

Deut: 29. 4.

that in failing to regenerate mā, he doth not *deficere*, or *faile* in any culpable mā ner: now let every indifferent Reader judge, whether here be not, *Dignus vindice nodus*, a knot worthy to be loosed; & it will require some worth of learning in him that solves it. And is it decent for this Authour to censure a man for a conclusion made by him out of the word of God, without shewing the faultinesse either of his interpretation thereof, or of his consequence framed therehence? So that this Author's wit & cunning is more to be cōmended in not specifying the place where *Piscator* delivers this doctrine, then either his learning or his honesty. He was loath to raise spirits, & afterwards to prove unable to lay them. Therefore thus I answer in behalfe of *Piscator*; though God herby me made the cause why sōe heare not God's words, to wit, in as much as he doth not regenerate thē, nor give thē eyes to see, nor eares to heare, & an heart to perceive according to that of *Moses*. Yet he doth not make God any culpable cause, neither indeed is he any culpable cause, while he failes to performe so gracious a worke towards thē: the reason whereof is this. He and he alone is a culpable cause, who failes in doing that which he ought to doe: ut God albeit he doth not regenerate a man, yet he failes not of doing that which he ought to doe. For it is no duty of his to regenerate any man; for he is bound to none. Now to be the Authour of sinne is not only to be the cause thereof, but to be a culpable cause thereof. Undoubtedly God could preserve any man from sinne if it pleased him, and if he doth not, he is nothing faulty. Secondly I answer that in true account, God is only the cause, *why* our naturall infidelity is not healed, our corruption not cured. Like as a Physitian may be said to be the cause why such a man continues sicke in as much as he could cure him, but will not: Soe God could cure the infidelitie of all, but will not. Only here is the difference, the Physitian may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himselfe; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sinne, and in the hardnesse of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for *Piscator's* saying here mentioned, *Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they may be justly punished*. Hereing are two things charged upon *Piscator*. 1. That *Reprobates* are precisely appointed by God to perish everlastingly. To this I answer that noe *Arminiā* that I know denies *Reprobates* to be appointed by God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds meerly according to his meer pleasure, or upon the foresight of sinne. We say it proceeds meerly according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sinne preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sinne, then it were of men's evill workes. Now looke upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of good workes, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evill workes: for the argumēt for the one is this. *Before Jacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evill; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therefore election is not of good workes*. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, *Before Jacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore reprobation is not of evill workes*. 2. If God doth ordaine any man to damnation upon foresight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature, or by the ordinance of God; not by necessity of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordaine to annihilate them for their sinnes, instead of punishing them with eternall fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God. For if it were, marke what intolerable absurdities would follow, namely this, That God did ordaine that, upon the foresight of sinne he would ordaine men unto damnation; whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of God's ordination; whereas all know that the Objects of God's decrees (which are all one with his ordinations) are things temporall, not things eternall. 3. If the foresight of sinne goes before the decree of damnation, then the decree of permitting sinne goes before the decree of damning for sin; that is the permission of sinne was first in intention, and consequently it ought to be last in execution; that is, First man should be damned for sin, and not till afterwards permitted to sinne. The second thing charged upon *Piscator* is this, that *Reprobates are precisely appointed to sin*. Now here the crimination grates not upō the manner of being appointed thereunto; otherwise a way could be opened for a progresse in infinitum. Now why should it be any more a fault in *Piscator* to say of some that they are appointed to sinne; then in *Peter* to say of some that they are appointed to disobedience; or in all the Apostles to professe that all the outrages commit-

ted by *Herod* and *Pilate*, by the Gentiles and people of *Israell* were such as Gods hand & his counsell had before determined to be done? or why doth *Piscator* make God to be the Authour of sinne in this, more then *Peter* and all the Apostles? And considering this man's unconscionable carriage in this, let the Reader take heed how he suffers himselfe to be gull'd by this Authour, and drawne to censure such speeches in *Piscator*, as making God the Authour of sinne, when hereby he is drawne ere he is aware to passe the like censure on the Apostles? And the holy Ghost himselfe, whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of *Piscator*. It is farther observable that *Piscator* saith, *That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination doe sinne necessarily*. I answer, *Piscator* was an excellent Scripture Divine, but noe School-divine; and therefore noe marvaile if he want the accuratenesse of Scholasticall expression. Yet I save him thus. They sinne necessarily upon suspicion that God will have them to sinne by his permission; but this is noe necessity simply so called, but only *secundum quid*. But God decrees the manner of things coming to passe, as well as the things themselves; as before I shewed out of *Aquinas*. Soe that albeit it must needs be, that sinne come to passe, in case God hath decreed it shall come to passe; yet if the question be, after what manner it shall come to passe, I answer, not necessarily, but contingently and freely, that is not onely with a possibility of not coming to passe, but with a free power in the creature to abstaine from that sin which is committed by him. For God ordained that every thing that doth come to passe shall come to passe agreeably to the nature thereof, and accordingly moves every creature to worke agreeably to their natures. Necessary agents, necessarily, contingent agents contingently. Free agents freely. And as formerly was mentioned, every sinfull act is a naturall act; and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to doe, or to leave undone any naturall act. And *Piscator* in other places dealing with *Vorsinus*, clearly professeth as I well remember (though the the place come not to my memory) that wicked men doe commit those things freely which are committed by them. And it is an excellent saying of *Aufine*, that, *Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia*, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfullnesse; & indeed they shew too much will therein, rather then too little: and in denying liberty to them that want grace, he speakes of liberty morall, which is only unto true good, not of liberty naturall, which hath place only in the choice of meanes, and is inseparable from the nature of man: But true morality sets a mans soule in a right condition towards his right end.

4. It may be this Authour could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning Gods decree, which he criminales in our Divines are Scripture expressions; therefore to helpe his cause here he imputes unto them, that they maintaine that God decreed this immutably; as if himselfe could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God, but not immutably. And would this Authour have the will of God to be of a mutable condition, like unto ours? I am confident he dares not professe so much; for albeit he licks his lips at a conditionall decree, yet how doth he conceive this to be mutable? For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith, and repentance, and perseverance; and damne others in case they continue in infidelity and impenitency; if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein is found, none damned but such as persevere in sinne unto death; what change is there in all this? Unless this be it, that God did not resolve to save any particular person untill his finall perseverance was accomplished; And so God may be said in proceesse of time, to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation, and another man's damnation: In which case Gods decree also should not be eternall, but begin in time. Again as touching that which followes of of God decreeing that *Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne*. I answer, to decree not to regenerate Reprobates, is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated, for they are not able to regenerate themselves; and to decree that they shall not be regenerated, is to decree that they shall live and dye in sinne, by Gods permission, he resolving never to shew such mercies to take them off from their sinfull courses by repentance. And so long as they are not borne of God, they will not heare his words, as our Saviour testifies saying, *Ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God*. As for sinne procured by the hand of God, which he obtrudes upon our Divines; not one passage doth he produce for that. Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in *Piscator* dealing against *Vorsinus*, which at this time doth not come to my remembrance; but withall I remember that *Piscator* being charged therewith by *Vorsinus* forthwith represents certaine passages of Scripture concerning Gods providence in evill, and appeales to the judgment

Eph: 28.

Jo. 8.

ment of every sober Christian, whether to do that, which therein is attributed to God, be not to procure sin. It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth, that the Lord sent him into Egypt, yet was this brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren. And it is no lesse plaine that God hardened *Pharaohs* heart that he should not let Israel goe. And by *Arminius* his Definition of effectuell grace, it is evident that by Gods denying it, sin doth follow infallibly. And so likewise upon Gods permission of willing this or that, he professeth that it must needs be, that by noe kind of argument shall such a one be perswaded to nill it. I come to the meanes whereby he is said to procure it. The first is, by *withdrawing grace necessary for the avoyding of sin*. Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines. 2 I know no grace which this Authour accounts necessary, that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawen by God. 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good; but this Authour doth not account any such determination necessary to the avoyding of sin. 4 Prohibition, denunciation of judgment, dehoration and such gracious actions, God doth neither withdraw, nor withhold from the wicked, who are partakers of this grace as well as Gods children, as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons.

5 An effectuell restraint from sin, I know none but the feare of God; yet this he withdrawes not from the wicked; for they never had it, nor from the children of God; only he doth not stirre it in them at all times, so often as he suffers them to sin, which yet may be to gracious ends. As 1 for the confirmation of their faith, that nothing, no not sin shall separate them from the love of God; when they shall find the goodnesse of God minding them of their errors, and bringing them to repentance. 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonnesse in beholding the uncomfortable issue of it. 3 To provoke them to walke more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come, standing upon their guard, and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride, according to that of Austin. *Audeo dicere, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestum, cadere peccatum. I am bold to speake it; It is good for a proud man to fall into some open and manifest sin*. I come to the second stay, whereby he objects to our Divines that they maintaine that *God procures the sinnes of men*, and that is by his *moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions*. To which I answer first that not any of the passages alleadged by him out of Calvin (who alone makes *totam paginam* in this of his) makes mention of Gods *irresistible working*; or of *moving or inclining unto sinfull actions*. And let every sober man judge whether a bridle is fit to urge men to action, and not rather to restraine from action, and this is the force of the first Quotation. But this Authour through heat corrupting his imagination tooke a bridle for a spurre. His second testifies only this, that man doth nothing but what God decreed, and by his direction appointeth; and this also upon pregnant testimonies of scripture; never undertaking to shew Calvins interpretation to be false, or his accommodation of them to be incongruous. In the third he grants that God workes in the mind of men. In the 4. he saith that *God stirrs up the wills, and confirms the purposes of wicked men for the execution of his judgment by Satan the minister of his wrath*. Where consider he doth this by Satan, that is he gives them over to Satan for this; so that 'tis Satan that stirres up their wills and confirms their endeavours, by Gods permission without restraint either immediate or mediate by the ministry of his good angells; and all this is but to execute Gods judgments. And that it is just with God to punish sin with sin, both scripture testifies in divers places, and Austin confirms with variety of Scripture testimonies, in his lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag: cap. 3. The last is that *God's worke it is to harden mans heart, and thereby prepare him to destruction*. And let every sober reader that is not willing to be cheated both of his faith and honesty all at once, examine these places in Calvin, and the Scriptures whereby he proves that which he affirms; and let him but aske the Authour these questions. If Calvin delivers nothing in all this but what he proves out of Scripture, why is he found fault with more then the word of God. If Scripture be mis-alleadged and mis-understood by him, why do not you confute him? 2 Though Calvin in all this makes no mention of Gods inclining wicked men to sinfull actions; yet Austin doth as before I have shewed, and that by variety of Scripture testimonies. And if this be to make God the Authour of sin, why hath he not so much ingenuity as to confesse at least in the close of all, that Calvin makes God the Authour of sin, no more then Austin doth; and neither of them more then the word of God doth, and therewithall renounce the Scriptures and turne Atheist. 3 As the Lord hardened the heart of *Pharaoh* to his destruction

tion, so did he the heart of Sihon also Now see what *Cardinall Caietan* writes upon this very place. *Utamq; homines partē (spiritum & cor, hoc est superiorem & inferiorem) male dispositam à Deo intellige negativè penes dona gratuita; positivè autem quoad iudicium, inclinationem & prosecutionem boni sensibilibus. Ita quod Deus spiritum Regis durum (hoc est non cedentem petitionibus) reddit, & non dando ei gratiam acquiescendi, & coo operando eidem, ad affectum securitatis & boni proprii, & similiter roboravit cor ad affectum boni, victoriam, & huiusmodi.* Each part of King Sihon, his spirit and heart, that is the upper and lower part being ill disposed by God (understand this negatively) as touching gifts of grace; but positively as touching his judgment, affection, and prosecution of a sensible good. So that the Lord made the Kings heart hard; that is not to yeild to the request made; both by not giving grace to rest satisfied, and by cooperating with him, to the effecting of security and his own good. And in like manner he hardened his heart to the effecting of victory, and the like. I have not heard that this my opposite hath been ever ready to censure *Caietan* for making God the Authour of all this; yet noe passage I am perswaded throughout all *Calvin's* works can be found comparable unto this. Yet was *Caietan* noe Jesuite, he need not spare his censures.

I come to the sum of that which he hath delivered in a whole leafe. The first whereof is this, that we teach, That God appointed many miserable men from all eternity to unavoidable torments. Now that God appointed many from eternity to everlasting torments, this Authour acknowledgeth as well as we. As for the avoidable condition of them, it is confessed on both sides, that they are avoidable only by breaking off their sinnes by repentance before their death; and by this we acknowledge them to be avoidable of all and every one, as well as they. But we say God doth not grant this grace to all. For he is not bound to give it to all, noe nor to any; but he vouchsafeth this grace to whom he will, and he denieth it to whom he will, and this *St. Paul* hath taught us, where he saith, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth.* The second is, that we teach, that God to bring about their intended ruine, decreed that they should without remedie live & die in a state of sin. To this I answer, that it is a most absurd conceite, to make the tormenting of any man God's end. We have learnt of King *Solomon* that, *God made all things for himselfe;* here is the end of his actions, the manifestation of his own glory. And albeit, he made the very wicked also against the day of evil; yet the end thereof was, for himselfe, as formerly specified, that is for the manifestation of his just wrath, and that God hath power without any difference in the matter, to make some vessels of wrath, and some of mercy, as he thinkes good. The Apostle plainly teacheth us, where he saith, *Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour.* And if any man's wicked proud heart make insurrection against this truth, the Apostle hath taught us to stop his mouth with this, *shall the the thing formed say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus?* Shall not God have as much power over the masse of mankind, as the Potter hath over the clay? So that this is God's end not man's damnation, but his own glory. *Hac loquendi ratio* saith *Calvin*, *this manner of speech, finem creationis esse interitum aeternum, the end of man's creation is his everlasting destruction, nunquam apud me occurreret, shall never be found in my writing.* So *Beza* in his questions and answers, I say God hath ordained not *iudicio*, for judgment, but, *iusto iudicio*, for just judgment, that is to manifest his justice upon them. Secondly, we deny that God suffers them to perlevere in their sinfull courses without giving them grace to repent, to the end that he may damne them; But with *Alvarez* every way standing as much for absolute Reprobation as *Calvin*; that God suffers them to sin, and to persevere therein, and damnes them for their sin, to this end, namely, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice. And as for this Authour's opinion in premising the foresight of sin to the decree of damnation, I have already represented the manifest absurdity thereof, as namely in this, that seeing God cannot foresee sin, unlesse he first decree to permit it, it followes that by his opinion, the decree to permit sin must preceed the decree of damnation, that is sin is first in intention, and then damnation. Whence it followes that if sin be first in intention, it must be last in execution; and consequently men shall be first damned for their sin, and after that suffered to commit sin; this is the glorious issue of the premises of this Authour. His third and last is, that by our doctrine, God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth so governe and work upon the wills of Reprobates, that they have noe libertie or abilitie at all in the issue of avoiding their sinnes, but must of necessitie commit them. To this I answer, that no other power is requisite for the effecting of all this; then 1. To suffer all men to fall in *Adam*, 2. To bring forth all men in originall sinne, which alone deserves damnation as *Mr. Hoord* confesseth, and as this Authour sometimes read in his Lectures at *Magdalen Hall*. 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates, but to suffer them finally to persevere in their

Deut: 2. 30.

Rom: 9. 21.

Cal: opusci
735.

ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance .2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actual sinnes: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sinne originall, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt masse. But as for actual sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a naturall manner. My reason is because though a good worke may be an act supernaturall; yet a sinfull work cannot be so, but every actual sin is an act naturall for the ground and substance of it. But every naturall & carnall man hath power freely, either to doe any act naturall or to abstaine from doing it, though when they abstaine from doing it, as from committing murther, adultery, theft, slander, or the like, they never abstaine from it in a gracious manner: Like as any morall good worke, they have libertie to doe, but they cannot doe it in a gracious manner. This proceeds meerly from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestowes upon any Reprobate.

Sett: 3.

M. Mason's Thus they teach, and therefore by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin, as it will plainly
Addit. p. 28. appeare by these following considerations. 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an
29. hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For first, the Devill is called the Father of lies, and by the like reason of all other sinnes, And therefore he that committeth sinne, is laid to be of the Devill, and to be the child of the Devill. And sin is called the worke of the Devill, which the Son of God appeared to loose. And why is the Devill so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate, and by his decree first and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinne. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin, by this doctrine then the Devill. 2. Wicked men are esteemed Authours of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more: for he overruleth the projects & purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot chuse but doe as they doe, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (*potentiam in se liberam*) a power in it selfe free to chuse what they refuse, or to refuse what they chuse, to determine themselves this way or that way, as liketh them best; but they have not (*Liberum usum*) a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of those offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the servile instruments that only execute and doe them.

3. Wicked counsellours and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. *Jezebell Ahab's* wife was reputed and punished as the murtherer of *Naboth*; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see, *1 Kings 21. 23. 25.* But what is counselling to enforcing? Evil counsells may be refused, but an allmighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Authour of them, then he that only useth the other.

Answer:

After two leaves spent, first in the charge; and secondly in proving that God is not the Authour of sin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Divines at pleasure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appeare, that by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin, as he saith, will plainly appeare by certaine considerations following: which in few words come but to this in generall, namely, that God doth more then the Devill, or wicked counsellours in alluring and advising others to sin, more then wicked persons in acting of their own sins. But by this discourse of his, he is as farre off as ever from proving that we make God the Authour of sin. For consider, either by doing more he understands, that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked men doe; & more: or though he does not the same, yet he doth that which is more then that. If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked men doe, this is notoriously untrue, considering the as tempters, & advizers, and perswaders unto sin. For God on the contrary forbids sin, perswades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his spirit; and indeed the spirit workes not, but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit; All holines of life is comprised within the compasse of ten commandments; these were given by the Lord from mount *Sinai*, pronounced by the sound of a trumpet; to these the Lord calls his people saying, *Stand in the waies and behold, and aske for the old way, which is the good way and walke therein & ye shall find rest unto your soules.* For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with the, *Hearre o heavens and hearken o earth, I have nourished and brought up a people, & they have rebelled against me.* When they have gone astray he exhorts the, and that most pathetically to returne by repentance, by promise of salvation, and threatening judgment if they doe not repent. *O Jerusalem wash thine heart from wickednes, that thou maist be saved*

Jer. 6. 16.

Esa. 1.

Jer. 4. 14.

*saved, how long shall thy wicked thoughts remaine within thee? I have seene thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthinesse of thy whoredome on the hills, in the feilds, and thine abominations: Woe unto thee o Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made cleane? When shall it once be? And to provoke them the rather unto repentance, he represents himselfe unto them as easy to be intreated, as slow to wrath, and one that by his patience and long suffering leades them to repentance. And to this end he gives charge to his Ministers, namely, by representing the gracious nature of God to admonish them of their sinnes, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpose to represent his promises which he hath annexed unto godlinesse, both the promises of this life, and the promises of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats also both of judgments in the world to come, to the casting both of body and soule into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to feare him above all others. And judgments of this world, as, famine, pestilence, and the sword of the enemy, To deliver them over into the hands of beastly people, skilfull to destroy; To send Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that shall sting them; and that without all mercy. Surely these are not the courses of Satan or wicked counsellours. Therefore they doe not as God doth, neither doth God doe that which they doe and more also. 2. If it be said that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devill doth, and wicked men doe in perfwading them to sinne; yet he doth that which is more then this. I answer, that nevertheless he cannot be accounted the Authour of sinne, in case the doing of this alone doth constitute an Agent the Authour of sinne. Now as formerly I have shewed, this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto, and of the Divines of Salamanca: yea and Vasquez the Jesuite professeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Again if to doe more then this, be to become the Authour of sin, both this Authour and all that are of his Spirit doe maintain as well we, that God doth that which is farre more then this. For I presume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth support our natures in the committing of sin; & who maintaines our senses in their vigour and quicknesse, without which we could take noe pleasure in sin, and that concurreth to every act of sin, in the way of cause efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Authour of sin, by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned; but physically and naturally, which no creature can doe, namely become a naturall coefficient cause to the act of another man's will. Nay which is most considerable, I presume this Authour hath so much accuratenes in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devill tempts us, or wicked counsellours doe tempt us to sin, God concurreth with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cause efficient physcally. *For in him we live and move and have our being; what is it to have our being from him, but that he is the Authour of it in the kind of a cause efficient? In the same sense doe we live in him, and in the same sense doe we move in him. It stands us upon as much to maintaine this, as to maintaine that God is our Creatour. For unlesse all things doe subsist in him, neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deale more then to perfwade. For a weake man is able to perfwade, but noe creature is able to performe these parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the discourse is as farre off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Authour of sin, any more then he is constituted the Authour of sin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he propoeth particularly and severely.**

Act: 17. 28.

1. *The Devill, saith he, doth only allure men by inward suggestions, and outward temptations to fall into sinne: But God doth much more if he doe necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinne. For to determine is infinitely more then to perfwade. Now to this I have already answered by shewing. 1. That albeit God doth more then this, yet seeing he doth not this; if the doing of this alone constitutes one the Authour of sin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; still God is free from being the Authour of sin. This Authour barely supposing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himselfe confesseth that God concurreth to the act of every sinne, and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall. And I may be as bold as to say of this, that it is infinitely more then to perfwade; like as he saith of God's determining the will and necessitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his discourse. And here first I wonder not a little at this Authour's distinction of the Devill's inward suggestion from his outward temptations. For I confesse freely I know noe outward temptation of Satan, distinct from his inward suggestions. Outward occasions and provocations to sinne I know none wrought by Satan, any farther then as he in some cases is*

Disput. theol.
pag. 108.

God's instrument, as in afflicting *Job*. For surely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the government of Satan; this is in his own hand still; and hereby occasions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himselfe in finfull courses, either in the way of profit, or satisfying his unclean lusts. And *Arminius* confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions, which provoke to such an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without sinne, if not by God's intencion, yet at least according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that arise therebence. This administration, I say *Arminius* confesseth, doth belong to the Divine providence. And these arguments, he saith, are objected either to the mind (of man,) or to his senses outward or inward; and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine administration is to make tryall whether the creature will abstaine from sinne, even then, when it is provoked thereunto. As, for the triall of *David*, was *Bathsheba* going forth to wash her selfe objected to *David*, whereupon he was inflamed with lust; *Joseph* was not, though farre more strongly sollicit by the temptations of his wanton Mistris. Secondly, to necessitate the will or determine the will are noe phrases of our Divines. The first is used only by *Bradwardine* (as at present I remember) sometimes *Arch-Bishop* elect of *Canterbury*; The other is that phrase of the *Dominicans*. Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves. Why doth not this Authour answer a chapter or two in *Bradwardine*, a chapter or two in *Alvarez*, where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively. Surely hereby he should performe a worke more worthy of a Scholasticall Divine, then by so hungry a discourse as this. Secondly, consider neither *Bradwardine* maintaines that God necessitates, nor *Alvarez* that God determines the will to sinne, but to every naturall act, in which kind of acts sinne is to be found: Why then should this Authour carry himselfe thus in his crimination? We know sin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof; an obliquitie such as concerning which, *Aufine* hath long agoe deliverd, that it hath noe efficient cause, but deficient only. And divers waies Divines have shewed how God may be the authour of the act, yet not the Authour of the sin; and illustrated it by various similitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horse, he makes him goe, but doth not make him halt. The sun shining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it stinke. The sun makes flowers to evaporate, and send forth their savours as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory, is fro the nature of things themselves on which the sun beates. In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toades, & snakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food; yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physicke. And God knowes how to make good use even of the finnes of men, and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underw-heele being out of his place, the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will set him going in a wrong way, as well as all the rest in a right way; his motion is from the upper whele, his irregular motion from himselfe. A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry worke. The writing is from himselfe, the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper: on this very question whether the act of sinne be from God, *Aquinas* maintaining the affirmative, illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame legge; the motion, saith he, is from the soule, the halting is fro the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmitie of the legge. Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Authour of the action, were to be the sinne; not considering that himselfe maintaines, that God is the Authour of the action, and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall. Thirdly, when *Bradwardine* maintaines that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof, he withall professeth that he necessitates it *ad liberum actum suum* that is to worke every act thereof, freely. Soe when *Alvarez* maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he withall maintaines that God determines the will to worke freely: and so *Aquinas*. For when he workes upon contingent causes, he moves the to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he workes upon necessary causes, he moves them to produce their effects necessarily. And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contingently, is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the contrary. Soe to move free causes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he saith, that sinne must needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Authour's judgment, that it must needs follow upon God's cōcurrence to this act. If he say that this cōcurrence is necessary to every act, I answer, it is necessary to the substance of every act, but

but not at all required to the sinne; though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, so say we is determination required to the substance of every act. And God's concurrence with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurs with another in moving a timber logge, which is the expression of the Jesuites, thereby manifesting the vilenesse of their opinion, as we can demonstrate, and that more waies then one by evident demonstration, as I have already shewed in my *Vindicie*. Let this Authour answer those digressions if he can, I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the *Arminians*. We know God is the first cause, and all other are but second causes in comparison to him. Yet we willingly confesse that the providence of God is wonderfull and of a mysterious nature in this; but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimonie, as scarce to any thing more. So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evill, wherein indeed it is most wonderfull; and he takes unto himselfe the hardning of men's hearts, and blinding of their mindes, and prostituting them to abominable courses, even to vile affections and thereby to punish sinne with sin, as *Rom: 1*. Therein saith the Apostle, *they received the recompence of their errorr*. This hath *Austine* also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book, *De gratia & Libero arbitrio* in two large chap: & likewise in his fifth book against *Julian the Pelagian* & third chap: this also the Adversaries have been driven to confesse in a strange manner; as to give instance first in *Bellarmino* whose words are these, *God saith he, praesidet ipsis voluntatibus easq; regit & gubernat, torquet & flectit in eis invisibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio male sint, tamen a divina providentia ad unum potius malum quam ad aliud, non positivè, sed permissivè ordinentur*. God is president over the wills, and so rules and governes, wrests & turns them, working invisibly in them, that albeit through their own fault, they are evill, yet by the divine providence they are ordered to one evill rather then to another, not positivèly but permissivèly. What one of our Divines hath said more then this comes to, or so much, professing that God rules and governes the wills of men by his invisible operation, ordering them to one evill rather then to another, which St. *Austine* calles inclining them? And the Prophet *David* we know prayes, that God would *encline his heart unto his testimonies and not to covetousnesse*, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to covetousnesse. But *Bellarmino* saith more then this, in saying that, *God wrestes and bends them, torquet & flectit*; those are his words; although he seemes to blast all this in the end by saying, that this is done *permissivè, by permission*, in flat contradiction to himselfe, whose expresse purpose is to shew, that God doth not only suffer wicked men to performe evill acts, and to desert the godly, but somewhat else also, namely, to rule and governe their wills, to wrest and bend them by an invisible working in them, to commit one evill rather then another. Secondly consider their generall doctrine of *congruous grace*, standing in a necessary conformity and correspondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concerning the foreknowledge of God, called by them *Scientia media*. By this doctrine of theirs God foresees in what case and by what motives man being moved to abstaine from this or that sinne, he will abstaine from it: And againe in what case and after what manner being moved to abstaine from sinne, he will not abstaine from it; And God makes choice at his pleasure how to move him, whether after such a manner in which case he foresees he will abstaine from sinne; or after another manner in which case he foresees he will not abstaine. Now who is so blind as not to observe, that as often as a man sinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God, he shall sin, by the very groundes received by our Adversaries; Thus much as touching my first answer concerning the necessary consequence of sinne upon God's operation, to be acknowledged by our Adversaries, according to the tenour of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My second answer is this. Albeit God determines the will to any vertuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing some morall good, or in the way of abstaining from some morall evill; yet unless God give man some faith and love, as fountaines out of which every morall worke must proceed, that it may be acceptable with God, such an one shall necessarily sinne, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither performe any morall good worke, nor abstaine from any morall evill worke in a gracious manner. Now let every sober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preserving a man from sinne in generall, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evill. In each of which God determines the will only to the substance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the substance of the act or noe, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or noe; still there

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7. & 9.

will be a necessary consequence of sinne to every act of man, if God doth not bestow the spirit of regeneration upon him, which spirit of God we know was given to our first parents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were justly bereaved upon the first sinne committed by them; And because all we have been derived from them since their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue untill such time as it pleaseth God for Christ sake, to restore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and lastly upon the very permission of sin, it followes necessarily that sin shall be, by the doctrine not of *Piscator* only, but of *Vorstius* and *Arminius* also; yea and of the learned amongst the Papists, as *Navaretus* and *Penotus*: And the very definition of Permission of sinne by *Arminians* justifies it; as also the Jesuites doctrine concerning *gratia congrua*. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abstaine from sin, as God well knowes; but such a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abstaine from sin, which also is well known unto God; doth it not manifestly follow that such a one shall sinne, though not sinne necessarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are esteemed Authours of their offences: Now by the way this is not so; To be a sinner is one thing, to be an Authour of sinne is another thing. And to be an Authour of sinne is in reference rather to anothers sinne, then to ones owne. And *Martinus* tells me that, *Authour est cuius auctoritate & sententiâ aliquid fit, cuius testimonio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Itaq; authorem & dissuasorem Cicero opponit. He is the authour by whose authority and judgment a thing is done, by whose testimonie we are induced to beleive ought; who exhorts to the doing of ought. And therefore Cicero makes Authour and dissuader opposite. But to proceed with this Authour who set the Printer on work for the edition of this peice. Men, he saith, doe plot purpose, choose and commit offences, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion, proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way, so as they cannot choose but do, as they doe, whatsoever they may thinke to the contrary. To which I answer, that it becomes every man to give the Divell his right, & and not make him worse then he is, nor wicked men neither. Now noe wicked man doth will or choose sinne as sinne. *Nemo vult esse incontinens*, saith *Aristotle*, although they doe such things as doe sufficiently evidence their incontinent disposition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can any thing be willed by man, but, *sub ratione boni*, under the shew of good: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleasure, or in the kind of honesty. So *Lucretia* when she killed her selfe, she did it for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that she consented not unto *Tarquinius*; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they doe or choose to doe for some motive or other, which whether it be pleasure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act sinfull, but only that it is against some law or other, forbidding it. And this act, (all sides confesse) is the worke of God, as well as the worke of man; as in whom we move, like as in him we live, and have our being. And *Bradwardine* maintaines that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the creature it selfe, whose act it is. This he proves of the creatures conservation, of the creatures action, of the creatures motiõ; & to this he proceeds by certaine degrees. And in all this God doth not transgresse any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a naturall act; and only in performing acts naturall is sinne committed; never in performing any act supernaturall; all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace. 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes, otherwise then as when accepting their intentions, he will not have them put such in execution; because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time & person. As when *David* was purposed to build God an house, & was encouraged therein by *Nathan*: yet the Lord sent *Nathan* shortly unto *David* to give him to understand, that he reserved that work for *Solomon* his Son; yet so well accepting *David's* purpose that he promised to build his house. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men, whether good or evill, let us blesse him rather for this then curse him; by cursing them that maintaine this good providence. Yet in overruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the ministry of his good Angells; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Authour dreameth. For that is not the way to worke agreeably to the reasonable nature of man (though so he worke also by generall influence afforded comon to all agents) but by representing to the understanding congruous motives to divert them from that they doe intend; whether in a gracious manner*

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manner, as he diverted *David* from his purpose to massacre the whole house of *Nabal*; or only in a naturall way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly designs, by representing the danger thereof, to make them feare, & so to restrain them. Will the Devill himselfe be over prone to blaspheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devill or man can doe; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth co-operate to every designe and execution of the creature, be it never so abominable, which neither man, nor Angells can doe. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully then any Devill can doe. The Devill could not say with truth that *He would harden Pharaoh's heart*, that he should not let Israel goe. Nor when he had let them goe, *I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them*, to bring them back. The Devill could not say in truth, as the Lord did to *David*, *I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the sunne*. Nor as he said to *Jeroboam*, *Behold I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee*. Nay the very permissiō of sin is as whereby it shall infallibly come to passe, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And shall it follow, that because God doth more, both as touching the act it selfe, and touching the sinfull condition of it, then any creature can doe, therefore God is the Authour of sinne? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good morall workes, whether in doing that which is vertuous, or abstaining from that which is vitious, this man shall certainly sinne, though not in so great a degree, unlesse God be pleased over and above to regenerate him, and to bestow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this case, though he doe an act vertuous, yet shall he not doe it in a gracious māner. & though he doe abstaine frō an act vitious yet he shall not abstaine frō it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintaine (if he thinks good) that except God doth bestow the spirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world, he is the Authour of sinne, not only when he moves them to such acts which are evill, but also when he moves them to the doing of such as are vertuous, or to the abstaining from those that are vitious. As for his phraes noe wise man will regard them, but only such as are content to feed on huskes for want of better food. As, when he talkes of *motion uncontrollable*, which makes a noise, as if men's wills would controule his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the first mover moves the creature most congruously unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noyses makes the phrase *immutable decrees* as empty things many times give the greatest sound: whereas by vertue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwise be, then that as necessary things cannot but come to passe necessarily, so contingent things cannot but come to passe contingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifest's how he licks his lips, at a *Mutable decree of God*, even of that God with whom, as *St. James* speaketh, *there is no variablenesse, nor shadow of change*. He doth acknowledge, we maintaine, *potentiam in se liberam*; but then he saith, we doe not maintaine, *liberum usum*; a most absurd distinction. For noe power deserves to be stiled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that *Bradwardine* proposeth to the judgment of all to consider, whether it be not an unreasonable thing to deny this unto God. *God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed*. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he laies not this to the charge of Papist's: Noe nor to the charge of *Bellarmino*, for saying that God doth not only rule, and governe, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evill rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phraes, it is no other then they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuites oppose the *Dominicans* in this. This Authour sides with the Jesuites, but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in *Alvarez* on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and cleare reason doth justifie. And the ground of the Jesuites in opposing, is meereley an invention of their own, concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a *middle knowledge*; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature meereley possible; and consequently cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meereley possible, into the condition

Suarez: de
anxil. lib. 1.
c. 2. num: 7.

condition of a thing future without a cause. Now noe cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason, but the will of God. For first, the cause hereof must be eternall, seeing the thing it selfe, of the cause whereof we dispute, is eternall, to wit, the fruition of any thing. This I say was eternall, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is noe eternall cause to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cause why things merely possible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlasting, must be found in God alone. Therefore it must either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and seeing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future, then makes them so; what remains but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof? Nay consider whether the Jesuites themselves doe not manifest more ingenuity by farre, then this boisterous *Theologue*, that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words, the resolution of whose arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confest principle of reason. Whereas not the greatest Angell of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse. For did we grant that, *God by his Almighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills.* Yet Suarez confesseth that so to worke, doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Almighty power of God: Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concurrence without subordination of the second causes to the first, implies flat contradiction. We say the wills determination of it selfe is the worke of God, otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the worke of God. Again the wills determination of it selfe, is no other then the wills operation; and this Authour that opposeth us dares not deny the wills operation to be the worke of God. But what School-divine can he produce that delivers himselfe in so absurd a manner; as to say that God first determines the will, and that afterwards the will determines it selfe; especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of it selfe, we say, is the worke of God moving the creature agreeably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried necessarily to that which is it's end, and appears to be good *in genere convenientis*; and freely to the meanes, which appears to be good, *in genere conducentis*, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confessing (*Durand* excepted) that God works the act; the question whether he works the act absolutely, the will a second agent subordinate unto God, as to it's Creatour? Or conditionally, *modo velimus*, provided that we will it. God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature? This Authour will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependance upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we say is most absurd. First because thus the first agent is made subordinate to the second agent, which is most unnaturall. Secondly, observe a manifest contradiction. For the question is about, *actum volendi*, the act of willing, in man. Now if God produce this act upon supposition, that man produceth this act, then the same act is produced by God upon supposition, that it is produced by man. If it be produced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement? Thirdly, by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it selfe. For hereby it is said, this act is made upon condition that it doth exist; and so the selfe same thing shall before and after it selfe. 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be noe worke of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any naturall act; in this Authours opinion. Fifthly, It is not possible the will can produce the act unlesse God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unlesse the will doth produce it, in this case there shall be noe act produced. For if I goe not to London unlesse you goe with me; nor you goe to London unlesse I goe with you; here is no going at all till one saith I say I goe, and his resolution carrieth the other with him, if the others depend thereupon. 6. Whereas to helpe at a dead list the Jesuiticall doctrine of, *Scientia media*, middle knowledge, is called in after this manner; God foreseeing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act, if God be pleased to concur; and upon this foreknowledge God resolves to concur. This doctrine I have already confounded by shewing the apparent falsity of this supposition. For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant, is a thing merely possible in it's own nature, & no more future then not future; it is impossible that this should passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future without a cause: And noe cause hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It followes that the wills producing such an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced, then on the contrary, that Gods producing such an act, dependes upon the creature's will to produce it. As for that which followes of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over it's action (I presume he meanes independent) it sounds more

more like the voice of the Devill, then of a sober Christian. Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himselfe challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himselfe; If he doth, I know noe greater sinne that hee or the creature can be guilty of; unlesse in case grosse ignorance doth excuse it. To deny God to be the first Agent is to deny his God-head; and if hee be, *primum agens*, hee must be *primum liberum* too, the first free agent. And to make our selves to be *prima libera*, the first free agents, what is other then to advance our selves into the very Throne of God's Sovereignty; and doe wee not feare least his wrath smoake us thence. And if all this that hee contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere necessitie were found in the motion of men's wills; yet *Suarez* will justifie us from speaking contradiction, or delivering ought that exceeds the compasse of God's omnipotencie. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God should not be unjust in casting the most innocent creature into hell fire; as *Meaina* professeth, and that by the unanimous consent of Divines, and *Vasquez* the Jesuite acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the last chapter of the booke, *de predestinatione & gratia* which goes under *Austin's* name, there is an expresse passage to justifie it. And albeit that worke be not *Austin's*, yet it is lately justified to be the worke of a great follower of *Austin's*, and as Orthodoxe as he; namely, the worke of *Fulgentius* as *Raynandus* the Jesuite hath lately proved; and justified that passage also; together with that which is usually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth chapter of *Wisdom*, and shewes the right reading, as followed by *Austin* and *Gregory*. And withall represents a pregnant passage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of *Macarius* to the same purpose. And out of *Chrysostome* in his 2. *De compunctione cordis*, about the end thereof. And out of *Austin* upon *Psalm* the seventieth, about the beginning. And to these he addeth *Ariminensis*, *Cameracensis*, *Serarius*, and *Lorinus*, all maintaining the same. And this is evident by consideration of the power, which it pleased the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our blessed Saviour, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I say, if all that he contends for were granted, should rather be concluded therehence, namely, that in this case the creature should be innocent; then that God should be the Authour of sinne; especially considering that God performes in all this noe other thing then belongs unto him of necessitie; as without which his moving of the second causes, it were impossible the creature should worke at all, which we have made good, by shewing the manifest absurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintaine a bare concurrence Divine either in subordination unto the agency of the creature, or without subordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Divine. But we doe subordinate it, as without which the second cause could not worke at all, and by vertue whereof it doth worke, and that freely, so farre forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature; but not so as to make the creature compeer with his Creatour. Let man be a second free Agent, but let our God that made us evermore be the first free Agent; least otherwise we shall deny him the same power over his creatures, that the Potter hath over the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour. This power in my maker, the Lord hath given me eyes to discern as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to submit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worst actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humour against his hand; though I thinke it lawfull for us in a holy manner to expostulate with God sometimes in the Prophets language and say, *Lord why hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies and hardened our hearts against thy feare?* Which yet I confesse he brings to passe at noe time, *infundendo malitiam*, by infusing any malice into me, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, *non infundendo gratiam*, not quickning in me that holy feare, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confesse willingly, I have a great deale lesse then I desire, though the least measure of it is a great deale more then I doe or can deserve. Neither shall I ever learne of this Authour after his manner to blaspheme God if at any time hee shall harden my heart against his feare. Though this Authour speakes commonly with a full and foule mouth, yet his arguments are lanke and leane; and of noe substance but words. As

when hee saith that, *God over-rules men's wills* by our opinion. Now to over-rule a man is to carry him in despite of his teeth. Wee say noe such thing but that God moves every creature to worke agreeably to it's nature, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to passe by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangable counsell hath determined to come to passe. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth professe by the unanimous consent of the ArchBishop, Bishops and Clergy of that Kingdome, when those Articles were made. So I speake warily and circumspectly, the rather because one Doctour *Heylin* doth in a booke intituled, *The History of the Sabbath*, professe, Chapter 8. page 259. *That, that whole booke of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdome. Anno 1631.* A thing I willingly confesse at first sight seemed incredible unto mee; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the dayes of King *James*, should be revoked in the dayes of King *Charles*; but expect to heare the truth of that relation. For the Authour thereof hath never as yet deserved so much credit at my hands, as to be believed in such a particular as this. But to returne, this Authours text is nothing answerable to the margin. For first, *imperare* to command, is one thing, and to over-rule is another thing: though he that doth, *imperare* command ought, is commonly accounted the Authour thereof, as a cause Morall, from whom comes the beginning of such a worke. But utterly deny that God commands evill, and the truth is wee acknowledge noe other notion of evill then such as the Apostle expresth in calling it *avopia* an incongruitie to the law of God, which law commands some-things and forbids other things. I come to his third reason. 3. I grant wicked counsellours and perswaders are deservedly accounted the Authours of sinne: The common use and acception of the words as I shewed in answer to the first, is observed to denote such. Therefore *Cicero* makes Authour and disswader opposite; and by law they are punishable in the same degree with the Actors. But God is noe counsellour or perswader to any lewd course, but forbids it, and disswades it, and that with denuntiation of the greatest judgments among trangressours. 2. I willingly confesse that counselling is farre inferiour to enforcing; yet in Scripture phrase earnest intreaty, or command is oftentimes exprest by compelling as *Mat*, 14. 22. *Mark*: 6. 45. *Luk*: 14. 23, *Gala*: 6. 12, and 2. 14. *1 Sam*: 28. 23. *2 Chron*: 21. 11. And noe marvaile for hereby many times men are drawn full fore against their wills to doe that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be resisted, but neither hath any man any will to resist that motion of God whereby he workes agreeable to their natures, then indeed there were place for resisting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous person, such as *Achan* to covet a wedge of gold and a Babylonish garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away secretly, and hide it in his tent, what resistance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this lesse agreeably to his covetous disposition, then to the disposition of Toades and Addars, when he moves them according to their nature to sting and poyson? So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to sting a wicked people. Doe not the Scriptures plainly professe that God did send them? Is not *Assur* in this respect called, the Rod of God's Wrath and the staffe in his hand? Was it not called the Lords indignation? Is he not compared to an axe and a sawe, shall the axe boast it selfe against him that heweth therewith? Or shall the saw extoll it selfe against him that moveth it? Still he confounds the act with the sinfulness thereof, speaking of God's producing finnes; whereas sinne is never produced, it being only an obliquity consequent unto the act of such a worker as is subject to a law. And our Adversaries confesse that God is the cause of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to professe that in producing the act he produceth the sin. As for that which he speaks of *Inforcing*, we may well pittie him, that when he wants strength of reason, he supplies that by phrales. We deny that God inforceth any man's will. Nay it is the generall rule of *Schools*, that, *voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced*: We maintaine that every act of the will, especially in naturall things (such as a sinfull act must needs be: for only gracious acts are supernaturall) is not only voluntary (which is sufficient

Jer: 8. 17.

Ez: 10. 15.

is sufficient to preserve it from being forced)but free also, by as much libertie as the creature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is *primum liberum*, a first free agent, that is the prerogative of God alone, the first mover of all, and the supreme Agent thus: I have dispatched my answer to his first reason consisting of three parts I come unto the second.

Sett. 4.

If we could find out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any Subjects, as (by this opinion) God doth in the affecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and finnes of those his Subjects. Who would not abhorre, saith *Moulin*, a King (speaking thus. I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murder or steale. This King saith he should not only make an innocent man miserable, sed & sceleratum, but wicked too, and should punish him for that offence (*cujus ipse causa esset*) of which himselfe was the cause. It is a cleare case, *Tiberius*, as *Suetonius* reports, having a purpose to put some Virgins to death, because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be deflowered by the hang-man, that so they might be strangled. Who will not say that *Tiberius* was the principall Authour of the deflowering of those Maides? In like manner (say the *Supralapsarians*) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death; but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice, to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed that the Devill shall deflower them, that afterwards he may damne them. It followeth therefore that God is the maine cause of those their finnes.

M. Mason's
Addit. 2. p.
29. 30.

Molin. Anat. c.
12. de predest.
pag. 37.

Sueton. vit. Tibi
cap. 61.

If a King should carry himselfe as God did in hardning *Pharaoh's heart* that he should not let *Israel* goe; and when he had let *Israel* goe, to harden his heart that he should follow after them; we would acknowledge such a one, not to be man but God. And then surely whatsoever our *Arminians* would thinke of such a one, we would thinke noe otherwise then *Solomon* did of him of whom he professed, that, he made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill. If God doth but permit a man to will this or that, necessesse, saith *Arminius*, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolum, that noe kind of argument shall persuade such one to abstaine from willing it. And I hope *Arminius* hath as great auctority with this Authour, as *Mr. Moulin* deserves to have with us. Noe King hath power to dispense any such providence as this. *St. Paul* tells us plainly, that, God hath ordained some unto wrath; and as he hath made of the same lump some vessels unto honour, so hath he made other vessels unto dishonour. The Lord professeth that he kept *Abimelech* from sinning against him. Thus the Lord could deale with all if it pleased him; Why doth he not? Is it not for the manifestation of his own glory? For to this purpose he hath made all things, And that, he suffers with long patience vessels of wrath prepared to destruction. And what to doe doth he suffer them? But to continue and persevere in their sinfull courses without repentance; the Apostle plainly tells us that it is, to declare his wrath and make his power known. This is not the voice of any Doctor of ours now a dayes, but of *St. Paul*. And shall *Mr. Moulin* be brought in to affront *St. Paul*? For recompence let the Jesuits be heard to whom the nation of the *Arminians* are beholden for their principall grounds; Wherefore doth God give effectuall grace unto one and not unto another, but because he hath elected the one and rejected the other? And I appeale to every sober Christian, whether the absolutenesse of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the absolutenesse of Election. But touching *Mr. Moulin*, I have heard that Doctor *Ames* sometimes wished that he had never medled in this argument. I am not of Doctor *Ames* his mind in this; though it were I thinke most fit every one should exercise himselfe in those questions, wherein by the course of his studies he hath been most conversant; so should the Church of God enjoy, plus dapibus & rixa multo minus invidia. I doe admire *Mr. Moulin* in his conference with *Cayer* as also upon the *Eucharist*, and on *Purgatory*, he hath my heart when I read his consolations to his Brethren of the Church of France; as also intreating of the love of God. I would willingly learne French to understand him only, and have along time desired, & still to get any thing that he hath written. I highly esteem him in his *Anatomie* though I doe not like all and every passage; yet but few are the passages wherein I differ from his opinion. I have been very sory to observe how by his doctrine in the point of reprobation he overthrowes his own Orthodox Doctrine in the point of Election. I would he would answer *Sylvester* who hath replied to his admirable letters written to *Monsieur Balzac*. I could be well content, were I once free, to supply what is wanting to *Waleus* his Apologie for him against *Corvinus*. But to the point, the passage here proposed

fed by him is I willingly confesse somewhat harsh. *I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him justly I will have him murder or steale.* But compare it with that of St. Paul formerly mentioned, *God suffers the vessells of wrath prepared to destruction, that he may declare his wrath, and make his power known.* And that of Eli's children, *They obeyed not the voice of their Father, because the Lord would slay them.* And that Amaziah would not heare: *For it was of the Lord that he might deliver them into his hands, because they sought the Gods of Edom.* And that of Jeremiah. Doubtlesse because the wrath of the Lord was against Jerusalem and Juda, till he had cast them out of his presence, therefore Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babel. And observe how neare Mr. Moulin is to expose these holy passages of Scripture, and the doctrine contained in them in like manner unto scorne, ere he is aware. And let him soberly consider, and without any humour of complying with our Adversaries out of a desire to charme them who will not be charmed, to what end God doth finally permit some to persevere in sinne; and can he find any other but this, for the manifestation of the glory of his vindicative justice in their condemnation? And without any desire to charme, I have shewed plainly, that God doth not permit any man to sinne, and finally to persevere in sin to the end that he may damne them: But that he both permits them finally in sin, and damnes them for their sinne, for the declaration of his wrath and power on them; and also that he may declare the riches of his glory, upon the vessells of his mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory: If he put a difference between *permission of sinne*, and *a will that they shall sinne*; I would entreate him not to stumble at this. For what difference between God's will to permit man to sinne, and to will that man shall sin by his permission: And the tragicall acts committed on the holy Son of God by Herod and Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, the Apostles say not they were permitted by God, but that they were predetermined by the hand and counsell of God. Mr. Moulin's care is to avoid harsh expressions; & it is a commendable care. For why should we causlessly expose the truth of God to be the worse thought of, and provoke men to stumble at it by unnecessary harshnesse? Yet I find the Scripture it selfe delivered by the holy Prophets and Apostles is nothing so scrupulous. *Malim dicere*, saith Mr. Moulin, *I had rather say, Deum non decrevisse dare alicui gratiam, quàm convertatur & credat;* that God hath decreed not to give some one grace whereby to be converted and believe; *quàm dicere eum decrevisse ut homo sit incredulus & impenitens;* then to say God hath decreed that man should be incredulous and impenitent: And he gives his reason thus: *Vox enim discernendi aprior est ad ea designanda, quæ Deus statuit facere, quàm ea quibus statuit non mederi.* For to decree is fitter to denote such things as God hath purposed to doe, then such things as he hath purposed not to cure. And indeed the Ancients in this sense take the word *predestination*, to be only of such things as God himselfe purposed to worke; as Grace and Glory, and the damnation of impenitent sinners. But if God decrees not to cure impenitency and infidelity in some; judge whether upon this ground, it may not well be said, that God decrees that the impenitency and infidelitie of some shall continue uncured. And Mr. Moulin confesseth that God decreed that the Jewes should put Christ to death. His words are these, *Deus vetit homicidium, idem tamen decrevit ut Judæi Christum morte afficerent.* God forbade murder, yet he decreed that the Jewes should kill Christ. Yet by the way consider, God hath no need of the sinne of man, that he may put him to death justly. For undoubtedly God could annihilate any creature that he hath made, the most holy Angells without any blemish to his justice. Yea by power absolute he could cast the most innocent creature into hell fire, and continue yet just still, as formerly hath been shewed, and Raynandus justifies, and represents variety of testimonies for this, not only of School-divines, one of whom professeth that it is *concors omnium Theologorum sententia*, the common opinion of Divines; but of the Ancient Fathers also. And therefore though to strangle Virgins was not lawfull for Tiberius; yet a greater & more severe worke then this is lawfull for God. Neither doth God command any impure course to any, but under pain of eternall damnation forbids it. But as he hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe, so can he harden any man's heart to doe as foule a work as this. And St. Paul testifies that he gave up the heathens to their hearts lusts, unto uncleannes, to defile their own bodies between themselves, which turned the truth of God into a lie, & worshipped & served the creature forsaking the Creatour, who is blessed for ever amen. For this cause God gave them up to vile affections; for even the women, did change the naturall use into that which is against nature. And likewise the men left the naturall use of the women, and burned in their lusts one toward another, and man with man wrought filthinesse. And this is noted by the Apostle to have been a work of judgment. For it followes, *they received in themselves such recompence of their errors as was meet:* I grant Tiberius was the principall

principall Authour of deflowring those Maides. For he commanded it, and that, as I have shewed, makes a man the Authour of a crime, both out of School-divines, and out of Orators; but God gave no such command to these heathens thus to defile themselves. And this Authour doubts not, but God cooperates to the substance of every act; notwithstanding the absolute dominion of the will over her actions, for which he pleades. And it cannot be denied unlesse the word of God be therewithall denied, that, *in him we move, as well as in him we live and have our being.* And though God gave noe commandement to Absalom to defile his Fathers Concubines, yet he tells David saying; *I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this Sun.* For thou did'st it secretly, but I will doe this thing before all Israel, and before the Sun. It is utterly untrue which this Authour obtrudes upon us, as if we thought it unlawfull, for God by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame. Was any more innocent then the Son of God? yet he gave him to suffer somewhat more then the death for the sins of men. Neither must we be gull'd with his phrases of the Devils deflowring of men, when by him they are carried away into abominable courses, so as to oppose Scripture & blaspheme God, the language of the holy Ghost being this that all the outrages committed upon the holy Son of God by Herod and Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, were such as, *God's hand and counsell had before determined to be done.* And the like cruelties or worse were executed upon the Saints of God by their Kings, who imploied their soveraigne power in executiō of the beast's behests; yet this is called the will of God. *God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree to give their kingdoms to the beast untill the word of God be fulfilled.* And the truth is if God permit such abominable courses and hardens men's hearts, occasion being offered they will commit them, according to the common proverbe. *He must needs goe whom the Devill drives.* And the very definition of the permission of sinne given by Arminius doth convince this, though he carrieth himselfe very superficially explicating God's providence in this, and the nature of obduration; which I have profecuted at large in my *Vindicia*, in answer to Bellarmine, especially where I treat of the obduration of Pharaoh chap. 11. Neither doe we make damnation the end whereunto God permits sinne; but both permission for sinne and damnation for sinne, we make the meanes tending to another end, namely, the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called *the declaration of his wrath.* And to make God the Authour of sinne by these courses, is clearly to charge the holy Ghost with blasphemie, seing the holy Ghost gives cleare testimony to all this in the word of God.

2 Sam. 12, 11
vers. 12.

Lib. 2, Digr. 2.

Rom. 9. 22.

SECT. 5.

That God is the Authour of men's salvation and conversion, all sides grant; and yet he doth noe more in the procuring them then these men report him to doe in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect, say they, he hath absolutely and antecedently, without the foresight of any deserving of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible meanes in their severall generations, draweth them to believe, repent, and indure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the finnes, and the small impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sin, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of the Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be stiled the prime cause and Authour of the finnes of the one, as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine case; and therefore they did make sinne an Object of prescience, and not predestination and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foule assertion, against an absolute, irresistible and necessitating decree, as I could easily shew, but that I feare to be over long. Only I will cite some few of those Authour's words whom the learned & reverend Bishop hath alleaged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians, and the maintainers of Gottschalk's opinion. The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of Johannes Scotus, which he framed against Gottschalk hath these words, Whosoever saith, that God hath laid a constraint, or necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearefully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him, by affirming that of him, to be the very Authour of sinne. Remigius Arch-Bishop of that Church explaining the Churches opinion in that point of prescience and predestination in seven severall rules; in the fift of those rules, he hath these words to the same purpose. God, saith he, by his prescience and predestination, hath laid a necessity of being wicked upon noe man. For if he had done this, he had been the Authour of finnes. And thus in my judgment doth it plainly appeare that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of men's finnes.

M. Mason's
Addit. 3.p.
30: 31.

Observe the false carriage of this Authour, *That God is the Authour of men's salvation and conversion, he saith, all sides grant;* as if there were noe difference between Arminians,

and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We say God workes faith and regeneration in us, and that for Christ's sake. The Remonstrants in their *Censura censura*, in expresse termes deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the gift of God. Or when they doe in termes professe this (as *Epicurus, verbis Deos posuit, re sustulit*) whether they doe not equivocate. Aske this Authour in what sense he makes God to be the Authour of man's conversiō, whether any otherwise thē, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In perswading unto faith & repentance 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the first, that mere nature & not grace, *Deo credere & ab amore verum temporalium ad divina precepta servanda se convertere omnes possint si velint*, saith *Austin*, All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of temporall things convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandments. Now this is noe more, then, *posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere*, to be capable of faith of charity, and this is, *natura hominum*, of the nature of man; As *Austin* testifies in another place, where he saith, *posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, natura est hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, gratia est fidelium*. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithfull. Consider in reason; supernaturall grace is not in reason to be accounted inferiour to a morall vertue; but so it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For morall vertue doth not give a man a power only to doe good if he will, but it inclines and disposeth the will unto vertuous actions. So justice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be just or noe; but it makes him just, and so disposeth him to just courses. Again if grace supernaturall doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to beleive; as well not to repēt, as to repent. For liberty is alwaies to act opposite; whence it will follow that by vertue of supernaturall grace a man is disposed not more to faith, then to infidelitie, not more to repentance then to hardnesse of heart and impenitency. 4. Consider, a man hath noe need of supernaturall grace to inable him to refuse to repent, seing naturallly he is sufficiently disposed hereunto; & necessarily by reason of that naturall corruption which is hereditary unto him. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by supernaturall grace, is not a free power working freely; but rather a necessary power working necessarily, like unto the condition of a morall vertue, which restraines man's naturall indifferency to good or evill, and disposeth him only to good. And consequently as many as maintaine no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deale like *Pelagians*, who called that which was meerly naturall, prevenient grace. Lastly if God be the Authour of man's conversion, because he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Authour of non conversion, and perseverance in sinne, because God gives power not to convert, and to persevere in sinne, if he will. 2. As touching the second, If God be the Authour of man's conversion, because he perswades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Authour of sinne, because he perswades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Authour of conversion, because he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well said to be the Authour of every sinfull act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confident this Authour will not deny. Now I could earnestly entreate the Judicious Reader to examine well this Authour's opinion in these particulars, and compare them with his former discourse, that he may have a cleare way opened unto him to judge with what conscience he carried himselfe in his former discourse, imputing unto us that we make God the Authour of sin; albeit in treating of God's providence in evill, we generally have the expresse word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof doe rather qualify the seeming harshnesse thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenour of his discourse, looke upon what grounds he denies God to be the Authour of sinne, he must withall deny God to be the Authour of faith, of repentance, of conversion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Authour of conversion; upon the same grounds he must make God the Authour of sinne: As in case to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Authour: Or if only upon perswading us to believe, God is said to be the Authour of faith; then it followes as a sufficient Apologie for us, that we make not God to be the Authour of sinne; seing none of us conceive him to be a perswader of any sinfull act; but rather a dissuader and forbidder thereof and that upon paine of eternall damnation. But on the contrary we make a vast difference between God's operations in sinfull actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As first, every sinfull act is alwaies within the compasse of acts naturall; noe supernaturall

De Gen: cont.
Manich. l. 1.
cap. 3.

De prædest.
Sanct: 1. c. 5.

naturall act is or can be a sinne. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithstanding his corruption hath in him a naturall power. But there is noe naturall power in man to the performing of an act supernaturall. God must inspire him with a new life called in Scripture, *the life of God*; and make him after a sort *partaker of the divine nature*; and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in such sort, that, *being crucified with Christ, we hence forth live no more, but Christ liveth in us*. These supernaturall acts are but few according to the three *Theologicall* vertues, *Faith, Hope, & Charity*, whose offsprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of our selves, hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worst it can doe unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devill. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a double influence; one common as they are acts naturall, touching the substance of them; another speciall as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evill acts, he hath noe influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the substance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilnesse of them, the reason whereof is that which was delivered by *Austin* long agoe. *Malū non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem, Evill hath no cause efficient, but deficient only*. And it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creatour cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & consequently of a fraile condition. And it is received generall as a rule in Schooles, that a creature cannot be made, *impeccabilis per naturam*, that is such a one, as by nature cannot sinne. This was delivered long agoe by *Anselme* one of the first of School-divines; *In evill things God doth worke, quod sunt, that they are; non quod mala sunt, not that they are evill; But in good things God doth worke, Et quod sunt, & quod bona sunt, both that they are and that they are good*. Here this Authour sets down our opinion concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleasure. We say with *Austin* that, *predestination is the preparation of grace*, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and, all confesse, it is also the decree of conferring glory. And because in making of this decree, God had respect unto some only, not to all, both men and Angells, therefore in this consideration it is called the decree of Election, in distinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace custodient from sinne, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angells, called in holy Scripture, *The elect Angells*; or grace healing, after men have sinned, and the decree of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called *God's Elect*, in reference unto this. It is farther to be observed that *Austin* grounds the Orthodox doctrine of predestination and election upon the Orthodox doctrine concerning grace. And the absolutenesse of the one he built upon the freenes of the other, in not being given according unto men's merits. As it appeares, *de bono perseverantia cap. 15*. Where having proposed some exceptions of the *Massilienses* made against his doctrine of predestination, coming to make answer thereunto, he begins thus, *Ista cum dicuntur, saith he, ita nos à confitendā Dei gratiā, id est, quæ non secundum merita nostra datur, & à confitendā secundum eam predestinatione sanctorum detertere non debent*. When these things are objected, they must not deterre us from confessing God's grace, I meane such a grace as is not given according unto works; nor from confessing the predestination of Saints according therunto. Now if the absolutenesse of predestination be grounded upon this, that, *grace is not given according unto merits*, (the scripture phrase denies it to be given according unto workes. But *Bellarmino* acknowledgeth that in this Argument, *merits and workes* are taken by the Ancients in one and the same sense,) it followeth that as many as deny the absolutenesse of predestination must therewithall maintaine, that, *Grace is given according to men's merits or workes*. And the reason is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleasure decreed to give grace unto some, and not upon consideration of their works. And this is to elect absolutely, and *antecedently without the foresight of any deserving*, yea of any works; though by that expression which this Authour useth he doth sufficiently manifest, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upō the foresight of men's workes but upon the foresight of men's deservings. It is farther considerable to prevent the reaches of such crafty foxes as we have to deale with, whose course is in joyning the decree of conversion and salvation together, to translate that which belongs unto one, unto the other most unreasonably. For albeit God proceeds according to the mere pleasure, and without all respect to workes, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to conferre it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleasure, and without all respect of workes in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, *whoever believeth*

Eph: 4. 18.

2 Pet: 1. 4.

Gal: 2. 20.

Rom: 8. 11.

2 Tim: 1. 9.

Tit: 3. 5.

1 Pet: 1.9.
Mat: 25.

Rom: 9. 11.

leiveth shall be saved, and accordingly he bestowes the kingdom of heaven by way of reward for faith, repentance, and good workes. This hath Christ deserved at the hands of his Father that our weake performances should be thus rewarded. Lastly, it is farther to be considered that God, as he thus bestoweth salvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance &c; so from everlasting he did decree to bestowe salvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good workes, any or all of these were the cause (least of all the deserving cause) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleasure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to bestow eternall life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clearly divers waies. 1. By the Apostl's discourse; where he discourseth after this manner, *Before Esau and Jacob were borne, or had done good or evil, it was said that the Elder shall serve the younger; therefore election is not of workes*: But if election did proceed upon the foresight of faith, repentance, and good workes, or any of them, then it might justly be said, that it were of faith, repentance, or good workes or of all of them; And the force of the Apostl's argument extends to conclude, that election is noe more of faith or of repentance, then of workes; not only because faith and repentance are workes, and so accounted in Scripture phrase, as it appears. *Jo: 6. 29.* But cheifely because before men are borne, they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good workes. 2. If faith were a motive cause unto election, then either it were so of it's own nature, or by constitution Divine: not of it's own nature as it is apparent. If by constitution divine, mark what strange absurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordaine, that upon the foresight of faith, he would ordaine men unto salvation, whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's decrees are alwaies things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. 3. It cannot be said that God giveth salvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may farre more congruently be said, that God gives faith to the end that he may save them; therefore the intention of salvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, then the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving salvation. Or better thus, if God foresee faith before he decrees salvation, then the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foresee faith) is before the intention of giving salvation; and consequently the giving of faith should be the last in execution; that is men shall first be saved, and afterwards have faith bestowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by sight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation, the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predestination. The first is *permission of sin*, the second is, *Damnation for sinne*, according to that of *Aquinas*, *Reprobatio includit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa*. *Reprobation includes a will to permit sinne, and to inflict damnation for sinne*. The first object of reprobation I say is, *permission of sinne*; not *Sin* as this Authour would have it, but *permission of sinne*: Because these decrees, to wit, of permitting sinne, and inferring damnation for sinne, are decrees of meanes conducing to a certaine end. For like as in election God decreeth to bestowe faith, repentance, and obedience on some, and to reward it with everlasting life for the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy mixt with justice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to sinne, and finally to persevere therein, and to damne them for their sinne to manifest his glory in the way of vindicative justice. Now whosoever intends an end must also be the Author of the meanes conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Author of permission of sinne, yet he cannot be the Author of sinne: Albeit upon God's permission of sinne it followeth that sinne shall exist. Now to permit sinne is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Custodient to preserve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their sinne, and healing it by faith and repentance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleasure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto some; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others. And so in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleasure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repentance, whereby alone sinne is cured, and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to persevere in sinne, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himselfe of mere pleasure without all respect to men's workes; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, *whosoever believeth not, and repenteth not, shall be damned*. And like as God damnes noe man but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So from everlasting he did decree to damne noe man, but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So that by vertue of the Divine decree of reprobation

reprobation, sinne and finall perseverance therein is constituted the cause of damnation; but by noe meanes is it constituted the cause of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foresight of sinne precede it. For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, *Grace is not given according unto workes*, the absoluteness of predestination is grounded in the judgment of *Austine* as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's workes, as necessarily followeth the absoluteness of Reprobation. Secondly, looke by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good workes, namely because, *before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger*; by the same reason it evidently followeth that reprobation is not of evill workes, because, *before they were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger*, *Esaus* reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to *Jacob* his younger, as *Jacob*'s election was designed by his dominion over *Esau* his Elder brother. 3. If sinne be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sinne, had it pleased him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, *God did ordaine that upon foresight of sinne, he would ordaine men unto damnation*. 4. If foresight of sinne precedes the decree of damning them for sin, then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it, as without which there can be noe foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnation; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be noe cause of God's will, as *Aquinas* hath proved; much lesse can a temporall thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternall. Upon this ground it is that *Aquinas* professeth, *Never any man was so mad, as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating*. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike; the will of God being alike incapable of a cause in both, whereas this Authour saith, that, *God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from sin to sin*; 'tis mere bumbast. All men being borne in sin must needs persevere in sin, unlesse God gives grace to regenerate them. For whether they doe that which is morally good, they doe it not in a gracious manner; or whether they abstaine from evill, they doe it not in a gracious manner. *He that is of God heareth God's wordes, ye therefore heare them not* saith our Saviour, *because ye are not of God*. *Arminius* acknowledgeth and *Corvinus* after him, that all men by reason of *Adam's* sin are *in sensu*. *Arminius* cast upon a necessitie of sinning. He askes what difference is there in the course which God taketh for the conversion of the Elect, and obduration of Reprobates; and I have already shewed a vast difference; and here in breife I shew a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he shewes not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themselves; as touching the evill acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cause efficient to the act which for the substance of it is naturally good. *For ens & bonum convertuntur*, every thing that is an entity, so farre is good, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evill, as which indeed can admit no efficiencie, as *Austin* hath delivered of old, Man himselfe is only a deficient cause of sin, as sin, and that in a culpable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurs two manner of waies, & that in the nature of a positive efficient cause in both, namely, to the substance of the act by influence generall, and to the goodness of it by influence speciall and supernaturall.

It is true the Fathers made sin the object of prescience, not of predestination; the reason was because they took predestination to be only of such things which God did effect in time; Now sin is none of those things that come to passe by God's effect, but only by God's permission. And that such was the notion of predestination with the Fathers, I prove first out of *Austin*. *In sua qua falli mutariq, non potest prescientia opera sua futura disponere, illud omnino nec aliud quidquam est predestinare*. In his foreknowledge, which can neither be deceived nor changed to dispose his own workes, that is to predestinate and nothing else. And sin, not being the worke of God, no marvaile if it come not under predestination. Secondly, out of the Synod of *Valens*, *Predestinatione autem Deum ea tantum statuisse dicimus qua ipse vel gratuita misericordia, vel iusto iudicio facturum erat*. We say that God by predestination ordained only such things as himselfe would work, either of his free mercy, or in just judgment. Againe it is as true that they made even sin it selfe the Object of God's will, witnesse that of *Austin*. *Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo*

Enchirid. 95. *ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo.* Not any thing comes to passe but God Almighty willing it, either by permitting is or working it. So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So *Arminius* *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum implere*, God would have *Ahab* to fulfill the measure of his sins. So Scripture often mentioned. And *Austin* gives thereason of it, *malum fieri bonum est*; it is good that evill should be. *Bellarmine* confesseth as much, namely that, *Mala fieri Deo permittente bonum est*, It is good that evils should come to passe by God's permission. And shall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he saith of the Ancients, that, *They refused this fowle assertion of an absolute, irresistable and necessitating decree as he could easily shew*, but that he feares to be overlong. It is nothing but froth; It is not the first time I have had experience of such like *Pyrgopolinices* eloquence of his. *Bradwardine* hath demonstrated that the will of God is absolute throughout speaking of his decree, and none conditionall, and his demonstration is this, If there be any will of God conditionall, then the condition whereupon it proceeds must be willed by God or no; to say it is not, is to acknowledge some things to exist in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath noe hand, which is generally disclaimed; And *Durand*, who affirms some such thing, is opposed generally, and indeed his arguments are very sleight. But if God doth will that condition; then either he wills it absolutely or conditionally; If absolutely, then the cause is gained. For then that which was first willed, was willed also absolutely not conditionally. As for example, if God wills a man's salvation upon condition of faith, if withall God's will be, and that absolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's salvation, and that absolutely. If it be answered that the condition is willed not absolutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I enquire whether God willed it or noe. If noe, then something is produced in the world, in the production whereof God hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that also, I farther demand whether he willed it absolutely or conditionally? If absolutely then all that depended thereupon were absolutely willed, and so the cause is obtained. If you say this condition was willed also conditionally, so a way is made to a progression in infinitum, which is a thing unsufferable by the consent of all. And as many as are put to give instance will forthwith manifest the nakednes of their cause. This demonstration of *Bradwardine* I sometimes represented to this very Authour in our private walking and communication, and he professed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other terme Irresistable this manifests this Authour's meaning, that some will of God, speaking of his decree, is of a resistable nature. Whereas *St. Paul* to the contrary plainly gives us to understand that God's will is irresistable; & the *Psalmist* saith, *that the counsell of the Lord shall stand. And my counsell shall stand, and I will doe whatsoever I will.* And therefore his decrees are resembled to mountaines of brasse. As for the lost terme necessitating. For the Gentleman paies us in words, for want of better coine, not considering that words are but winde, he would cheat his Reader by this, presuming he would be so simple, as to believe that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and *Bradwardine* who peculiarly useth this phrase, understands hereby noe other necessitie then upon supposition, which *Alvarez* shewes by generall concurrence of Schooll-Divines, that it may well stand with absolute contingency and liberty, it being noe other necessity, then that which is called, *secundum quid, in some respect*; And such a necessitie *Arminius* maketh consequent to permission: & *Bradwardine* is exprest that God necessitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from *Aquinas* his doctrine, where he maintaines that God's will imposeth noe necessitie upon the creatures will; because he ordaines both necessary things come to passe, necessarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a possibility to the contrary; & likewise free actions freely, that is with a free active power in the Agent to doe otherwise. But come we to the consideration of the passages produced out of the Ancients. For I presume they are the choicest. For though he feared to be overlong, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behooved him to represent the best. And I believe he could produce more of this nature. For I have been an eye witnes of it under his hand now foure yeares agoe. And though he produce them not, I hope to doe it for him ere we part, to shew how little I feare his concealements, and somewhat of the Predestinarians also, being glad of such an opportunity to discover the wildnesse and precipitation of his judgment touching that which is called the predestinarian heresy here touched by him.

The first is a passage taken out of the Church of Lyons, denying that God hath layed a necessitie of sinning on any man. Another out of *Remigius*; both represented (yea & many

Es. 46. 10.
Zach. 6.

ny more of this nature) by that most reverend and most learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh Doctor *Usher* in his history of *Goteschalk*, 138. and 173. To these I answer. First these Ancients are about 850 yeares after Christ; yet marvailous orthoðoxe considering those times in the point of predestination. And let no man think that they deny a necessity of sinning laid upon all by originall corruption, the consequent of *Adam's* prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, should it become us to follow them in this? Doctor *Potter* acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that *libertas à peccato*, liberty from sinne, is not incident to a naturall man; it is true he desires to quash it by saying there is yet in man, *Libertas à necessitate*, à liberty from necessity; but from what necessity? From the necessity of sinning? If so, why should he then deny a liberty from sin; yet he never taketh any paines to cleare this from contradiction, but blindfoldly followes *Bernard*, without caring much to understand him. And he looks to be pardoned because *Vossius* did so before him. *M. Fulke*, in his answer to the *Rhemish Testament*, usually distinguisheth between *libertas à peccato*, & *libertas à coactione*, liberty from sinne, and liberty from constraint; and denying all liberty from sinne to a naturall man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken some paines to shew Doctor *Potter's* superficially carriage in this, and to cleare *Bernard*; which it may be I will add to this by the reason of the homogeneous nature of it. In the meane time liberty from sinne is utterly denied to a naturall man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And noe marvaile seeing *Arminius* himselfe, and *Corvinus*, those great patrons of natures power, doe acknowledg this, as before I mentioned; only they say God is ready to remove this necessitie of sinning from all, and every one.

2. But the meaning of *Remigius* and the Church of Lyons is the same with that of *Prosuper* formerly mentioned, in his answer to the objection of *Vincentius*, where he confesseth, *Hominem non redemptum Diabolo esse captivum*, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan; and that, *creatura peccatrix pœnalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relieto vero domino) (ponte se vendidit)*. The creature sinning deservedly suffers the dominion of Satan by way of punishment, as to whom he sold him selfe voluntarily. *Hec quippe servitus non institutio est Dei sed judicium*. This slavery of man to Satan is not God's institution but judgment; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleasure, but in the way of judgment. Like as *Aug. cont. Julian; Pelag.* *Austin* in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiscence to be, not sinne only, but the punishment of sinne also. So *Remigius* and the Church of Lyons say, that God imposed it not on *Adam* but man falling from God brought a necessitie of sinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon justly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him.

2. Why he should alleadge the first passage under the name of the Church of Lyons, I know not; The reverend Bishop acknowledgeth *Florus* to be the Authour thereof, a Deacon of Lyons pag. 126. Although the same Reverend Bishop acknowledgeth that other book also that goes under the name of the Church of Lyons now extant in the *Bibliotheca Sanctorum Patrum*; and wherehence *Vossius* communicateth unto us his *excerpta*, was written by the same *Florus* pag. 115. He had more reason to father his next passage, which he produceth out of *Remigius* upon the Church of Lyons. For albeit *Maldonat* cites the booke intituled *Liber de tribus Episcoporum epistolis* (whence this passage is taken under the name of *Remigius*); yet he who set it forth ascribes it to the Church of Lyons, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of *Nicholas Faber*, as appeares *Goteschalk: hist.* 170. But none doe I find to ascribe this worke of *Florus* to the Church of Lyons, though the Authour of another booke under that title, the Bishop acknowledgeth to be *Florus*.

3. *Florus* acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a necessity of sin in a sort, p. 149. *In Sanctis licet sit liberum arbitrium jam Christi gratiâ liberatum atq; Sanctum; tamen tanta est illa sanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt sine peccato esse non possint, & cum velint atq; desiderant non peccare non possunt tamen non peccare*. In the Saints of God though there be freedom of will, as freed by the grace of Christ, and made holy, yet this health is such, that as long as they carry this mortall body about the they cannot be without sin; and though they would and desire to be without sin, yet they cannot be without sin. This I conceive is spoken in respect of the flesh lusting against the Spirit, & of the law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of sin. How much more are the wicked in bondage to sinne and Satan, as the same *Florus* sheweth pag. 142? For whereas *Scotus* taught, that a man had not lost his liberty, but only the power and vigour of his liberty. *Florus* opposeth him thus, *Non rectè dicit, quia nec sentit, he saith not well, because he thinks not well; sed sic ut vigorem & potestatem libertatis, ita ipsam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipse ad verum bonum*

unde cecidit liber esse non possit. As he hath lost the vigour and power of his libertie; so he hath lost libertie it selfe, insomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, untill he be freed by the grace of Christ. In like māner Remigius discourseth also, grāting free will only to evill, p. 36. In infidelibus id ipsum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest. In infidells, free will it selfe, so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead workes, cannot be free in living workes. that is, is not free to produce workes belonging to a spirituall life. So that they unanimously confesse that in respect of originall sin, there is a necessity of sinning, but this is rightly to be understood; namely thus, that true good they cannot doe, so that whatsoever they doe is evill, only that it is free unto them to doe this or that evill, which is most true. Secondly, thus farre they qualifie this necessitie of sinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, so as to sinne whether they will or no. For albeit Rabanus charged them, whom he opposed herewith, pag. 53. Si enim secundum ipsos qui talia sentiunt, Dei predestinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus iusto iudicio, damnat peccantem, cum ille non voluntate, sed necessitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who thinke such things, God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his Will; how doth God in his just judgmēt damne him that sinneth, when he sinned not voluntarily but necessarily? Thus they criminated their adversaries: but Remigius answers on their behalfe, who were thus fallisly accused. Nemo ita sentit, aut dicit quod Dei predestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propria voluntatis perversitate, sed divina predestinationis necessitate peccare videatur. No man so thinks or speaks, that God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his will; so that a man should seeme to sinne, not by the perversitie of his own Will, but by the necessitie of divine predestination. But this is the worke of Divine predestination, that he who sins willingly, & perseveres willingly in his sins, shall against his will be punished. And the truth is taking predestination as it signifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to conferre this, rather God's not predestinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cause why a man sinneth, according to that of our Saviour. He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God. Yet this is rightly to be understood. For God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cause why their naturall corruption is not cured, thē that they goe on in their sinfull courles: for naturally carnall men are prone enough to sin, and in this course they necessarily continue, untill God changeth their hearts; necessarily I say, but not against their wills. For sinne is as a sweet morsell, which they roule under their tongue. This may suffice for answer unto these passages, and withall to represent the vanitie of this Authour's discourse, endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Authour of sinne, more of this hereafter. For I am acquainted with that which he here conceales, and with certaine adjuncts thereunto, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lyons concerning falling from grace; as also this Authours bold adventure in two particulars in justifying Vossius, citing the cōfession of Pelagius as one of Austin's sermons; as also defending him in the point of the predestinarian heresie, which Doctor Usher maintaines to be a mere fiction of the Semi-pelagians to bring Austin's doctrin thereby into disgrace. But Vossius conceives that there was indeed such an heresie, and that the Monks of Adrumetum were the Authours of it. And this Interpolatour takes Vossius his part, and labours by certaine arguments to make it good against the judicious observations of that most reverend and learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh. It may be I shall represent my answer thereunto by way of digression; but first I must dispatch my answer to this I have in hand.

Sect. 6.

M. Mason's Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination all which (me thinks) are noe better then mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give noe true satisfaction to the understanding. There is say they a twofold decree.

Addit. p. 31.

32, 33, 34.

1. First an operative, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh allthings. 2. A permissive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe. If God should worke sinne by an operative decree, then he should be the Authour of sinne, but not if he decree by a permissive decree to let it come to passe, and this only they say they maintaine. It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne; for otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counsell, Eccclus. 15. 14. He suffered the nations in time past to walke in their own waies Ait. 14. 16. And dayly doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins; And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory; for he hath noe need of the sinfull man, Eccclus. 15. But partly because he is (*summus provisor*) supreme moderatour of the world, and knoweth how

to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evil; and especially for that reason which *Tertullian* presseth, namely, because man is made by God's own gracious constitution, a free creature undetermined, in his actions, untill he determine himselfe; And therefore may not be hindered from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeale his own ordinances.

2. It is true also that a permissive decree is noe cause of sinne, because it is merely extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath noe influence at all upon the sinne. It is an antecedent only, and such a one too, as being put, sinne followeth not of necessitie. And therefore it is fitly contradiistinguished to an operative decree. And if that side would in good earnest impute noe more in sinfull events to divine power, then the word *Permissio*, imports, their maine conclusion would fall, and the controversy betweene, us end. But first, many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sinne (*efficaciter*) with an Energetically and working will. Witness that discourse of *Beza* wherein he averreth and labourerh to prove, that God doth not only permit sinne but will it also: And witness *Calvin* too, who hath a whole section against it, calling it a carnall distinction invented by the flesh, and (*effugium*) a mere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind (*Deo volente, & jubente*) by Gods will and command; who must shortly after be punished for his blindness; He calleth it also (*figmentum*) a fiction, and saith they doe (*ineptire*) play the fooles that use it. By many reasons also doth he endeavour to lay open the weaknes of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speaks of God's smiting men with a Spirit of slumber and diddnesse, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts &c. Of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded, and hardned, *Nimis frivola est ista solutio*, saith he, *it is too frivolous a glosse*. In another place he blameth those that referre sin to God's prescience only, calling their speeches (*argutia*) tricks and quirks which Scripture will not beare; and those likewise that ascribe it to God's permission, and saith, what they bring touching the Divine permission in this businesse will not hold water. They that admit the word *permissive*, doe willingly mistake it, and while, to keep of this blow, they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For

1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedome, and committing such sins day by day as they might have avoided; and to which he proceedeth (*leno gradu*) slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, *Psalm*: 81. 11. 12. *Israel would none of me, so I gave them up &c.* *Ezech*: 18. 39. *God and serve every one his Idoll, seeing ye will not obey me &c.* *Rom*: 1. 21. 24. *Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, therefore God gave them up unto their hearts lusts, to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind.* *Rev*: 22. 11. *He that is unjust let him be unjust still*. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners only; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and willfull, which will by noe meanes be reclaimed. But the permission which they meane, is an act of God's antecedent will, exercised about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternall consideration.

2. Permission about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners, or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling; that are able to stand; & supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted; but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of sin, and so includeth an absolute necessitie of sinning. For from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow; as the fall of *Dagon's* house followed *Sampson's* plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. *Maccivim* in two disputationes, expounding this word (*Permissio*) circumscribes it within two acts. The first of which is a Substraction of Divine assistance, necessary to the preventing of sinne; And having proved it by two arguments, that none may thinke he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two. The first of them is our reverend and learned *Whitaker*, some of whose words alleaded by him are these, Permission of sinne is a privation of the aid, which being present, sinne would have been hindered. The second is *Parum*, for saying that that helpe (which God withdrew from *Adam*) being withdrawen, *Adam* could not see use his endowments, as to persevere. And this doctrine, saith he, is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of *Parum lib. de grat. primi hominis* c. 4 p. 46. Their permission therefore of sinne being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actual effectuall procuring and working of it. For (*Causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens*) a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient) and so is but a mere fig-leave to cover the foulness of their opinion.

Here we have a very demure discourse proceeding in a positive manner, proceeding from one that takes upon him to be a Master and dictator of sentences; wherein there is little or nothing found that he delivers of his own; or to purpose that he delivers of others. Nothing of any colour of pertinency, besides what he delivers in the last place touching our opinion of the nature of permission of sin. And I willingly confesse, *The divine permission of sin* is a very obscure point, and in my judgment most come short in the explication thereof. *Arminius* hath a large digression upon this place of Permission in generall, and of permission of sin in speciall: It was the first peece of *Arminius*, the examination whereof I undertook only with a mind to search after satisfaction therein. And finding noe content therein, I gave my selfe to enquire thereof in a positive manner; wherein I proceeded very farre, setting downe in foule papers, as they came to hand, whatsoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then set my selfe upon preconceived grounds reasonably well discurssed by me, to deale with *Arminius* some five Sections after the beginning of his discourse on this argument, which five first Sections I took not into examination, untill I had dispatched the whole. And having an occasion to deale upon this argument when I came to the defence of *M. Perkins* his answer to the third crimination, whereupon I deale in the second book of my *Vindicie*, I thought good to digresse after the second Section, & to call a certaine proposition of *M. Perkins* to account, which was this, *Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenis, quia Deus non impedit*. It is the

Collog Mompeli
2 part. p. 177.
Cal: insis. lib.
14. c. 18. Sect
1. vers. 2.

Id: ibid. lib. 2.
c. 4. Sect. 3.

Collog: Theol.
disp: 9. pag. 104

Answer.

third Digression, of the second book, the title whereof is this, *Propositio illa Perkinſii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) ſub examen revocatur*. There is noe digreſſion throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philoſophicall and Theologicall contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permiſſion. Firſt, in things naturall. Secondly, in things morall. And theſe firſt in good things. Secondly, in evill things. In the courſe whereof many obſcurities and difficulties doe offer themſelves to be cleared, & ſolved by diſtinction; where coming, to an end, I deliver my ſelfe in this manner. *I perceive in how ſlippery an argument I exerciſe my ſelfe, too much expoſed to the calumny of adverſaries, and too apt to incurre the diſlike of good men; whereas in all my labour I aime at nothing elſe, then according to my power to explicate the myſtery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderfull manner; And to diſſemble nothing, but repreſent all difficulties that doe occurre, that both my adverſaries may have at hand what to impugne; Our Divines wherein to take paines, either by way of explication of what yet remains obſcure; or by confirmation of what they ſhall find to be ſound yet unſufficiently proved.* Now that Digreſſion of mine being ſo large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And ſo may others too when they ſhall conſider againſt whom this man's ſtomach workes moſt. For he cannot be ignorant of my answer to M. Hoord his proſelyte, if not therein to himſelfe. Again, the exception here in the laſt place taken againſt our doctrine of permiſſion, is exactly the ſame with Arminius his exception againſt Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have answered at large, and that in ſuch manner, that I willingly profeſſe, I was utterly to ſeek at this time, of what I had there delivered; ſo that upon my conſulting the place, the things I there met with, ſeemed new unto me, in diſcovering many waies the inconſequence of Arminius his diſcourſe, which yet is the very ſame with this of Mr. Maſon's. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the ſecond Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for noe better then an idle diſcourſe (yet an answer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to convince the juſtneſſe of that exception made by Arminius, by ſound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the leaſt authority to confirm it; And though on the contrary I have divers and ſundry waies manifeſted the falſeneſſe thereof: well I am not reſolved to ſuffer him to paſſe unanſwered, how idle ſoever his diſcourſe may appeare to be. Four diſtinctions of ours he propoſeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his answer unto Perkins, nor any part of that his answer pretermitted by me. But this is written in Engliſh for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was ſaid of M. Hoord's diſcourſe; namely, that it was fit to be copied out, and communicated unto the Country. He ſaith theſe diſtinctions are, *deſuſions of the ſimple*; when he proves it, then it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas he ſaith, *they give noe true ſatisfaction to the underſtanding*, this is rightly to be underſtood, to wit, in reference to an Arminian underſtanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagianiſme. Yet is he not privy to the underſtanding of all, ſo much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But ſuppoſe they doe not. The diſtinctions uſed by School-Divines to accommodate God's predeſtination with man's free will, are many and learned, but Caietan profeſſeth of them all that they doe not, *quietare intellectum, ſatiſſie the underſtanding*; but what followes; Therefore ſaith he, *Ego captivo meum in obſequium fidei; I captivate mine unto the obedience of faith*. to wit, becauſe ſcripture is evident for both: And why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange that God's providence in governing the world ſhould be of a myſterious nature. And however this Authour may cenſure Caietan in this, yet Alvarez profeſſeth that herein, *doctiſſimè, & piſſimè loquitur; he ſpeakes moſt learnedly and moſt piously*. Yet permiſſion, in the judgment of Suarez, is not merely a negation of prohibition, but conjunct with a poſitive operation in concurring to the act of ſinne; which Aquinas hath proved to be *a Deo, from God*, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himſelfe is not operative in ſinne, otherwiſe then as touching the ſubſtance of the act. For ſinne, as ſinne hath noe cauſe efficient, but deficient only, as Auſtin hath long agoe delivered; neither hath he been oppoſed herein by any that I know. Obſerve how with him to hinder, and abſolutely to hinder is made all one; yet *to will*, and *abſolutely to will* in God, is not all one in his opinion. I doe not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counſell. For he forbade him to eate of the forbidden fruit, which is ſomewhat more then to diſſwade from it. And yet to perſwade or diſſwade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counſell: For it is to impart unto him another counſell. Yet though we diſſwade a brother, and ſo not leave him in the hand of his own counſell; yet we ſtill leave

leave him to his own free will. Both these I have insisted upon more at large in the second book in my *Vindicia*, Sect: 2. Digres. 3. It is true God hath noe need of setting forth his own glory, noe more then he hath need of making the world; but the existence of sin may be and is necessarily required to the setting forth of God's glory in some attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appeare in pardoning sinne, nor the glory of his vindicative justice, (called in Scripture his wrath, *Rom: 9. 23.*) in punishing sinne, unlesse there be sinne to be pardoned, and sinne to be punished: Nor the glory of his power and wisdom in working good out of evill, unlesse God give way to the committing of Evill. And if upon God's permission of sinne, it be not necessary that sinne exist, then it is not in the Almighty power of God infallibly to procure the manifestation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of justice punishing it. But seeing these reasons are not considerable with this supercilious *Theologue*, it should seeme likely, that looke what he substitutes in the place thereof, will prove substantiall, and satisfie such understandings as his own: And that he represents out of *Tertullian*, namely, *because man is made by God a free creature*. This reason was represented by *Arminius* before him, and that out of *Tertullian*. *Arminius* his huskes are pleasing to him. Such was the condition of the prodigall child when he forsooke his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to performe naturall acts as well as morall; and morall good as well as evill? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Christ to the performance of actions spiritual? What therefore must God only permit them to performe them, and by noe means worke them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience, yea and keep them from sinning against him, as he kept *Abimelech*, *Gen: 20*? See how this Authour displaies himselfe ere he was aware; and withall what the reason is why he affects to deale upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace, least his vile opinion miserably defacing the glory of God's grace might appeare with open face in 'its proper colours. Yet it breakes forth more then he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sinne, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to worke their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to doe what they will; if they will sinne to permit them; if they would doe any good worke whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good worke, or to abstaine from sinne, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath noe more hand in working a man to any good worke (excepting the act of commanding and perswading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evill. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to doe what they will, whether it be good or evill; otherwise God should nullifie his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both *Arminians* and *Jesuites*. For *Arminius* maintaines that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like doe the *Jesuites* maintaine in their doctrine of grace effectually in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good worke, and accordingly preserve him from any sinne by vertue of grace effectually, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be noe way prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills. But *Tertullians* authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himselfe in so shamefull a manner. Yet *Tertullian* will not serve his turn any more, then it doth serve *Arminius* his turne, as I have shewed in my answer to *Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de predest. Sect: 7.* and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the contradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vaine. For 1. the decree operative is extrinsecall to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sinne (as which admits noe efficient cause thereof being of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Authour will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sinne followes of necessitie, as well as upon the position of the decree operative; that is of necessitie, by supposition, not necessity absolute. For as *Aquinas* hath delivered and proved, not only the things themselves come to passe by vertue of God's decree, but, *modi rerum, severall conditions of them*. As for example, necessary things, necessarily; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permitted do alwaies come to passe, not only *Piscator* with our Divines, as Mr. *Perkins*, Doctor *Whitaker* and *Pareus* doe avouch, but *Vorsinus* also and *Arminius*, as I have shewed in my *Vindicia*, lib. 2. digres. 3. *Arminius* his words are these, if God permits a man to will this or that

Lib: 1. cont:
Marcion.

that, *necesse est*, it must needs be, *ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum*, that no kind of argument move him to will it. *Navaretus* the Dominican professeth the same, in *quaest. 19. pag. prima art. 6. pag. 65. col. 1.*

1. That this distinction is rejected by our Divines this Authour brings no tollerable evidence. As for *Beza* here it is confessed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit sinne, and whereas he addes that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit sinne (speaking of permission divine) is to will that sinne shall come to passe by God's permission. And *Austin* hath professed of those things that come to passe by God's permission, that they come to passe, *Deo volente, God willing them*. And the Scripture acknowledgeth as much; that the Kings in prostituting their Royall authority, to the executing the pleasure of the Beast, did herein fulfill the will of God. So that God's permissive decree is as effectuell in its kind, as the operative decree in its kind; thus farre, that like as what God mearies to worke shall come to passe, so look what God meares to permit, that also shall come to passe. Neither doe I know any Arminian or Jesuite, that denies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of sinne, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When *Calvin* will have the evill of sinne come to passe, *Deo volente, God willing it*, he denies not any more then *Beza* doth, that it comes to passe by God's permission of it. But *Calvin* rests not in a bare permission; and no marvaile. For the Scripture saith not, that God permitted *Pharaoh* to refuse to let *Israel* goe, but plainly and energetically thus; *I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let Israel goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, I will rent the Kingdome from Solomon*; not I will permit it to be rented, and so throughout. *Bellarmino* himselfe contents not himselfe with a bare permission, but farther saith, *God doth rule and governe the Wills of wicked men; yea, torquet & flectit, he wrests and bends them*. And *Austin* often saith, *he enclines them unto evill*. And whereas it is farther added out of *Calvin* that *a man is blind, volente & jubente Deo, God willing and commanding it*. Is it not expresse Scripture, *Es. 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy, and shut their eyes*. So that *Calvin* doth but accomodate himselfe to Scripture phrase. But when we come to the explication of this either in Christian reason, or by comparing one place of Scripture with an other, we say that to *Make their hearts fat, their eares heavy, and to shut their eyes: And to give them the Spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and eares that they should not heare*; Is no more then, *not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare*. Yet where *Calvin* saith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is so disturbed; but I guesse the Authour would referre us to *lib. 1. Institut. cap. 18. prima & secunda Sect.* But I find no such thing there, but speaking of God's providence in blinding *Ahab*, thus he writes, *Vult Deus perfidum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived*. This is plaine out of the *1 Kings 22. 20*. Who shall entise *Ahab* that he may goe, and fall at *Ramoth Gilead*; *operam suam offert Diabolus ad eam rem. The Divell offers his service for this*, saith *Calvin*. And doth not the Scripture expressly testifie as much? *There came forth a Spirit and stood before the Lord, and said I will entise him; And the Lord said unto him, where with? And he said, I will goe out and be a false Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets*. *Calvin* goes on, *Mittitur cum certo mandato, ut sit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum*; God sends him with a certaine command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all *Ahab's* Prophets. This also the Scripture testifies as expressely, as the former; *Then the Lord said, thou shalt entise him and prevaile also; Goe forth and doe so*. Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Authour might not as well caluminate the Holy Ghost the Inditer of this Scripture, as *Calvin* who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every sober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifestly appeare, *Excœcari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devill, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it*; but this taken apart from the instance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might suspect his meaning were, that God commands a man to shut his own eyes, & blind himselfe. And judge I pray whether to say, that this whole providence of God concerning *Ahab*, was no more then permission, deserves not to be called, *figmentum, a fiction*, as indeed *Calvin* calleth it. To this he addes the joynt profession of the Apostles touching God's providence in crucifying of Christ; in *Abalom's* incest, the *Chaldeaes* bloody execution in the land of *Juda*, and the *Assyrians* before them, which in Scripture is called the worke of God &c. And concludes it to be manifest, *Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentia Dei nudam permissionem substitunt, that they doe but toy and trifle, who in place of God's providence substitute a naked permission*. And this Authour doth but caluminate *Calvin's* expression, in rendring the word *ineptire*, by playing the foole. *Ineptire* in the proprietie thereof
- Enchirid. 9. 5*
- Es. 6. 10.*
- Rom. 11. 8.*
- Deut. 29. 4*
- Sect. 1.*
- vers. 21.*
- vers. 22.*
- Ast. 4. 28.*
- Ast. 2. 23.*
- 2 Sam. 16.*
- 22. & 12. 12.*

thereof, is in this case to faile of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not justly taxe those who understand such Scriptures, as speake of God's smiting men with the Spirit of slumber and giddinesse, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hardning their hearts, of a permission, and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened? I had thought common sense might have justified him in this; taking Calvin aright, who denies not permission in all this, but *nudam permissionem, naked permission*; as much as to say these Scripture passages doe signifie more then permission; And as I have said before Bellarmin himselfe doth not satisfie himselfe with a naked permission in such like providence divine as here is mentioned. I thinke he may justly say that to explicate *excecation* and *obduration* by permission is such an explication as will satisfie no sober man, and that such a solution is too frivolous. And as for God's prescience, it is apparent that the horrible outrages committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture testifies not to have been foreknown only by God, but by the hand and counsell of God predetermined also; & more then this, cleare reason doth justifie that the ground of God's foreknowing ought, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonstration.

2. Who mistakes the nature of permission most, we or this censurer, let the indifferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permission humane, and permission Divine. Sure I am *Suarez* requires to permission divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more then that both *Scotus* of old without question, and the *Dominicans* of late, and *Bradwardine* before them maintaine this concurrence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all these mistake the nature of permission, if we believe this Authour upon his word wherein he carrieth himselfe very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reason for it, though with manifest contradiction to himselfe, but let us consider it.

1. *Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom &c.* Most untrue, and manifestly convictable of untruth by that which himselfe delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he said, It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne; for otherwise there would be none. By this it is manifest that whensoever sinne is committed, there had place God's permission of sinne, otherwise there would have been no sinne, therefore permission had place in the very first sinne that was committed by man, and Angells. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to censure and correct the mistakes of others about permission. As *Austin* sometimes said of one opposing him, *noverit se esse obduratum*; so mayest thou not say of this Authour in this discourse of his, *noverit se esse excacatum*, let him take notice how himselfe is blinded? The Lord giving Israel up to their own hearts lusts; he like a resolute Doctor will have to proceed by way of mere permission. Yet the Lord saith not, he permitted them to their own lusts; and *Rom: 1. 24, 26, 28*. Observe, first looke what he permitted came to passe throughout, even to abominable courses. Secondly, observe, the judgment of God is noted herein. *They received the recompence of their own error as was meet*. What? And are God's judgments executed only by God's permission, and that by the hands of them that are judged and punished? Such is the accuratenes of this Authours divinity comming to correct the mistakes of others about permission. And for the prooffe of all this we have this Authour's bare word without any reason or authority represented by him. As for that of *Ezechiel* not chap: 18. 39, but chap: 20. 39. *Go and serve every one his Idols*; this hath the forme of a command, rather then of a permission; but the Lord hereby signifies, that in serving him, while they serve other Gods, they doe but profane his holy name in serving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, then the heathens who served not him at all, but other Gods only. So that the Lord seemes to signifie, that he had rather, they should not serve him at all, as *Revelations 3*. I would thou wer'st either hot or cold, but seeing thou art luke-warme, I will spue thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Authour would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former disobedience was it not a consequent of God's permission? For if God had not permitted their disobedience, surely it had not been by the Authours discourse in the beginning of this Section. As touching that *Revelations 22. 11*. I hope by the same rule of this positive *Theologue*, not only their continuing to be unjust, was by God's permission, but their first being and beginning to be unjust was by God's permission also. And surely if this man's word be of any credit, all sinners were first permitted to sinne, otherwise

wife they had never sinned, and not the obstinate and willfull only. Were not the Angells innocent before their first sin? was not Adam innocent before his first sin? and did not God permit both Angells and men to sin their first sin? If not; what truth is in this authour's word, when he said, *God hath decreed to suffer sin? for otherwise there would be none.* And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is crackt, and deserves not to be believed in ought.

2. We have been more beholding unto this Authour, since he came to meet with our distinctions, then throughout all his former discourse; as I have shewed already in part, & shall discover more by God's helpe (not his permission only) ere we part from this. He seemes to be conscious of some thing and fearefull of giving too much advantage, as appeares by his expressiō, when he saith that *permission* (of sin; for so he should say) *supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning.* Now this is nothing congruous to his former expressions whereby it was made to suppose that, *a man is able to stand.* For to be able to stand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to stand; but to have a possibility of standing, or not sinning is not so. For though a man hath no power in himselfe to stand or to abstaine from sinne, yet if there be a power in God to make him stand, and to preserve him from falling, this is sufficient to make good, that a man hath a possibility of standing and abstaining from sinne. And we are willing to confesse that God is able not only to preserve any man that stands from falling, but also to raise any man that is fallen; and to make him stand. Thus *Florus*, *Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo propria voluntate inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo possit assurgere ad bonum; Ut autem assurgat ad bonum, non est propria virtutis, sed gratia Dei miserantis. Nam & qui mortuus est dici potest posse vivere, non tamen sua virtute, sed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatur, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen sua virtute, sed gratia miserantis Dei. Et ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum predicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinsecus admonente, & Deo intus suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant.* After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evill, he hath free will whereby he may arise unto that which is good; but to arise unto Good is not of his own power, but of God's grace commiserating. For of him also who is dead, it may be said, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by 'its own power, but by the grace of God shewing mercy. And therefore all men are admonished, the word is preached unto all, because this they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admonishing outwardly, and God stirring them up inwardly, they which beare may be revived. Observe by the way a manifest incongruity in saying that *permission* is a not hindring them from falling, who are able to stand. For they who are permitted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are supposed to stand, and not only to be able to stand. It seemes this Authour cannot endure that *Permission* of sinne, should consist in the withholding of a grace needfull, to abstaine from sinne. Whence it followeth evidently that in this Authour's opinion, either God's permission of sinne is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of such a grace, without which neverthelesse man may keep himselfe from sinne; and consequently, though such a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to sinne, as well as to abstaine from sinne; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it followes that like as when a man sins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abstaines from sinne, it is not by vertue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells King *Abimelech* exprelly *I kept thee from sinning against me.* If he pretends that some grace is withheld whensoever a man sinneth, but will not say that is was necessary for the avoiding of sinne it followeth that when man is permitted to sinne, he is no more apt to sinne, then while such grace was denied him, and consequently no more apt to abstaine from sinne when such a grace is granted him, and consequently in granting such a grace he permits him still to sinne, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to doe good, as much as in granting it; So that still it is not God that keepeth a man from sinne, as often as he abstaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Authour as well denies, that God is the Authour of any good, as that he is the Authour of any evill: But man is Authour of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be denied, but that the power of doing evill is from God. He will grant likewise that

God

Hist: Gotsch:
pag. 142.

Gen. 20. 6.

God is ready to concurre to any good act if man will, and I presume he will not deny, but that God concurs also to the substance of every evill act. The only difference that remaines is this; God perswades only to good, and disswades only that which is evill. Now this third and last assertion we grant as well as he. Yet he layes to our charge that we make God the Authour of evill, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Authour of any good in the actions of men, and makes noe place for any grace save such, as is hortatory, which is performed usually by the ministry of men. Yet consider what *Bradwardine* sometimes Arch-Bishop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind before *Luther* or *Calvin* were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his second booke is this. *That free Will being tempted cannot of his own strength without the helpe of God and his grace overcome any temptation.* Of the first this, *that free will strengthened with what created grace soever cannot without another speciall succour of God overcome any temptation.* Of the sixth this, *that That speciall succour of God is the unconquerable grace of God.* Of the seventh this, *That no man though not tempted, can by the strength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great soever it be, without the speciall assistance of God avoide any sin:* & all these propositions he demonstrates with variety of argument. Behold the ingenuity of this Authour; He lies in the face of *Calvin* and *Beza*, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unlesse God by his grace keep and preserve a man effectually from sinning, it cannot be that he should abstaine from sinne. *Bradwardine* maintained the same before any of these were borne, yet he saith nothing to him, lets all his arguments alone; but upbraides us for maintaining the same doctrine, without giving any reason to convict us of our error. Adde to this, which I have omitted, the Corollary of that seventh chapter in *Bradwardine* formerly mentioned is this, *That it is the will of God, which preserves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from sinne.* Not one of the arguments whereby he confirms any of these positions, doth this Authour goe about to answer. In like manner *Alvarez. Positâ permissione divinâ infallibiliter peccat homo;* upon supposition of Gods permission, man sins infallibly. The proposition he intends to prove in that disputation is this, *Therefore a man is not converted because he is not aided of God.* But both he and we deny that hereupon a man sinneth necessarily alwaies, but only in some cases. In some cases it followeth, as namely a man borne in sinne, and in the state of corruption, the naturall fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency, untill God affords a man the grace of regeneration, he cannot believe, he cannot repent. *They that are in the flesh cannot please God. Thou after the hardnesse of thy heart that cannot repent. Therefore they could not believe.* In which case God is not the cause of infidelity, and impenitency; but these proceed naturally and necessarily from that originall corruption wherein they are conceived and borne. God is only the naturall cause why this their naturall corruption continues uncured. For none can cure it but God, it being a work nothing inferior to the raising of them from the dead. Yet he is no culpable cause of this. For as much as he is not bound to any, but he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. So that necessarily without the grace of regeneration, every man continueth in his naturall corruption, devoid of faith, of hope, and love. These being supernaturall, and whereunto no man can attaine with out supernaturall grace. In like manner, hence it followeth that no naturall man can performe any morall good act in a gracious & acceptable manner in the sight of God, because the fountaines of such performances, are not found in naturall men. But they have a free power as to commit any naturall evill worke; so to abstaine from it; though not in a gracious manner: Free power as to abstaine from any vertuous act, so to performe it also, though not in a gracious manner. They may be temperate, chaste, just, and the like; but their vertuous actions are not truly vertues in a Christian account, because they know not God, nor Christ, much lesse doe they believe in him, and performe these vertuous actions out of their love unto him. If *Maccovius*, and *Whitaker*, and *Pareus* be of the same mind, and the *Dominicans* with them, and *Bradwardine* before them all; let the indifferent Reader consider what an hungry opposition is made by this Authour, not offering to answer any one of their Arguments, nor of mine neither, in my *Vindicie*; Nor saith ought by way of reply upon any answer to the like argument of *Arminius*. The resolution of all that here he delivers, determining in a rule himselfe proposeth, without reason or authority to justifie it. A rule as here it is applyed conteining a notorious untruth. For *causa deficiens* in no case can be *efficiens* in proper speech, any more, then *causa efficiens* can be accounted *deficiens*, unlesse it be understood in divers kinds. As for example, *efficiens naturaliter* may be *deficiens moraliter*, and *deficiens moraliter* may be *efficiens naturaliter*. *An efficient cause naturally, may be deficient morally,*

Lib. 9. de au-
xil: disp: 101
p. 803. num. 7
lin: penult:

Ro: 8.
Ro: 2.
Jo: 12.

l. 2. digrf. 3.
Criminat. 3:
Sect: 2.

and so a cause deficient morally, may be efficient naturally. Least of all can it have place in the present question, which is of the cause of sinne. For sinne as sinne, evill as evill, *non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; hath no cause efficient, but deficient only; as Austin* hath long agoe determined; and it is a rule generally received and never that I know denied of any. Again *causa deficiens in necessariis* may be culpable I confesse, and so interpretative (as they say) may be interpreted to be as good as an efficient. As in a civill consideration it is said of the Magistrate, that, *Qui non vetat peccare cum possit, jubet. He that forbiddeth not a man to sinne when it is in his power, or when he hath authority to forbid, 'tis as if he should command the committing of that sin.* Now this is only in such a case, where the necessitie respects the person who is the deficient cause, as namely in case he be bound in duty to afford help and succour to him that cannot keepe himselfe from sinning without the succour of an other, not otherwise. And therefore it reacheth not to God, who is not bound to preserve any man or creature from sinning; Least of all is he bound to regenerate a man that is borne in sinne. Adam was created in all sufficiency that the reasonable creature was capable of, without any pronenes unto evill, but rather in a morall propension to that which was good; And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all mankind, even a necessitie of sinning, as *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confesse. He wanted no power to doe that which was good, or to abstaine from sin, but ever since his fall, impotency to that which is good, & pronenesse unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inheritance of all mankind. And as for the permission of Adam's fall, his sin was in a thing naturally indifferent, the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abstain from that fruit any more, then to partake of it. Neither doe we say that God did withhold from Adam any grace that these our adversaries maintaine to be necessary for the avoiding of that sinne which was committed by him. How Adam himselfe was brought by Eve to eate of that fruit is not expressed. As for Eve the temptation which Satan used with her, & which did prevaile is expressed: He allured her with the representation of the powerful nature of that, to make them as Gods knowing good and evill, & he made this seem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree, *the Tree of knowledge of good and evill.* It seemes not likely that she knew who it was that spake unto her in the Serpent, nor that she was acquainted with the fall of Angelis. Then againe *the desire of knowledge*, is no evill thing it selfe, or stands in any contradiction to the integrity of a reasonable creature: Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the best, it brings such a perfection with it. Only the error was, in affecting it this way. God did not keep the Devill off; nor reveale unto her who it was that spake unto her; much lesse his apostaticall condition; least of all his project to supplant them. Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inspired into her to resist it at the first, & to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it. She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the service of God, then unfit. All which considered, her will being moved to seek this perfection by tasting of such a fruit, there was no cause or reason to hinder her from tasting it, save only the consideration of God's prohibition. For the will of every reasonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good, and though that good may prove evill in some circumstance, yet if that circumstance be not considered, the will proceeds to affect it. How long the Devill was exercised in this temptation we know not. Inconsideration is conceived by *Durandus* to be the originall of that sinne of theirs; and God was not bound to maintaine this consideration quick in her, and of the danger of such a transgression. In fine she came to a will & resolution to tast of it; to the producing of this act, as a naturall thing, the Lord concurred, as all confesse, namely to the substance of the act. The question is whether he concurred to the effecting of it absolutely or conditionally? It was as true of Adam and Eve, that in him they lived and moved and had their being, as it is of us. We say God as a first cause moves every second cause; but agreeably to their natures; Necessary agents to worke every thing they worke necessarily; Free agents to doe every thing they doe, freely. But to say that God made them *velle modo vellent, to will in case they would will*, is so absurd as nothing more; The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it selfe, and consequently both before and after it selfe. See what I have delivered concerning this in my *Vindicia lib. 2. Digr: 3. and Digr: 6.* of the nature of permission, more at large, where unto this Authour is content to answer just nothing.

Sect: 7.

M. Mason's
Addis. p. 34.
35.

There are two things say they in every ill act. First, the materiall part which is the substance of the action. Secondly, the formall part which is the evill or obliquitie of it. God is the Authour of the action it selfe, but not

not of the obliquitie and evill that cleaveth to it; as he that causeth a lame horse to goe, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Authour of sinne. First, all sinnes receive not this distinction, because of many sins, the acts themselves are sinfull; as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and *Saul's* sparing of *Agag*, and the fat beasts of the *Amalekites*. Secondly, It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions, & not of their aberrations. For they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions, as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions but as transgressions of Gods law.

3. To this simile I say that the Rider or Master that shall resolve first to flea his horse, or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame, that for his halting, he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: And so God if he determine to cast men into hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the Authour, as well of their sins, as of those actions to which they doe inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to destroy them.

This distinction of that which is *materiall* and that which is *formall* in sinne is commonly used by *Aquinas* 1. *secun: q:71. art:6. in corp: Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo; Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato; cum dicit dictum vel factum vel concupitum; Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod est quasi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem aternam.* So then the substance of the act is the materiall part in sinne; And the opposition of this act to the law of God is the formall part of it, both according to *Aquinas*; and according to *Anst*in also. And *q:75. art:1. corp.* He defineth sinne to be *Actus inordinatus, an inordinate act*, and distinguisheth the act from the inordination of it. *q:79. art:2.* He propoeth the question, whether the act of sin be from God? and in the conclusion resolves it thus, *Cum actus peccati sit ens, necessario est à Deo*, Considering that the act of sinne is a thing having being, necessarily it is of God. And in the body of the Article, *Dicendum quod actus peccati & est ens, & est actus, & ex utroq; habet quod sit à Deo; The resolution is that the act of sinne, is both a thing that hath being, and an act, and in each condition it hath, that it is of God.* And he proves this both by authority and by reason. As for the defect of this act, that non *reducitur in Deum tanquam in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, that is not charged upon God as the cause thereof, but on a man's free will.* And he illustrates it thus, *Sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non autem in virtutem motivam à quâ tamen causatur quicquid est motionis in claudicatione.* Like as the defect called halting is charged upon a crooked legge as the cause thereof, and not upon the motive faculty, though from it proceeds all the motion that is found in the halting: Neither did I ever read any School-Divine that contradicted this distinction. *Mr. Mason* doth without alleading any authority for it. Yet he might have alleadged *Arminius* opposing after this manner, though before him, that I know, not any.

1. We say not only of many sins, but of every sinne, which hath any act therein, that the Acts themselves are sinfull, because every such sinne, being actuell, it is *Actus cum defectu, an act with a defect*, that is an act defective. As *Aquinas* speaks in the place immediately before alleadged; and this defect is in respect of the law of God. As *Anst*in defineth sinne to be, *dictum, factum, concupitum contra legem Dei, A thought, word, or deed against the law of God.* And this is enough I thinke to denominate it sinfull. But the argument used by this Authour is the very same which was formerly used by *Arminius*, and whereunto I have answered; *lib. 2. de permiss. Sect: 21.* and that after this manner. Be it so that the act it selfe is forbidden, and consequently the act it selfe is inordinate; but what Will it therefore follow that these two are not to be distinguished, to wit, the act, and the inordination of it? a strange liberty of disputing. A man's hand is sometimes inordinate, as being monstrous, either having too much, or too little; as either wanting five fingers, or having more then five: what therefore shall it not be lawfull for us to distinguish between the hand and the monstrosity of the hand? 2. The wall it selfe is white; what therefore shall we not distinguish between the wall, and the white colour of it? A man himselfe is vertuous and vicious; shall this hinder us from due distinguishing between the man and his morall condition, whether vertuous or vicious; Many other arguments are represented by *Arminius* which this Authour toucheth not; yet in the place forementioned I have shaken them all to peeces, such is the rotten condition of them. And over & above I have proved, not that in every sin the act is to be distinguished from the inordination of it; but that in every sin of commission there is place for this distinction, and that after this manner. Every sinne of commission, is an act inordinate; but in every inordinate act we are to distinguish between the act it selfe, and the inordination of it. And that the act and the inordination of it are two, I prove thus. That if they are one and the same then we may well say that the act is an inordination; but this is most false. For nothing can be affirmed or predicated of the same thing both in the abstract, and concrete (God himselfe excepted) As for example you may say of a wall, that it is white, you cannot say of it that it is whitenes. For the wall is in the predicament

predicament of substance, but Whitenes being a colour is in the predicament of quality. 2. A gaine an inordination is a privation of order. But no act is formally a privation, and consequently neither can it be formally an inordination. 3. An entitie positive, & a terme privative cannot be one and the same formally, but two distinct notions. Now every act is a positive thing, but inordination is a mere privation. 4. Lastly, God is confessed by all to be the cause of the act, but if the act be all one with the inordination, he should be the cause not of the act only, but of the inordination, that is of the sinfullnes also.

2. Observe his shifting carriage. It is our Tenet that God is the Authour of the action it selfe, but not of the obliquity: and himselfe hath expressly acknowledged this to be our tenet in the beginning of this Section. Now whereas he makes shew here of proving that we make God the Authour, not of the action only, but of the obliquity also, he performs no such matter; but only this, that we make the object of God's decree, not the action only, but the aberration also; but in all this there is no contradiction unto us; We willingly grant that in as much as God permits sinne, he will have sinne come to passe, by his permission, every good thing that comes to passe, he will have it come to passe by his being the Authour of it and effecting it; the evil that comes to passe, he will have come to passe also, not by his being the Authour of it and effecting it, but only by his permitting of it. So that still that of *Austin* holds good. *Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to passe unlesse God will have it come to passe.* And according to the eleaventh article of religion established in the Church of Ireland, *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time shall come to passe;* and according to the expresse word of God testifying that the tenne Kings in giving their Kingdomes did here-
Rev: 17. 17. in doe the will of God. And that the horrible outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God by *Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel* were by the hand and counsell of God before determined to be done. We say sinfull courses (not hand over head), but unrepented of, lead unto damnation, but not as meanes. For they are neither man's meanes; for if they were, then the end also whereunto they tend, should be intended by him; Neither are they any meanes of God: For all meanes are the workes of him that intends the end; So is not the sinne of man the worke of God, but the permission of sinne is his worke: And this is the meanes which he intends thereby to bring to passe his intended end, which yet on the part of Reprobates is not the damnation of them, but the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, which in Scripture phrase is called the Declaration of his wrath. For God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill. And to this end he doth not only permit them both to sinne, and to persevere therein without repentance, but also to damne them for their sinne. And this worke of God namely the permission of sinne is as requisite for the manifestation of his mercy on the part of his Elect, as for the Declaration of his wrath, on the part of reprobates. Yet who was ever found so absurd as to say that we make the sinfull actions of men to be the meanes which God useth to bring about the salvation of his Elect. So little cause have we to make use of this distinction as the action it selfe and the sinfullnesse thereof, to shew in what sense it is a meanes which God useth whereby to bring about the damnation of man. For we utterly deny sinne to be any such meanes of God, but the permission thereof only is the meanes whereby to bring about not their damnation, as this Authour suggesteth, but the meanes (together with the damnation for sinne) whereby he bringeth to passe the declaration of his just wrath. But men of this Authours spirit; unlesse they be suffered to calumniate at pleasure; and corrupt their opposites Tenet at pleasure, they can say just nothing. It is true actions deserve damnation only as they are transgressions of God's law, but we deny that these transgressions are God's meanes, but only the permission of them is his meanes; and by permitting these transgressions, as also by damning for them, he brings to passe his glorious end, to wit, the declaration of his just wrath. 3ly, It is most untrue that God brings any man into a state of sinne; He brings himselfe into it most freely, God having no other hand in the sinne, but as permitting it, that is as not preserving from it. Indeed If he did bring men into sinne, and they not rather bring themselves thereinto, he were the Authour of it. But it is well knowne that sinne cannot transcend the region of acts naturall. All acts supernaturall must needs be the worke of grace, and truly good; But every sinfull act is merely naturall, never supernaturall. Now never any of our Divines denied a man liberty in his greatest corruption, unto acts naturall; the Devill himselfe hath liberty thus farre. It is true originall sinne is brought upon all by the sinne of Adam; For hereby the fountaine of humane nature became corrupted; but in this very sin of Adam we had an hand, if there be any truth in
 Scripture

which testifies that, *In Adā we all have sinned*. This is the doctrine which the Author spights, though he be more wise then to publish to the world his spleen against it: And I have seen under his hand where he denies originall sinne to be *veri nominis peccatum*, sinne truly so called. And albeit *M. Hoora* makes a flourish in saying that God might justly damne all man-kind for the sinne of *Adam*; and that also was this Authour's doctrine in the lectures which he read at Magdalen Hall; yet I have good cause to doubt whether this be his opinion now, and not rather the same with *Pelagius* his opinion, saving the difference which *Pelagius* did put between not entering into the Kingdome of heaven and damnation. As for all other sins which we call actually, they are, as I said, naturall only, and not supernaturall; and therefore no man wants liberty, as to doe them, so to abstaine from them; Only he wants a morall and Spirituall liberty to abstaine from them in a gracious manner, according to that of *Aquinas*. *Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit.* *Thom: 1. p. q. 23. art. 7. ad tertiu.* Though a man who is reprobated of God cannot obtaine grace, yet that he falleth into this or that sinne it comes to passe of his own free will. It is true also even in God's providence concerning acts naturall, there is a great mystery. For as God foretold *David* that, *his neighbour should lye with his wives*; and though he sinned secretly, yet the Lord would doe this openly: So he foretold that, upon that *Altar* which *Jeroboam* erected, *a child that should be borne of the house of David. Josiah by name, should burne the Prophets bones*. And that *Cyrus* also should build him a City and let goe his captives: Yet who doubts, but that *Cyrus* did freely deliver the Jewes out of *Babylon*? and *Josiah* did as freely burne the Prophets bones upon the alter in *Bethel*, as ever they did action in their lives? So *Abalom* did as freely defile his Fathers Concubines. Then againe we deny that the damnation of any man is the end that God intends, but the manifestation of his own glory. And therefore though he hath made the wicked against the day of evil; yet both that, and all things he hath made for himselfe. And to this tends both the permission of sinne, and the damnation of Reprobates for their sin; And in no moment of nature, are either of these intended before the other, both being joynly meanes for the procuring of another end. And if permission of sinne were first in intention with God, and then damnation as these men would have it, it followeth evidently by the most generally received rules of Schooles that permission of sinne should be last in execution, that is men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to fall into sinne. This is the issue of these men's Orthodoxy and accurate Divinity.

Section 8.

The will is determined to an Object two waies. 1. By compulsion against the bent and inclination of it. 2. By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it. God's predestination say they, determineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first; It forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would. When men sin, 'tis true they cannot choosē; And it is as true, they will not choosē. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cause of men's sins, but their own wicked wills.

1. The Ancients made no distinction between these two words (Necessity) and (Compulsion) but used them in this argument promiscuously; and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne least they should grant him hereby to be the Authour of sin, as I have touched before, and shall intimate againe afterward. Nor did the School men put any difference between them, as may appear by the testimony of *M. Calvin*, who speaking of the School-distinction of the will's threefold liberty; from necessity, from sin, from Misery, saith, This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth necessitie with coercion.

2. That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne, as that which forceth it, because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoided; and therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of sinne as if it did enforce it.

3. That which necessitates the will to sinne, is more truly the cause of the sinne, then the will is; because it overruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it, 'its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of it selfe, and disposer of 'its own acts, and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, *Αυτεξούου α δεινόντων αυτοδυνατον*, a power which is under the insuperable check and controule of no Lord but it selfe. It overruleth, I say, & maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superiour command and determination; And therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins, as proceed from the will to determined, then the will is. For when two Causes concur to the producing of an effect, the one a principle overruling cause, the other but instrumentall, and wholly at the Devotion of the principall; then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influx and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it. We shall find it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent. It is not ye that I speak, saith Christ, but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you, I laboured more abundantly then they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me. And I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me saith *St. Paul. Gal: 2. 20.* In these and many other places the effect or work spoken of, is taken from the instrument

M. Mason's Addit. p. 35.

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Mat: 10. 20.

1 Co: 15. 10.

ment, and given to the principall agent ; Which being so , though man's will worke with God's decree in the commission of sinne , and willeth the sin which it doth, yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of God's Almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe ; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will, the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause.

4. That which makes a man sinne by way of necessitie, that is with, and not against his will, is the cause of sin in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will; As he which by powerful perswasions draws a man to stab, to hang , to poison himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that evil, and unnaturall action, then he that by force compells him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death; And so if Gods decree doe not only make men sin; but sin willingly too; not only cause that they shall (*malè agere*) doe evill; but (*malè velle*) will evill, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

Answer.

God determines the will to sinne by necessitie, though not by compulsion: this he obtrudes upon our Divines as their opinion, but quotes none; is it likely that he who quotes *Beza* to shew that in his opinion, God doth not only permit sinne, but will sinne; And *Calvin* to shew, that a man's mind is blinded, *volente & iubente Deo*; would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them? If his common place booke could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them, to shew who they be, and where they say that, *God determines the will to sinne by necessity though not by compulsion*, Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so, and the place where, and their own words? Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way? The very phrase of determining in Latine is no word of course with our Divines in this argument. It is the phrase of the *Dominicans*. But doe they say that *God determines the will to sinne*? I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expresseth himselfe so unsholastically, so absurdly. *Alvarez* saith that, *God by his effectuall decree predetermineth second causes to worke*. He saith that God doth predetermine the will to the act of sinne, as it is an act. That the first root of contingency is the will of God. Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion? Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production? Namely, to produce it voluntarily and freely? Nothing lesse though this Authour counts it his wisdom to conceale this. *God by his omnipotency doth cause, that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely*. Again, *God's generall concurrence is a divine, immediate influence into second causes whereby they are, foremoved, applied and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature; The naturall cause naturall; the free cause freely; as I have professedly delivered*. *Disput. 18. 23*. And that in such sort freely, as they can choose to doe otherwise if they will, and that in the very instant wherein they doe what they doe. But come we to consider his answer.

1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients, he gives us his bare word for it, as touching the confounding of necessitie and compulsion; yet *Bernard* I confesse willingly, in talking of *liberty from necessity*, understands by *necessity* coercion. He saith farther, that those Ancients did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne, least they should grant thereby that God is the Authour of sinne. But I doe not thinke he can shew this phrase of *necessitating the will* any way to be found among the Ancients, what he hath touched before I have considered, what he shall intimate hereafter, I hope I shall not let it passe unsaluted. And the truth is to *necessitate* hath such an Emphasis with it as to perswade that whatsoever a man is necessitated to do, that he doth by constraint against his will. And it is a rule commonly received that *Voluntas non potest cogi*, The will cannot be forced; which is most true, as touching *Actus elicitus*, the acts of the will inward and immediate, and not so of *actus imperati*, acts outward and commanded. But *Bradwardine* who alone useth this phrase amongst School-Divines, takes it in no such sense, but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that, not necessarily, but freely; which this Authour most judiciously dissembleth all along for desparing to prevaile by true and substantiall information of the understanding; *perturbandis affectibus suffundatur*; by a corrupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet, hopes to worke distast upon the Readers affections. *Bradwardines* position is this, *God can after a sort necessitate every created will to its free act, and to a free cessation, & vacation from act*; and hath a Corollary to this effect; That some kind of necessity, and liberty are not repugnant, but may consist together. Again, *God doth after a sort necessitate every created will, unto every free act therefore, and to every free cessation and vacation from act that by necessity antecedent naturall*. And he addes a Corollary, that some kind of antecedent necessity and liberty are not repugnant, and may consist together.

This distinction of *liberty from necessitie*, *liberty from sinne*, *liberty from misery*, I find in *Bernard*, and *Vossius* alleadgeth it only out of him, and the School-men might take it up after him. *Bernard* hath many obscure passages in the prosecuting of it, especially in reference to the two first members. Neither doth *Vossius* take any paines to cleare them from

De aux: disp. 22
Disp. 24.
Disp. 26.

ibid. Disp. 118,
pag. 485.
ibid. de aux:
Disp. 121. pag.
490. n. 3.

Bradw. de cau-
sâ Dei l. 3. c. 1.
Id ibid, c. 2.

from a manifest contradiction in shew : And no marvaile if Doctor *Potter* doth not , in stating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will , which he undertakes very magnificently in his *answer to charity mistaken*; he was content to be led by his blind guide: now the seeming contradiction is this. If there be in a naturall man no liberty from sinne, then is he necessarily carried into sinne ; and how then is there any liberty in him from necessitie ? unlesse *necessitie* be taken as all one with *constraint*. And *Bernard* sometimes in that very treatise doth clearly expresse himselfe to understand thereby coaction. And so *M. Fulk* in his answer to the Rhemish testament, denying unto man liberty from sinne , yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. And indeed sinne to the profane person is like a *sweet morsell which he rolleth under his tongue* , as the booke of *Iob* speaks, he comes not constrained thereunto, but naturally takes delight therein; & I doubt too many there be, who though they are driven to confesse, that a naturall man hath no liberty from sinne , yet they please themselves with a certaine expression of *Lindan's*, that a man hath free will unto sinne ; hoping therehence to conclude when time serves , that a man as he hath freedome to commit it , so he hath freedome to abstaine from it, and so by a backe doore to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the first, namely that even a naturall man hath liberty from sinne. I am not sure that *Lindan* did well understand his own expression, so as to know how to make it good, much lesse that they are able who lick their lips at it. But of this, and the clearing of *Bernard*, and of the difference between liberty naturall, and liberty morall I have else where discoursed at large. And *Calvin* observing this contradiction might well blame them that confound necessity , with coaction; whereby a way is opened to conclude, that because a man is free from constraint of sinning, therefore he is free from necessity of sinning ; whereas originall sin doth necessarily incline him to sinfull actions & courses in generall; though to this kind of sin in speciall, or to this particular, in what kindsoever, it doth not: yet by the way it is to be considered, that *Calvin* in some particulars, as namely in gracious courses, did attribute so much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will, as that the actions performed thereby though voluntary, yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free; & indeed they are wrought in opposition & as it were in spight of a certain principall of corruption that in part remains in the very best of God's children. But we see no reason to the contrary, but that, when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life, of the life of grace, by the spirit of regeneration , though all the powers thereof doe incline only to that which is good, like as the powers of naturall corruption incline only unto evill, yet the particular use and exercise of those is alwaies free: Like as the particular use and exercise of the powers of our corruption is alwaies free to the committing of this or that sinne according unto emergent occasions standing in congruity to every man's particular disposition.

2. The Authour keepes himselfe to the language of his own Court , but he should not so imperiously put it upon his opposites to concurre with him in the language of *Ashdod*. We know nothing that necessitates the will to sinne , but that originall corruption, wherein every man is conceived, and which we brought with us into the world. For that makes us impatient of a yoke, like unruly Heyfers ; And nothing is more burthensome unto us in our corrupt nature , then the holy lawes of God ; *The statutes of Omri are not so , nor all the manner of the house of Ahab* ; these are punctually observed , when God's holy ordinances are proudly despised. God moves every creature to worke agreeably to its nature. Necessary Agents necessarily , contingent Agents contingently, Free Agents freely. He doth not move to any such act as is sinfull , save only where the feare of God is not at all found, or not quickned, but the motions and suggestions of Satan entertained ; nor then neither alwaies ; and that not only in his own children , but even in the hearts of the wicked to restraine from sinfull courses in spight of Satans temptations, by injecting into their minds the consideration either of danger, or of shame ensuing; so in a naturall way to restraine from the committing of such an act as is sinfull, especially when he seeth it prejudiciall to the peace of his Church in generall, or any member thereof in particular; otherwise if he gives them over to Satan, and moves them agreeably to his suggestions entertained by them , as being naturally well pleased with them, why should this seem strange to any ? So that not any sin is inevitably committed by the most wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth, but he hath power enough (I doe not say to avoid it, an absurd phrase as if sinne were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no, but) to abstaine from it, though not in a gracious manner, that being in the power of them only who have the spirit of regeneration dwelling in them.

3. In the same language he prosecutes his vile cause, giving manifest evidence to the world that it cannot be supported without lyes, nor embraced by any but those whom God in his secret judgments hath given over to strong illusions to believe lyes. It is not incredible to me that ever any Papist or Protestant hath affirmed that God necessitates the will to sinne; They generally acknowledge that evill hath no cause efficient, but deficient only: The terme of God's operation is no other then the substance of the act, which as an entity, and as an act must necessarily proceed from God, as *Aquinas* hath delivered. And albeit they maintaine that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth worke upon the will of the creature which, from the first time that Divines came resolutely unto the acknowledgment of this Divine concurrence to the act of sin, hath also been received as I have shewed in my *Vindicia*. For *Peter Lombard* disputing on either side about this concurrence, leaves it indifferent to the Reader to imbrace either part: Either the affirmative that God doth concur to every act, though it be sinfull, or the negative. Yet I say as many as doe maintaine the affirmative, doe so maintaine God's motion upon the creatures will, as to move it only agreeably unto it's nature, namely to work freely not necessarily. Like as he moves necessary Agents to work necessarily, and contingent Agents to worke contingently. And if this Authour be ignorant hereof, which may well give him boldnes. For who so bold as blind Bayard? What doth he other in all this but betray his own shame comming to discourse on such an argument, as an asse comes to play upon an harp, as the proverbe speaks. But if he be not ignorant of this, what unshamefastnesse doth he manifest all along, making bold only upon the simplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him, and abuse him, and draw him along to oppose the free grace of God in predestination and regeneration, under colour of making God the Authour of sinne in the point of reprobation; which yet he despaires of making good against us without notorious untruths, and that undoubtedly delivered against his own knowledge. For what Authour hath he produced to justifie this that any of our Divines maintaines that God necessitates the will of man to sin? Not any that I know using this phrase *Necessitate* but Papists, and among't them none that I know but *Bradwardine* a man renowned in his time both for eminent learning, and eminent piety, as appeares by Sir *Henry Savill's* preface unto that book of his; and he no where affirming that God necessitates any man unto sinne; but only to the substance of the act; & that not so as to make the will work necessarily, as the phrase imports in a vulgar eare, and unto a popular judgment (whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage most unconscionably) but agreeably to 'its nature, that is contingently and freely. For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this, why doth he not? Is there any hing throughout this whole discourse that more requires he should name the man, and quote the places, where this is affirmed, then this? Yet here we find a blank; he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word, which deserves no credit at our hands; And is it possible to believe so foule a crimination without all evidence produced, unlesse faction and partiality hath blinded his eyes? Should he have laied to our charge that we maintaine that God necessitates the will to any good act, and to overrule the will therein, we should utterly deny it without distinction. It is true he overrules the will of the flesh, but not the will of the Spirit, the regenerate part, but moves it agreeably to 'its nature, and to worke not only voluntarily but freely whatsoever it worketh. For albeit the regenerate part is like a morall vertue (though as much transcendent to it, as a thing supernaturall transcends a thing naturall) inclining only to that which is good; yet is it alwaies moved to this particular good rather then unto an other most freely. Like as a man's naturall corruption inclines a man only to evill; yet to this kind of evill or to this particular evill, rather then to that, Man is moved most freely. So that if we maintaine not that God workes a man to every good act, otherwise then freely; let the very conscience of our enemies judge, whether we can maintaine that God necessitates the will either of men or of Devils unto sinne. For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act. One unto it as unto an act, and that is influence generall; Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act, and that we acknowledge to be an influence speciall and supernaturall. But as touching an evill act, all sides confesse that God hath but a single influence thereunto and that generall, namely, as it is an act, not as it is evill. And albeit this influence which we call concurrence nnto the act, be joyned with an influence into the will of the creature to move it to the producing of the same act; yet this motion is no other then whereby the

the will is moved to worke agreeably to 'its nature; that is freely. Like as all other Agents are moved by God, the first Agents to worke agreeably to their natures, necessary things to worke necessarily, contingent things contingently. So that in all this there is no overruling of the will, no liberty taken from her, but rather she is maintained and established in her free condition, and moved agreeably thereunto; like as in the eleaventh Article of Ireland it is expressed. For after it is laid downe that, *God from all eternity did by his unchangable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe*; It is forthwith added that, *hereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather*. But because of another claw that here is subjoynd by this Authour, it is to be considered that the liberty of the creature is not equall unto the liberty of the Creator God himselfe: But like as all other causes are but second causes, God alone the prime cause; All other Agents but second Agents, God alone the first Agent. So likewise all other free Agents are but second free Agents, God alone *primum liberum, the first free Agent*. So that no liberty of the creature doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God, *In whom we live and move and have our being*, what a proud thing & presumptuous were it for the creature to aspire unto such an exemption. Who oppose us in the point of free will more then Papists? Yet see how *Alvarez* disputes against this vile and presumptuous conceit, so much maintained by the Jesuites, and after taken up by the Arminians, who live by their scraps, as if they would be content to wash their dishes. The Jesuites discourse thus, *That the Will may be free, she must have the Dominion of her act*, true saith *Alvarez*, *debet habere Dominium sui actus*, *Disp. 22. num: 44.* *non tamen oportet quod habeat primum & absolutum Dominium sui actus*, she must have the dominion over her act, but not the first and absolute dominion of her act. And *Disput. 117*, he proposeth this question, *Whether the will hath her dominion of her act, and what dominion this is*. In the resolution whereof he proposeth three conclusions.

1. *The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof. In this conclusion the Divines on both sides doe concur.* 2. *Free will created in the actuall use of Dominion and power which she hath over her acts, depends on God as of an absolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will doe in particular. This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace, not only morally, but efficiently and physically doth cause us to worke that which is good, & it is proved, saith he, by all those reasons whereby it hath been formerly shewed that God by his decree & effectuall motion doth predetermine all second causes, even such as are free, to worke, preserving their liberty and nature.* 3. *The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, especially in respect of acts supernaturall. Our meaning is that all dominion & actuall use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause, or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the cheifest & first cause efficient, & ought to be resolved into him, as into the first Authour, & first absolute Lord thereof. And the truth is the question of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distinction. For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall, and the resolution thereof, is according to the resolution in the point of originall sinne. But free will unto actions in generall under an apperance of good, this is naturall liberty; and the resolution thereof depends upon a right understanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their severall kinds, such operations as are agreeable to their severall conditions. The first liberty consist's in disposing man aright towards his end; like as morall vertues tend to this. But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the meanes, unto what end soever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, *in genere boni conducentis*, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evil, right or wrong. But the appearance of good moving in the former is only, *summi boni*, of our cheifest good, the enjoying whereof will make us happy. But to returne, this Authour with whom I deale in present, stands for the will of man's absolute dominion over her acts; as before he did expresse; whereas *Alvarez* professeth utterly against this, Neither doe I blame him for contradicting *Alvarez* in this; but for carrying himselfe like a positive *Theologue*, nor so only, but like a *peremptory Theologue* contenting himselfe to dictate rules to others without all prooffe, save this that otherwise we make God the Authour of sinne. Yet this is not any expresse Argument of his neither; but he obtrudes premises upon us, which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of these dayes, unless it be by some Libertines, against whom none that I know have disputed more effectually then some of those very Divines which here are traduced*

Heb: 13. 21.

by him. But observe the vile and abominable issue of this Authours doctrine in this particular, making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act; yea and to have the absolute dominion thereof, as formerly he did expesse *Self: 3.* For seeing the act of faith, of repentance, and the like are free acts; if liberty cannot be maintained unless a man hath the absolute dominion of his own act, hence it manifestly followeth, that God doth not determine the will to believe, to repent, or to any good work, yet the Scripture professeth that *God is he, who makes us perfect unto every good worke, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ.* That it is *God who worketh in us both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure.* So that if a man should live *Methusaleh* his age, and spend that whole time in a gracious conversation; yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more, it is merely of his good pleasure; so little cause have we to presume of perseverance in that which is good by our own strength. And againe all this God workes in us for Christ his sake. Christ hath deserved even this at the hands of God his father. What then is the meaning of this, that God should cooperate with us to the will and the deed, provided that we will? Consider the absurdity of this (upon the supposall of the possibility of such a cooperation, which yet by evident reason may be demonstrated to be utterly impossible.) Did Christ merit any thing for the Angels; yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours? Nay is it possible that any act should exist without God's operation? And is it reasonable to subject such a course of Divine providence to the merits of Christ? Thus we see whereunto this Authour tends in this discourse of his, namely so to maintaine God to be no Authour of sinne, as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good, no not of faith, repentance, or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angel: we on the other side desire & endeavour so to carry our selves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill, we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing, that is good and gracious; which is this Authours course, as appeares manifestly in the issue. And observe his crafty carriage foxe like; Had he dealt upon predestination, and the efficacy of grace, and therein professed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts, every man's will hath an absolute dominion over them; and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto: For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance; how many thousands would have been ready to have flowen in his face, and abhorre such abominable doctrine. Therefore he baulks that, and deales only upon reprobation; and here he layeth our charge that we make God the Authour of sinne, by necessitating and determining the will to sinne (though his premises herein I have shewen to be most false) therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will so much as to the act whereunto the sinfulness accrewes; both because man's will is free; and because so he should be the Authour of sinne. And if once he can make his Reader to swallow this, he doubts not but to take him in the point of predestination and grace also; and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or necessitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance, and that for feare of denying man to have the absolute dominion over his will, to worke himselfe to faith and repentance at his pleasure: and secondly, for feare of making God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act; Like as by saying that God doth determine or necessitate the will to sinne, we make him the Authour of sinne. Behold Reader the issue of this man's Divinity; and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death, by working thee with him to oppose the free grace of God, both in predestination and in regeneration, and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith, to repentance, and to every thing that is pleasing and acceptable unto him, & that through Jesus Christ. Yet we have shewed a manifest difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good, and moving the creature unto such acts as are evill. For in evill he moves only to the substance of the act, whereof our Adversaries themselves acknowledge God to be the Authour; that is the efficient cause, and this he performes by influence generall. But as touching every good act, the Lord moveth not only to the substance of the act by influence generall, but also to the goodnes thereof by influence speciall. He proceeds to tell us what Philosophers teach concerning the condition of the will. And because it is very absurd for a Christian to goe to schoole to Philosophers to learne the condition of Divine providence; he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the same as he saith, but he quotes neither the one, nor the other. Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it, and *ex nolentibus volentes facere*

cere, of unwilling, to make men willing, to worke men to faith, to repentance, to all kind of pious obedience. And as for God's secret providence in evill, how plentiful is the Scripture concerning this? God is said to have sent Joseph into Egypt, though this was brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren; To tell David, that the sword should not depart from his house, though this could not be taken up or used, but by the free will of men; To send Senacherib against a dissembling nation; and to professe that this proud King in all his bloody executions upon the people of God, was but as the axe, or the sawe in the hand of God. The like is testified concerning Nabuchodonosor after him. Nay the Prophet demands, *Whether there be any evill in the City and the Lord hath not done it;* speaking of the evill of punishment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courses, so in impure courses the Scripture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fift book against Julian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book *de gratiâ & libero arbitrio*, professing, *occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cordis*, that the perversity of the heart, or will, comes to passe by the secret judgment of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill; that is his phrase as I have formerly shewed, abundantly representing the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not so much in Scholasticall discourse, as in rhetoricall amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him selfe and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a disputer. *That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superiour command and determination;* this action of command comes in most unseasonably, it denoting a morall action, commanding not only things agreeable, but sometimes contrary to the will of the person commanded. No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto sinne, which yet is most false; for he moves it only to the substance of the act.) But why should it seeme strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator, and his instrument, and a servile instrument. Yet the notion of servility is very aliene from the matter in hand; that having place only in proper speech as touching morall obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions naturall, and of the subordination of the second cause to the first, the second Agent to the first. And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Authour doth? Doth this Authour himselfe thinke it possible that the Creature can move it selfe, or performe any operation without God's concurrence? I doe not think he doth. Doe we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cause efficient? And doth not the same Apostle, and in the same place testifie, and that in the words of an heathen man (to shew that all such did not so maintaine the *Ἀυτὴ ἐστὶν, the αὐτὴ ἐστὶν, the αὐτὴ ἐστὶν* condition of the will, as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine) professe that in God we move also? And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concurrence divine; whereabouts this Authour spends not a word, as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deale on that point, which alone is controverted. The irresistible subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is most untrue. For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know, maintaines the same divine motion under the notion of necessitating: Whereas he infers herehence that *God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined, then the will is.* Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Bradwardin maintaines that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alvarez, that God determines the creature to worke freely. Now is it a sober course hence to inferre, that the act is not free? As much as to say it cannot but be free, therefore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sinne, and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sinne. God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act; yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concurrence. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concurrence; We say God concurs to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the first Agent; not a cause only, but the first cause; and man as a second Agent, and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But these men devise God, and man to move to the producing of the same act, as two men in lifting

ing a timber logge, most indecently : And to free this concurrence from chance, they say sometimes that God workes this or that act in us *modo velimus*, that is, upon condition that we will. But when they consider that God workes the act of willing, as well as ought else; & are demanded to answer upon what condition he workes this, what condition will they devise of this? will he say, *modo velimus*, provided that we will? As much as to say, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man, at such a time will produce such an act of willing in case God be pleased to concur to the producing of it, hereupon he resolves to concur to the producing of it, whereby the finall resolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature. I say the finall resolution of every sinfull act committed by the creature. Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in *Judas*, the act of willing to betray his Master, is it in its own nature merely possible, not future; how then did it passe into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting (For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cause? And what cause could there be of an eternall effect, but an eternall cause, which is God alone: And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessitie of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at least by the necessitie of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by necessitie of nature. This is that Atheisticall necessitie whereupon our Adversaries are cast, while they oppose such a necessitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to passe agreeably to their natures, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent causes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as *Aquinas* discourseth. 1. pag. q. 19, in the Article whose title is this, *Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat*, whether the will of God imposeth a necessitie on things that come to passe in the world? The reason this Authour brings is a mere Socysme, saying the same over and over againe, As when he saith, For when two causes concur to the producing of an effect; the one principall overruling cause, the other but an instrumentall & wholly at the devotion of the principall, then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. To which I answer, that which he calls overruling, I have often shewed how absurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to its nature, but moves it only agreeably to the nature thereof. As for the cause principall, what Scholar of any braines ever denied God to be the cause principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurs? For is he not the first cause and the first Agent? Are not all other second causes and second Agents? But this Authour hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sinne, not to the naturall act under it, whereas God as touching the sinfullnesse of it is no Agent at all, much lesse a prime Agent; no cause at all, much lesse a prime cause. Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto, yet if he works the creature therunto agreeably to its nature, that is if it be an necessary Agent, moves it to worke necessarily; if it be a contingent agent, moves it to worke contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to worke freely; then by *Arminius* his confession our cause is gained. For God shall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuse. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who say that God determines the will, as the *Dominicans*; or that God necessitates the will, as *Bradwardine*. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely, in such sort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwise if they would. They confesse this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason. *Cajetan* professeth thus much as before alleadged; and *Alvarez* maintaines it in a set disputation; And supposing God's concurrence as necessarily required to every act of the creature, they are able to prove by evident demonstration, that no other concurrence can be admitted, then this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof, but agreeably to its nature and condition. And this is farther demonstrated by God's fore knowledge, of things future. Another *Arminian* with whom I have had to deale in this argument, being pressed with this reason drawn from God's foreknowledge and urged to shew how things possible became future & that from everlasting (for from everlasting they were known to God as future) had no way to helpe him

selfe but by flying to the actuall existence of all things in eternity. And I have good ground for strong presumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye, which was above foure yeares agoe. See the desperate issue of these mens discourses; who are drawn to take hold of such a Tenet to helpe themselves withall, which their best freinds the Jesuites, the Authours of *Scientia media*, doe utterly disclaime. And on the other side the *Dominicans* who embrace the actuall existence of all things in eternity, are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of *Scientia media*. So that when the Jesuites are reconciled to the *Dominicans* in the point of actuall existence of all things in eternity; And the *Dominicans* to the Jesuites in the point of *Scientia media*, then these men with whom I deale are like to prevaile, which I doubt will hardly be before *Elias comes*. Thirdly consider, if when one cause is principall, overruling the other, the effect must be imputed rather to the principall then to the other. It followes evidently that when the causes doe equally concur without any such overruling of one the other, then the effect is equally imputable unto each, & consequently the sin (For such is this Authour's language in this Argument) is equally imputable to both, to God as well as man; And he is to be accounted the Author of it, as well as man. I appeale to every mans sober conscience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this. But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall, but that Gods concurrence is conditionall, to wit, in case the creature will, and so man is to be accounted the Authour of sinne, and not God, hence it followeth, that seeing Gods concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the same nature in the opinion of these men; God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more, then he is the Authour of sinne, in the language of these disputers. Or if they fly not to this, as I have found this Authour (as I guesse) to deny Gods concurrence to stand in subordination to man's, then my former argument is not avoided; But a third reason ariseth herehence against his former discourse of Gods concurrence, namely, that if God and man doe equally concur unto the act of sinne, then, as I have already shewed, that they are equally guilty of sin. So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own faith and repentance as God is, in direct contradiction to the Apostle who saith that, *Eph: 2. 8. Faith is the gift of God & not of our selves*. We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act, whether it be naturall or supernaturall. For *in him we move as well as in him we live & have our being*. But we deny sin, as sin, to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God, as the Apostle defines it to be *Ἀνομία*, Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent, & the texts produced by him, that we may not be carried away as he is with a superfiary apprehension of things. And first consider) we might plead as well for such acts as this Authour calls sins, as he doth for acts gracious by his superfiary discourse. For doth not *Joseph* comforting his brethren say unto them in like manner. *Now then you sent me not hither, but God*. But consider farther in that passage alleadged by him out of *Mat: 10. 20*. *It is not ye that speak but the spirit of my Father which speaketh in you*. Was not this speech of the Apostles a free action? The labour of *Paul* more abundantly then of all the rest of the Apostles, was it not a free action in *Paul*? if God determined the unto these actions, then freedom of will humane stands not in opposition to determination divine; and consequently though the act be evill that is, done by man; yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act, without any impeachment of the creatures liberty. If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a simultaneous concurrence to their actions, why is he called the cause principall, since it is confessed, God doth afford the like concurrence to every sinfull act, as touching the substance thereof.

Againe he repeates the same, when in case of divine determination, he saith, *the sinne cannot be so rightly ascribed to man's Will the inferiour, as to God's necessitating decree, the superiour cause*. To which I answer againe, being drawn thereunto by his *Tautologies*; by the same reason it may be inferred, that when the fire burnes any combustible thing, the burning is rather to be ascribed to God the more principall cause, then to the fire the lesse principall, the first cause being more principall then the second; and if it please God so to order it, the fire shall not burne as it appears in the three noble children cast into the furnace of *Babylon*, when they came forth there was not so much as the smell of fire upon them. Secondly I answer as before, by the same reason, when the concurrence unto the sinfull act is equall, on man's part, & on God's, each shall equally be accounted the Authour of that sinne, and not man more then God; Now such a concurrence is maintained by this Authour. Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance; since by these mens opinions

opinions God affords only his concurrence he shall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himselfe is. Lastly be it granted that God is a more principall cause then mā in producing the act, yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the causality of the sin, who hath no Agency therein, by doing what he ought not to doe, or not in that manner he should doe, this is found only in the creature, who being a free Agent, otherwise then as originall sinne hath impaired liberty, which I hope this Authour will not deny, is justly answerable for his own transgression. As for example, God determined that *Cyrus* should give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land; yet this action of *Cyrus* was as free an action, as any that was performed by him throughout his life. God determined that *Josiah* should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at *Bethel*, yet *Josiah* did this as freely as ought else. God determined that Christ's bones should not be broken, yet the souldiours abstained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had used, in case they had broken them. This divine providence we willingly confesse is very mysterious, and as *Cajetan* saith the distinctions used to accommodate it to our capacite doe not quiet the understanding; therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith. And *Alvarez* in a solemne disputation proves that it is incomprehensible by the wit of man.

4. His last is delivered most perplexedly. I can make no sense of it as the words lie, but I see his meaning. He supposeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to sin willingly, & that he saith is worse then to constrain a man to sinne against his will. Where observe how this man's spirit is intoxicated when he delivered this. For first he calls that worse which is merely impossible, and that by his own rules. For he holds that sinne cannot be, except it be voluntary, speaking of sinne committed by any particular person. Secondly he supposeth that by our opinion God makes a man to sinne, which is most untrue. For when he acknowledgeth that no sin can be committed by man without God's concurrence; will he say that God by his concurrence helps a man to sinne? He helps him to the producing of the act, not to the committing of the sinne. And indeed be the act never so virtuous, if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God, it is no better then such as the Heathens performed; of which *Austin* hath professed that they were no better then *splendida peccata gloriosus sins*: So that if God doth not give a man these graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he shall sinne, and not only in acts vitious; and God is not bound to bestow these graces on any.

Section 9.

M. Mason's Sinne may be considered as sinne, or as a meanes of declaring God's justice in mens punishments. God
Addit. p. 37. doth not predestinate men to sinne, as it is sinne, but as a meanes of their punishment. He is not there-
fore, say they, the Authour of sinne.

38.

1. A good end cannot moralize a bad action; it remaineth evill though the end be never so good [*Bonum oritur ex integrit.* end, manner, yea matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steale that he may give an alme; or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church; Or oppress the poore to teach them patience, Or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example; or doe any forbidden thing, though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding. And the reason is because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; forasmuch as it is *leso divinae majestatis*, a *wronging of God's majesty*; and so *Divino bono opposita*; directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as any thing can be. This Saint *Paul* knew very well, and therefore he tells us plainly that we must not doe evill that good may come thereof. Whosoever therefore willet sin, though for never so good an end, he willet that which is truly and formally a sinne, and consequently God, though he will sinne for never so good ends, yet willing it with such a powerfull, and effectual will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he becommeth Authour of that which is formally sinne.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposit, for sinne as sinne, and in no other consideration is meanes of punishment. If God therefore willet it as a meanes of punishment, he willet it as a sinne; his decree it determinatd at the very formality of it.

3. This distinction taketh upon God a further aspersiō, and loadeth him with three speciall indignities more.

1. Want of wisdom and providence. His counsells must needs be weak if he can find out no meanes to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sinne, which his soule hateth, into the world and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it.

2. Want of sincerity and plaine dealing with men. *Tiberius* as *Suetonius* reports, having a purpose to put the two sonnes of *Germanicus*, *Drusus* and *Nero*, to death used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is justly censured for great hypocrisie. And so if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, doe decree that they shall sinne that to they may be damned for those sins, which he decreeth, and draweth them into the dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under pretext of justice for sinne, but yet for such sins only as he hath by his eternall counsell appointed as the meanes of their ruine.

3. Want

3. Want of mercy in an high degree, as if he did so delight in blood, that rather then he will not destroy mens soules, he will have them live and dye in sinne, that he may destroy them, like to those Pagan Princes of whom *Justin Martyr Apol. 2.* two or three leaves from the beginning saith, They are afraid that all should be just least they should have none to punish. But this is the disposition of Hang-men rather then of Good Princes: And therefore faire be thoe foule enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and Father of mercies. And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is in my conceit most evident that the rigid and upper way makes God the Author of mens sins, as well as punishment. And so much for the first generall inconvenience, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the dishonour of God.

I willingly professe I am to seeke what that Divine of ours is that saith God doth predestinate men to sinne, *as a meanes of their punishment.* Here this Authour is silent, names no man, quotes no place; Like as in the former he carried himselfe in this manner. The Ancients generally take predestination in no other notion, then to be of such things which God himselfe did purpose to bring to passe by his own operation, not of such things as come to passe by God's permission. Neither can I call to remembrance any Diviae of ours that talkes of God's predestinating men unto sinne. But the Scripture affords plentiful testimony of God's will, ordination, and determination, that the sins of men come to passe by God's permission. Was it not God's will that *Pharaoh's* heart should be hardened, so as not to let Israel goe for a while, when he told *Moses* that he would harden *Pharaoh's* heart that he should not let Israel goe? Was it not God's appointment that *Absolem* should lye with his fathers Concubines, when he denounced this judgment against him, that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lye with them before the sun? Was it not his will that the ten tribes should revolt from *Rehoboam*, when he protested of that businesse, that it was from him? Was it not God's will that the Jews and Gentiles should concur in crucifying Christ when the Apostles professe, that both *Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel* were gathered together to doe what God's hand and counsell had before determined to be done? Doth not Saint Peter professe of some that stibled at the word being disobedient, that *hereunto they were ordained?* And that the ten Kings in giving their Kingdomes to the beast did fulfill the will of God, as touching this particular? But that God should will or ordaine it as a meanes of punishment, as if the end which God aimed at, were the punishment, is so absurd and contradictionary unto Scripture, that in my opinion it cannot well enter into any judicious Divines heart so to conceive. And marke how this Authour shuffles herein: for first he saith that sin may be considered either as sinne; or as a meanes of declaring God's justice in punishing it. And why doth he not keep himselfe unto this? especially considering, that not permission of sin only, but the punishment of sin also are jointly the meanes of declaring God's justice. And where King *Solomon* professeth that God made the very wicked against the day of evill, in the same place he manifesteth what is the end of this; namely in saying that he made all things for himselfe, that is for the manifestation of his own glory. And this glory is not only in the way of justice; but in the way of mercy also; which this Authour as his manner is, very judiciously conceales; this attribute of mercy lying not so open to this Authours evasion, as that of justice. And is it possible God's mercy and the demonstration thereof should have place where there is no sin? considering that no other evill, or misery, had entred into the world, had it not been for sin, according to that of the Apostle, *By one man sin entred into the world, & death by sin.* Neither are these generalls the only end that God aimed at in this, but many other particulars there are, whereby the glory of God's wisdom and power, and grace doth appeare, by occasion of sins entrance into the world. The horrible facts of Jewes and Gentiles committed upon the person of the Son of God, were such as whereby the Lord brought to passe the redemption of the world. If Christ had not been crucified what satisfaction had been made for the sins of the world? how could he have been set forth as a propitiation for our sins through faith in his blood? & yet this is not all the glory of God that breaks forth by the permission of sin. The punishment of one sin by another is an admirable worke of God's providence, and that more waies then one. For God can punish, and doth, one man by the sin of an other. The *Assyrians* and *Babylonians* committed outrages enough upon the people of God, yet hereby the Lord was just in punishing the sins of his own people, *Senacherib* blasphemed the God of Israel, the creature his Creator, most unnaturally, this unnaturalnes of his towards God, the Lord avenged by the unnaturalnesse of his own children towards him: This was the worke of the Lord, as himselfe acknowledgeth. *I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. Man seeketh the face of the Ruler, but every man's judgment is of the Lord.* Many unjust judgments have their course in the world, yet *Solomon* saith, *every man's judgment is from the Lord.* It is just with him to

Answer.

Act. 4. 28.

1 Pet. 2. 8.

Rev. 17. 17.

Ro. 5.

Esa. 10.

Habak. 1.

Ef. 37. 7.

Prov. 28.

Ro: 1. 28.
verse 26.
verse 24.
verse 26.
verse 27.

Aug: contra Ju-
lian: Pelag. l. 5.
cap: 3.

Lib. 5 cont. Jul.
Pelag: cap. 3.

Aquin: q: 23. de
volunt. Dei ar-
tic. 6.

punish unjust courses with unjust courses, and there is mercy in this; for no better way then this to bring mens former wicked courses to their remembrance. As *Adonibezek* when the thumbs of his hands, and great toes of his feet were cut off, then he remembered his former cruelty; and how that 70 Kings had eaten bread under his Table, having the thumbs of their hands and feet cut off; And herein he acknowledged the just hand of God saying. *As I have done to others so hath God done to me.* And as many as will not in like manner acknowledge the just hand of God in like cases, let them take heed lest *Adonibezek* one day rise up in judgment against them. Thus it is just with God by one sin of the same man to punish another. For because the Gentiles knowing God, glorified him not as God, but were unthankfull, turning the glory of the incorruptible God into the Image of corruptible things, therefore the Lord gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to doe those things which are not convenient. Therefore God gave them up to vile affections. Therefore God gave them up to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes to defile their own bodies between themselves. And what were these inconvenient things? what was this uncleanes? Wherein consisted this, defiling of their bodies between themselves? The text expresseth it thus. *For even their women changed the naturall use into that which is against nature. And likewise also the men left the naturall use of the women, & burned in their lust one towards another, & man with man wrought filthines.* But was there any judgment of God to be observed in this? The Apostle hath discovered this also unto us in the words immediately following, thus, *And they received in themselves such recompence of their error as was meet;* observe manifestly the just hand of God in all this. As for the manner how God brought all this to passe, we answer with *Austin*, whether it be *modo explicabili*, or *inexplicabili*, by a way that may be explicated by us, or whether it be *inexplicabile*, the Apostle troubleth not himselfe hereabout, his care was only to shew how great a judgment this was: & this is prosecuted farther by *Austin* in the same place, shewing by variety of particulars, all taken out of the word of God, in the place formerly quoted. Neither is this all the glory of God that coes to be manifested by the permission of sin. For he knows not only how to judge one sin by another, but to heale one sin by another also. *Audeo dicere*, saith *Austin*, *ut ile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestum, cadere peccatum*, that so they may be humbled and brought to sobriety and passe the time of sojourning here with greater care and feare. Now consider in how hungry a manner this Authour sets downe our tenet concerning God's providence in willing, and decreeing, that sin shall come to passe in the world by his permission; whē he talks of sin being a meanes of punishment, a most absurd expression, both in a sinister stating of the end, punishment not being the end, but a meanes coordinate to an other end, to wit, the manifestation of God's glory, who hath made all things for himselfe, that is for the setting forth of his own glory; as also in a sinister stating the end, sin being not a meanes (as most absurdly he styles it) but a meritorious cause of punishment: Like as in reference to the manifestation of his glory, it is not the meanes, but the materiall cause thereof. But the permission of sins, that and not sin is the meanes together with the punishment thereof, tending to the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice? 1. A good end cannot moralize a bad actiō. We grant it. But seeing it is impossible that the divine hand can doe any bad action, the end of his actions is sufficient to justifie his courses. For as *Aquinas* hath delivered; God's wisdom is his justice. For he is a debtor to none but to himselfe; and how to himselfe? Not otherwise then in all things which he doth, to carry himselfe so as it becōmeth himselfe; that is to order every thing to a right end, which is only the manifestation of his own glory. For himselfe is most lovely; and 'tis his nature to be most loving of that which is most lovely. Now to order all things aright to their congruous ends, is the part of wisdom. And see how extravagant this Authour is in every one of his instances. For to steale, to commit adultery, to oppresse, to kill; is to sinne; and in willing any of these, a man wills his own sinne. But the Argument we treat of, is of God's willing the sins of others; as when God's hand and his counsell determined that those things should be done, which by *Herod*, *Pontius-Pilate*, the Gentiles, and people of *Israel* were committed against the holy Son of God; and when the Kings gave their kingdoms to the beast herein they are said to doe the will of God and when every mans judgment is said to come frō the Lord, not only judgment just, but even judgments unjust to wit, of men, yet God hath a just hand in plaguing others by the; man ought not to doe evil that good may come thereof; but God's willing it to come to passe by his permission is no evil at all; Nay it is good; nor so only, but the thing willed by him is good by the confession of *Bellarmino*, even then when he is opposing us in this very argument; *Malum fieri Deo permittente bonum est*, it is good that evil should come to passe by God's permission: And it was avouched by *Austin* many hundred yeares before *Bellarmino* was borne

borne. And he professeth that God would never have suffered sinne to have entered into the world, had he not knowne *that it appertained to his almighty goodnesse, rather to work good out of evill, then not at all to suffer evill.* Compare the judgment of *Austin* with the judgment of this Authour, and consider whether they differ not as much as light and darkenesse. And what wisdom were it for God to permit sinne (when it is in his power to hinder it, as this Authour acknowledgeth in the sixt Section) if it be a greater evill. (and that to God, as it appears by his expression of it, *Lesio divina majestatis, the hurt of the Divine majesty*) then the good that can come thereby can be? So that the crucifying of Christ was greater in the kind of evil, then the redemption of the world that came thereby, was in the kind of good. No man of common discretion will permit ought (if it lye in his power to hinder it) to his own disadvantage, unlesse he can make thereby, not only an equall advantage, but a greater. But let us farther consider the superficially speculation of this Divine, more becomming children in the Church of God then a grave and learned Divine. Sinne, he saith, is *lesio Divina majestatis, the Wronging of the Divine majesty*; but in what sense I pray? Is God any thing the worse for any mans disobedience, and transgression of Gods law? Surely like as he is no way advantaged by our obedience, so is he as little disadvantaged by our disobedience. Yet I affect not to carry that I deliver by the authority of mine own bare word, which is this Authours course most usually; I represent Scripture for it. *If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him; yea when thy sins are many, what doest thou unto him? If thou be righteous what givest thou him, or what receiveth he at thy hands? Thy wickednesse may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righteousness may profit a son of man.* And in reason, looke of what nature the benefit is that redounds from the creature unto God, of the like nature is the detrement. Now God by making the world acquires no internall perfectiō unto himselfe, but only makes his glorious nature known, and accordingly if the world should have an end, this manifestation should cease; but his glorious nature should still continue the same. And as he manifests his glory by the world, so some creatures he hath made intelligent, fit to take notice of his glory, and accordingly requires at their hands they should acknowledge it, and that not in word only, but by their dutifull obedience; and that for the farther manifestation of his glory, to their good and wonderfull happinesse, if they obey; and their extreame sorrow and misery, if they continue rebellious against him. So that whereas the end of all Gods actions being but the manifestatiō of his glory, he doth not loose so much as this, by the sins of men; For he can glorifie himselfe in their just destruction; Nay he can manifest his glory another way; namely both the glory of his mercy in pardoning their contempt of his majesty done unto him; which men, so proud many times they are, can hardly doe; but in such a case prove implacable. Likewise of his grace in curing it, as also his power and wisdom in procuring a strange satisfaction to be made for it in a wonderfull manner, and that by his own blood; That so way may be made for the manifestation of his, not royall only, but Divine magnificence in bestowing the kingdome of heaven upon them. So farre is he from being any way hurt by the sins of men in any true reall account. And accordingly as he permits sins dayly; so he offers his free grace dayly for the pardon of them; and to this tended the dayly sacrifice among the Jewes, of a lamb every morning and a lambe every evening. But why then is sinne, said to be *lesio Divina majestatis*? I answer this is to be understood not of any hurt done to his majesty in it selfe, but as in the minds of men, who hereby manifest their contempt of the divine majesty. And they that doe contemne him would put him out of his throne if they could, & wish that there were no God; & the foole would faine bring his heart about to thinke so. But though earthly Kings may be dethroned & sometimes have been, yet he that sitteth in heaven laughs all them to scorne that rise up against him. And bids the *posheard strive with his fellow posheards, not with his maker. Who will set the thornes & briars against me in battell? I would goe through them & burne them together. For God is a consuming fire.* It is true we must neither do evill that good may cōe thereof; nor permit it neither, if it lye in our power to hinder it. God neither will doe any iniquity nor cā doe; but yet is lawfull for him to permit evill that good may come thereof. Yea & will, or decree that evill shall come to passe by his permission, as I have proved at large in a digression to this purpose & therewithall discovered the Sophistical arguments of *Aquinas*, & *Durandus*, to the contrary, not to speak of *Valentianus*; not one part of all which large digressiō do I find answered by this Author. I have often alleadged pregnant passages of Scripture to this purpose & *Arminius* confesseth expressly that God would have *Ahab* to fill up the measure of his sin; which could not be done but by adding sin unto sin; Yet this is made the object of Gods will by

*Job: 36. 6.
verse 7.
verse 8.*

Act: 20. 28.

Es: 45. 9.

Es: 27. 4.

Heb: 12. 29.

Zeph: 3. 5

by *Arminius*. This will of God to have sinne come to passe by his permission, is effectuall. For whensoever God permits it, it comes to passe, as both *Arminius* and *Forstius* acknowledge, not *Piscator* only: And amongst Papists *Navaretus* & *Alvarez* as before I have shewed; Yet God hath no efficiencie in the sinne, but only in the act whereunto sinfulness adheres; and the saying of *Austin* is well knowne. *Non aliquid fit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit*; Not any thing comes to passe, but that which God will have come to passe. And the eleventh Article of Ireland is most expresse for this. I am driven to repeat the same things often; this Authours frequent Tautologies urge me thereunto.

2. Though the members be not opposite it matters not; it is sufficient they are disparate; the purpose of it being to shew, not that God doth not will sin, but only to shew under what notion he willeth it. Yet it is false and absurd to say that sinne is a meanes of punishment. For to him it belongs to worke the meanes, who intend the end, but sinne, as sinne, is no worke of God; but the permission of it is his worke, and his meanes, not to this end that he may punish it, but he doth both permit it and punish it for the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice, like as he doth also permit sinne in others, not to pardon it; but he both permits sinne, and pardons it to manifest his glory in the way of mercy.

3. I come to the consideration of the speciall indignities wherewith God is loaded by this our doctrine as this Authour pretendeth.

1. And indeed is God's wisdom and providence so strong, as that he is able to find meanes to glorifie his justice without the permitting of sinne? (For God hath no other hand in sinne as sinne, but of permission; to the substance of the act he cooperates as a cause efficient, as all confesse.) For of what justice doe we treat in this argument? Is it of justice remunerative, or justice vindicative? Was it ever heard that permission of sinne was required to make way for God's justice remunerative? Or is it possible that way can be made for the manifestation of Gods justice vindicative (in Scripture called God's wrath) unless sinne be permitted to enter? For though he hates it; yet this Authour confesseth that God permits it, as without whose permission it could not enter into the world. *Sett: 6.* In the last place this Authour helps himselfe with a phrase of God's appointing men to commit it, which he obtrudes upon us thinking to make the ballance on his part the heavier, not considering that words are but wind. We say the horrible outrages committed upon our Saviour, God foredetermined to be done; And told *David* that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lye with them before the Sun; And that it was his will that the Kings should give their Kingdome to the Beast; this we deliver according to God's word; whereas all this our opposit's discourse is quite besides the word of God; as if he would have us take his absurd conceits in steed of oracles. And doth he not know that *Austin* sometimes sayd that, *Judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini*, *Judas was chosen to betray his Master*? Or will he answer that he was the first that said so?

2. To the second I have already answered, and that at large in my answer to *M. Hoord*, in the preface and second *Section*. There I have shewed how that it was merely devilish policy in *Tiberius* to move him to take this course, to make way for a grandchild of his own, to bring him to the imperiall throne; This moved him to seeke the death of *Germanicus* his two Sons, whom *Augustus* made him to adopt as successours in the empire, & lest the putting of them to death without cause might provoke the people to mutiny against him; therefore by cunning contrivances he caused them to be provoked to revile him, that so he might have some cause to justifie his destroying of them; which yet he did not by any publique execution; he was loath to come to that for feare of raising some tumult thereby; *Fame necavit, he famished them*. Now how hath Satan possessed the heart of this unhappy Divine thus to blaspheme the holy one of Israel by comparing his waies to these abominable courses of *Tiberius*, not fearing lest his tongue rot in his head while he is uttering of them? Cannot God take the life of any man from him, be he never so innocent, and that what way he will, even by punishment, if it please him? For is it not of God's mere mercy that he promisseth, *Not to famish the soule of the righteous*? As for provoking courses, is it not apparent by these our opposites confession, that to all the provoking courses in the world God doth concur, and that as an efficient cause of every action? And accordingly he did concur with these provoking courses used by *Tiberius*. And did not God professe that he would *provoke the Israelites by a foolish people, and by a foolish nation he would anger them*? How did *Shimei* provoke *David* by railing upon him; And how did *David* interpret it, The Lord, saith he, hath bid him to curse *David*?

Not

Not that he gave any such command in proper speech ; but by his secret providence brought this to passe, using to this purpose the vicious disposition which he found in *Shimei*, but caused it not. And observe what *Austin* speaks in the like case of his mother *Monica* exercised with the opprobrious speeches of her servant, *Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? Nonne protulisti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis, & uno ictu putredinem illam praeclidisti?* My God what diddest thou? how diddest thou cure her? how recover her? Diddest thou not bring forth an harsh and sharp reproch out of an others heart as a medicinall instrument in thy secret providence, and with one stroke pared away all that rottenesse? Thus *Adonibezek* when his thumbes and great toes were cut off by his enemies, he acknowledged that God had done to him, as he had done to others. And *Solomon* testifies that, every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. If every man's judgment, then surely unjust judgments and not just only. And although they are unjust as they proceed frō man, yet are they just as they proceed from God. Like as the parricide of *Adramelech* & *Sharezer* committed upon their Father *Sennacherib*, the Lord takes unto himselfe when he saith, *I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land.* Yet what was *David* the worse for *Shimei's* cursing; neither would he thereby be urged to requite evill for evill upon his subjects; the more inexcusable were the Sons of *Germanicus* for reviling their Prince *Tiberius*, though never so much provoked thereunto. Neither was this fact of *Tiberius* a fruit of Hypocrisy, which is the counterfeiting of holines, justice was pretended indeed not holines & that through feare. For the wicked man is continually as one travelling with child, A sound of feare is in his eares. The cunning contrivances that *Tiberius* used are specified by this Authour, but he doth not specifie the cunning contrivances that God useth by our opinion, as he obtrudes upon us. Belike he was to seek of thē, yet we expresse God's providence herein by no other termes then the word of God it selfe doth suggest unto us; Namely of blinding the mind, of giving over to strong illusions, of hardning the heart, of giving over unto their hearts lusts, unto vile affections, unto a Reprobate mind To all which is required no other thing then the not curing of that naturall corruption, and habituell vicious disposition which is found in the wicked whether in the way of luxury, or in the way of uncharitableness, and malice; or in the way of ambition & pride. And secondly the administration of congruous occasions unto this their corrupt disposition, which *Arminius* himselfe confesseth to be the worke of God's providence in his *Theses* of providence, and which in Scripture phrase is stiled the leading into temptation; against which our Saviour taught his disciples to pray. Thirdly the giving them over to the power of Satan. And lastly God's generall concurrence in moving all creatures to worke agreeably to their natures, necessary things necessarily; contingent Agents contingently; and free Agents freely. But my answer to this I have profecuted at large in more sheets then here are leaves in my answer to *M. Hoord*.

Ez: 37.38.7.

Job 15.20.21

3. As for want of mercy, we willingly confesse according to the tenour of God's word (as this Authour delivers himselfe without all respect thereunto) that God shewes no mercy in hardning them. For to harden in Scripture phrase is opposite to God's shewing mercy. And as he is bound to none; so he professeth that, *He will shew mercy on whom he will shew mercy, and will have compassion on whom he will have compassion.* And this the Apostle takes hold of in prosecuting the doctrine of election, and concludeth from hence in part, & in part from God's hardening of *Pharaoh*, that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, by hardning meaning such an operation, the consequence whereof is alwaies disobedience; as appears by the objection derived therehence in the words following; *Thou wilt say then why doth he yet complaine?* (now he complaines only of disobedience) *For who hath resisted his will?* Manifestly implying that when God hardens man unto disobedience, it is his secret will that he shall disobey. Like as when God hardned *Pharaoh* that he should not let Israel goe; It was God's secret will that he should not let Israel goe for a good while: Secret I say in distinction from the will of command, which is alwaies made knowne to them who are commanded. But it pleased the Lord to make this will of his knowne to *Moses*, though it was kept secret from *Pharaoh*; yet afterwards he told *Pharaoh* to his face by his servant *Moses* saying. *And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to shew my power in thee, and to declare my name to all the world;* though *Pharaoh* believed it not as appears by that which followeth; *yet thou exaltest thy selfe against me, and lettest them not goe.* But this Authour together with *M. Hoord* goeth by other rules, which his own fancy suggests unto him, he will have God's love and mercy extended to all and every one, Christ's redemption to extend to all and every one; the Covenant of grace to comprehend all and every one; and

Ex: 33.19.

Rom: 9. 18.

upon these universalities he grounds his transcendent consolations; whence it comes to passe, that *Abraham* the father of the faithfull, was of no more comfortable condition, then the grand Signior among the Turkes: And the grand Signior had as good grounds of consolation as *Abraham* himselfe. Yet this not shewing of mercy on the vessells of wrath prepared unto destruction tends to the greater demonstration of his mercy on the vessells of mercy prepared unto glory: As the Apostle testifies *Ro. 9. 23*. And let this Author tell Saint *Paul* if he thinks good, *That this is the disposition of hang-men rather then of good Princes*. And this is the perpetuall tenour of this Authour's discourse to conforme God's courses to the conditions of courses humane. Man is bound to shew mercy on all; God is not. God is free to pardon whom he will, man is not. *If we permit men to sinne in case we can hinder them, we shall be guilty with them, but how innumerable are the sins committed in the world, which if God would hinder could never be committed?* As *Austin* discourseth *lib. 5. contra Julian: Pelag: cap. 4*. In nothing did *Nero's* cruelty shew it selfe more, then in prolonging the lives of men, that he might torment them the more. What then? Shall we taxe God for crueltie in keeping mens bodies and soules alive for ever in hell fire to torment them everlastingly without end? See what a doore of blasphemy is opened against the just God that will doe no iniquity, by this Authour's unshamefast discourse.

Zeph. 3. 5.

By this let the indifferent Reader judge of this Authour's present performance, & withall take notice of that which himselfe hath dissembled all along touching his own tenet; namely that of every sinfull act committed by the creature, God is the efficient cause, as touching the substance of the act, as for the sinfulness thereof we hold it impossible that God can have any agency at all therein, or any culpable deficiency; forasmuch as he neither doth ought which he should not doe, or after what manner he should not, nor leaves undone ought which he should doe, or after what manner he should doe, all which are incident to the creature who is subject to a law; but not at all to the Creatour who gives lawes to others, but himselfe works according to the counsell of his own will in all things. The summe is, whatsoever we deliver as touching God's secret providence in evill, we have expresse scripture for us, nothing but pretence of carnall reason against us; which when it comes to be examined, is found subject to manifest contradiction, both as touching their feigning things future without the decree of God; And as touching their conditionall decrees, and conditionall concurrences, ours is not in any particular; The greatest shew of contradiction on our parts is in the point of necessitie and libertie; Now to cleare this, as others have taken paines, so have I in my *Vindicie* proving divers and sundry waies, that these two doe amically conspire, to wit, the necessitie being only upon supposition; the libertie and contingency simply so called; only it is not to be expected that there should be no difference between the libertie of the creatures, and the libertie of God the Creator; Or that the creature in her operation should be exempt from the operation of God; The second cause exempt from the motion of the first; whereunto this Authour addresseth not the least answer. As for the difference which this Authour puts between the upper way and the lower in making God the Authour of sinne, compare this with *Arminius* his profession; Namely that the same twenty reasons which he objected against the upper way, may all of them be accommodated against the lower way, all of them admitting of the same distinctions (which this Authour invades) to cleare God from being the Authour of sinne.

Lib. 2. digr: 5

The second inconvenience. Section 1.

M. Mason's The second inconvenience is the overthrow of true religion and good government among men. To this, this opinion seemeth to tend for these reasons.

Addit. pag.
38. 39. 40.

1. Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say necessity hath no law; creatures or actions in which necessity beares sway are without law; Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme; or any bruit creatures to doe according to their kinds, because their actions are naturall and necessary; they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. Among creatures indued with reason and libertie, lawes are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedome: Fooles, mad-men, and children are subject to no law, because they have no libertie. To men that can use their libertie, lawes are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepe; to weepe, to laugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary; the will may governe them, but it cannot suppress them.

And so, if to deale justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries, be absolutely, and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principall within, or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these and in the other.

Now if necessity hath no law, then actions in themselves evill, if under the dominion of absolute

the necessity are transgressions of no law and consequently no sins. For sin is a transgression of the law.

This that I say hath been said long agoe. For *Iustin Martyr* speaking against destiny hath these words, *1 Jo: 3. 4.* If it be by destiny (that is by absolute necessity; For that the Fathers doe generally call by the name of destiny,) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a little after. It would seem, if this be so, that vertue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And surely well might he say so. For to what purpose was the Son of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sinne? Why was the ministry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell propounded? Why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other meanes to hinder men from sin applied, if sin be nothing, but a mere opinion?

Christ, the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments, and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon of sinne, are all but mere fables, nay very impostures, if sinne be nothing. And by consequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians, Jewes, Turkes, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whether tendeth this, but to the overthrow of religion?

2. Because it taketh away the conscience of sinne. Why should men be afraid of any sinne that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? Or what reason have they to weep and mourne when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily?

The *Tragedian* saith, when a man sinneth, his destiny must beare the blame. Necessity freeth him from all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either; then sorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; For the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. *Primum in orbe Deos fecit timor.*

Fati ista culpa est: Nemo fit facinus nocens.

I come to the consideration of the second inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is charged; And that is nothing inferiour to the former; to wit, *The overthrow of true religion and good government amongst men.* With what judgment these are termed inconveniences I am to seeke, and I wonder what mischiefs are greater then these inconveniences; But I come to consider how well he makes good his charge.

1. If sinne be no sinne certainly the opinion must be erroneous that conceives it to be sin. I had thought there had been no predication more true then that which is identical. We are taught that *sinne is a transgression of God's law.* That the wages of it, in the just judgment and decree of God is no lesse then death even everlasting death, both of body and soule; That God sent his own Son, and made his soule an offering for sinne; that so he might set him forth a propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood. But let us see this Authour's reason to prove his crimination. He begins with an axiome, that, *Necessity hath no law;* and hereupon he doth expatiate with his instances too too imperinently; a course which *Bellarmino* takes not, whom yet I have answered on this very argument in my *Vindicie*; least of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcell of my answer unto *Bellarmino*. Now this axiome is not applied to Agents unreasonable, but only reasonable, by them who treat thereof. As in case a man be driven to steale, to relieve naturall necessity; yet all confesse that a man is not only unexcusable, but also not to be pitied, if he hath brought this necessity upon him; And never any sober man that I know, denied stealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lyons are not forbidden to prey, nor fishes to swimme, nor bruite creatures to doe according to their kind. For they are unreasonable, and consequently not capable of command, otherwise then by spurre, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like sort, children afore they come to the use of reason are not capable of admonition. As neither mad men are, nor fooles, such as we call naturall; But this Authour is none such. For then his wit would not serve him for opposition as it doth. It is true likewise, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part sensitive; but only as touching his part reasonable, consisting of an understanding, whereby he is enabled to know his superiours, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to performe obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to set them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to goe they goe, if to doe this they doe it; As the *Centurion* signified, to our Saviour the readinesse of his servants to doe their Masters commands.

*1 Jo: 3. 4.
Ro: 6. 23.*

*Es: 53. v. 2.
Co: 5. 21.
Ro: 3. 25.*

At length he comes to conclude that, *if to deale justly, so exercise charitie &c. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whesher this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these as in the other.* by these he meanes acts of the soule rationally, by the other, he meanes acts of the soule vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that any thing is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internall emanations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some

Agents

Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindered in their operations; either by Angels as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angels and men. And albeit a question may be made as touching acts supernaturall, whether the creature hath any free power to performe them freely; such as are the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we doe not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernaturall principle into our soules, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of morall vertues, and of the contrary vitious actions, that there is a free power in man to performe them naturall; untill such time as by a vitious disposition, procured by a custome in vitious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evill; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himselfe of a morall liberty unto actions vertuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soone as he hath throwne him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vitious habit contracted, man hath freedome morall unto actions vertuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of *Aristotle*, and thus he illustrates it. For certainly the habit of vertue is not an indifferent power to doe an act vertuous or vitious, but it is a morall propension and inclination only to acts vertuous. So is the habit of justice a morall propension and inclination to performe only that which is just. The like may be said of every morall vertue in speciall. How much more doth supernaturall grace consist not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and waite for the joyes of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuse to performe any of these acts; but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the soule of man, moving and swaying it only to gracious acts pleasing & acceptable in the sight of God, which indeed constitutes a spirituall liberty from sinne, and makes a man become the holy servant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our waies. On the other side with out grace a man is left in that naturall corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a slave to sinne and a vassall to Satan led captive by him to doe his will. Yet not withstanding there remains in every one his naturall liberty still, which consists only in the choice of meanes conducing to man's end; whereas morall vertue and grace doe order the will a right towards a right end; morall vertues according to the knowledge naturall which he hath of his right end naturall, grace according to the knowledge supernaturall, which a man hath of his right end supernaturall, which isto be rightly disposed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this naturall liberty still continueth the same; As for example, he that is vertuous so farre forth as he is vertuous, continueth still free; not as freedome signifies an indifferency to performe an act vertuous vitious, but being thereby disposed only to vertuous actions, he is free whether to exercise this or that vertuous act, according to occasions offered; or in the same kind of a vertuous disposition; whether he will doe this or that in particular, as to give in such a proportion, or in such a season, or to such or such persons, in all which being of a vertuous disposition he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of *recta ratio*, *right reason*, otherwise called wisdome. In like manner a vitious person still keeps his naturall liberty, though he hath lost his morall, and is become *Servus tot dominorum*, *quot vitiorum*, a slave to so many Lords as there are vices in him, as *Austin* somewhere speaketh. I say he keeps still his naturall liberty. For let him be a Robber, he still continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lye in waite for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure person, still he continueth free to choose whom he will corrupt, to contrive what course he thinks best for the satisfaction of his lusts. Let him be covetuous or ambitious, still he continueth free to make choice of the meanes conducing to the end obtained by him. In like sort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this spirit of regeneration he is moved only to doe those things which are pleasing to his heavenly father, but still his naturall liberty continueth the same, as whether to exercise the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the same kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confession of his sins, or upon thanksgiving, or upon supplication, & that either for blessings temporall, and the releife of his naturall necessities; or for grace, and the reliefe of necessities spirituall

Eth: 1. 3. 5.

Eph: 2. 2.

2 Tim: 2. last.

spirituall; or to exercise himselfe in every kind of these, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewise if he give himselfe to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as also of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all these distinctions doth this Authour take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedome to performe, either acts vicious, or vertuous; whereas the vertuous man's will, as he is vertuous, is inclined to vertuous courses alone, and the vicious man, as he is vicious, is inclined to vicious courses alone, and not to vertuous. And it was wont to be said, that, *Habitus agunt ad modum naturæ, habet* (whether vertuous or vicious) *they worke after the manner of nature*, that is naturally and necessary, as before I have declared of a morall necessity, which still consists with a naturall liberty; either in vertuous, or vicious exercises to make choice of particulars in respect of all variety of circumstances, according as their reason suggests unto them in the use of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of absolute necessity in all this; Much lesse is any man good by absolute necessity but by freedome of will accustoming himselfe unto good actions according to the dictates of reason. But a man that is dead in sinne hath no power to regenerate himselfe; this worke of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raising of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scripture, as also to creation; And by regeneration we are said to be made new creatures, now as God workes this in time, so from everlasting he did decree to worke it; and it was wont to be the generall Tenet of Protestant Divines in opposition unto Papists, that a man in his first conversion is merely passive, in which particular *Roffensis* a Popish Bishop about an hundred yeares agoe opposed *Martin Luther*. As for a sinfull or a vicious act, that is alwaies an act naturall; For acts supernaturall can neither be vicious, nor sinfull; but merely gracious. And all cōfesse that as all men have naturall power to performe any act naturall, so have they power also to abstaine from it. Only untill a man is regenerate he cannot but sinne; yea though he doe that which is good as touching the substance of the act, or abstaine from that which is evill in like manner; yet can he not performe the one or abstaine from the other in a gracious manner, *Therefore you heare not God's word*, saith *Jo: 8.* our Saviour to the Jewes, *because ye are not of God. They that are in the flesh cannot please God*, That all men are cast into a necessity of sinning, both *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confesse, as formerly I have shewed. And Doctor *Potter* acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no naturall man hath *libertatem a peccato*, though forthwith he nicks it, in saying they have *libertatem a necessitate*, not explicating it that so he might cleare himselfe from contradiction, whereas Doctor *Fulke* usually puts the distinction between *liberty from sin*, and *liberty from coercion*, and denying the former unto a naturall man, he granteth the latter.

Now truly this *Theologue* taketh very profitable paines to prove that sin is not nothing; and exuberates in the prooffe hereof to the very solid conviction of all those that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any such creatures *in terra Australi incognita*, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Joviall world which is waited upon with foure moones, as they that came lately from the discovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under colour of making sin to be some thing, labour to draw us to an acknowledgment that it is some positive thing, as Doctor *Jackson* in his last booke the 8th, as I take it of his *Commentaries* upon the Creed laboureth to prove with great strength of affections; Like as in the same vigour of resolution he professeth that *whether God punisheth sinne necessarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man*; but he is not over prodigall of his reasons for either. We are very willing to grant that every sin as sin is something privative, and as touching the act substrate, it is something positive also; And when the Apostle defineth sin by *ἀνομία* if in that word the first letter be *Α* *σπερ δὲ* *Α* *privative*, clearly the forme of sin is made to consist in privation, as much as to say *an incongruity to the law of God*; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admonish the Reader of the wisdom of this Authour; All along; he supposeth that by our doctrine sinne comes to passe by absolute necessity, this I say he suppoeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any such necessity is consequent to our doctrine. And this himselfe knowes full well. *Alvarez*, who maintaines that God determines the creatures will to every act thereof, even to the act of sin, utterly denies that any absolute necessity of humane acts followeth hereupon; or any necessity that stands in contradiction to humane liberty. Bradwardine also sometime Arch-Bishop of Canterbury elect maintaines, that

God necessitates the will to every act thereof; yet denies peremptorily that humane acts comes to passe by absolute necessity, or by any necessity that stands in opposition to the liberty of the creature; Only he saith that some kind of necessity, and that antecedent may well consist with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no paines to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to passe by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sinne is no sinne, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talkes of things necessarily comming to passe, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seems to grant that sins may come to passe necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no paines to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins comming to passe in the world, then as they are accommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evil. And whether he will have this terme *Antecedently* to be an addition to the former terme *Absolutely*, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with termes proposed without all explication. But let us endeavour to bout out the meaning of these perplexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Authour have faith to come to passe necessarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to passe necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to passe not necessarily at all? If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, of *absolutely and antecedently*? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Authour deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely upon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as *Aquinas* hath long agoe disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall worke necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to passe & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to passe necessarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we say, is absolute not conditionall, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are absolute as touching the act of God willing; as *Bradwardine* hath demonstrated by cleare reason; and *Piscator* out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not absolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, then faith should be given according unto workes, that is, grace should be conferred according to mens workes. And when I consider this Authour's compounding of these termes absolutely, and antecedently, I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to passe antecedently, when it comes to passe by an Antecedent decree in this Authour's language, (though most absurd.) So in his language, the things are said to come to passe by absolute necessity, when they come to passe by an absolute decree; the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to passe necessarily; & an absolute decree to make it come to passe absolutely necessarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upon which I am stumbled ere I am aware. Now let the sober Reader judge how farre these odde conceits are from all sobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and consequently? What therefore will it hence follow that the world had it's existence necessarily, and that by the way of absolute necessity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himselfe, namely to exist necessarily, and that in the way of absolute necessity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the transcendent perfection of God, *To be* most necessarily; to worke most freely; Necessity and that absolute, being the greatest perfection of being: So that *Bradwardine* conceives this to be the prime and originall perfection of God, *esse necessario*, to be necessarily. On the other side freedome in the highest kind, is the greatest perfection in operation; and God alone so workes, as without subordination to any superior Agent; but no creature, man or Angell so workes, as without subordination to God the first Agent, the first cause, the first free worker. Now I come to the second particular of this second inconvenience. 2. And that is that *our doctrine*

taketh

taketh away the conscience of sin; and this we willingly grant is consequent upon the former. For if sinne be no sinne, there is no cause why any man should be troubled with the conscience of sin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and most untrue imputation never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evil to come to passe by absolute necessity, there can be no more truth in the consequent then there is in the Antecedent. We say that every sinne that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much lesse doth any sinne come to passe by any absolute necessity. For albeit there be some things that come to passe necessarily by necessity of nature, as proceeding from Agents naturall, working naturally and necessarily. Yet is no worke of nature wrought by any absolute necessity. God being able to set an end to nature and the works thereof whensoever it pleaseth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleasure of God, he restraines the course thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much lesse doe the actions of men, not only in respect of God's agency, who is the first cause, but in respect of man's agency, a second cause, and working deliberately and freely come to passe not necessarily, but contingently, and freely; So farre off are they from coming to passe by absolute necessity; to exist by absolute necessity being the incommunicable perfection of God himselfe. But I confesse this Authour sheweth some humanity in the prooofe of it, to wit, out of the *Tragedian* very judiciously and learnedly. *Fati est ista culpa; nemo sit fato nocens.* It is the fault of fate or destiny, and what comes to passe by destiny is no fault of man's. Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate, finding his servant in a fault, when his servant excused himselfe upon fate, saying it was destiny that he should steale; made a ready answer saying, *Et cado*, it was his destiny also to be punished; So farre was he from justifying or excusing his servant upon any such ground, or forbearing to punish him. And doth not this Authour know that *Jocasta* for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things; yet in conscience of her incestuous courses destroyed her selfe in the same *Tragedian*? But consider, indifferent Reader, whether this Authour doth not carry himselfe, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpose were not to informe them; but to abuse and mocke them. For is that all waies the faith or opinion of the *Tragedian*, whatsoever he puts into the mouthes of this or that Actor? Doe not they represent the absurd pretences of some, as well as the reasonable discourses of others? Then againe who are they that maintaine, *Fatum, destiny*? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines? Yet I confesse this Authour deales ingeniously in one thing, to wit, in walking so fairely in the steps of his forefathers. For thus the *Pelagians* accused the doctrine of *Austin*, not only after he was dead, as appeares by *Prosper's* Epistle *ad Ruffinum*; but even while he was living as appeares by *Austin* himselfe; *Nec sub nomine gratia fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus;* neither doe we maintain destiny under the name of grace, in saying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if some are pleased to call the will *Allmighty* God by the name of fate (or destiny) we avoid the profane novelties of words, but we doe not love to strive about words. Where observe how first the same crimination was made against *Austin's* doctrine by the *Pelagians*, which this Authour makes against ours.

Aug: contra duas epist. Pelag: ad Bonifacium.

2. The doctrine which the *Pelagians* opposed (in this crimination was this, *Grace* is not conferr'd according unto workes. 3ly, *Austin* disavowes all antecedency of workes to the bestowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be bestowed on any; which yet is the beloved *Helena* of this Authour, therefore he talkes so oft against an Antecedent decree. Then againe it is manifest that the greatest maintainers of destiny and fate, did not maintaine it in any opposition to the free wills of men. And *Austin* himselfe professeth that such a necessity as is expressed in these words, *Necesse est ut fiat*, it must needs be that such a thing shall come to passe, containes no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudiciall to the free wills of men. His words are these; *Si enim necessitas nostra illa dicenda est, quae non est in nostra potestate, sed etiam si nolumus, efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis; Manifestum est voluntates nostras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, sub tali necessitate non esse, Multa enim facimus, quae si nolumus, non facerimus. Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut aliquid ita sit vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem voluntatis auferat.* If that is to be accounted our necessity, which is not in our power, but whether we will or no, worketh as it can such as is the necessity of death; It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the necessity of fate. For we doe many things, which if we would not we should not doe them.

Austin: de civitate Dei l. 5. cap. 10.

But if necessity be defined to be such a thing as when we say it must needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to passe; I know not why we should feare least such a necessity should bereave us of free will. And this *Austin* delivers to meet with the vaine feares of those, who placed our wills amongst those things which are not subject to necessity, least so they should loose their liberty. Observe this well and compare it with the present discourse of this positive *Theologian*, who thinks to outface *Austin* with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifests that he speaks all this while of necessity in respect of God's decree not simply, but considered as irresistible; by the way making no bones of avouching some decrees of God to be resistable, notwithstanding the *Psalmist's* protestation, *Whatsoever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth*; And *St. Paul's* emphaticall expression of the same truth, saying, *Who hath resisted his will*? But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any reason to prove that any decrees of God are of any resistable condition? But let his decrees be never so irresistible, and let that be true which *Austin* saith, that, *Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit*; Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse God will have it come to passe. And after *Austin* the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have every thing come to passe agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, as *Aquinas* hath not only said, but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an establishment thereof rather, as the *Arch-Bishops*, *Bishops*, and Clergy of Ireland have professed in the foresaid Article; that I may shew some authority for my sayings, as this Authour represents none for his, but carrieth himselfe like a Master of Sentences, as if he were in his own sufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, then the Pope in a generall Councell: And albeit my selfe after many others, and some formerly mentioned have shewed in a large digression to this purpose that necessity upon supposition, may well stand with contingency, and liberty simply so called. And in the first place have instanced in necessity of infallibility consequent to God's prescience, which though *Cicero* thought could not consist with man's liberty, yet Christians have alwaies been of a contrary opinion; untill the Sect of the *Socinians* arose; and *Arminians* are very apt to shew them so much courtesy as to beare their bookes after them. Secondly I have proved a necessity upon supposition of God's decree to permit sinne. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from sinne, as *Gen. 20. 6.* He professeth as much to *Abimelech*, that he kept him from sinning against God. In case God will not keep a man from sinne, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, considering that of *Austin*; *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia*, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulness. Thirdly and lastly upon supposition of God's will; And this I prove evidently to passe on every thing which God foreseeth as future considering that contingent things are merely possible in their own nature; and cannot passe out of the condition of things merely possible into the condition of things future, without a cause: And no other cause of this transmigration can be devised with any colour of reason or probability, save only the will of God. Neither doe I find that digression of mine in any the least part weakened, or so much as assailed by ought that this Authour hath delivered; Who sheweth himselfe upon the stage, rather to brave his opposites with the bare authority of his words, then with sound argument to dispute ought.

Sect. 2.

M. Mason's
Addit. p. 40.
41. 42.

Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sin. Offences if fatall, cannot be justly punished: 2. The reason is because thoe deed, for which men are punished or rewarded must be their own, under their own power and and sovereignty, but such are no fatall acts or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sin be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

Not temporally, as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Jewes *Deut. 22. 25.* Which was that if a Maid commit uncleanness by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was because there was no cause of death in her; what she yielded to was through compulsion, being overborne by power; As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour so was a Virgin in that case a sufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of universall right: No just punishment can be inflicted for sinne, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The speech of *Lipius* is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason, (*Fatali culpa fatalis pena*) fatall faults must have fatall punishments. Did magistrates thinke mens offences unavoidable, they would thinke it bootlesse, and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not only so, but we see by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reason have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of the headstrong

headstrong & exorbitant passions. Yea we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. *Valerius Maximus* telleth that *Popilius* a Roman *Prætor* sitting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slain her mother, because she had murdered her children (*neque damnavit, neque absoluit*) 8. c. 1. neither cleared her nor condemned her. And *Aulus Gellius* reporteth of *Dolabella* the *Proconsul* of *Asia*; that when a woman of *Smyrna* was brought before him who had poisoned her husband and son for murdering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the *Areopagus*, which was the gravest and most renowned judgment seat in the world; The Judges there not daring to acquit her, being stained with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provoked with just griefe, commanded the accuser & offender to come before them an hundred yeares after. And so neither was the womans fact justified, the lawes not allowing of it; Nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise magistrates have spared such offenders as have been overwayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or if offenders did thinke that their offences were their destinies, and that when they murder, steale, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practise any other outrageous villanies, they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree; and can doe no otherwise; they would and might complaine of their punishments as unjust, as *Zeno*s servant did; when he was beaten by his master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten because he was (*fato coactus peccare*) constrained to make that fault by his undecidable fate. The *Adumetane* Monks, misled by *Saint Austin* *Epist.* 105. *ad sextum Presbyterum*, (which he calleth a booke wherein he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace that they denied free will. And this *Saint Austin* confuted in his booke *De gratiâ & libero arbitrio*. And thinking the grace of God (as *Saint Austin* taught) to be such as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to doe better. Against this *Austin* directed his other booke, *De correptione & gratiâ*. In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as *Kimedonius* saith truly in his preface to *Luther De servo arbitrio*. Between grace and predestination there is only this difference (as *Saint Austin* teacheth *Libro de predest. Sanctorum cap.* 10.) that predestination is a preparation of grace, and grace a bestowing of predestination. As *Zeno*s servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately thinke that men could not choole but offend. And what would be the reluctance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest infolencies, and dissolution of all good government.

Indeed if our doctrine make sin to be no sin, and therewithall take away the conscience of sin; it is not to be marvailed, if it take away the desert and guilt of sinne: For as sinne is no sinne; so likewise it is as fit that the desert and guilt of sinne, should be the desert and guilt of no sinne; and so no desert or guilt at all. This Authour to serve his own turne takes great liberty of discourse in talking of offences fatall; these were called by *Austin* profane novelties of words. Yet elsewhere he professeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence; *Sententiam teneant, linguâ corrigant; let the hold their orthodox meaning, but let the correct their language* Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working every thing that is good, and permitting every thing that is evill. And without this will of God not any thing comes to passe in the judgment of *Austin*. *Non aliquid fit* saith he, *nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo*, Nor any thing comes to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have it come to passe either by suffering it, or by his own working of it. to wit, if evill, suffering it, if good working it; but of each he professeth that God wills it. The abominable outrages committed upon the person of the holy Son of God, were such as Gods hand and Gods counsell foredetermined, that is as much as to say, antecedently determined to be done. And the ten Kings in giving their kingdoms to the Beast, are said herein to have agreed to doe Gods will. Yet this Authour dares not say, that these actions could not be justly punished. Yet the maintainers of destiny (as I have shewed out of *Austin*) denied that the wills of men were subject to destiny; while this Authour talks in their language, why doth he not talke in their meaning? And if he talks in our meaning, why doth he not talke in our language? Now *Austin* farther saith (as I have shewed out of the same place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all necessity, feared a vaine and causelesse feare; professing that as to some necessity the will is not subject, such as is the necessity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to some necessity it may be subject without any danger; and that necessity he expresseth to be such, as when we say, it must needs be that such a thing come to passe. Now such a necessity and no other is granted by us as consequent to the will of God, so that if God will give a man faith, it must needs be, such a man shall believe; if he will give repentance it must needs be, that such a man shall repent; if he will keep such a man as *Abimelech* from sinning against him, it must needs be, that such a man shall be kept from sinning against him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it must needs be, that such a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keepe a man from sinne, but suffer him to sinne, it needs must be that such a one shall sinne. If God harden the heart of *Pharaoh*, so that he shall not let *Israel* goe, undoubtedly so it shall come to passe. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their king-

domes to the Beast, they shall infallibly give their Kingdomes to the Beast. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to doe things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus prostituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they shall doe those inconvenient things, be they never so abominable; yet not necessarily, much lesse in the way of absolute necessity, (as this Authour wordeth it, affecting to speake with a full mouth (which is a quality naturall to these *Arminians*, and runnes in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a possibility, but also with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then surely their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and sovereignty, but yet not supream and absolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God must have the prerogative still of being the first mover, the first cause, the first Agent, the first free Agent; So farre off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by absolute necessity; that we utterly deny any thing in the world to have its existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone, as before I have shewed. *Sciendum, faith Durand, quod loquendo de necessitate simpliciter, voluntas divina nec imponit, nec imponere potest rebus necessitatem; nec res creata sunt capaces talis necessitatis.* We are to know that speaking of necessity simply so called, the will of God neither doth impose, or can impose any such necessity on things, neither are creatures capable of such necessity. But if we speake of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by causes intermediate; it is to be said that all things doe not come to passe of necessity; but some doe, and some doe not. God will have some things come to passe by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to passe necessarily; Others come to passe by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to passe contingently; Whereby, faith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to passe of necessity in reference to the Divine Will; because, as hath been shewed, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to passe freely; and therefore speaking absolutely; they may not come to passe, although, upon supposition that they are Willed, they cannot but come to passe; but this is only necessity upon supposition.

1. Indeed if men did sinne against their wills; and virgins sometimes are ravished, & men are slaine by force full sore against their wills, they deserved no punishment. But is it possible that a man can will that which is evill against his will? Every ordinary Scholar in the University knowes that axiome, *Voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced.* *Lipsius* his speech, *fatali culpa fatalis poena, fatall faults have fatall punishments*, this Authour saith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason. As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate, yea the very first to understand themselves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called *Fate Stoicall*. Now *Zeno* was the father of the Stoicks; yet when his servant was taken playing the theife, pleaded for himselfe, saying it was my destiny to steale. *Zeno* answered him in his own language, that it was his destiny to smart for it too; right in this same sense that *Lipsius* spake. Yet *Zeno* knew full well that he punished his servant freely. And *Zeno* is well knowne to have been a great Master of morality for all this, which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Authour well knowes. And *Austin* censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity, as men transported with vaine and causelesse feares; manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty. Magistrates though they believe with *Austin* that, *Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have it come to passe*; And with the Church of Ireland, that *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should in time come to passe*. And with *Aquinas* that the roote of contingency, is the effectuall will of God; yet may they well thinke it reasonable enough to punish offences; seing that God decrees that some things, even all the actions of men shall come to passe contingently; as well as other things shall come to passe necessarily. For to come to passe contingently is to come to passe avoidably; and if they be the actions of men, freely also. It is incredible that any sober man should remissely punish faults for the exorbitancy & strength sake of the passions, whereby they were committed, but rather in consideration of the potent causes which raised such passions in them, under a colour of justice. And we commonly say *the greater the temptation is, the lesse is the sin*. So *Peter* surprised suddenly with feare denied his Master. Yet what saith *Aristotle*. *In some things no force is sufficient for excuse; but a man ought to dy rather any manner of death, then commit them.* For those things in *Euripedes* are ridiculous, which moved *Alcmaeon* to kill his mother. Indeed *Plato* maintained that things done through passion were not voluntary. But *Aristotle* a better Master then he, disproves it, and by excellent reasons confirms the contrary. And whatsoever

In first dist.
46. quæst. 1.

Artic: II.

Arist: l. 3c. 1.

Ibid.

whatsoever *Popilius* the Roman Pretor judged of her, who slew her mother, provoked by her Mothers fact in murdering her children; yet let our lawes be consulted, and the opinion of our Judges in such a case; and whether such a one were not to be condemned; and whether *Popilius* his judgment deserves to be admitted for the correction of the lawes of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We should soone have a wild world, if every one being provoked by the insolencies of others should thrust themselves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that *potestas patria* originally was power of life and death. But all is fish that comes to this Authour's net; like as her fact who poisoned her husband and son for killing a son of hers; destroying two for one without all authority most unnaturally; and that not hastily, but in a deliberate way by poisoning. And doth it become Christians to admire such heathenish courses of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence? And was this so doubtfull a case, whether so wicked a wretch avenging her selfe by poison secretly given upon her husband and son for the death of another son of hers, that the sentencing thereof should be put over untill an 100 yeares after? But what of all this? These willfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is just with God to punish sinne with sinne; one man's sinne by another. As of *Senacherib* the Lord professeth, that he would cause him to fall by the sword in his own land, this was brought to passe by his own children falling upon him furiously, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of these. How was innocent *Naboth* used, and by publique sentence condemned to be stoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practise of wicked *Jezabel*? Yet *Solomon* spareth not to profess that every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. Never were more abominable courses executed upon any, then upon the holy son of God: Yet these were all foredetermined by the hand of God, and the counsell of God, as the Apostles with one voice acknowledge. *Prov: 28.* By the same providence was *Joseph* sold into Egypt, God working thereby the preservation of them that sold him; Thus *Sihon* was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with *Pharaoh* their King to their own destruction. Thus the Lord punished *David's* foule sinne by the murder of *Amnon* contrived by his own brother; and by the sword of *Absholon* rising up against his own father; and by the sword of *Shimei's* tongue cursing *David*; wherein *David* acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he punished the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and so prostituting them to abominable courses. What outrages were committed by *Senacherib* that proud and blasphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and the staffe in his hand; is said to be God's indignation. *Ez: 10.* And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occasions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate such corruptions; and withall gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will breake forth into murder, as in *Senacherib's* sons; and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God; into stealth sacrilegious, as in *Achan*; into adultery and that in an incestuous manner as we see in *Abshalom*; into insurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from *Rehoboam*; into treasons as *Judas* betraying his own Master; and into all manner of outrageous villanies, whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand, though this Authour in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exercised in actions good for the substance of them; or in abstaining from that which is evill, they never a whit the more either performe the one, or abstaine from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace supernaturall, which God is not bound to bestow on any. All sides confesse that Divine concurrence is necessary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in God we move, as well as in him we live, and in him we have our being. And about this concurrence a queffion is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, *modo nos velimus*, provided that we will, is as absurd and contradictory a conceit, as can be devised; seing the greatest question is concerning the act, of willing: And is it possible that God shall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the same act be the condition of it selfe, and so both before and after it selfe? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's prescience, that at such an instant man will produce such an act of will, provided that God will produce it; which is worse then the former. For hereby each Agent's operation

tion is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then againe a thing is fained to be foreseen by God as future, which hath no cause of the futurition thereof, being in it's own nature merely possible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifest by invincible reason. Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily required to every action, is made into the will it selfe moving it agreeably to the nature thereof, to doe whatsoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely also; taking liberty a-right and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end, is naturall and necessary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himselfe aloft, and superciliously despiing to enter into any of these lists of argumentation; and as if the matter were *conclusum contra Manicheos*, confidently suppoeth, without all prooffe, that we maintaine that all humane actions come to passe by absolute necessity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatsoever comes to passe comes to passe by his will saith *Austin*: and the Church of Ireland: By the effectuall will of God, saith *Aquinas*, as which, he makes the roote of all contingency; And therefore as necessary causes worke necessarily by the will of God; so by the same will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently; and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely. And observe the immodesty of this Authour, he tells us what *Zeno's* servant pleaded for himselfe with his Master; but he doth not tell what *Zeno* answered him, that he concedes; it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants. *The Adrumetine Monks*, he saith, were misled by *Austin*; a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God; and the memoriall of his opposites rots. Did *Austin* misleade them? did he draw them into error? If they did mistake *Austin*, shall it be true therefore to say they were misled by him? How many mistake and misunderstand God's word; what then? shall we be so audacious and blasphemous, as to say they are misled by the word of God? Why may not such impudent persons proceed, and say they are misled by the holy Ghost? Then that which he saith of these Monks, as misled by *Austin*, it is a notorious untruth; *Cresconius* and *Felix* that came over to *Austin* of their own hands to complaine of some in their Monastery; laid to their charge indeed that they so taught grace, that they denied free Will; & that this they pretended to have learned out of *Austin's* booke written to *Sixtus* the Presbyter. But *Austin* was not hasty to believe this crimination: And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monke of whom they complained, *Auc librum meum non intelligit, aut ipse non intelligitur*; either he understands not my booke; or himselfe is not well understood by his brethren. If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained mistooke *Austin*. For *Austin* doth not any where so maintaine grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother understood *Austin* aright in that foresaid booke of his, then he maintained no such opinion as *Cresconius* and *Felix* laid to his charge, but they rather misunderstood him. And this appeared to be most true afterwards. For *Florus* was the man whom *Cresconius* and *Felix* accused, and whom *Austin* desired of *Valentinus* the father of them, that he would send over unto him, as *Caccius* acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was sent over to *Austin*, as appears in *Austin's* booke *De correptione & gratia* cap. 1. With whom when *Austin* had conferred, he found him most orthodoxe as himselfe professeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoiced, and withall signifieth to *Valentinus* that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood *Florus*. And therefore when *Austin* in his *Retractions* comes to take notice of his booke *De gratia & libero arbitrio*, and the occasion of writing thereof, he sets it downe not absolutely, because of those who so doe maintaine grace, as wishall they deny free Will, but with a disjunctive addition, thus, or because of those who think when grace is maintained, therewithall that free Will is denied. The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by *Cresconius*, and *Felix* against *Florus*; but the latter was according to *Austin's* suspicion at the first, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appears by the first chapter of *Austin's* booke *de correptione & gratia*; where *Florus* is justified and magnified by St. *Austin*, and his criminators condemned. And seeing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accusants pretended, who so maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that also must needs be false which followeth in this Authour, when he saith that against them also St. *Austin* wrote his other booke

booke *De correptione & gratia*: And the truth is the whole buisinesse was ended and the tumult appeased between those Adrumetine Monks, before *Florus* came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by *Florus* concerning the amicable composition of all things there. And *Austin* in this very passage which this Authour grates upon, professeth that he writes not against them; only he answereth such an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by some of them formerly against *Florus*, and the doctrine of *Austin* maintained by *Florus*. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the same *Florus*, as it seemes. But of this more at large in my digression concerning the predestinarian heresy, which I purpose to subjoine to this. *Austin* saith indeed that, *Predestinatio est gratia preparatio, gratia verò ipsa donatio*. Predestination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it selfe which was prepared; not the bestowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporall be the bestowing of a thing eternall? What entertainment *Zeno's* servant found at his Masters hands (which this Authour conceales) I have often shewed, who taught no such doctrine as destiny as to free a knave from stripes; who as so great a Philosopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his servant; and himselfe so well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not *Zeno* so well instructed in the mystery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the selling of *Ioseph* all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beast, which should come to passe in the latter part of the last times of the world. But let him make himselfe merry with *Zeno's* servant, who taken in a theevish fact was content to helpe himselfe with any pretence; but *Zeno* we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in despite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvaile if the house he builds thereon must needs totter and fall on his owne pate.

This digression
on in his late
book against
Corinthians pag.
174. 175. &c.

Sett: 3.

2. Nor if this be true can sin be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this I have the fathers bearing witness generally and plainly. *Tertullian* hath these words; The recompence of God and evill can with no justice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of necessity. *Saint Hierome* saith, where necessity do mineers, there is no place for retribution. *Epiphanius* saith, the stars which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may be punished with better justice then the men themselves. We place mens nativities under no fatal constellations, saith *Saint Austin*, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judgment of God. *Prosper* (speaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, saith, this judgment should never be, if men did sinne by the will and determination of God. *Fulgentius* also saith the same, It is great injustice in God, to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was *Saint Bernard's* opinion too; it is only a will free from compulsion and necessity saith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward & punishment. Out of these testimonies laid together may be collected three things,

1. That the Ancients did use to call a necessity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of destiny; from what externall cause soever this necessity did arise.

2. That they did use these two words (*Necessity*) and (*Compulsion*) promiscuously; and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our present purpose) that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity, under the power of their sins.

I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of *Epiphanius* writing of the error of the Pharisaees, who beleived the immortality of the soule, and the resurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to passe by necessity. It is, saith he, a point of extreame ignorance, or madnesse rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous judgment, to say that there is any destiny, any necessity in mens actions. For how can the righteous judgment of God and destiny comply and stand together? And (let me adde) how can the beleife of this and true piety stand together? For where this perswasion that mens sins are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out.

4. It tendes to religions overthrow; because it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere destiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predestination; and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the necessary issues of the divine decree. All things whatsoever though they seem to doe somewhat; yet by this opinion, they doe indeed just nothing; the best laws restrain not one offender, the sweetest rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull sermons convert not one sinner, the humblest devotions divert not one calamity; the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more then would be done without them, but the necessitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion doe nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from another?

Epiph. l. 1. adv. her. 16. p. 35. n.

3.

Prosp. ad cap.
Gal: Sent. 1.

then? and if good endeavours and onsets doe nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled and every way governed by an active, absolute, and Almighty decree) to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend? To nothing more then to the subversion of piety and pollicy; religion & lawes, society and government? This did the Romans see full well; and therefore they banished (*Mathe-maticos*, the teachers & abettors of destiny) out of Rôme. These and the like inconveniencies which come from the upper way, did worke so with *Prosper*, as that he calls him no Catholique who is of this opinion. Whosoever saith that men are urged to sinne, and to be damned by the predestination of God, as by a fatall, unavoidable necessity, he is no Catholique.

They did also make the Araucan counsell denounce a curse against such. That any are predestinated by the divine power to sinne, we doe not only not believe; but with the greatest detestation that we can, we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will believe so great an evill. Thus farre of my reasons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way.

Answer.

2. Undoubtedly if sin cannot be punished temporally, it cannot be punished eternally. We have no need, I should thinke of the Authority of any fathers to justify this. Where doth this Authour find, that we maintaine that a man is good or evill, *not freely but by necessity*, that *Tertullian* is brought in as opposing us here? Yet we thinke this is worthy of distinction: For was not *Adam* made by God habituall good? *Durand*, I am sure, maintaines that in his creation he was endued with all Morall vertues: & this we read in Scripture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I presume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unlesse he were made vertuous, I cannot conceive. So likewise man being brought forth in the corrupt masse, when afterwards he is made good either in the way of justification, or in the way of regeneration; these are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I presume this Authour dares not say that man regenerates himselfe. But as for the denomination of goodnesse and badnesse in man, that ariseth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all such goodnesse or badnesse is acquired freely, not necessarily.

And as *Tertullian* takes necessity, to wit in opposition unto liberty; So I presume doth *Hierome* too; otherwise these two Fathers were yoked together unequally in this place. Now we know no such necessity domineering in man, as stands in opposition to liberty. Much lesse doe we maintaine any necessity over the will of man, depending upon fatall constellations; And as *Epiphanius*, and *Austin* discourse thus of necessity in reference to fatall constellations; So it seemes likely that *Hierome* and *Tertullian* did discourse of necessity in the same sense. To sinne by the will of God in *Prosper* is to sin by the predestination of God, as appeares both by the Objection it selfe, and *Prosper's* answer thereunto throughout. Now predestination in the fathers meaning is of no other things, then such as God purposed to worke. And accordingly we answer that no evill in the world, as evill, comes to passe by God's will to worke it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is *Austin's* expresse professiô, that *Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit*. Not any thing comes to passe, unles God Almighty will have it come to passe; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; some by working them, others by permitting them; *vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo*; either by suffering it to come to passe, in case it be evill, or himselfe working it, in case it be good. *Fulgentius* justifies this sense in his sentence here alleadged. For to sinne by God's will in *Prosper*, is all one with being made an offender (or made to sinne) by God, in *Fulgentius*. Now we say God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evill; only he doth not cure that naturall or habituall viciousnesse, which he finds amongst men, in all. For *He hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will he hardeneth*; and indeed he is bound to none. *St. Bernard* clearely maintaines that there is noe liberty from sinne in any naturall man; and consequently every naturall man is cast upon a necessity of sinning; and therefore that liberty from necessity which he grants to man, can be no other then liberty from compulsion; And so *Dr. Fulke* usually makes the distinction run between Liberty from sin, and liberty from coercion; & denying the one he grants the other.

1. That the Antients did call that necessity, which ariseth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of destiny; This Authour brings not the least colour of prooffe; neither do I thinke he is able to bring any, save only of the Pelagians, who traduced *Austin's* doctrine of predestination by the name of destiny. And so they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to mens workes; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predestination, as is apparent *De bono perseverantia. c. 15*.
2. In the second I wonder this Author observes not how he contradicts himselfe. For if they used these words *Necessity*, & *compulsion*; promiscuously; doth it not evidently follow that they distinguished them not? but alwaies tooke them of equivalent signification. But I doe not find that *Austin* tooke necessity of the same signification with compulsion; when he distinguisheth

distinguisheth of necessity; saying some necessity is such, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the necessity of death; and to such a necessity he saith, the will is not subject. Another necessity there is; as when we say, *It must needs be, that this, or that come to passe*, and he confesseth plainly that the will may be subject to such a necessity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof.

3. And well they might hold that God's judgments were not just on sinners, if they were held by any absolute necessity under the power of their sins. We say that nothing hath either existence, or continuance, by absolute necessity, save God alone. But I guesse this Authour calls that necessity absolute, which flowes from God's absolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditionall, it stands him upon to prove it, not boldly suppose it. Especially seeing *Aquinas* hath professed that never any man was so mad as to say that there is any cause of God's predestination, as touching the act of God's predestinating; and that there can be no cause hereof he proves because there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Doctor *Jackson* in his booke of providence confesseth that the distinction of God's will, into a will antecedent, and a will consequent, is not to be understood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, seeing reprobation in it's kind is the will of God, as well as predestination in it's kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing; no cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so neither can there be any cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And looke how [mad a thing it is for any man to maintain that there is some cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So as mad a thing it must be every way to avouch that there is a cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truly the Apostle St. *Paul* plainly manifests that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (namely because before *Jacob* or *Esaue* were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said, *The elder shall serve the younger*) upon the same ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evill workes. And the same reason manifests that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the causes, the one of Election, the other of Reprobation; as well as good and evill workes. And both *Piscator* by evidence of Scripture, and *Bradwardine* by evidence of reason have demonstrated, that no will of God is conditionall, which is to be understood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be evidently further demonstrated thus; If any thing be the cause of God's will, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; Not by necessity of nature, as is evident and all confesse, there being no colour of truth for that; besides such an opinion were most dangerously prejudiciall to God's sovereignty, and liberty. If therefore they say, it is by the constitution of God, marke I pray what an insuperable absurdity followeth hereupon. For seeing God's constitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that upon foresight of this or that he would will such a man's salvation, and such a man's damnation. And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternall act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is apparent, that the objects of God's will are things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be said there is a cause thereof as School-Divines doe generally acknowledge. And thus *Gerardus Vossius* speaks of the conditionall will, which he saith the Fathers doe ascribe to God. For this is the instance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordaines to bestow salvation on a man in case he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God. And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditionall, inasmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but such as die in sin without repentance. But albeit predestination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be said to be conditionall according as the School-men explicate their meaning; and reprobation likewise, as touching the particular of dānatiō mentioned: yet no such thing can be truly affirmed either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of grāting, or denying the grace of regeneratiō, which are intended also by the decrees of predestinatiō & reprobatiō. For albeit God intends not to bestow salvation on any, but upon condition of faith; nor damnation on any, but upon condition of finall impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to bestow the grace of regeneration on some for the curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the same infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the same grace of regeneration unto them. This I say God doth not

intend to bring to passe upon any condition ; For if he should, then grace should be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all along in divers Synods, and Councells against the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds according to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our naturall corruption ; but merely according to the pleasure of his will, as the Apostle testifies saying, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.* And if the conferring and denying of this grace be absolute, how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute? And consequently that one man is delivered from the power of his sins, whether originall or habituall ; another is not, but still continueth under the power of them; This I say, doth, & must needs come to passe by vertue of Gods absolute decrees. Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon. First because no greater necessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himselfe. Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world; yet no wise man was ever known to affirme that the worlds existence was, and is by absolute necessity. In like sort, God did absolutely decree, that *Josiah* should burne the Prophets bones, upon the Altar; That *Cyrus* should build his City, and let goe his captives; That no man should desire the *Israelites* land, when they should come to appeare before the Lord, their God thrice in the yeare ; That God would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withall their heart, and with all their soule. To put his feare in their hearts, that they should never depart away from him ; To cause them to walke in his statutes and judgments to doe them. To worke in them both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Yea to worke in them every thing that is pleasing in his sight through *Jesus Christ*. Likewise that *Absolom* should defile his fathers Concubines ; that the Jewes should crucify the Son of God; that some through disobedience should stumble at the word ; that the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast. Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they did ought in their lives; All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to passe ; The good by God's effectiō the evill by God's permission ; and decreed absolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be shewed upon what condition on *Absolom's* part, he should defile his fathers Concubines; upon what condition on the Jewes part, they should crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, others through disobedience should stumble at God's word ; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast. And if they take *Arminius* his way, let them reply upon mine answer to *Arminius*; if *Bellarmin's*, let them reply upon my answer to *Bellarmin*, that we may not trouble the world with our Tautologies : If a different way from both these, I shall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it such entertainment as according to my judgment it shall be found to deserve.

So that with *Epiphanius*, though we are ready to concur in denying destiny, which as before we heard out of him, was a necessity derived from the starres ; yet with *Austin* we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity, to maintaine the liberty thereof, and he gives instance in such a necessity as whereby we say, *It must needs be that such a thing come to passe*, as no way prejudiciall to man's liberty. And *Arminius* confesseth, that upon supposition of God's decree it must needs be that the Souldiers should abstaine from the breaking of *Christ's* bones ; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing must needs come to passe which God hath decreed to come to passe, yet it is indifferent to come to passe necessarily or freely ; which also God determines according to the nature of the things themselves ; namely that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpose he hath prepared different Agents, as *Aquinas* observeth some necessary working necessarily, some contingent working contingently.

4. Still this Authour harpes upon the same string imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle of a man's life a mere destiny ; his meaning is that we take away all liberty, which is most untrue. As for destiny it is well knowne as before I have shewed that this was the usuall crimination, which the Pelagians cast upon the doctrine of St. *Austin*; and that, because he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's workes. And what was *Austin's* answer hereunto, I have shewed before : *Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.* If men please to call the will of Almighty God by the name of destiny ; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we doe not love

love to wrangle about words. For God to worke us to faith, to repentance, to every good worke; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure (for which we have expresse Scripture, both in the old and new Testament, as earst I shewed) & absolutely to decreethis is to make the whole circle of man's life, as touching good courses, but a mere destiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, then grace must be conferred according to works, which is as true Pelagianisme, as ever dropt from the mouth of *Pelagius*, & which himselfe was sometimes driven to renounce, yet this Pelagianisme is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Again if *non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens fieri velit*, Not any thing coes to passe, unlesse God Almighty will have it come to passe; whether good or evil; which was sometimes delivered by *Austin*; and of late professed by the Church of Ireland in the dayes of King James, this is to make the whole Circle of man's life a mere Destiny; if this Authour be of any credit so farre as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is expresse from the unanimous consent of the Apostles, that both *Herod & Pontius-Pilate*, with the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counsell had before determined to be done: Yet were they gathered together to doe such acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done, since the world beganne: And if we believe this Authour, all this came to passe by meere destiny: And if this be to come to passe by meere destiny, why should we not believe it? Have we better or more compleate testimony for ought throughout the whole booke of God, then for this? All things that come to passe must needs be the issues of the divine decree; not only such things as come to passe necessarily, by necessary Agents working necessarily; but even such things also as come to passe freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as *Aquinas* hath proved; and *Austin* and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath justified, and cleare reason demonstrated, for as much as otherwise no future thing could be foreknowne by God from everlasting. For nothing can be from everlasting knowne by God as future, unlesse from everlasting it were future. But without the decree of God passing upon it, no contingent thing can passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible (such as it is in it's own nature) into the conditiō of a thing future. So that whosoever denies God's decree to passe upon every thing that comes to passe throughout the world, must therewithall deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Authour avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never answer it while his head is hot. I conceive I have had sufficient experience of his strength already this way, and of the shamefull issue of his adventure therein. He that sayd, *Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens fieri velit*, Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse the Almighty will have it come to passe, sayd also that God so workes in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apostle said, that *In God we move*, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the same stampe a fardell of unshamefast untruthes. Belike when God saith, *I will cause them to walke in my statutes and to doe them*, God caused them to doe just nothing. In like manner when the holy Prophet expostulates with God in the person of the Church after this manner, *Lord why hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts against thy feare*, the meaning is, *why hast thou caused us to doe just nothing*. In like manner when God restraines offences, he doth it not by his lawes, When he promotes vertue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts sinners he doth it not by sermons; when thousands were converted in one day, it was not by the ministry of *Peter* and his fellow Apostles. This Authours meaning seemes to be, that unlesse man converts himselfe, it is not done by sermons. But see how he overlasheth; whē carrying the matter so as if God's decree necessitated and overruled all by our opinion; yet most absurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavours. And who seeth not that to overrule is to carry the reasonable creature on to doe contrary to his own will and judgment. For unlesse he doth tosse strenuously he can prevaile nothing with any sober and indifferent Reader. In like sort to necessitate denotes such a motion whereby the creature is carried to doe a thing necessarily but this is not *Bradwardines* opinion, who alone amongst Schoole-Divines, that I know, useth this phraze of necessitating. For he saith that *God necessitates the creature to his free act*, & this necessity is but modall, according to that expression of *Austin* *neesse est ut aliquid fiat*, which *Austin* confessed 1200 years agoe to be no impeachment to man's liberty. But because that phraze *Necessitating*, is not only of an harsh sound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary sense to that of the Authour's; therefore other School-Divines, and generally our Divines use it not. And how immodest a course is

this to thinke to choake us with other mens phrases, and that in a quite contrary sense to that wherein the Authour's take it? And as if he had very substantially concluded the point, that *lawes doe nothing, rules of religion, and mens endeavours doe nothing*, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philosopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere trifler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other prescribed, why men are encouraged to some things; and scared from the other. He might as well aske what meant King *Hezekiah* to have any care either of his foode or of taking Physicke for those 15 yeares which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant *Paul* to tell the Master of the ship, that unlesse the Mariners were detained in the ship they could not be saved; what meant some to trust to their swimming, others to boards & broken peeces of the ship to get to land, when the Lord by his Angell had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that sailed with him? In the very daies of *Cicero* the Stoicks were acquainted with such like arguments made against their destiny, and knew how readily to answer them by distinguishing between *Fatalia* and *Consatalia*, as appeares in *Cicero's* book *de Fato*, and *Turnebus* his answer to *Ramus* thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Authour disputes not logically, if he did, the vilenesse of his argumentation would soone appeare according to it's proper colours; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetoricall flourish, as if his wit served him for that best, whereat I wonder not a little, that he should forsake that wherein his facultie lieth most, according to the reputation that goes of him, & trust to that wherein his best dexterity hath been accounted but *insicere*. If our doctrine tends to the subversion of policy, religion, and lawes, society & government In the next place we expect when he will turne starke Atheist and professe as much of the word of God, seing it is manifest our doctrine cheifly is founded upon the word of God even in that which sounds most harsh unto carnall judgment; namely as touching God's secret providence in evill, this Authour not accomodating any answer to any one of those places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holinesse, his contrary doctrine cannot stand without maintaining that Grace is given according unto mens works; which is exprelly contradictory to the word of God. *2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5*, and opposed by the church of God as the sowre leaven of Pelagianisme, from the Synod of Palestine all along. For aske this Authour wherefore God bestowes faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to answer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not growne so impudent as to deny exprelly; though the Remonstrants in their *Censura censura* come so farre, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they must answer that the reason hereof is, because the one by some act of his or other hath prepared himselfe for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plaine termes as one hath exprest it, that God doth worke in us *Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe*. But doth he not worke also the very act of willing? Saint *Paul* saith he doth; *yea every thing that is pleasing in his sight*. And how doth he worke in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the absurdity whereunto they are driven, still fetching in a priority of mans act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet most preposterously. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of our selves we will already? And this also utterly overthrowes God's prescience of things future, which can have no true foundation besides the divine decree. As for *Mathematici* which were banished out of Rome, were those Divines, or Astrologers rather? If they subjected the event of all things to the influence of the stars, shall *Austin* be blamed or the Church of Ireland for subjecting all things to the councill of God's will, and that according to the expresse testimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evill; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evill things to his will of permitting them. As for *Prosper's* saying in the last place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much lesse the actions of men to come to passe unavoidably, no not upon supposition of God's decree; but by vertue of his decree both contingent things come to passe contingently, that is with a possibility of not comming to passe; & free things freely, that is joyned with an active power in the Agent, either to suspend his action, or to doe otherwise; as well as necessary things come to passe necessarily. This I say we avouch with *Aquinas*, and accordingly with him maintaine the root of contingency to be the effectuall will of God. Againe I have often shewed that Predestination in the phrase of the Antients is only of such things as God decreed to bring to passe by his effectiion; notwithstanding this, *Austin* was bold to professe, that *not any thing came to passe unlesse God would have it come*

Phil. 3. 13.

Heb. 13. 21.

to passe; but evill things only by suffering them; good things by working them, As for compulsion which is *Prosper's* phrase; and which this Authour corrupts rendring it by the *urging*, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts supernaturall; much lesse doe we grant compulsion to acts naturall; such as are all sinfull acts; yea too connaturall unto him, compared in Scripture to *sweet morsells which they roule under their tongue*, as the booke of *Job* resembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Authour's sufficiency and modesty. *Austin* never said that God predestinated any man to sinne. For predestination with them (as hath been said) was only of such things as God determined to worke. Yet the same *Austin* confidently professeth of *Enchirid.c.* those things which come to passe by God's sufferance (and these we all know to be evil things) that they come not to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have them come to passe,

Thus farre in answer to this Authour's additions to *M. Hoord's* discourse, and concerning the upper and more harsh and rigorous way which *M. Hoord* left unprosecuted. pag. 49, there is a passage added, a citation out of *Peter*, but it is of the same nature with the rest, & add's no strength to the argument; and my answer satisfies it as well as the rest.

P. 52. &c. Is inserted a representation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holinesse.

Self. 1.

It fighteth with God's holinesse, and maketh him the principall cause of sin in the greatest number of men I know that the defender of it doth not thinke so. For the maine reason which moved the *Synod of Dort*, & some other Divines before and since, to bring downe predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was, that they might maintaine a fatal and absolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as Doctor *Twisse* hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sins of reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principall Authour. Two things they say which taken together, methinks, inferre it. 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoid sinne, 2ly. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot possibly avoid sinne; that is into the state of originall sinne, which consists of two parts.

1. The guilt of *Adam's* transgression. 2. The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interested, not through the force and efficiency of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from *Adam*, as our first principles; but by God's free and voluntary order and imputation. *It came not to passe by any naturall meanes* (saith *Calvin*) *that all men fell from salvation, by the fault of our first parent. That all men are held under the guilt of eternall death in the person of one man; it is the cleare and constant voice of Scripture.* Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause. it must therefore come from the wonderfull counsel of God. A little after he hath the same againe with as great an Emphasis. How is it that so many nations with their children, should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so. As roundly doth Doctor *Twisse* affirme the same. *The guilt of originall sinne is derived unto us only by imputation, the filth only by propagation, and both these only by God's free constitution.* A little before he hath these words. *The fault of our nature cometh from God's free appointment. For he doth not out of any necessity, but of his mere will only impute the sinne of Adam to us.* To this purpose he speaketh a great deale more in the same place. To these sayings *Saint Bernard* hath the like speaking of *Adam's* sinne he saith, *Adam's sinne is anothers, because we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the just though secret judgment of God, reputed ours.*

And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, only because we were in *Adam's* loines when he sinned, and derive our being from him, then these two things will follow.

1. That we stand guilty of all the sin which *Adam* committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loines, as well after his fall as before; and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where doe we read that we are guilty of any other of his sins? To the first sin only doth the Scripture entitle that sin and misery, which entered into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may see. *Rom. 5. 15. 16. 17 &c.*

2. That children are guilty of the sins of all their progenitours, especially of their immediate parents. For they were in their loines when they sinned, and more immediately then in *Adam's*. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children as we may see. *Exod. 20. 5.* where God saying that *he will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him*; plainly implyeth that children are not simply charged with their fathers sins but conditionally if they be haters of God, as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their sins. In *Ezech. 18. 14. &c.* The Lord signifieth thus much in his Apology against the cavill of the Jewes. For first he saith, that if a wicked man begeth a son that feareth his fathers sins, & doth not the like, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father. This implyeth that the derivation of being from the parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sin, nor consequently to the sinne. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the fathers loines with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then the Lord tells them expressly thus much in two propositions.

1. Affirmatively

M. Mafons Ad-
dis. p. 52. 53,
54. 55.

Vindic. grat. l. 1
par. 1. cap. 4. in-
itio.

Instit. l. 3. c. 23.
Self: 7.

Vindic. grat. l. 1,
par. 1. digr. 4. c.
3. prop. finem

Bern: Serm. 1.
Domi: 1. post. 8.
Epiphani.

Ezech. 18. 20;

1. Affirmatively, *The soule that sinneth it shall die.* And that it may be known that he speaks exclusively, only the soule that sinneth shall dye; he delivers his mind.

2. Negatively, *The Son shall not beare the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquity of his Sonne.* &c.

Mat. 23. 32. 34.

Our Saviour in that woefull speech of his to the Pharisees, *Fulfill ye also the measure of your fathers.* Be bold I send unto you *Prophets.* &c. them ye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood. &c. Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritours of their fathers sins & punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sins, they came to inherit both their sins and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are cōe, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestours prevarications. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, personall sins, parents, progenitours sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing

Answer.

cap. 4.

Whereas I am quoted here to give the reason which moved the Synod of Dort, and some other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall; namely this, to avoid the imputation of making God the Authour of sinne. I doubt this Authour hath so long inured himselfe to leasings, that it is growne naturall unto him to deliver untruthes. For first I make no mention (in that fourth *Digress.* of mine in the matter of predestination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. That *Digression* of mine is spent in answering the arguments of those who dispute against *Massa nondum condita*, and stand for *massa corrupta*, to be the object of election and reprobation. In the first chapter I make answer to *Mr. Elnathan Parre* in an English tract of his, wherein he deales upon this argument. In the second chap: I deale with others that make choice of the lower way; because it seemes to be the easiest way, which I expresse in the very words of *Mr. Doctor Abbats*, Bishop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with most; and therefore I thought good so much the more thoroughly to discusse that. But doe I say they tooke this courie to free God from the imputation of sinne? Nothing lesse; my words are these in the *Digression* cap. 2. *Quod plurimos movet, illud est, nimirum quod in sententiâ illâ de massa nondum conditâ, omnia sint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac verò de massa corruptâ predestinationi hominum praeferendâ contra clara sint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, iudicioq; antiquitatis planissimè consentientia;* where I mention two reasons that moved them to take this way 1. This, in that opinion concerning the *Mass* of mankind not yet created, all passages are intricate, perplex, and intangled with infinite difficulties: but in the opinion concerning the *Mass* corrupt, all things are cleare. 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are most plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgment of antiquity. Now after I had endeavoured to discover the insufficiency of this plea in the second and third chapter of that fourth *Digression* in the matter of predestination. In the fourth chapter I propose mine own judgment concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt masse of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgment of others, as this Authour carrieth the matter; but mine own judgment. For thus I beginne. *Ad extremum, vis liberè pronuntiem, quid unicè proficiatur ex hac nostrâ predestinationis Objecti sententiâ temperatione. Dicam igitur quid sentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapsu primorum parentum, decreto predestinationis subjiciendo & subordinando liberemur huic unicè provisum esse, ab istius quasi media & temperatoris opinionis assertioribus mihi plusquam probabile, aut verisimile videtur, ne scilicet alias peccatum fieri statueretur, decernente Deo, tanquam medium ad fines à Deo, in predestinatione sibi praestitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quam author peccati constituendus sit, nullâ solidâ ratione explicari posse videtur.* In the last place, will you give me leave freely to professe, what we profit by thus tempering our opinion touching the object of predestination? I will therefore deliver what I thinke. So that herein I purpose mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. Hereence thus we gaine that we are freed from subjecting and subordinating man's fall unto God's decree of predestination. It seemes to me more then probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate opinion doe provide only against this inconvenience; (that is their way doth indeed provide against this, and against no other inconvenience in my opinion) to wit, least otherwise the sinne of *Adam* should be said to come to passe, God willing it, as a meanes conducing to those ends which God intended in predestination; from whence it followes as it seemes, that it cannot be explicated by any solid reason that God is not made the Authour of sinne. All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others thinke so too; namely not that God is hereby made the Authour and principall cause of sinne; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any solid reason. Now *Cajetan* confesseth as much, namely that in these mysteries, all the distinctions that are used, doe not quietare intellectum, satisfie the understanding.

derstanding; and therefore he doth captivate his owne into the obedience of faith. And Alon-
rez justifies him in this, professing herein that he speaks doctissime & piissime, most lear-
ned and holyly. And in a peculiar disputation he maintaines that the mystery of Gods
providence and predestination, standing with the liberry of our wills, is incomprehensible
by us in this world. Lastly, consider, this is delivered only of the first sinne of our first
parents, which this authour perverts most shamefully, when he avoucheth that I should
acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoyd the imputation
of making God the principall cause, not of Adams sinne alone, but of sinne in the grea-
telt number of men. And to confesse a truth, if sinne be made the meanes for the pro-
curing of the ends which God intends in predestination, undoubtedly God himselfe
should be the authour of sinne. For whosoever intends any end, he, and none but he,
must be authour in working the meanes which tend to this end. Therefore I said, only
that in this case, It seemes that the sinne of Adam was intended by God as the meanes;
Whereas in truth and upon due consideration it appeares that not the creatures sinne,
but Gods permission of the creatures sinne, is the meanes whereby God brings
to passe his glorious ends. Yet not the permission of sinne alone, but joyned toge-
ther with the pardoning of it, and saving his elect in despite of it, is the compleat
meanes (together with the procuring of Christs merits) for the manifestation of
Gods glory in the way of mercy; And in like manner, not the permitting of sinne
alone, but joyned with the punishment of it, is the compleat meanes for the ma-
nifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase
is called, the declaration of his wrath. And whereas I said that hereby it seemed
that it could not by any sound reason be manifested, that God was not the Au-
thour of sinne, by the first way, this Authour avoucheth of the defenders of the
lower way which seemes most temperate, that from their conclusions it followeth
evidently, that of all the finnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by ma-
ny degrees, God is the true and principall Authour. Observe, this (he sayth)
followeth evidently from their conclusions; and, forthwith he tells us that he thinks
so, or, to his thinking, it doth so. And why is he not the Authour of all
the finnes of the elect alio? whereas originall sinne continues in them also,
they carry about them a body of death, and have cause to complaine, of a
law in their members that rebellith against the law of their mind, and leaderh
them captive to the law of sinne. Only there is a principle of spirituall life in
them, that renews their repentance dayly as their finnes are renewed; but
they looke not to be freed, from sinne as long as they live in this world.
But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirmes of the
finnes of the Reprobate, that God is made the Authour of them by our
doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that Cornelius a Lapide a Jesuite shapes Calvines
doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto
him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, in Reprobis manat cer-
tus & necessarius lapsus in peccata qualibet, A certaine and necessary falling
into all manner of finnes, doth flow in Reprobates. But not from these princi-
ples mentioned by this Authour, but rather from two other principles. The
1. that God destinated Reprobates to everlasting punishment, as to their
end; and unto finnes, as to the meanes thereof. The 2. is that man doth
nothing freely in negotio damnationis sue; but that in all things he is driven of
God, as a bowle by him that throwes it, as an hatches by him that hoves
with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot resist. This he
imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly
to Calvin. This Cornelius denies not, for ought I know, that by the just
judgement of God, though executed according to his will and pleasure, hath
brought all men forth into the world in originall sinne, or that any man
can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for these
two conclusions which he imputes to Calvin: as they are false in them-
selves, so they are as falsely charged upon Calvin. Hac loquendi ratio, nun-
quam apud me occurret, sinem creationis esse aeternum interitum. Calvin expressly
denyes, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damne him;
Neither is sinne any meanes whereby God brings a man to damnation, but
the permission of sinne is Gods meanes, and that together with damning for
sinne, is the compleate meanes, whereby God brings to passe his end concer-
ning

Rom. 9. 22.

Rom. 7.

Cornel: in Ep.
ad Rom. c. 9.
18.Calvin: de oc-
cult. Dei pro-
vid.

Rom. 9. 12. 23.

ning Reprobates, which is the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, called his wrath upon those Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, as *S. Paul* plainly teacheth us. The other principle which he obtrudes upon *Calvin*, is as false, and as falsely layd to his charge. In good actions he grants the elect are so carryed to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Liberty to consist in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confesse he is in an error: but that reprobates do not that evil freely, which they do, is nowhere affirmed by *Calvin* that I know nor by any learned or sober Divine. For albeit we all concur in this with *Bernard*, that no naturall man hath *libertatem a peccato*, liberty to keepe himselfe from sinne: Yet that he is carryed into this or that particular sinne, we all confesse it is done freely. And the reason is evident, drawn from the difference betweene gracious actions, and sinfull actions. Every gracious action is supernaturall, either as touching the substance of the act, such as are the acts of faith, hope, and love, or as touching the manner of performing them, such as are all vertuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unlesse they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is some colour, that such are not performed freely; but there is no such colour, as if man were not free in performing actions vitious; considering that all vitious actions are naturall actions, none of them supernaturall. And surely every naturall man as he hath power to performe any action naturall; so hath he power to abstaine from it. But proceed we along with our present Authour.

1 The first doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is such, that I little thought there had beene any difference betweene him and us thereabouts, consisting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt masse, or in the state of originall sinne.

2 The other, that man, in the state of originall sinne or naturall corruption devoyd of the spirit of regeneration, is under the servitude of sinne; hath no liberty from it. Now in these particulars I could not imagine that this Authour differed from us, unlesse with *Pelagius* he entertaines an affection to deny originall sinne. For if all men be borne in originall sinne, seing it is God that *takes us out of our mothers wombe*, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be denied, I should thinke, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in originall sinne. As for the second, Doctor *Potter* confesseth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in state of nature hath no liberty from sinne. It is true, this liberty he distinguisheth from that liberty, which is called, *liberty from necessity*, which he grants to a naturall man; to whom he denyes the former, which cannot stand without contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from sinne he must needs sinne. And therefore Doctor *Fulke* upon the Remish Testament doth usually distinguish betweene liberty from sinne, and liberty from coaction. And both *Arminius* and *Corvinus* confesse that by the sinne of *Adam* all men are cast upon a necessity of sinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this necessity of sinning upon reasonable termes to be performed on mans part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifestly breathing the spirit of *Pelagius*, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, *that grace is conferred according to works or merits*. This makes me conceive that this Authour carryeth himselfe cunningly in the proposition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more then every one is aware of. And indeed the phrase he useth of *bringing men into an estate*, is very harsh, though applied to *Adam* and *Eve* our first parents, much more applied to their race and posterity. For albeit *Adam* was created in a better state, and afterwards brought into the state of sinne, and bondage of corruption: yet what sinister judgement moved this Authour to impute this unto God, rather then to *Adam* himselfe? what if God tooke his holy spirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themselves naked and were ashamed? was it not just with God to do so? Doth not *M. Hord* professe, that it were just with God to damne all for originall sinne, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Authour in his Lectures at Magdalen Hall, my selfe being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongst the errors of his youth, mistaking *Bel-larmine*, which now he is so wise to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the

Gallowes,

Gallowes, is it the Judge or Sheriffe, and not their ſins rather? Yet this, though abſurd enough, ſatisfies him not, but withall he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleaſure, which phraſe is prone to worke a perſwaſion in the Reader, that hereby is ſignified that God brought not man in this ſtate in the way of juſtice for his ſinne, but merely of his own will or pleaſure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to maintaine any ſuch prodigious aſſertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemnes a malefactor unto death, & Sheriffe takes order to execute him. Now if queſtion be made why ſuch a man be hanged; will any wiſe man referre this to the *will and pleaſure of the Judge or Sheriffe*, and not rather to the malefactours deſerts? In like ſort it is God that condemnes a man, and inflictſ eternall puniſhment upon him, but is there any colour to ſay that *he doth this of his will and pleaſure*, and not rather that he doth it in the way of juſtice provoked thereunto by mens ſinnes? Laſtly when it is ſaid that God brought him into the ſtate of corruption, who would not thinke that thereby were meant that God was the poſitive Authour of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man himſelfe averted himſelfe voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangeable good; and converted himſelfe unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God hereupon taking his Spirit from him and that moſt juſtly, left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, ſave by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phraſe is more harſh applied to the race & poſterity of *Adam*, in whoſe production he hath no other hand, then that which neceſſarily belongs unto him, as the Authour of nature, namely, the quickning of them, and fashioning of them in the wombe, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there ſprings a leprous fruit, ſhould this ſeeme ſtrange? We all derive our nature from *Adam* fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereaved of God's Spirit moſt juſtly for his tranſgreſſion; why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange then, that our natures ſhould be no better then *Adam's* was after his fall? It is true the propagation of originall ſinne, hath alwaies been accounted of a myſterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very ſtrange and odde conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some ſaying that the ſoule is derived from the parents, a ſtrange conceite even in Philoſophy not only in peculiar reference unto the ſoule reaſonable; but generally I find Philoſophers have entertained peculiar contemplations about *Datores formarum*, in a more generall way. Others have thought that the ſoule is deſiled by the body, as a ſweet and ſoveraigne oyle may be corrupted by a naughty boxe; which is worſe then the former, no marvaile that a bodily thing ſhould corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body ſhould corrupt the ſoule, the one being corporall the other ſpirituall is beyond comprehension: Farre more probable or rather without queſtion that the ſoule rather corrupts the body. The poſitive inclination unto evil is that which hath troubled all and made ſome conceive that it could not proceed immediatly from God; For if ſo, then ſurely not *impura*, but *pura*. Others and particularly *Ariminenſis*, as I remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the ſerpent, others as *Johannes Bacconius*, that the ſoule though comming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the ſinne of *Adam* gives it over to the power of Satan, who as an univerſall cauſe ſupplies the place of a particular cauſe in the poſitive corrupting of it. This at the firſt ſeemed unto me as very ſingular, ſo a very ſtrange adventure, and that *Bacconius* is a very rare School-man and more uſed in the *Arabian* philoſophy then all the reſt, ſave ſuch as were of his own profeſſion. And that I take to be the reaſon, why *Aquinas* diſcourſeth as he doth of *Intellectus Agens*, making it a faculty of the ſoule; and *Durand* diſcourſeth in ſuch ſort of that argument, as if he never underſtood the ſtate of the queſtion; which I take to proceed frō this that they were ſo little acquainted with *Averro's* philoſophy, wherein *Zabarell* was well ſeen. And I find him ſometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this *Johannes Bacconius* was in ſome particulars of his mind, he doth not ſay, he learnt it of him. But I know no School-Divine comparable to him for depth of philoſophicall ſpeculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of originall ſinne. I willingly confeſſe it is one of the three points wherein ſometimes I perſwaded my ſelfe I never ſhould be ſatisfied in this world. And that which moſt troubled me was the poſitive nature of it. Wherin *Cajetan* is thought to diſcourſe ſtrangely alſo, even to the palate of *Pontificians*; And *Aquinas* his definition of it, calling it, *Habitus corruptus*; hath coſt me no ſmall paines in the diſcuſſion thereof. At length I conceive there is no greate cauſe of ſo much pudder to be made about it, ſave that certaine prejudices which we lay for grounds doe caſt us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, excepting