *Coccius* for helping him to this conceit. But this makes the matter more strange another way, namely that Austin should not take notice of this Predestinarian Heresy, seeing none was so well acquainted with the opinion of those his neighbour Monks, as he, being the man, whom they consulted about the difference that rose thereabouts, and wrote two Books thereupon and composed all. And yet I see no reason why *Vossius* should referre it to the Adrumetine Monks hand over head, when as it is cleer by the relation of them, that came over to Austin to complaine thereof, and to conferre with him thereupon; that they were but few, who were carried away with that error, whereof they complained

ned, and that it was but one, that troubled the place of their Monastery herein, who was as it were the Ringleader to the rest; of which *Vossius* could not be ignorant. And therefore I see no cause why he should charge them all indifferently, or that party either, who were tainted herewith, as is pretended; seeing there was an *Amesianus* who led the rest, of whom *Vossius* speaks nothing at all; and I suppose he knew some good cause why. Besides, the Predestinarian Heresy is pretended to have risen *Ab Augustini libris male intellectis*. Now I find no colour of evidence hitherto, that these Monks of Adrumetum, whom *Vossius* makes the founders of this Heresy, were led away by the misunderstanding of *Austins* writings. Neither doth *Vossius* any where, that I know, take any pains to clear this. And I would gladly be beholding to this Author, that pretends so much zeale unto, and skill in the knowledge of Antiquity, and so boldly stileth *Lucidus* a Predestinarian, for communicating unto us his rare evidences concerning this point, out of his great observations. And so much the rather, to take mee off from mine error, who since the first time that I travelled in the search after this Predestinarian Heresy in dealing with *Corvinus*, which is now some three years agoe. I have been apt to conceive that this Heresy from the first, was but a meer fiction of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, cunningly to disgrace thereby the doctrine of *St Austin*. And since the coming forth of *Dr Ussers* History in the cause of *Godescalcus*, I have been confirmed herein; as wherein he gives to understand, that whereas *Tyro Prosper* wrote hereof before *Sigibert*, although the Printer hath made him to speak as *Sigibert* doth, namely, that *Hec Heresis orta est ab Augustini libris male intellectis*: yet that is not the language of *Tyro* himselfe, but plainly this, *Hec Heresis ab Augustino orta est*, and that learned Bishop hath shewed out of two Manuscripts of *Tyro*, the one in Bennet Colledge in Cambridge, the other in our Kings Library: and this he farther confirms by comparing the description which *Gennadius* makes of that, which he calls the Predestinarian Heresy, with the doctrine of *Augustin. lib. 5. cont. Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. & de Bonis Persév. cap. 15.* And withall the same learned Bishop makes it appeare, that look what doctrine *Sigebertus* ascribes to the Predestinarians, the same doctrine was charged upon *Austin*, and such as concurred with him therein. This I say that learned Bishop proves out of the beginning of the 6 Book Hypemnesticon. *Credere nos vel predicare sugillatis quod Deus quosdam hominum sic predestinet ad vitam regni celorum, ut si nolint orare, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles esse, eos omnino perire non posse, nec prorsus sui debere esse sollicitos quos Deus quia voluit semel jam elegendo predestinavit ad vitam: quosdam vero sic predestinavit in Gehenna penam ut etiam si credere velint, si jejuniis & orationibus, omniq; se voluntati divinæ subicerent, in his Deum non delectari & vitam illis eternam in totum dari non posse, &c.* Now this in effect is the very Heresy of the Predestinarians related by *Sigebert*. Therefore I much desire this Author would take the paines to prove, that this pretended Predestinarian Heresy was indeed received to be an Heresy by the Catholique Church, and not rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians, wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of *S. Austin* in the poynt of Predestination.

Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent. I come to the consideration of that which follows.



DISCOURSE.

The Second Motive.

IT S unwillingnesse to abide the Tryall. I find that the Authors and Abettors of it, have been 2do. very backward to bring it to the Standard, not only when they have been called upon by their Adversaries to have been weighed, but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates who might have commanded them. A shrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.