

*Beza in Col.
Mompelg. pag.
375.
Vide etiam O-
fander.
Brand. Collog.
Hagb. pag. 57.*

*Aff. Syn. p. 1.
pag. 133.*

In the Disputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between *Beza* and *Jacobus Andreas* with some Seconds on both sides, *Beza* and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of Christ, the Lords Supper &c. When they came to this Point, did decline the fitting of it, and gave this reason among others, that it could not then possibly be disputed of, *sine gravi eorum offenculo, qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt*, without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries.

The Contra-Remonstrants also in their Conference with their Adversaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Westfrizland that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the Conference, then to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise of Dort, in the year 1618, and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod *ut de Electione potius quam de odiosa Reprobationis materia agerent*, that they should rather dispute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which makes all thing manifest? especially considering these things.

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill, or well stating of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion is much promoted, or hindered.

2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4. That it was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falshood, and therefore bound in justice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth, for *Nihil est ad defendendum puritate tutius, nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius*, saith S. Hierom.

*Psal. 139.
23, 24,
Ioh. 3. 20, 21.*

The striving to lye close and hide it selfe, though perhaps it be not so infallible, yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cause. Truth covets no corners, but is willing to abide the tryall, whether in men or in doctrines. *David* knowing his heart to be without guile, offers himselfe ready to the Lords tryall, Search me, O God, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and see if there be any wicked way in me. And our Saviour tells us that, Every one that doth evill, hates the light and comes not to the light, least his deeds should be reprov'd; but he that doth truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As S. Paul saith of an Heretick, he is *αὐτοκατακεῖ* selfe condemned, and so may we say of Heresy and untruth, it condemnes it selfe, and by nothing more then by refusing the Touch-stone. He is to be thought an empty Scholler, who is loath to be oppos'd, and his gold to be light and counterfeit, that will not have it touched and weighed, and these Opinions to be but errors, which would so willingly walk in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concerns the peace of the Church so much to have them examined.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

VV Ho are these Authors of this Doctrine, who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard? Is *Beza* those Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the meer pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of mans faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years agoe, and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foresight of sinne, but of the meer pleasure of God? Is this Author so ignorant, as not to know what are the conclusions of *Alvarez* in the question, Whether there be any cause of reprobation on mans part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. disc. 110. pag. 866.

1. His first Conclusion is this, *Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some everlasting life, and to permit their sinne, is not conditionate, but absolute: neither doth it presuppose in God, foresight of the deserts of reprobates, or of their perseverance in sinne unto the last period of their life.*

2. His next Conclusion is, *In the Angels that fell, there is no cause of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foresight of their future sinne, God, pro sua Voluntate, of his meer will, did reprobate some of them, and suffered them to fall into sinne.*

3. The third, *Infants departing in Originall sinne alone, there is no cause on their part of reprobation,*

To have their Doctrine Tried.

reprobation, if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years.

4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation. Therefore neither sinne actually, nor originall, nor both of them foreseen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the prooffe hereof he prosecutes at large.

5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof, presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sinne originall, or actually, for which a reprobate is damned. Marke it well, He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cause for which a reprobate is damned. And Aquinas (whose followers the Dominicans are) expresseth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez. *Præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte pænæ quæ preparatur reprobationis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata, &c.* in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Prescience of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment, to wit, in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes. Where sinne is evidently made the cause of damnation, and that by vertue of Gods purpose, but by no means the cause of the decree it selfe. And the same Aquinas elsewhere professeth that, No man was so mad as to affirme that merits are the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cause thereof, he proves, because nothing can be the cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The same doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the same distinction to reprobation it selfe. *Odium æternum*, saith he, implies two things, *Principale significatum & connotatum &c.* & primum non est ex meritis, sed secundum. This he explicates in the words following, *Quod patet si resolvatur, quia Odium est propositum puniendi: Propositum autem nullus meretur sed penam*, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is Gods purpose to punish: Of this divine purpose there is no meritorious cause, but only of the punishment. The same was the Opinion of Gandavensis, Scotus, Halensis, as I have shewed in my *Vindiciæ*.

Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modesty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of absolute reprobation. Perhaps he will say his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predestination mankind not yet created. But to this I answer, that Beza doth so indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and consequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be understood of this nice and Logically poynt, as touching the object of reprobation. The main question is, whether there be any cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongst Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that those I have named did shrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof? What a silly thing is it then to inferre, that because Beza at such a time, did decline the disputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonstrants at another time, therefore it is suspectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his instances.

Beza he saith did decline the sifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predestination) (for on that they were moved to dispute.) I doubt this Author speaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the story hereof, either in Osiander or in Beza, but transcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Osianders History, that they did conferre thereof. It is true he stood off at the first, and gave reasons for it, but at length he and his fellowes, condescended to the instance and importunity of their Adversaries, and so came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are these. *Præfat. in 2. part. Respons. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evasura essent reliqua satis prospiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata sententia Illustriss. Principe salutato, in reliquam sequentem Collationem consensimus; eà tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Pasche Festum, ea disceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andræ declarationes rursùm processimus.*

Was it this point alone the sifting whereof, as this Author phraseth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no lesse then three Points. This appears by the second part of Beza's answer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as also by the answer of Jacobus Andree, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they list not *De Tribus illis* conferre;

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

Aug. de Don.
Persev. c. 16.

conferre, yet he thought it fit that *Theses* written by them on those three Articles should be rehearsed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addresse an answer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And these three Articles were concerning, Predestination, Baptisme, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which *Jacobus Andreas* gives his reasons, why he thought it fit they should entertaine farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes answer in his Preface to that second part of his Answer *Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg.* It is true, this reason Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publicely to dispute thereof, to wit, of predestination, *Quod hæc gravissima questio publicè in illo cætu allatis utrinq; contrariis sententiis disceptari absq; nonnullorum offendiculo non posse videretur.* For both the mysterious nature of it is such, as few are capable of it; the Massilienses professed as much, as appears in *Prospers* Epistle unto *Austin*, *De his taceri exigunt* (saith *Prosper*) *quorum aliiudinem nullus anigerit.* And to the same purpose, even they who durst not dislike *Austins* doctrine thereof professed as much, as appears by the Letter of *Hilarius* unto *Austin*. *Consentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujusmodi disputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari?* Then again it was in a Lutheran Assembly, and amongst many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exasperated. *Causas verum tacendi longum est omnes querere* (saith *Austin*) *quarum tamen est & hæc una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt.* No wise man, saith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. *Quanto minus sapit*, saith Beza in that Preface of his, *qui de præstantissimo vino prius in utres facibus adhuc, & vappa obstitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet.* Lastly, Beza perceiveth the practice of *Jacobus Andreas* standing upon a place of advantage, to urge them to conferre upon such a poynt, the truth whereof is most harsh to carnall affections, that so he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what *Jacobus Andreas* was, I know not, but Beza sets him forth as a man of a most malevolent disposition to the French Protestants: and our Saviour hath admonished us, Not to give that which is holy unto doggs, or to cast pearle before swine. Yet *Andreas* to serve his turne, and to draw them into a snare, pleads that the doctrine of Predestination, is not so to be put over in the Schooles, *ut non opus sit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere*; yet *Hunnius* a man of the same profession, is so farre different from *Jacobus Andreas*, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of prescience divine, but very sparingly; how much lesse would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predestination divine? *De Prædest. quest. & respons. pag. 394.* his words are these, *Interim hoc repero quod supra monui rudioribus (quibus Apostolus vult lac propinari, non cibum solidum apponi) non esse multum de præscientiâ Dei disputandum, hæc solummodo de causa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quæ alias in Scholis in Disputationibus contra adversarios, & ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei astrui solent. Coram rudioribus ergo simplicior loquendi ratio & ipsorum capui accommodatior est si dicamus, Deum ad hereditatem regni celestis elegisse & certo saluare decrevisse eos omnes qui resipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hac vitâ decedunt.* Its well known what order King *James* took in his time, in the restraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Deane, and counselled the States likewise to forbid the preaching of those controversall points amongst them. And if it were wisdom in them to take this course, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why should Beza's with-holding from conference hereupon, be any thing prejudiciall thereto.

But were there not other causes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceales, and which Beza proposeth in the first place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Missive, alleaged no other cause of that meeting, but *Infelicem de Cænâ Domini controversiam*, that unhappy Controversy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Citties sent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cause, but to conferre thereabouts. This *Jacobus Andreas* acknowledgeth, and giveth a reason why in those Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of those three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to conferre, to wit, *quod illos in istis quoq; dissidere non intellexerat Princeps Illustrissimus.* And thirdly, because the Feast of Easter approached, and they desired to be at home in their own Citties by that time.

Lastly, doth it follow, that because they declined the sifting the truth of these poynts (as this Author phraisseth it) after such a manner, to wit, by publique disputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the sifting of it? They made this

this offer to propose their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if *Jacobus Andreas* were pleased to propose any Theses against it, they would take them along with them and upon consideration to addresse a convenient Answer thereunto; This Beza sets down in that Preface: Let *D. Andrews* shew if he can, saith Beza, *hanc Christianæ doctrine partem aut à nostris sive scribendo sive concionando prætermisam, aut à suis rectius & acutius quàm à nostris pertractatam.* And truly for my part, I no way like such conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither such strength of memory as to command a present use of my knowledge in these poynts upon all occasions, nor such command of my passions, as to keep them from breaking forth in such sort as might be obnoxious to censures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I feare not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almost omitted out of Beza, in his Preface to the First Part of his Answer to these Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things passing between them on both sides, might be set down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this course I confesse I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to conferre with any. But this so faire a motion was rejected by *Andreas*; He would conferre rather by word of mouth then by writing. A second motion proposed by Beza was this, that what was spoken on both sides, might be set down in writing by Notaries chosen and appoynted thereunto by common consent. But neither would *Andreas* admit of this. *Petivimus*, saith Beza, *initio ut utriusq; omnia scriptis propria Collocutorum manu subscriptis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andrea non placuisset qui verbis agi malebat* (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the most part) *postulavi ut utriusq; dicta à probatis & utriusq; partis consensu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quæ deinde cuiusq; parti recognoscere & addita subscriptione confirmare liceret. Hæc enim erat profectò justa & sincera colloquendi ratio ut sic falsationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, &c.* Now let any indifferent person that is not fowred with partiall affections, judge whose carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudiciall to their cause, the carriage of *Andreas*, or the carriage of Beza.

I come to the Contra-Remonstrants unwillingnesse to conferre upon the poynt of reprobation. What their reasons were I know not. But this I am sure of, the Scripture is free in speaking of election, and expresse, not so of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its opposition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Austin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, speaks liberally of predestination, but very sparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing lesse mysterious then that of election; so it is farre more harsh to carnall affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, *Barnavelti* that ruled the roost amongst the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.

But, what boldnesse doth this Author take in passing his suspicious censures upon a doctrine, because some defenders of it, at some time have been loath to come to entertaine a publique Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonstrants would not be brought to give their reasons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Austin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the absolutenesse both of Predestination on the one side, and of preterition on the other (as *Vossius* acknowledgeth) is to be suspended of untruth? And if my readinesse to come to the triall hereon doth nothing credit the cause as maintained by others; why should others unwillingnesse to come to the same triall, be any disparagement to the same cause, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that *Peter Moulin*, concurring with us in the poynt of absolute predestination, maintaines reprobation to proceed upon the divine foresight of finall perseverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the Mr *Moulin* doth, and acknowledged the meer pleasure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I doe not think any friend of his would think any whit the worfe of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, considering how many worthy Divines opposite to the Arminians, doe either conceive, or at least seem to conceive

that the purpose of God to damne, doth presuppose in *signo rationis* the foresight of finall impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and so brought forth into the world in *damnata Massa*, as Austin calleth it. God of his meer pleasure cures this naturall corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in some, by regenerating them and bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refusing to regenerate them, to bestow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Christian fellowship, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithstanding some nice differences, which in the issue I hope, will prove to be merely Logically, and nothing Theologically.

* The Doctor directs his speech unto S. Nathaniel Rich.

Lastly, however this poynt of unwillingnesse in some, to come to conferre in the poynt of reprobation, might cast some colour of suspicion to the prejudicing of their cause; yet least of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, considering that it is his own case, as who declineth not one poynt only, but all the rest in this his discourse, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing answerably (I presume) to * your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing answerable to the promise he made unto you, your self are best acquainted therewith. Yet because the Remonstrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonstrants declining this Controversy) have taken liberty to oppose the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants in this poynt, so farre forth, as they made construction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not spare even here, to digresse so farre, as to take notice what they delivered, and to ad-dresse an answer hereunto, the rather because I find this discourse of theirs inserted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.

Now, whereas first, by a long deduction upon consideration of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine in the poynt of election, they doe inferre *Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120.* that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, so infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this consequence we utterly deny. It only followes herehence, that like as faith; whereby mans naturall infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, so the denyall of faith, that is, the not curing of mans infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed considering the means must be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in mans election, the means tending thereunto must be Gods work, as namely, faith; in like sort, whatsoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, must be his work, which cannot be infidelity or sinne, but the permission of sinne rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is naturall unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propose two things to be questioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants. 1. *Utrumme Fides in consilio & decreto Dei de electione ad salutem, eam ipsam electionem ordine præcedat an verò consequatur?* 2. *Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Consilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipsam reprobationem ordine præcedat an sequatur?* The latter of these is only pertinent to our present purpose; yet seeing they handle them both, so farre as to dispute against the opinion of their opposites in both, and carry themselves herein *Magnificentissime*, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the ballance of Scholasticall consideration, least some such as this Author, should affect to seem judicious in suspecting my declining of them to favour of some inability to encounter them.

Thus therefore they beginne.

If faith followes election unto salvation, then also the decree of sending Christ as a Saviour into the World, must necessarily follow that election; But this consequent is absurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Christ.

To this I answer. First out of mine own opinion, Thus.

Faith is supposed to follow Election unto salvation, upon no other ground then because the intention of giving faith, is supposed to follow the intention of giving salvation. But this I should deny, and that for this reason, because this subordination is grounded only upon supposition, that salvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. First, because the end of Gods actions, is not the salvation of man, but

but the manifestation of his own glory. *For he made all things for himselfe*, *Pov. 16. 4.* and reason justifies it. For God being the supream efficient, must be the supream end; and being *Optimus* as well as *Maximus*, he must needs be both most lovely and most loving, of that which is most lovely, that is, of himselfe. But because some may conceive that though Gods glory be the supream end, yet mans salvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I answer; First, let such shew then what is the glory of God, which salvation of the creature setteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be stated right, it will appeare, that not salvation alone, but something else is required to be joyned with it; as namely, the mission of Christ, yea and faith in Christ, to compleat that means, which tend to the procurement of such an end, that is, to the setting forth of such a glory. Secondly, the end whether supream or intermediate is alwaies such as being rightly understood, doth break such a means; but salvation is not so in respect of faith; for it doth not bespeak it, as is apparent in the salvation of Angels, of Infants; as also in this, that it was absolutely possible for God to save even sinners without Christ, as may be demonstrated, and I have demonstrated in my *Vind. Grat. Dei.* by variety of evident reasons.

In a word, if Gods supream end, were the manifestation of his glory on some considered, as meerey possible in doing them good in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with justice, and that *ex Condigno & ex Congruo*; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and bespoken hereby, is a body consisting of divers particulars, all together compleating the inegrall means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they must be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifested upon them and permitted to sinne, otherwise God could not doe them good in the way of mercy, which supposeth misery, but also that a Saviour must be sent, and he no lesse then the Sonne of God, to deserve the pardon of their sinne and salvation, otherwise it could not be in the way of mercy mixt with justice *de Condigno*: and faith and repentance must be bestowed on them, otherwise the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and lastly, salvation, otherwise good could not be done them in the highest degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predestination of Christ either before or after the Predestination of man; as our Brittish Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predestinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as *Aquinas* maintained Christs predestination, and our predestination to be one act in God, and consequently neither could be the cause of another.

Thus have I dispatched mine answer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But supposing the method of the Contra-Remonstrants found, in making salvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both mans faith in Christ, and Christs Mission to be intended as means. We deny this to be absurd or ignominious unto Christ. Lets heare how they prove it, thus; If the decree of sending Christ be posterior to the electing of singular persons unto salvation, then the intention of mans salvation was posterior to Gods intention of satisfaction to his justice, which say they is absurd and foolish, to wit, to decree the salvation of sinners, unlesse first he decree satisfaction to his justice. But I answer according to the forme of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine: First, by proving their order to be found: Secondly, by shewing the invalidity of the Remonstrants discourse.

First therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, then such as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order most received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is in his right Witts consider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of these two, Mans salvation, and Christs Mission to satisfy for the sinne of man. Was ever any man known to be so brain-sick as to affirme, that the salvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the sending of Christ into the World to satisfy for the sinne of man? On the other side, how fair and plausible is it to affirme, that Christ was sent into the world, to satisfy for mans sinne, to this end, that man might be saved? whence it followeth evidently by the most approved rules of Schooles, that the intention of mans salvation is *in signo rationis*, before the

intention of sending Christ into the world, to make satisfaction for sinne. Againe, if Christs sending into the world to make satisfaction for sinne, be first in intention, then it should be last in execution, by rules undeniable, and such as are manifest by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man should be first saved and after that Christ sent into the World, that, by his sufferings, Gods justice might be satisfied.

Now I come to the consideration of the Remonstrants argument. The Consequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vaine thing for them to cry out, that it is absurd and foolish to say, that the intention of salvation, precedes the intention of satisfying Gods justice; for words must not carry it: and it is well known that the most empty vessels give the greatest sound. I have shewed how absurd it is to conceive, that man was saved to this end, that Gods justice may be satisfied, and that 'tis farre more probable to say, That by Christs sufferings, Gods justice was satisfied to this end, that man might be saved. For the salvation of man we say, was not intended by God simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice; which end doth not presuppose the permission of sinne, as these Remonstrants shape the matter to varnish over their consequence, with some colour of probability: but rather it bespeaks, both the permission of sinne, and satisfaction to be made for sinne; to the end that so man might be saved, not simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice. But suppose they were considered as sinners, Why should the Remonstrants look strangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God should intend the salvation of sinners *in signo rationis*, before he intended that his justice should be satisfied? For doe not they maintaine, that God by power absolute, can pardon sinne without all satisfaction? But supposing that God will not pardon sinne without satisfaction, in this case they may contend, that God must first intend to take a course, that such satisfaction may be made, and then intend to save. And let them contend but in the name of reason, and not of clamours, and content themselves, with the infatuation of themselves, with such senselesse conceits, and not spread this scab unto others also. My reason to the contrary is still the same, namely, that if God be pleased to save sinners in despite of sinne, in the way of mercy mixt with justice, the case is cleare, that satisfaction for sinne, is rather a means of mans salvation, then mans salvation is a means tending to the procurement of satisfaction for sinne, and consequently the intention of salvation of sinners, is in reason to precede the intention of procuring satisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet say these Remonstrants, if a man will be so obstinate, as (notwithstanding the felicity of these Remonstranticall witts in fruitfull inventions and subtile argumentations) still to deny that there is any absurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have runne themselves out of breath. If, say they, the decree of Christ a Saviour, be after the election of particular persons unto salvation, it followeth that God did decree some particular mens salvation, before he ordained Christs merits to procure their salvation; but this is foolish and absurd.

I answer, No more foolish and absurd then the former: and indeed every one of these consequences for the expressing whereof, they affect to seem very inventious, doe favour of no invention at all; the Consequents doe so evidently, even every one of them appeare as clearely in the Antecedent, as a mans face in a glasse, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much lesse doe they relish of any subtilty of wit. So that all this while, they seem to be in travell with nothing but wind, or sick of the disease called Tenasmus, striving mightily to doe somewhat, when indeed they doe nothing at all. And our former argument still hath place, and here also applied, doth manifest, that seeing the merits of the sonne of God are the means of mans salvation, then mans salvation is the end of Christs merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of mans salvation, as the intention of the end, should precede the intention of sending Christ to merit as the means, rather then to be subordinate unto it. And indeed if the sending of Christ into the World to merit, should be first in intention, then should it be last in execution; that is, All the elect should first be saved, and then Christ should be sent into the world to merit their salvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is so silly as not to perceive, that if the consideration of Christs obedience, as satisfactory, will not serve their turne, surely neither will the consideration of his obedience as meritorious, stand them in any

To have their Doctrine Tryed.

ny stead) they put into this Consequence another clause, without all art, and without all honesty, pretending, that hereby we make salvation destinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this case between destination and decree, or as if we make salvation destinated to a man hereby, before it is destinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is salvation) intended before the merits of Christ (which are the means of salvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right wits, say this is to make salvation destinated to a man before it is destinated to him? Farther, it is to be observed, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermost of their strength, and the rather, because it will notably discover either their ignorance, or which is most likely, (for as much as they do not directly insist, as they might upon a new argument farre more plausible with the ignorant) their unconscionableness. For they signify that hence it will come to passe, that the intention of salvation, being before the intention of sending of Christ to merit, salvation shall exist, being decreed as present to God, before Christ is considered as he that by his Crosse hath deserved it. Now had they said *before Christ hath deserved it*, I should readily have granted it. For I hope none of the would deny, that the salvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, existed not only before God, but actually and really before Christ was crucified. To prevent this elusion of their argument, they expresse it thus, *Before Christ was considered as he that hath deserved it*. Yet here they fall foule upon an indecent expression. For I will be bold to deny, that Christ was considered by God, as one that had deserved mans salvation, before he had deserved it. For before he had deserved it by his Crosse, to say, that God considered him as one that had deserved it, is either to erre or to feigne, neither of which is incident unto God. God considered him from everlasting, as one that in the fulnesse of time should deserve it, by suffering upon the Crosse, not as one that had deserved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amisse. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their salvation were decreed before Christs merits, then their salvation did exist as present with God before Christs merits did exist, as present with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to discover their ignorance, which they betray in this. First, neither Gods prescience, nor Gods decree doth make things to exist, otherwise then in *Esse cognito & in esse velito*; but this is not to exist. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, *ut præsens Deo*; which indeed is *Terminus diminuens* in this case. For it is present to God by vertue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alone is to exist. But let this Peccadillio passe. Secondly, Who seeth not that this argument tends to the utter destruction of all distinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any such distinct intentions in God, the one must be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Lets goe no farther then the manifestation of Gods power and wisdom as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintnesse of this argumentation, that the manifestation of Gods wisdom and power in creating the world did exist, as present with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. *Speſtatum admiſſi riſum teneatis amici.*

Thirdly, to draw neerer to the discovery of their ignorance. I grant it shall first exist; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no such priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though such a priority in this case is found in man. What then? Ile tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you doe not apply it to any of the two kindes of priority of nature mentioned by *Aristotle*. For try if you please, and you shall find that none of them can possibly serve the turne; What then is this priority of nature so called? I answer, it is only *Prioritas rationis*: And so I formerly said, that the intention of the end is *in signo rationis*, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this *Prioritas rationis* consist? I answer out of *Durand*, it consists in this, that, *Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius*, and so indeed, *Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis*. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For alwaies the nature of the end duely considered, doth bespeak what shall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of existence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly so called, but only such a subordination between them, that the reason of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any

sober man judge, Whether the salvation of man be required to the procuring of Christs merits, and not rather, Christs merits are required to the procuring of mans salvation; which yet is not true of salvation considered simply, but only as to be bestowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of justice, and by way of satisfaction made for sinne, that so a man may be saved by grace in despite of sinne. In the close of all they signify that this of theirs in the last place seriously considered will make it appeare, that this doctrine of their Adversaries, tends notably to the diminution of Christs honour, and to the annihilation of Christs merits, to wit, unlesse Christs merits be acknowledged the end of mans salvation, and not mans salvation the end of Christs merits, Christ shall be dishonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be supplied by the serious (they should say ignorant) consideration of their Profelites. They presume this colour of dishonour redounding hereby to Christ, will be sufficient to blow up their Adversaries, though it prove of no more force then a squibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the English at *Delfe*, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes house, and another being a Goldsmith, told him and another consort of theirs, he had a devise to put munny in all their purses, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence sylver, and in that Widdowes house they would ply their businesse very securely. To work they went, and casting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of those Dolars, and stamping them full and faire, this Gold-smith, with the quantity of three pence sylver, sylvered them over very fairely, and, least they should seem too light, hangs them up in the chimney in a bagge, that the smoak might bring them to the sadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is employed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth, and he laies out their coyne in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good sylver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in *Delfe*, in one of these Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray some suspicious gestures and interpretations upon the coyne. That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all speed; and home they come, and make themselves merry with the relation. In like sort these Remonstrants shew a great deale of Tinne and trash in these argumentations, and they have not so much as three pence sylver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of some dishonour by their adversaries doctrine redounding unto Christ, will be taken for a peece at least of good sylver. I confesse, I am somewhat the more merrily disposed at this time, For being taken off from the midst of a sentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inne: He was pleased to entertaine me with such good discourse, that it did not a little refresh my spirits. His reaches were after new discoveries for the advancement of learning; and endostrinated me more in one halfe hower, then seventeen years study in the University. For whereas I never learned there, more causes then foure, he was pleased to acquaint me with nine; which I took some pains to learn without book, and they were these, Matter, Forme, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And most courteously offered himselfe to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken sentence, I was desirous to return to my studies Theologicall, and to let those Philosophicall progresses alone. But I protested unto him seriously, that he had informed me more in the number of causes in a short space, then *Oxford* had done in many years; he entreated I would consider of them, and I promised I would, and conferre of them too, with all the Schollers I companied with; which he took in very good part; and so I took my leave. And finding my spirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I resolved, forbearing my usuall time of supper, to follow these studies close that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of those causes being found out, otherwise called, Invention (as for Judgement, I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made use of it very happily in finding out, or discovery of the foppery of these Remonstrantical argumentations.

Now I proceed to the second Question, as more seasonable to the present occasion. And here first they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, answerable to faith on the part of election, which is most untrue, as formerly I shewed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by

us subordinate to reprobation; as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to election. But they goe on, as in shaping our Tenent at pleasure, so in basting it with their very liberall censures, as *absurd and execrable*, in such sort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be sufficient to represent the horror of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Christ. And indeed their best strength lyeth in setting forth their Adversaries doctrine in such colours, as the Devil is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adversaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is so little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in sinne, and corrupted and estranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuse to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a vessell of wrath, that so Gods glory may be manifested upon him, in the way of justice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.

1. The first is this. *If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto destruction, then God cannot in justice destroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injustice, then to destroy a man for that, that followeth necessarily upon reprobation which is the work of God.* To this I answer.

1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent in ordering them.

1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the state of Originall sinne, of leaving this originall sinne uncured in them, and last of all, of damning them for their sinnes; are decrees not subordinate, but coördinate, as decrees *de Medicina*, tending joyntly to one supream end, which is the manifestation of Gods glory upon them in the way of justice vindicative; as also to shew the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding in others that miserable condition, which through Gods meer grace and goodnesse they have escaped. Rom. 9. 22.

2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent, I answer,

1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foresight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the Brittilsh Divines their *Theses De Reprobatione*; and *Alvarez* professeth the same. The denyall of grace, and so the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured, they make consequent (as it seems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foresight of infidelity subsequent; and this foresight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it signifies the decree of damnation. And thus farre I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or signe of reason did God ordain any man to damnation, but for sinne; and consequently in no moment of nature, or signe of reason, did the decree of damnation goe before the foresight of sinne or infidelity.

2. But suppose, as these Remonstrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all poynts proportionable to the decree of salvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be subordinate to the decree of salvation; so the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for here it consists the just proportion, and not as they feigne it, between faith on the one side; and infidelity on the other) is with them made subordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I answer,

1. Their Consequence should be this, *If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in justice damne them for Infidelity.* Now here is no colour of good Consequence.

2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediately

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence.

Resp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one; as touching the force of the Consequence: but then consider.

1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the consequention of infidelity, simply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the necessary consequention thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Consequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above most illogically.

2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary consequention of sinne in generall, or infidelity in speciall, upon Gods permitting of it.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the sinne of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus, *If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in justice damne a man for Infidelity*; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is Gods work.

Resp. I answer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is cashiered as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himselfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expressly professeth, That in case God permits a man, *Velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolum.* Exam. pag. 153. I could adde *Vorstius* also, herein concurring with *Piscator*, *Perkins*, and *Navarretius* the Dominican is as expressly in this as any other; as also in subordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, *Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse.* Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, *At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & penitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam:* He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We our selves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of swasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoever believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our sinnes, through faith in his blood.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessfully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectuell: this effectuell suasion, he confesseth to be administred by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuell, yet he saith it is administred by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuell, that is such a grace as whereupon he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as *Paul*, the other reprobate as *Esau*. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord foreseeeth which of them will prove effectuell with *Paul*, and which ineffectuell; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he foreseeeth will prove effectuell. Again he foreseeeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuell with *Esau* and which ineffectuell, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuell. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to shew his mercy in the salvation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressly to professe, That by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuell, he found himselfe in a streit upon his distinction of grace sufficient

sufficient and effectually, and the description of each; he drew his breath very short; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of ayre, he concluded that discourse with, *Hæc ex Augustini sententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58.* and in the next page. *Hicce autem ita explicatis ex mente Augustini & fortè Scripturæ sensu.* But, What, a mischief, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? First, that he willingly grants that, *Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & penitentiam non dare* (provided it be well understood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered *ex sententiâ & mente Augustini*, and but perchance, *ex Scripturæ sensu*, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (*Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & penitentiam non dare*) most prejudiciall to his own Tenent at first sight, and much more by the distinction following of *Gratia sufficiens & efficax*; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Austins back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. *Primò, de Gratiâ sufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utriusq; dispensatione, dispensationisq; Causis*: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well consider this, that talkes so much of our Divines unwillingnesse to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectually, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectually grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectually grace, doth work in man, *non Velle credere, modo velit*, and why not as well, that he workes in man, *non Credere, modo Credat, non Respicere modo Respicat*. This that I speake, I can shew under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Authors Discourse, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a smoake, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney.

4. Let the argument stand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permission follow upon the decree of damnation, and that necessarily. Yet consider.

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confesse, as many as concur against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall sinne. By Gods permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actually sinne is there in the World, or habituall sinne arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawfull for him to punish it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

2. Suppose all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them *Velle quod possunt* (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that stood, *amplius Adjutorium*, then he gave the others; whereby it came to passe, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall wee say in this case, is it possible that they should *Velle bonum*, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apostle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall wee hereupon say, they doe not sinne freely? What shift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us *non Velle*, or by saying that God doth work in us *non Velle, modo Velimus*, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The selfe same act, being made before and after it self; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleasure, or according to mans good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to passe freely, because it comes to passe necessarily, upon supposition of Gods denyall of grace, to refrain from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

freely by us, because God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evill works are not done the lesse freely, because God denies speciall and effectuall grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingnesse unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As *Austin* saith, that *Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia*. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulnesse.

4. The Schooles teach, that liberty of will consists only, in *electione mediorum*, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Gospel is preached to a carnall man, whose ends are only carnall, as the Apostle saith, Philip. 3. 20. *They mind earthly things*; so farre forth as he shall find it serviceable to his carnall ends, he may believe it and make profession of it, as many times Hypocrites doe, and sometimes in such sort, as it is hard to distinguish, between a true and an Hypocriticall professour. This moved the Apostle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themselves, and prove themselves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in *faith unfeigned*. For there is not only a grosse Hypocrisy, whereunto a mans own heart is privy, but a secret Hypocrisy whereof the man himselfe is nothing conscious; yet such a faith undoubtedly is performable by a naturall man. Now when a man rejects the Gospell, the faith and profession whereof he finds nothing serviceable to his carnall ends, doth he not judiciously and deliberately, yea and wisely too (according to the wisdom of flesh and blood) reject it?

5. *Austin* professeth *Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will*, and justifies it in his *Retractions*. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averse from believing, We justly say, such a man cannot believe; as our Saviour saith, *How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and seeke not the honour that cometh of God alone*. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Morall only, which is to be distinguished from impotency Naturall. For notwithstanding this, it may be truly said, that; All men may believe if they will, and herein consists the naturall liberty of the will. The Morall liberty consists, rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of sinne and Sathan; then in a power to doe good if they will, and not otherwise. But I never find that Arminians doe distinguish these.

6. It is not sufficient for Arminians to conclude, that such a thing upon supposition comes to passe necessarily, therefore it comes not to passe freely.

1. For upon supposition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to passe necessarily; yet simply the World was made by God freely.

2. In like sort, upon Gods foreknowledge that such a man will not believe it followeth necessarily, that such a one will not believe; and so the like may be said of the most free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?

3. In like sort upon the denyall of an effectuall impediment of sinne, unto a man it followeth necessarily, that such a man will sinne, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular sinne whatsoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that such a sinne is not committed freely? nothing lesse.

2. The Remonstrants second argument is this.

What God cannot performe that God cannot will. But God cannot damne a man for infidelity flowing from such a decree of Reprobation.

Resp. 1. But who saith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but *Piscator* upon these words, Yee therefore heare not my words, because yee are not of God. But understand him aright, it is as if he should say, Therefore such a man goeth lame, because the Physitian will not cure him: yet it is well known the cause of his lamenesse is from within, and perhaps procured by some distemper of his own: yet in case a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be said to be the cause of lamenesse; but how? *per modum non removens*. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cause whereof notice is taken in Naturall Philosophy. And in this sense and no other,

it is well known that *Piscator* makes God the cause of infidelity, and that according to the expresse Word of God. But in my judgement *Piscator* mistakes the phrase, *To be of God*, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to say, *ye therefore heare not my words*, because God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that naturall infidelity which is in you.

2. But take the argument according to the former expreffion, God cannot damne a man for that infidelity which is consequent to reprobation; And then my Answer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this.

3. The Third followeth. *If Infidelity flowes from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor seriously offer salvation unto them, but necessarily counterfeit. For it is manifest Hypocrisy, to invite those unto faith and salvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.*

Resp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flowes from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrances, but the not curing of mans naturall infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.

2. I say, There is no simulation at all of God in this. For that which he propoeth is but this, that, *Whosoever believeth shall be saved, and Whosoever believeth not shall be damned.* He sends his Ministers to Preach this, and to Beseech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whose sake? Not for the reprobates sake, but for the elects sake, Who because they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Ministers, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he should, many of the Ministers themselves, even of those that not only prophesied in his name, but cast out Devils, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commission should be generall to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apostles themselves take notice of this? Doth not *Paul* professe that, He became all things to all that he may save some? And who were those some, but the very elect of God, as the same Apostle elsewhere professeth, saying, *I suffer all things for the elects sake.* And doth not *Austin* professe that if we knew who were reprobate, we would no more pray for them, then for the Devils? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24. 2 Corinth. 6.
2 Tim. 2. 10.

4. The Fourth and last. *If Incredulity followes the decree of reprobation, then God considered the reprobates in his counsell of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as false into Originall sinne. Sed falsa sunt hæc omnia. All these things are false. And these things, he saith, are delivered, contra absurdam, detestabilem, atq; abominabilem sententiam.*

Resp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry discourse for substance of argumentation throughout.

1. Yet as I said, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintaine that God of his meer pleasure, hath mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance (considering all in the corrupt Masse) and of his meer pleasure hardens others (no worse in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation signifies the decree of damnation, doe permit thereunto the foresight of finall perseverance in sinne.

2. According to my Ordering of Gods decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all Gods decrees, they being eternall, and but one act in God, and that act his very Essence, and all other things being temporall. I doe not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reason, before the consideration of mans finall impenitency. As neither doe I conceive it to be after this, but both simultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in *Adam*, together with the decree of finall leaving some therein, and the decree of damning them for sinne, I take not to be subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous.

3. Whether we take the First-way for shaping the object of predestination, or the Second, or the Third, I Answer.

1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement meerly Logically, nothing Theologically; the resolution whereof according to generall rules, is easily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is Gods end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto those ends.

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

2. Which way soever we take of the Three, I never found any reason given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have justified in my *Vindicia*, as touching the First-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Answer to *Corvinus* against *Tilenius*, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I trust, routed and profligated the 20 Reasons of Arminius, proposed against the First and Last-way, but chiefly against the First, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.

Now I returne to the Author of this discourse, and to the remainder of his second Motive, from whence I have digressed.

I was here passing over unto the third instance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the History thereof, to prepare my selfe for an answer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reasons of that the Contra-Remonstrants motion to be spared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here cast upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be spared from conferring upon the poynt of reprobation. But whereas the Remonstrants had incurred the point of election and reprobation with seaven Questions, which pertained not to the state of the Controversy concerning the first Article, and being also imperfect and intricate for the most part, and proposed to this end, to draw their Adversaries away from the true state of the Question; They desired to be spared from answering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleased the States, that leaving those thorny questions, they should come to the handling of the Articles. This is set down in the Preface to those *Acta Synodalia*, set forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the proposing of these two questions to the Remonstrants, as touching the decree of Predestination. 1. Whether the intire decree of Predestination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlasting decree to save believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perseverance therein, did precede election, as the Causes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonstrants had answered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their seaven, for the most part, intricate questions. *Reponerent deinde septem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, questiones, ad quas a Pastoribus à Classibus deputatis responderi volebant. Quæ cum ad controversiæ de primo articulo statum non spectarent, etiam mutilæ atq; intricatæ pleræq; essent, eumq; in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a præcipuo controversiæ statu rectaq; agendi ratione, in ambages adducerent. Pastores exposuisti per Libellum supplicem Illust. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati sunt, ne de reprobatione sententiam suam manifestarent (uti Remonstrantes improbè sæpius ipsis objectarunt) sed disertè sententiam suam quantum ad Ecclesiarum pacem atq; ædificationem sufficere existimarent, non tantum vivâ voce sed & scripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum æternum electionis singularium personarum decretum ponunt, simul quoq; ponere æternum de reprobatione & reiectione quarundam singularium personarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut sit electio, quin simul quodq; sit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum questiones temere excutere, nihil aliud esse quam inutilibus disputationibus & nihil profuturis libris, Ecclesiam replere, ejusq; pacem perturbare. Declarationem suam hanc Libello supplice expressam, moderatis omnibus, pacemq; amantibus ingeniis, sufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipsis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne statuisse quidem condemnare quenguam nisi justè propter propria ipsius peccata: Placuit itaq; Illust. Ordd. ut missis illis spinosis questionibus, ad articulorum petractionem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection proposed by the Remonstrants in these words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghiensi Libello supplice Illust. Hollandiæ & Westfriziæ Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati sunt Contra-Remonstrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipsi Contra-Remonstrantes cum in Colloquio Haghiensi jussi essent, ad interrogata quedam nostra de reprobatione respondere Magistratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, usq; adeò ut Collationem ceptam abrupte se male profiterentur quàm ut summorum Potestatum imperio se constringi paterentur, nihil aliud conscientie suæ prætexentes quam quod Ecclesiæ ædificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157: Festus Hominus, one present in that Conference, stands up and answers, Exposuitq; paucis quàm non bonâ fide hæc de illis dicerentur. Se Libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: ceterum quia Remonstrantes subdole in ipso Collationis initio, septem questionibus spinosis ac minime necessariis non tantum ad reprobationis, sed electionis quoque doctrinam spectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonstrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonstrantes Libello supplice apud Illust. Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conquestos fuisse atq; ut Remonstrantibus mandaretur, ne extra justam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiisse. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonstrantes*

monstrantes quantum ad edificationem satis erat, sententiam suam clarè ibidem explicasse uti scriptorum editorum fide probari potest. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctissimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipse huic interfuerat Collationi, suo præsens comprobabat testimonio.

Now I come to the Synod of Dort.

4. This Author saith the Remonstrants were there warned by the President of the Synod, *Ut de electione potius quam de odiosa reprobationis materia agerent.* And truly at first I wondered not a little, that the President of that Synod should account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to say, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly signify hereby, such a doctrine as deserves to be hated; but I thought withall, that they might expresse rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of those, that submit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of those, and of those only, who follow the judgement of flesh and blood. Yet I thought good to enquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonstrants themselves doe expresse this, even as here it is expressed, thus, *A Reverendo Præside moniti sumus ut à negativis enunciationibus absteremus & de electione potius quam odiosâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus.* Yet I confesse this did not satisfy me; For why should this Author make choyce to expresse it in the Remonstrants termes, rather then in the words of the President himselfe. Therefore I turne to the beginning of that Session, being Sess. 32. There I find this particular, *Submonuit & Præsides ut potius questionibus illis inhaerent, quæ circa suavem de electione doctrinam versarentur, quam ut de odiosâ doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent.* Now I find a great deale of difference between professing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admonishing to spare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their usuall course, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, *Doctrinam de prædestinatione odiosam reddere conabatur*, as it is professed in the Preface to those Aët. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They professe in like manner of the Remonstrants, namely, that in their Remonstrance they endeavoured, *Illust. Ordd. odiosam reddere doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum*, and that not only, *de divinâ prædestinatione*, but also *de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perseverantiâ*, but all this *malâ fide, nec sine apertis, atrocibusq; calumniis.* Moreover I find, Sess. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synode gratifying the Remonstrants, and yeelding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, *Quoniam Remonstrantes aliquoties professi sum, se per conscientiam in Synodo subsistere ulterius non posse, nisi prius caveatur ipsis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Theſibus & Scriptis suis hætenus exhibitis proposuerunt, in posterum agatur. Synodus quò magis ipsis fiat satis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, statuisse sese ac statuere sententiam ipsorum, non de electione modo, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere atq; examinare. Quantum nempe in conscientia ad Dei gloriam, edificationem & tranquillitatem Ecclesiæ, omniumq; conscientiarum posse ac debere satis esse, ipsa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic est servandus & ordinem quod attinet, suum esse de eo dispicere, non autem fratrum Remonstrantium qui huc sunt citati, quicquam præscribere, existimat.* This decree being read to the Remonstrants, they refused to give way unto it. The 40 Session contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod *de modo Agendi*, the Synod must not prescribe to them. And they professe against it Sess. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, *Nec satisfit nobis si dicatur Synodum permissuram, ut nostram de reprobatione sententiam tractemus quoad illa ipsa ad gloriam Dei, edificationem Ecclesiarum, conscientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hæc ipsâ restrictione, nobis præciditur libertas & plenaria sententiæ nostræ defensio, & contrariæ Impugnatio. Præterquam quod non levis suspicandi nobis data sit occasio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione differentes audiverit, nequaquam permissuram ut Contra-Remonstrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione sententiam prout necessarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari.* Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Forraine Divines; and they all with one consent professe, *Tantam Remonstrantibus libertatem ad defensionem causæ suæ concessam esse, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi posset. Ac proinde nullam esse causam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonstrantes querelam instituissent, vel auctoritatem hujus Synodi subterfugerent. Nihil illis esse imperatum quod ullo modo conscientias ipsorum gravare posset. Ac proinde conscientie velum frustra pervicaciæ obtendi. Abundè iis omnibusq; modis satisfactum jam esse. Absolutam illam, nulliq; circumscriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipsis non posse. Æquum esse ut certis sese legibus submittant, quibus, si exorbitent, coercerentur.* Nay in the next Session, which is Sess. 42. there is a representa-

tion made of their unreasonable demand in these words. *Profeſſi ſunt ſibi agendi modum a Synodo præſcriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, ſed & circa omnes articulos & Theſes, ſingulaq; argumenta de ſententiâ Contra-Remonſtrantium, & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calcem illos maximè urgeat.* Hereupon the Opinions of the forraigne Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yeeld unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, *Qui conſentientibus declarabant ſuffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo eſſe alienum id quod Remonſtrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere ſibi liceret.* Their judgements hereupon are here repreſented ſeverally and at large; Firſt of our Britiſh Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Heſſe, then of the Helvetians, then of thoſe who were of the correſpondency of Weteraw, then of thoſe of Geneva, then of thoſe of Breme, and laſtly of thoſe of Emden.

5. Upon the former bald and baſe pretences, as if, *Concluſum eſſet contra Manichæos*, the Author proceeds crowing *magnificentiffimè*, and demanding in this manner.

Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light which makes all things manifeſt, eſpecially conſidering theſe things?

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of practiſall Divinity by the well, or ill ſtating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.
2. That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.
3. That Reprobation was the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.
4. That it was accuſed with open mouth and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.
5. That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth. For, *Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate facilius*, ſaith S^t Hierome.

Now albeit for the diſcovery of the vile vanity of this concluſion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any ſober mans due conſideration of the pre-miſes duely examined according to my former answer; yet I think good not to paſſe it over without ſuch particular conſideration as it deſerves. Firſt, I pray conſider, what is that light that makes all things manifeſt? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were diſverſe other things diſputed of, beſides this of predeſtination. Now is the truth manifeſted hereby in all thoſe particulars? If it be, I pray, let him ſignify on whoſe ſide, whether on the part of *Jacobus Andreas*, or on the part of *Beza*? To whom is it made manifeſt? To either ſide, or only to that ſide, on whoſe ſide this Author conceives the truth to ſtand? Doe you not manifeſtly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who ſeeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifeſt the truth. And ſuch men are able to manifeſt, as well out of conference in their diſcourſes, either Poſitive, or Controverſiall, as in conference; yea, and farre better; Thoſe diſcourſes being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences, eſpecially in caſe they meet with malignant opposites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that ſpirituall light, which giveth manifeſtation to all ſpirituall truth. And conſequently neither are they to be cenſured as bluſhing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of theſe controverſies, then to conferre about them in ſome caſes; or that preferre conference by the penne as *Beza* did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleaſed the lipps of *Jacobus Andreas*. Yet neither *Beza* did reſuſe to yeeld to *Andreas* his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonſtrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, reſuſe to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have ſhewed by authentically evidences. But ſuppoſe *Beza* and his fellowes, whether two or three had altogether declined to conferre at all, as in my judgement they had good reaſon to reſuſe, muſt this be cenſured their bluſhing at the light? *Auſtin* profeſſeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many cauſes of forbearing to deliver the truth at ſome times. He little dreamed of expoſing the truth thereby to ſuch a cenſure, as if it bluſhed at the light. And if ſome few might be juſtly cenſured as bluſhing at the light, muſt all for their ſakes, by the rules of juſtice, be made obnoxious to the ſame cenſure, and not the Doctours only, but the Doctrines it ſelfe? Is it not apparent that a true and ſound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and *Veritas eſt temporis filia*, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth

in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have crackt the crowne of this conclusion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the rest.

1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practicall Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall poynt, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erroneous doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blasphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; so is it blasphemy also, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refusing conference thereabouts, I have already spoken sufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpose to subjoyne to the end of those five considerations here distinguished, as remarkable ones, if my memory failes me not.

2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of these is to be handled first, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the stating of the other, I should think no sober man would make question. Yet the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally censured by the consent of forraine Divines that assisted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himselfe, and his own carriage in this business. For he undertakes only the poynt of reprobation.

3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himselfe a strange liberty of discourse. We read and heare of no small stirres in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits; but I never read that the Jesuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cause of any uproare in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jesuits in Rome it selfe, wherein *Valentianus* through some heat in disputation, caught a feaver whereof he dyed within three daies after; of the relation whereof, made by one *Pet* (that had been a Priest) in Oxford I was sometimes an eare witnesse. The Jesuits were rather taxed for their herodoxy in the poynt *de auxiliis*, as *Petrus Matthæus* in his History reports it. And from D. *Jacksons* mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard should deliver upon the mention of *Molina* the Jesuit, namely, that he was the man, *qui tantos tumultus excitavit*, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Protestant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the stirre that was raised by *Huberus* in the Lutheran Churches, was neither caused nor occasioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. *Huberus* his cause was, a pertinacious standing for an universall Election. It seems he hath relation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongst the States only, and their particular, or provinciall congregations alone (as it seems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us consider, Who made those uproares, were they the Contra-Remonstrants, or the Remonstrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonstrants, let him prove it, least he be justly censured for one of those wild beasts, an Emperour was sometimes warned to beware of, they were the slanderers. If the Remonstrants were the authors of these uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chiefe cause of them, Were not those Arminians voluntary agents in those uproares? If they conceived their opposites doctrine to be unfound, could they not oppose it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Again, their opposites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till those daies? Or was there any uproare made thereupon, 'till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cause of an uproare, which hath no such consequent ensuing untill it meets with some turbulent spirits, which begin to stirre as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they stirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly so called, they conferred alike? But he saith it was the chiefe cause, and only saith it, yet *Molinæus* professing reprobation to proceed, upon foresight of finall impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonstrants professed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damne any man
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The Contra-Remonstrants willing

of ripe years, but for finall perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally cease or in part? But such criminations are nothing strange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked *Ahab* saluted the holy Prophet *Elijah*. *Art thou he that troubleth Israel?* but he spared not to answer him, *I am not he that troubleth Israel, but Thou and thy Fathers house*. In the like manner were *Paul* and *Silas* entertained *Act. 16. 20.* when being caught and brought before the Magistrates, heard such an accusation made against them, *These men which are Jewes trouble our city: and preach Ordinances which are not lawfull for us to receive, neither to observe, seeing we are Romans.* And no marvaile if the Devill roares, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdome is shaken. But because he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a tast of the violent proceedings in those parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. *Dordrac.* set forth by the authority of the States. And because uproares concern insurrections against government in Church or State; The first particular I observe of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after *Arminius* had been much suspected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain poynts which hitherto he had declined, saving in a false manner, his protestation in the issue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, sowed with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuse to subscribe the Confession of the Catechisme, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. *Pastores Arminii sententiam amplexi passim in Classibus recusabant mandato Synodi de subscriptione Confessionis, ac Catecheseos morem gerere.* Here we have the beginning of a manifest schisme. Now consider we the progresse hereof. Hereupon a resolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a Nationall Synode, in the yeare 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practices of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the space of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. *Arminius* himselfe acknowledgeth, *de Heterodoxia sua varios rumores omnes jam ecclesiis pervasisse, incendium a se suscitatum ipsa Ecclesia recta superare dici.* Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpose was, to call a Provinciaall Synode in October following, and signification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to *Arminius*, being admonished to manifest their considerations in their severall Deanaries, that so they might be fairely sent to the Synod that approached. They put this off also. *Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quoque, singuli consuetis tergiversationibus pariter hoc detestantur.* The like refusall was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themselves (for as for the Provinciaall Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they should give up their considerations within a Months space, or be obnoxious to Censure Ecclesiasticall. Hereupon was means made by *Utenbogard*, for letters from the States unto those Pastors, to send up unto them their considerations sealed, that so they might reserve them to the Provinciaall Synod shortly to be held. In these proceedings a man may easily smell *Barnavells* hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length *Arminius* his Declaration before the States. In answer whereunto *Gomar* riseth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongst other courses of *Arminius*, makes relation of this, as how *Spretus Synodorum Classium & Prebyteriorum iudiciis ac decretis ad supremi Magistratus tribunal prima instantia prosiluisse, ibique querelas atque accusationes suas adversus Ecclesiarum doctrinam proposuisse, artibusque aulicis favorem sibi Ecclesiis vero odium consiliare diligenter studuisse.* And hereupon besought the States, that seeing *Contentiones gliscerent, Ecclesia turbarentur, Civesque in partes distraherentur*, the Nationall Synod which they had promised might be gathered together with the first; which yet by the practice of *Utenbogard* and others was still delayed. Hereupon *Arminius* his Faction grew so bold, as publicly to Preach against the received Doctrine, as *Bertius* spared not to declare himselfe; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, because this Author drawes all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon *Bertius* declared himselfe, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, *De justificatione hominis coram Deo, De Prædestinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perseverantiâ fidelium*; and upon these very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between *Arminius* and *Gomar* before the States. And one *Venator* spared not publicly to broach *Pelagian* and *Socinian* errors. Whereupon he was suspended by the Churches of North-Holland. In spite of whom notwithstanding, he continued his courses of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Pastors in the Deanary of *Alomar* considering he was lawfully suspended, and withall

a man of impure life, refused to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by *Vtenbogards* practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they should admit him. Now when the States considering the present exigent, were easily like to condescend to a Provinciaall Synode, the Arminians moved, that the Deputies to be sent thither, should not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the usuall course, but only by the States, presuming hereby, that either none, but such as favoured their cause should be sent, or at least such as were lesse alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to passe, that the calling, not only of a Provinciaall Synode, but of the yearely Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, *Sine Magistratus Supremi autoritate magno numero. Atq; ibi inter se inita per subscriptionem nominum confederatione seu conspiratione; manifestum in Ecclesiis Reformatis Schisma instituunt.* That year came forth the Remonstrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonstrants, *Vorstius* is brought in to be a Professor in the place of *Arminius*. For as touching the exceptions taken against him, the Remonstrants professed before the States, he had given them good satisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practises for the removing of such Rectors from their Churches, as were their opposites, and obtruding upon the people such as were of their own Party. At *Almar*, *Adolphus Venator*, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Armes against the Magistrate, whereby he was driven to relinquish his place, and others brought in of *Venator* his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Pastors, the one having formerly executed his Ministry amongst them for fifty years continuance. *Grevincovius* in like sort, with the Magistracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there *Cornelius Geselius* of his Ministry first, and then by their Sergeants to cast him out of the City. *Vtenbogard* sends Remonstrants into Utrecht, and amongst others, *Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & seivum.* Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland also the ordinary and annuall Synodicall Assemblies were hindred by the practice of *Vtenbogard*, like as still they continued withall their art to hinder the calling of a Nationall Synod, so often promised by the States, and so many years deferred. *William of Nassau* moved both *Vtenbogard* on the one side, and *Festus Hommius* on the other side, to consider of a course how these stirres might be pacified. To which motion *Festus Hommius* makes answer, that in case the Remonstrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a course whereby some peace might be made in the interim, untill a Nationall Synod were gathered. This is the more observeable, because this Author layeth all the cause of those uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he professeth they had great cause to suspect the Remonstrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And these are afterwards declared to be these, Fol. 14. pag. 1. *De perfectâ Christi pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Justificatione hominis coram Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine salutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ.* And whereas, they desired the Remonstrants would deale clearly and make known what their opinion was in those poynts: *Vtenbogard* having laboured to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquisition amongst them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtaines of the States, that no such Declaration should be required at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synode by their continuall sollicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be most prejudiciall to their proceedings, they brought it so to passe, that like as formerly their Annuall Synods were hindered, so now it was forbidden to the Deputies themselves, thenceforth, to take any such stile unto them, or performe any such office as whereabout they were then employed. And so the Relator proceeds in setting downe their insolent courses untill at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Brittain, all for the most part, inclined to the convocation of a Nationall Synod, they fell plainly on, upon these desperate Counsellis openly professing that the calling of a Nationall Councell, would prove prejudiciall to the Majesty

and Liberty of the Provinces, manifesting themselves hereby utterly averse from such a course; which yet hath been most in use in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions arising in matter of Religion. I professe, I nothing affect to spend time in such searches and relations, I had rather imploy it another way, but you see I am driven unto it, to represent the unshamefaced condition of this Narration.

4. And whereas he saith, *It was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falshood*, it is apparent that the Remonstrants would very well have rested contented with a mutual toleration of one another in their severall waies. For when *Vienbogard* and *Festus Hommius* were to meet together, and treat upon some faire course of composition, *Vienbogard*, together with those of his side, professed they knew no other course for settling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; *Festus Hommius* and others with him on the other side, professed they knew no better course then convocation of a Nationall Synode, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themselves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themselves herein refusing to declare themselves, I have formerly shewed. And farther, in the pursuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther storied, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpose from some of the States. And consider farther, If any amongst us should rise up, and confederate themselves and impugne any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuse us for maintaining erroneous doctrine therein, and challenge us for falshood, if they doe it with never so open mouth, shall this be sufficient to justify them and condemne us, if wee doe not come to a tryall with them to dispute the case, though Wee are the Possessours, They the Intruders and Innovators? Wee maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority established amongst us, and They which impugne the doctrine received, are they not usually judged amongst us, as such who are rather to be censured then disputed with? And withall consider, that this *mutua tolerantia*, which the Remonstrants so much pressed and were so glad to enjoy, was with greatest instance stood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Lastly, how often was *Arminius* himselfe questioned and called upon to give satisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the first, Motion was made for his surrogation into the place of *Ju- nius* beind deceased, then the suspicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amsterdam not well likeing to let him goe from them, amongst whom at that time, he exercised his Ministry; and that because they observed his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an University: at length upon the great instance both of *Vienbogard* and *Arminius* himselfe, way was made for him unto the Chayre, upon condition he should conferre with *Gomarus* upon some chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all suspicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a solemne Protestation given his word, that in case he had any singular opinion of his own, he would not spread it. Hereupon he made open profession, that he condemned the chiefe Pelagian opinions concerning grace naturall, the strength of Free-will, Originall sinne, the perfection of man in this life, and Predestination, and that he approved all those disputes, which *Austin* and other Fathers had written against them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errors were rightly refuted by those Fathers, and withall promised, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Professors place in the University. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all suspicion of Heterodoxy in himselfe, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, *De satisfactione Christi, de Fide justificante, de justificatione per fidem, de Perseverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine salutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c.* all which he afterwards contradicted, as also did his Followers. This I say, he then at the first maintained publiquely, *contrâ sententiam suam* (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to say, against his own Conscience) and *Corvinus* is alleaged as in a certain Writing of his set forth in Low-Dutch ingeniously professing as much, *Prefat. in Synod. Dordracen, Autoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1.* But after he had been a yeare or two in the place, he begins to unmaske himselfe

himselfe, and by his Publique Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Schollers in private, his heterodoxy discovered it selfe. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are sent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he disliked ought in the doctrine received, he would sincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive satisfaction, or the whole businesse might lawfully be put over to the consideration of a Synod. *Arminius* his answer was, that he never gave any just cause, why such rumour should be spread of him, neither was it wisdom for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that should make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private persons, he refused not to conferre with them, provided that in case they differed, no relation hereof should be made unto a Synod. The Church of *Leyden* also admonished him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he answered he could not yeeld thereto, without leave from the Curators of the University, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by such a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Professors and Pastors with great earnestnesse, that if he had ought to say against the doctrine received in their Confession and Catechisme, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promising their endeavours to give him full satisfaction, or if not so, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a faire agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which passed between them should be divulged. The answer he made, was this, It was no wise part for him to yeeld to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the present meeting being not ordained unto any such purpose, fol. 5. p. 2. *Gomar* openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, *neq; ejusmodi subterfugis diutius hâc in re uti*, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he represents his continuall practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are these, *Quibus insuper artibus opiniones suas disseminare; Publicè scilicet ab Ecclesiis rogatum obtestatumq; sententiam suam occultare, privatim vero Pastoribus quos in eam pertrahi posse speraret, ac discipulis suis diligenter eam inculcare; argumenta Nostrorum præcipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa soleret exervare, Jesuitarum verò aliorumq; Adversariorum, quibus doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinæ receptæ Veritate dubitationes discipulorum animis ingerere, eandemq; cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quasi in æquilibrio suspendere, ac deinde prorsus rejicere, nullam hætenus sinceritatis ac consensus in doctrinâ, licet sæpius ab Ecclesiis amanter fraterneq; rogatum Declarationem edere voluisse.* Now let any indifferent person compare the carriage of *Arminius* the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonstrants, standing for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrays the greater distrust of the integrity of their Cause.

5. As for the easinesse of defending it, if it be not, or were not so in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the sifting of it, What is that to the purpose? Then who are they, who say it may so easily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who doe not acknowledge a great mystery in the divine providence. And from the daies of *Anselme* unto this present day, it hath ever been accounted (in my observation) a very difficult poynt to accord predestination divine, with the liberty of mens wills. But put the case it may easily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithstanding, if it be found harsh to mens affections, are they likely to admit it with such ease? I should think it ought to be put out of question, that *God hath mercy on whom he will*, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart, as also that *God hardeneth whom he will*, leaving their infidelity and hardnesse of heart uncured; yet when flesh and bloud riseth up against this doctrine thus, *Why then doth God complaine; (to wit, of mans disobedience) for who hath resisted his will?* And the Apostle addresseth hereunto no other answer but this, *O man who art thou who disputest with God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessell unto honour, another unto dishonour?* Is flesh and bloud, I pray, apt to rest satisfied with this?

Now as touching the two things I promised to adde, they are these.

1. I pray consider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciously pronounce

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

nounce sentence against himselfe. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promise he made unto you; and I pray consider how answerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controversies, as touching which he professeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles so much agitated between the Remonstrants, and the Contra-Remonstrants? Doe you not perceive how he makes choyce only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lye close as touching foure of them? What is this, but according to his language, *the coveting of corners*? And what willingnesse of abiding the tryall doth this manifest? Yet he pleaseth himselfe in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as *David* was when he offered himselfe to the Lords tryall, and thereupon advanceth himselfe to the greater liberty of censuring others, such as *Beza*, and *Musculus*, and their Fellowes, together with the Contra-Remonstrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himselfe, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his shaping, is voyd. This is an usuall course with those of his spirit, whereof I have had plentifull experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geese are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geese in comparison to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuseth to come to the light, (in his phrase) this is the censure he liberally bestowes upon his opposites. For though some of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of those, they are not so willing, but this young Master in Israel, out of the plerophorous conceit of his own integrity and sufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the rest alone. Yet I pray make the scales even, What instance can be given, I doe not say of *Beza*, *Musculus*, or any one of the Contra-Remonstrants, but of any one of the like condition to himselfe, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to shew the reasons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianisme, to the opposite opinions, hath carried himselfe, as this Author hath done, to give his reasons only on the part of one of them, and yet passeth his censure so prodigally on others for refusing triall, by the way implying, a glorious ostentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of service, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by prooffe from testimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein also as it were purposely, declines all those places, wherein the Scripture speaketh directly of election, predestination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly speaking hereof, he purposely declines, and yet he calls the places he insists upon, *pregnant testimonies*; and indeed so they are, but nothing at all to the purpose of predestination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvaile not he is so well conceited of his atchievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, sitting on a Cart-wheele, in a dry summers day, and saying, *See what a dust I make*. For, because he hath discharged himself so unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deale with *Beza*, or with any of the Contra-Remonstrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it soon appeare, *that Heresy and untruth condemnes it selfe* (this is the sweet accommodation he makes of that the Apostles *αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν*) to wit, by their refusing the touch-stone, and his readinesse backed with all sufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given so plentifull demonstration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with some Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, some reasonable motives, and wise carriages of the matter, but inspired him also with some martiall spirit, fit for any encounter, despising his Adversaries, as empty Schollers, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to speak boldly, and shew himselfe in the clear day, when such as *Beza* make choyce to walk in mists, and dwell in silence. Besides his care is very Apostolicall for the peace of the Church, whereas *Beza's* was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonstrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of these belike, have been so forward to shew themselves unto the World, and upon the stage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at least in the poynt of reprobation) no not *Beza* in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find these spirits exceeding busy; and I have been so happy (for so I account it, although I confesse my time might be farre more profitably bestowed) as to meet with some of their Mysteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lyons skinner, doe smell farre more of the Fox then of the Lyon.

2. The second is this, Why should their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in these particulars, as any Arminian whatsoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never shall. I heartily wish, time might serve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his *Examen*, his Conference with *Junius*, *Corvinus* his answer unto *Tilenus*, I have entered upon *Vossius* his Pelagian History. I desire I might have time and opportunity, for their *Synodalia Dordracena*, but most of all with the Jesuits; while I deale with them I learne somewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.

3. Let mee adde one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the seaventeenth is concerning Predestination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, should forbear to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in dispute, may we not justly plead, a faire conformity to the wisdom of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reason, why this author utterly pretermits the prosecuting his opinion concerning Predestination and election, to wit, least thereby he should fall foule upon the doctrine of our Church, so evidently set downe in that Article concerning the poynt of Predestination? The Church of Ireland content themselves, with the very forme of that 17th Article of ours concerning Predestination: Only they premise two Theses; the one whereof is this, *God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Councell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe, yet so, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the second cause is taken away, but established rather;* The other this, *By the same eternall Councell, God hath Predestinated some unto life, and Reprobated some unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increased nor diminished.*



DISCOURSE.

The Third Motive.

The Infamy of it.

IT is an Opinion (as it is maintained by the Supralapsurians) odious to the Papists, and opens their foule mouthes against our Church and Religion, and so abhorred (maintained either Way) by all the Lutherans, that for this very Tenent, they call us damned Calvenists, think us unworthy to be above ground, and in their Writings protest, that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists, then to us.

Sir Edwin Sands speaks of men, whom he commends for singular learning and piety, (whose opinion he so sets down, as he declares it to be his own) that they think it were no blemish for the Reformed Doctors to revive their doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) especially touching the eternall decrees of God, wherein some of their chief authors have runne into such an utter opposition to all the Romish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalized all other Churches withall, yea, and many of their own to rest very ill satisfied. *Relat. pag. 194, 198.*

At the closing up of the Conference at Mompelgard, when Frederick Earle of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge *Beza* and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands, they utterly refused it, saying, That they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of Brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty, *errorum teierimorum*, of most pestilent errors, of which they reckoned this for one. *Hemingsius* left his own side, and joyned with us in the poynt of the Sacrament, but would come no neerer to us, but maintained a distance in this. *Osiand. Hist. Eccles. pag. 1040. Colloq. Morn-pelg. pag. 566; 567.*

It is a Morfell, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; and therefore I think it would not down very easily with us, and without suspicion.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

Hist. 1. 5.

Annal.

1 Corinth. 4.
13.

Aft. 20

2 Cor. 6. 4, 8.

HIs third Topick place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongst Papists and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhorre it. But I pray consider, was not the doctrine of the Gospell infamous at the first, both amongst Jewes and Gentiles? What time the Jewes were the only people of God, how doth *Tacitus* out of his worldly wisdom brand them? Doth he not call them *Gentem teterrimam, Genus hominum inuisum Diis*? And as touching their religious Rites, marke what censure he passeth upon them, *Profana illic omnia, quæ apud nos sacra, rursus concessa apud illos, quæ apud nos incesta*, and comparing them with the Rites of Bacchus, saith, *Liber festos, lætosq; ritus posuit, Judeorum Mos absurdus sordidusq;*. And speaking of the Christians he calls them, *Genus hominum propter flagitia inuisum*. This censure he passeth upon them in the daies of holy *Paul*, who forbade them to doe evill that good might come thereof, and commands every soule to be subject to the Higher Powers, even then, when soules were at the best, and powers at worst. And see I pray what the King of Ashurs judgement was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jerusalem, in comparison to the Religions of their Nations, which were heathenish. *Isa. 10. 10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idolls, seeing their Idolls were above Jerusalem, and above Samaria*. So that of an heathenish Religion, he had a better estimation then of the Religion of the Jewes. Now if some Rabshakeh amongst them should turne heathen (for such a tradition, as I remember is received amongst the Rabbins, namely, that Rabshakeh was a Jew, but turned heathen) and afterwards endeavoured to entice the Jewes to doe as he did, and that because of the infamous nature of their Religion amongst heathens, how deserved such a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be stoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive daies of the Church, some Christian should turne Jew or Infidell, and practice to seduce others from the obedience of faith, representing unto them how every where it was contradicted, how Christ himselfe was counted a blasphemer, a forcerer, how the Gospell was a scandall to the Jewes, foolishnesse to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apostles, the world thought they did God very good service. Saint Paul himselfe professing of himselfe and his fellowes, *That they were made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things*. Did this infamy prevail with *Paul*, or any other holy servant of God, to remit any thing, in the maintenance of his Christian faith? Nay, doth he not professe, saying, *I passe not for these things, neither is my life deare unto me, so I may fulfill my course with joy, and the Ministrations that I have received to testify the Gospell of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themselves as the Ministers of God by honour and dishonour, by good report and evill report, as deceivers and yet true*.

Againe, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine should be well spoken of, by such as are opposites and adversaries thereunto? Suppose a rigid Lutheran should by Gods providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in justifying himselfe for the change of his Opinion, should represent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgement of Papists, and in the judgement of Calvinists; I pray consider, How in all likelyhood would this plea be entertained? Could he expect any better recompence hereof, then to be cast out of their Synagogues? Suppose a Papist should have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the poynt of justification, and, being demanded the reason of this change of mind in him, should answer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongst Lutherans and Calvinists is so great, and that such a morsell, which neither Lutherans nor Calvinists can swallow, should therefore (in his judgement) not down very easily with Papists, and without suspicion. Now let any indifferent Reader consider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongst Papists. Yet I mean not to quiet my selfe, or content my Reader with this parallell. Of that which he here delivers of Papists, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawne, for the credit of this assertion. Neither the

ther gives he any testimony of Lutherans, their calling us *damm'd Calvinists*, and though he had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdome of God for that? And I pray consider, is it not in our power to recompence them, and call them, *damm'd Lutherans*, if we list to recompence malice with malice, so to serve our own turnes? And all this is delivered by him without distinction of Papists, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jesuits; in like sort without all distinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part.

And first, as for Papists; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. *St Pauls* prayer was, *that they might be delivered from unreasonable men*. I think never Sect rose up more unreasonable then this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had dispatched a large discourse sent unto me from one of same Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads then one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papists. Another with whom I had to doe not long before, professeth in plain manner thus; *The Jesuits ten of them for one, favour the absolute irrespèctive decree, following herein as they think St Austin, but especially their St Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzzy zelots for the cause; of whose consent some amongst us are not ashamed to bragge*. If our irrespèctive decree, be so joyntly maintained by both Jesuits, and Dominicans, and that as they think according to *Austin*, how is it possible our doctrine herein, can be so odious to the Papists? Or what Papists doth he mean, if neither Jesuits nor Dominicans, nor any such as concur with either of them? Or if it be so odious unto them, as one Arminian Proselite professeth, how can it be so concordantly maintained by them, as another Arminian proselite avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papists, what will these Lutherans gaine, by uniting with Papists rather then with us, that is, with the Masters rather then with the Schollars. And if a Lutheran should be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to justify himselfe should plead; That we Calvinists are ready to protest, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predestination, we had rather unite our selves with Papists then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author most inconsiderately proposeth, as a poynt of very ponderous consideration?

But as touching Papists, their dislike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapsarian-way. And indeed that distinction of the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian-way, was brought in meerely to get thereby some more elbow roome. For if they agree with us in the poynt of Gods absolute and irrespèctive decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in stating the object of predestination to be *humanum genus nondum conditum*, will prove odious unto them; considering this is a meer Logically difference, as I have shewed in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei cap. 1. pag. 1. De Predestinatione digress. 1*. Yet as touching the Supralapsarian-way, that opinion is imputed unto *Junius* by *Arminius*, as also to *Thomas* and his Followers. *Collat. Armin. cum Jun. pag. 4.* and if so, how improbable is it, that such an Opinion should be so odious to the Papists, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And *Alphonſus Mendoza* spares not to professe, that supernaturalls were intended by God before naturalls; and his discourse hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spaine, and he was urged as himselfe professeth, to set it forth in Print. And the *Quatuor signa Francisci Mayronis* (mentioned by Mr Perkins *De Prædest. Modo & Ordine*) doe manifest that he took the same way; and these *quatuor signa*, *Franciscus Mayo* received from the doctrine of *Scotus*. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines different in this poynt, who yet neither hated one anothers doctrine nor persons for this difference; like as so it is amongst us, as in the place above mentioned I have shewed. Nay it is apparent, that *Junius* took upon him to reconcile all three opinions thereabouts, and *Piscator* after him, who also hath discharged his part herein, farre more clearely then *Junius*. And no marvail, *Junius* having first broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they desire, who are in love with error: All the question between these our Divines consists in this, Whether it were the will of God that *Adam* should fall by his permission; so to make way for Gods glorious ends, to wit, the manifestation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Sonne of God, as also in the way of mercy, in the salvation of some; and in the way of justice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapsarians maintaine, that such

was the will of God, least otherwise way should be made for the manifestation of Gods glorious works by accident, rather then by Gods providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapsarian way, had rather decline this nice poynt as difficult, then oppose it as odious. But say I, the doctrine wherein both Jesuits and Arminians doe agree, will abundantly serve us to justify us, in the positive and affirmative part of so nice a poynt as this. For by their doctrine of *Scientia Media*, God did foresee, that upon such an administration of his providence about *Adam* as was used, *Adam* would fall; and more then this, that God could have brought forth other administrations of his providence in very great variety, some whereof were such, that if God had used, *Adam* would not have fallen. Now being pleased to make use of such an administration of providence divine, upon the purpose whereof, he foresaw *Adam* would fall; and not being pleased to use such a providence, upon the purpose whereof, he had foreseen *Adam* would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifestly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, *Adam* should fall by his permission.

Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harsh then that of Gods determining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the substance thereof. Dares this author betray such ignorance, as hand over head to professe, that this doctrine is odious unto Papists? Whereas the most learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in expresse termes, whereas our Divines course is, to keep themselves to the phrase of Scriptures. And as for the Jesuits who oppose it, and in the place thereof bring in *Scientia Media*, and *Gratia Congrua*, shaped after the genius of *Scientia Media*. I can shew an expresse acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cause, that between the *Gratia predeterminans* of the Dominicans, and *Gratia congrua* of the Jesuits, there is no such materiall difference at all, but that the absolutenesse of predestination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other.

To conclude, I would this Author would be so wise, as once more to consult with his Oracle, and enquire, Whether Papists are more ready to joyne with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Christs Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the poynt of Reprobation, or of Gods concurrence. For suppose we held as *Suarez* is pleased to state our Tenent, namely, *Quod Deus omnipotentis voluntate nobis necessitatem imponat*; yet the same *Suarez* saith, that in this very poynt, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed ought, *Quod vel in re ipsa contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam superet*. I presume no Papist is so well conceited in the Lutheran doctrine in the poynt of Ubiquity.

From that which he affirms of Papists, I come to that which he affirms of Lutherans. And what one instance hath he given of any Lutheran, speaking against our making the corrupt Masse the object of predestination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir *Edwin Sands*, nor out of *Ofander*; Nay what cause is there, why either Papist or Lutheran should, in case the object thus stated (or in a more rigid forme of the Masse Uncorrupt) doth no way constrain us to maintaine, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of sinne; no nor to maintaine, that God doth intend the salvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, in finall perseverance in faith and repentance, provided God suffer him, to live untill the use of reason, as I have shewed, and endeavoured to justify, and make appeare, in my *Vindic. Grat. Dei*, in the digressions concerning Predestination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintaine, that God did intend to damne any man but for sinne; Neither doe I maintaine, that God intended to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principall, reall (not verball only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about Gods bestowing of faith and repentance, and his purpose thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foresight whereof it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto some, and denyes it unto others. When *Tossanus* makes relation of *Hunnius* his exposition of that place Acts 13. 48. *Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam*, thus, *id est, qui sese ordinaverant & disposuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum*; * *Hunnius* in his refutation of *Tossanus* his *Theses*, cites *Tossanus* to appear before the tribunall seat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to shew in what place of his writings, this is

* *Et illud fide amplectendum.*

to be found, professing that such doctrine is the very Pelagian Heresy, and that himselfe never approved it, but disproved it rather, and most constantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known so absurd, as to say, that God worketh in us, *nō Velle credere, modo Velimus?* Yet this doctrine I can shew in expresse termes delivered by an Arminian. But come to the consideration of the instances proposed by him.

The first is the Relation of Sir Edwin Sands. And I remember well to have read in him somewhat concerning the *Predestinary Pestilence*, so called by some. And I might wonder at this Authors wisdom, in premitting that passage; but upon search finding it about Fol. 59. though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceased to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cause to commend his wisdom therein, although it expresseth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readinesse to returne to the Papacy rather then to admit that *Predestinary Pestilence*. For *predestinary pestilence* goeth not here alone, but is joyned with the *Sacramentary pestilence*. For these two poynts, saith he, are the ground of the quarrell; but he addes I confesse, that the *Predestinary pestilence* was more scandalous at that day then the former. Yet the same Author professeth Fol. 73. of the Lutherans, that if he fetch an elle forwards one way, for an elle he looeth another way, it is only by a kind of boysterous force and violence against the Calvinists, as in *Strasbourg* of late. And the reason hereof he takes to be in part the Absurdities of the *Ubiquitary Chimera*. And as for the passage here alleaged, I find it about Fol. 86. Wherein I consider, First that the speculative opinions he speaks of are not about the eternall decrees of God only, or especially above all others, as here by cunning carriage it is pretended. For the words runne thus; *It can be no blemish to them to revise their Doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, especially touching the eternall decrees of God, the quality of mans nature, the use of works, wherein some of their chiefe Authors have come to such an utter opposition, &c* So that the poynts of rigorous doctrine, which were to be qualified in this Gentlemans judgement, are many, but especially three; The first whereof is touching the eternall decrees of God, The second concerning the quality of mans nature, The third concerning the use of Works: So that the doctrine of Gods eternall decrees is not the poynt alone, the rigour whereof especially is to be qualified in this Authors judgement, but this especial care of qualification, is by him referred to the three poynts formerly mentioned, and that indifferently. Secondly, Whereas this Author relates, that this is delivered, not as out of the relators judgement only, but as out of the judgement of men whom he commends for singular learning and Piety. I find no such matter in the Relation that I have, though I have searched after it, both by considering what went before, and what comes after, as farre as he treats of the same matter. Whether this comes in a second Edition I know not: in mine I find no such thing. So that the weight of this motive hitherto, lies wholly upon the authority of this Gentleman. And surely I should think it were nothing hard to counterballance this authority to the full. And it may be he speaks herein no other thing then wherein he was indoctrinated by his Tutor, as lately an ingenious and grave divine, differing from us in the poynt of reprobation, most ingeniously acknowledged, that he was brought into that opinion of his by his Tutor, who was a Lutheran: And I doubt we have too many such amongst us. Of late I have heard, that one of good place spared not openly to professe, saying, *Call us as we ought to be called, for we are Lutherans*: I would wee had not too many Popish-hearted amongst us.

Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviseth us to revise the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to Gods eternall decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigour of some mens opinions thereabouts. For whereas some have subordinated Gods decree of permitting sinne, to the decree of damnation, I have taken another course, and doe maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting finall perseverance in sinne. Again, I presume this Gentlemans meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching Gods eternall decrees. I willingly professe, I desire no better triall of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, set forth in the daies of King James

The Contra-Remonstrants willing

Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth bestow faith and repentance on some, thereby to cure that naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his meer pleasure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding some morall difference or preparation in one more then in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he shall acknowledge, that God doth shew his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his meer pleasure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to professe, that let him state Gods eternall decrees after what manner he will, I shall willingly subscribe thereunto; provided it be suitable unto the former ground: and as for the unsuitable nature thereof, if in case it so fall out, let the prooffe and evident demonstration thereof, lye on mee. But if his opinion be, that God bestowes faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by some morall preparation, which he finds in one, rather then in another, I appeale to the Lutherans themselves, whether this be not in plain termes no better then Pelagianisme.

As for his calling their opinions in this poynt, speculative opinions (as this Author would have us observe) I am willing to observe it: and withall I think, he doth it with better judgement, then this Author doth in calling them practicall.

And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into these opinions of theirs, *in opposition to Popish Doctrine*, This is so out of season in these daies (notwithstanding the raw judgement of this Author) that our Arminians spare not to professe (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have learned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papists. And *Grevinovicus*, against *Amesius*, spares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit follow the Jesuits, then Wee the Dominicans, considering that the Dominicans are the great Administrators of the Inquisition in Spaine. This is delivered as touching the poynt of grace and Free-will: but as touching the poynt of election and reprobation absolute, I can shew under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no materiall difference between the Dominicans, and most part of the Jesuits; so little difference there is between the *Gratia Prædeterminans* of the one, and the *Gratia Congrua* of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we scandalize the judicious and learned Papists; and what those other Churches are which we scandalize, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Author knows not, or is well content to dissemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socinians and Anabaptists. And how doe we more scandalize the Churches Lutheran herein, then they scandalize us? Was it ever known, that by meer differing in Opinion from other Churches, Christian men were said to scandalize them? Or if it were so, must not the scandall in this case, be equall on both sides?

As for the leaving many of our own very ill satisfied, why should that seem strange? What doth *Carrier* write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the same mind with himselfe, some Papists, some Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongst the Lutherans, as ill satisfied with the doctrine commonly received amongst them, save that they are farre more forward, to excommunicate all such, as soon as they appeare, then Wee? Besides all this, The poynt of scandall is brought in very unseasonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and professe, if any are scandalized by it, it is a scandall taken, not given: God forbid we should grow so profane, as to account it a scandalous thing to make profession of Gods truth; especially this truth we maintain being so neere to a cleare opposition to Pelagianisme, a Heresy condemned by the Church above 1200 years agoe.

When *Frederick Duke of Woortenberg* exhorted his Divines to acknowledge *Beza*, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The answer of refusall was made by *Jacobus Andreas* a most bitter enemy, and one whom *Beza* describes, *tanquam virum sanguinarium*, and his carriage throughout was most imperious. And it becomes an Arminian spirit well, to make the rancour of his malicious heart, a rule whereby to cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a farre better grace might a Papist cry down our faith, opposite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Popes abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit
of

of hell. For surely it is fit he should be of farre more authority then *Jacobus Andreas*; not to speak of the Anathematization of it in the Councell of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papists, in that they deny that we can be saved, many amongst us are of opinion, that a Papist can be saved, therefore better to be a Papist then a Protestant; yet surely it is in the power of our corruption to requite malice with malice, and as much to scorne with our heeles their Brotherhood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we doe not give our selves leave to requite their malice, if that be no scandall to themselves; there is no cause why it should be any scandall unto us. In *Sir Edwin Sands* about Fol. 59. there is such a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker sides in those parts both of Palgrave and Landsgrave, have with great wisdom and judgement (to asslack those flames) imposed silence on that poynt, to the Ministers of the one Party, hoping that the charity and discretion of the other sort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwise, that Lutheran Preachers rage hither-to in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that seeing there was so little charity and discretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Conclusions, to shew as little charity and discretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they fashion to themselves, will bear them out in this, it beeing meerely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to say in answer hereunto.

The phraze in *Osiander* is not, *errorum terribiliorum*, but *haereson terribiliorum*, of which this Author saith, they reckoned this for one. And let him speak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denyall of Consubstantiation another? As also the denyall of the lawfulness of that Baptisme, which was administred by Woemen; (the practice whereof King *James* reformed in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As also their not concurrence with them in opinion about the Person of Christ, which by their *Ubiquitary Chimera* (as *Sir Edwin Sands* call it) they doe miserably deforme. These and other such like were the errors, whereof this Author saith, *Beza* and his Fellowes were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for so I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby sentence *tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis*; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predestination alone, but of *de Cænâ Domini, de Personâ Christi, de Imaginibus, de Baptismo*, and last of all *de Prædestinatione*.

Yet I have not done with this. For I beseech you consider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miserably deceived in all this, and that these *terribiliorum Haereson* are not such as *Jacobus Andreas* with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of *Beza* and his Brethren, but rather such as *Beza* and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lutherans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, in *Scriptis*, so goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; *Jacobus Andreas* not enduring to give way to *Beza's* motion as touching the consigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the relation in *Osiander* runs thus; *Ad hæc D. Jacobus respondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Beza & ipsius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternitatis praebeant non ignorare illos quàm horribilium errorum & terribiliorum haereson in suis Scriptis coram Ecclesiâ ipsos reos egerint; Ideo, se mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatis Haereses ab Orco revocent ut Ecclesiâ Dei obtendant.* Now these words though at first sight they may seem to be referred, either to the *Woortenbergers* as accusing *Beza* and his Brethren, of such errors and heresies; yet the words following, *Ideo, se mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatis Haereses ex Orco revocent*: these words I say doe farre more incline to signify, that *Beza* and his Brethren, laid these horrible errors and heresies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans wondered, how they could desire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted such horrible Heretiques; rather then the Lutheran party, should wonder how they should affect Brotherhood with *Beza*, seeing they neither did affect any such, and if they had it was not fit they should wonder at their own actions. But that which follows puts it out of all question; where comes in manifestly, what the Lutheran Party conceived of the Doctrine of *Beza* implying thereby, what *Beza* and his

The Contra-Remonstrants willing&c.

Fellowes conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expressed; the words following are these, *Contra verò in quibus & quàm tetris erroribus ipsi versentur* (that is Beza and his company) *hac Collatione iis demonstratum esse: In quibus cum adhuc perseverent ipsos intelligere quòd eos pro fratribus agnoscere non possint.* In which words *Andreas* gives the reason why he and his Fellowes cannot acknowledge *Beza* and his fellowes for brethren, because they maintained, *tetros errores* (as he calls them;) for proöfe whereof he appeales to the present Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very first word, *Contra verò*, it followeth, that in the former part was set down, the reason why *Beza* and his fellowes, should not desire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, because they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained *horribile errors and most pestilent Heresies*, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this present Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearly the meaning of *Andreas*, it is apparent, that the charge laid by *Beza* and his fellowes, upon the Lutherans, was of fouler crimes, by *Andreas* his relation, then was the charge laid by *Andreas* upon *Beza* and his Brethren. For *Andreas* charged *Beza* only with, *errores tetros*; but *Beza* and his are said to have charged the Lutherans with *horribiles errores, & hæreses terribiles*. So that this Author doth miserably mistake his own evidences, and shamefully abuseth himselfe first, and others after him, if they will be abused by him. And whether he hath not taken it from some *Achates* of his upon trust I know not; and if it be so that some *Achates* hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved *Fidus Achates* in this.

In the close, it will not be amisse to shew, how Mr *Mason* of *St Andrews Vnderbasi* in *London*, alleageth this carriage of *Jacobus Andreas*, as a testimony of the Lutheran uncharitableness, in comparison with the charitable condition of their opposites, in a small Treatise of Contentment in Gods gifts. pag. 19. And shall their uncharitableness plead for the truth of their way, or be any just argument, of the untruth of our way, in any sober and wise mans judgement.

Of *Hemingsius* his leaving his own side, I never heard or read before, unlesse that of a Papist he became a Protestant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and these are called by the other *Semi-Calviniani*. And what I pray hath *Hemingsius* deserved, that his authority should be greater then the authority of *Zuinglius*, *Calvin*, *Junius*, *Zanchius*, *Piscator*. The Lutherans themselves (I suppose) will hardly think him worthy to be remembered the same day with *Martin Luther*. And as for *Martin Luther*'s doctrine herein, to my judgement, he is farre more expresse and resolute then *Calvin*, and I find that *Beza* in his Conference of *Mompelgard*, doth sometimes twit his opposites with *Luthers* Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I doe not find they answer any thing at all.

When he saith, It is a Morfell, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; What a wild course doth he take in these his Motives. Must we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the most part of Christian Churches doe embrace it yea or no? Why should wee not then runne out in this our search, and enquire, what is the Moscoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Æthiopian, and Abyssine, and so proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preached unto our people also, to their more profound, and substantiall edification, if they list to believe us upon our word. But I suppose he looked no farther then to this Westerne World, secluding the new discoveries within the last hundred years or somewhat more. And very confidently he must exclude all Popish Churches, or presume they are for him in this. Yet as I said, the very last Arminian, I have had to deale with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papists; and another to this purpose, there is no materiall difference between the *Gratia Congrua* of the Jesuits, and *Gratia prædeterminans* of the Dominicans. And secluding Popish Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greatest part of the Christian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Party, then the Churches of the Calvinists (which is more then I find in *Sir Edwin Sands* his Relation.) Now suppose the number of the Calvinists and their power were greater then that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reasonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turne Calvinist?

Calvinist? If it be of no weight to perswade them, why should it be of any moment to prevail with us?

I come now to the Fourth and last of these Motives.



DISCOURSE.

The Fourth Motive.

*Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errors
of the Stoicks and Manichees.*

THe Opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determined, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Starres, which raigned at mens births, or by the Concatenation of naturall things, and the disposition of the first matters of all things, being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another as it doth, and the *Materia Prima* being so disposed; that all things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even *invito Deo*, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they be.

The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evill actions by an Evill God, who was the *primum principium mali*, the first and principall author of all evill things that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the absolute decree, doe say one of these two things; either that all actions naturall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary, or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, sith, *Omnis actio est propter finem*, All actions are done for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.

Now in these three Opinions, we may note two things.

1. The substance and formality of them, which is, an unavoidable necessity of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be; In this all of them agree; and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and insuperable necessity doe domineere. And therefore *Melancthon* doth not slack in many of his common Places, to call this absolute decree, *Fatum Stoicum*, *Tabulas Parcarum*, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks errors, as we may see in a certain Epistle of *Melancthon* to *Penter*, where he speaks thus, *Scribit ad me Latius de Stoico Fato usque adeo litem Genevæ moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Misera Tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.* And *Beza* too speaking of *Melancthon* saies, *Philippus de his rebus ita scribere cepit, ut Geneveses quasi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videatur.*

2. The Circumstances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or first matter, the Manichees from *duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna*, and these last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, so that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive the necessity of evill actions, or unhappy events from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to their error.

If it be so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute reprobation be suspected, because these dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Commonwealth, nor so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, but because it made all things and events necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my Reasons of the first sort.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

OUR Doctrine I see is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but also as Stoicall, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coördinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet observes to fall out sometimes, namely, that,

Accedit fervor capiti numerusq; lucernis.

It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr *Bastard* sometimes told my good friend D. *Hoskins*, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr *Bastard* as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his sight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort: True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoicall, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of *Austin*, many hundred years agoe. This

*Prosper. Epist.
ad Ruffin.*

Prosper testifies after *Austins* death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. *Proui sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunaq; repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium penitus submovere & sub gratiae nomine necessitatem predicare fatalem.* Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers passages; as *Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5.* Sub nomine, inquit, gratiae ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini inspiraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere. This is the objection; His Answer followeth in these words. *Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.* And cap. 6. *Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quisq; vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solum actus & eventa, verum etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei vero gratia non solum omnia sydera & omnes celos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona vero per indebitam gratiam misericordiae voluntate largitur: utrumq; faciens non per stellarum temporale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altumq; consilium. Neutrum ergo pertinere videmus ad Fatum.* And cap. 8. *Jam de Gratia & Fato quam inania loquuntur ostendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertire, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitatus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum.* In like sort, the Pelagians charged *Austin* with Manicheisme, *De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3.* to whom he answereth thus, *Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, atq; ut nefario vocabulo terras imperitos, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Heretici, fiant Manichaei.* And more at large, *Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2.* *Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium naturarum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utroq; redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo instituta negetur ulla creatura; & contra Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perditam requiratur humana natura.*

2. *Manichaei carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed naturale sit, bonum insuper laudant. Catholica utroq; redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utriq; permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem predicare.*

3. *Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam*

etiam hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum, arbitrium ad faciendum præceptum bonum. Catholica utroq; redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & istis dicens, si vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.

4. Manichæi dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturæ malæ commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam justam non quidem particulam, sed creaturam Dei, etiam in istâ corruptibili viâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utroq; redarguit, Manichæis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, si dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, nosmetipsos seducimus. His morbis inter se contrariis Manichæi Pelagianiq; configunt dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, seperati opinione diversâ, sed propinqui mente perversâ. Jam verò gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, Baptismum ejus simul evacuunt, Carnem ejus simul inhonorant, sed etiam hoc modis causisq; diversis. Nam Manichæi meritis naturæ bonæ, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonæ perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus servorum suorum. Utrisq; ergo merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum.

But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Predestination.

1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the starres, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a shew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. *Deutr. 4.*) no marvail if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As *Austin* saith, *De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1.* *Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi consuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vimpositionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur.* But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus distinguish, but by their *Series Causarum*, they comprehended all causes celestiall or sublunary. *Ramus* indeed conceived such a difference between *Possidonius* and *Chrysippus* both Stoicks, but *Turnebus* makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. *Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiæ oblectatum, Fatum syderibus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam si in simul ægotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & cæli constitutione & affectione, non tamen idcirco in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat.* Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoicks, *Fatum* was God himselve and nature; and that by *Fatum* they understood, *omnem naturæ contagionem*, which was *Cicero's* phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per *contactum*, which *Cicero* called *Naturæ contagionem*. And he proves as much of *Possidonius* out of *Cicero De Divinatione*. For *Quintus* therein professing according to the opinion of *Possidonius*, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of *Cicero's* second Book of Divination shewes, that whereas *Possidonius* his opinion was, *Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quæ tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere.* He concludes thus; *Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturæ conjunctionem, ordinem seriemq; causarum permanere credidisse.* *Idem Possidonius* (saith he.) *παλμυρον διώνισμα* scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum *Fatum* esse sensisset. And like as *Possidonius* did not insist only in the starres, for the confirmation of Fate, so neither did *Chrysippus* in inferior causes. *Necessitatem naturæ acutus interpret* (he taxeth *Ramus*) *ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem errore cumulaisti.* Nam nec *Possidonius* in solis astris *Fatum* ponebat sed in totâ naturæ contagione, ut *suprà* docui: & *Chrysippus* in eadem naturæ contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of *Cicero* answering *Chrysippus* in this manner. *Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sic affectio astrorum valeat, sive ad quasdam res; ad omnes certe non valebit.* *Chrysippum enim alloquitur* (saith *Turnebus*) *ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis.* Thus he disciplines *Ramus*, and proceed farther, saying, *Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum posuisse, audi ex Cicero; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c.* Nihil istud argumentum (thus *Turnebus* concludes herehence) nisi etiam in astris *Fatum* poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by *Ludovicus Vives* in 4. lib. *August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8.* and that out of *Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos*; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of causes

ses necessary knit together, the Third the *Starres*, the Fourth the *Execution of Divine Decree*. I say all these make but one *Fatum* with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of *Turnebus*. And *Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8.* expressly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted *Fatum* in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to passe in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in *Austin*, nor in those that comment upon him, *Ludovicus Vives* and *Coqueus*, nor in *Ramus* or *Turnebus*; but rather to the contrary in *Ludovicus Vives*, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of *Plato*, as touching one God whom he made *Principem Parentemq; ceterorum*; the *Ceteri* belike were such spirits as wee call Angels. And that *Maximi Dei leges* were *inevitabiles*, and this was called Necessity, and such a Necessity, *cui ne Deos quidem* (that is inferior spirits) *resistere posse. Quæ verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labore queant, in quâ sita est Fortuna. Quæ verò certis causis progredierentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamē necessitatem non afferat electioni.*

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evil: and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill, and not such as accrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. *Daneus* hath commented upon *Austin de Hæresibus*, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errors of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, *Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nobis à naturâ ipsâ insitam, non rebellionē nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedienciâ natam; Quamquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant.* And where *Austin* answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shewed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes.

2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now addresse my selfe. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.

The First whereof is this; *That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewise, are absolutely necessary.*

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in *Essendo*, in being, or in *Operando*, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation *ad extra*, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Sonne. But *ad extra* this necessity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and starres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes to passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restraints their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore *Durand* professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily, doe indeed come to passe meereley contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come

to passe; like as upon supposition, that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to passe; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe, by ratiōall agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency, *Aquinas* and *Scotus* concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; *Scotus* relates it into the will of God as a free agent. *Aquinas* resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the producing of necessary things necessarily, and agents ratiōall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that *Josias* should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that *Cyrus* should proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether *Josias* and *Cyrus* did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. *Exod.* 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, *Neceſse est*, of some things coming to passe, which yet came to passe as contingently and freely, as ought else. And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will *Ephes.* 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselſe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with *Vorstius* shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as tō be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I allege the 11th Article of Ireland for this? *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.* There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall believe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with o-

The Absolute Decree

pen face professe, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supream ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them professe, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they professe, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these? If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with error then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as appointed by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and muffled, or veyled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word *unalterable*, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, *In vaine is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined*. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally seeking after *Summum bonum*, after happineffe. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guesse to be, his finall perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

some

some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth, and that *after the same way*. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes? especially considering that God hath more wisdom and goodnesse to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodnesse is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discouraging of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotes no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madnesse is it to say, that the lesse power God hath of receiving change, the lesse power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? *Rogers* in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected thence, in this forme, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, *Those wrangling Sophisters*, saith he, *are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, doe say, that God he did not in the time long agoe past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.*

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shamefull an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, saith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase *Freedome in actions*. For by freedome we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unlesse God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unlesse these determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to say, unlesse we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationally; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uselesse on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying *Omnis actio est propter finem*. This altogether concerns the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concerns the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himselfe, are either supream or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himselfe intends. The supream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make straight steps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying of God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must goe on, in conforming our selves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I

The Absolute Decree

not beleieve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath *rationem Boni*, which surely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidable-nesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undecidable Fates, and insuperable necessity doe domineere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbear the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, some of them at least, (though *Austin* delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much lesse doe I find by them, that any thing came to passe, *invito Deo*. Though I willingly confesse, that such a generation hath risen up in these daies, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, *invito Deo*, if this be not, I willingly professe I know not.

But *Melancthon*, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, *Fatum Stoicum*, *Tabulas Parcarum*, and to charge the Church of Geneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks errors, as appears by *Melancthons* Epistle to *Peucer*, and *Beza's* confession in the life of *Calvin*. To all which I answer.

1. That this Author either was better read in *Melancthon* then in *Luther*, or no so just matter could he find in *Luther*, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods decrees.

2. *Beza* reports what *Melancthon* seems to some, and that Epistle of his to *Peucer* might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon *Lælius* his relation, which was this, *De Stoico Fato usq̃, adeo licet Geneva moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Leone differret*. This I say is *Lælius* his relation made unto *Melancthon*, whereupon *Melancthon* saith no more then this, *O Misera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur*.

3. *Melancthon* died foure years before *Calvin*, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did passe any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in *Calvins* daies, many years before his death. Now *Calvin* and he were very great: *Melancthon* so well known and esteemed by *Calvin*, that more then once he appeals to *Melancthons* judgement. Once in the point *De Cænâ Domini*, mentioned by *Ofiander*, *Hist. Eccles. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666.* which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the poynt of Free-will and Predestination, as appears by *Calvins* Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, *de Libero Arbitrio*, which he sent unto *Melancthon*: Was it ever known that *Melancthon* passeth any censure upon them?

4. When *Grotius* in like manner objected *Melancthon*, see I pray how *Lubbertus* answereth him, *In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras si ipsam stare pro Remonstrantibus existimas, &c.* Idem *Melancthon* in 9. ad Romanos, *Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civiliter vivebant quam nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo opera non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillenur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc memineris Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere,*

Non

Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (saith Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de prædestinatione sensisse. Fatetur hoc ipse Melancthon ad Calvinum; suo (inquiens) hæc cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt παρτέρεα, & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmus: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to shew, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Prædestination. Calvinus, saith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, atq; inde infert illos perire non posse. Melancthon verò a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quòd sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & serîo resipisco, ergo sum electus: atq; ita in ipsâ se consentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvinus approbat Melancthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.

5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of Melancthon unto Calvin, I could not rest satisfied untill I had seen the Epistle it selfe: at length I found it amongst Calvins, Epist. 49. Therein coming to the poynt, *Ad Quæstionem (saith he) de prædestinatione habebam amicum Tubingæ doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere solebat, se utrumq; probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se hæc conciliare non posse. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthon also: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give Calvin to understand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of Gods providence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods prædestination with the liberty of mans will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he saith, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo (saith Alvarez) doctissime & piissime loquitur. Melancthon goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, saith he, cum Hypothesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, postea contingentiam in hac nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem sentio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse eum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actionem. All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately then this, He denyes it not: Hæc etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur. In the same manner he goes on, Accusamus ipsi nostram voluntatem cum labimur, non queramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus Μόνον θέλοντων (inquit Basilus) & θεός πρὸς ἡμᾶς παύει. Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so expressly professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bonæ agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium voluntatis: & Fulgentius Epist. 4. Ab ipso (Deo) est initium bonæ voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Bishops prevaile in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodical Epistle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanæ voluntatis expectat sed ipsam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I doe not write these things (saith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most expert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things doe agree with yours, hæc cum tuis congruere sed sunt παρτέρεα, woven with a thicker thred, & ad usum accommodata. Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books sent unto him, and written of Free-will and Prædestination.*

5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particulars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of Calvins, and the words are these. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quæstionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sententiæ nostræ congruerent. Tamen si enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re tamen ipsâ optime inter nos convenit.

The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their necessity from the Starres or first matter; The Manichees from the two supream causes; And the Authors of the

third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the error.

To this I answer.

1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of punishment? Is there any evill in the City, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it lesse become him to be the author of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner professe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?

Amos 2.
Ier. 9. 24.

2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turne in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expressly professeth, *Heb. 13. 20.*) or to permit any particular evill, we willingly professe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth consequently that *necesse est*, that such a thing come to passe; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, contingently and freely. And this *Arminius* in plain termes professeth in the poynt of evill, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; *Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum*, *Exam. pag. 153.* But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evill comes to passe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evill actions, a necessity that binds the Lord himselfe.

1. As touching the first, These words of *Arminius* are well known, *Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere*. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of *scientia Media*: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeeth by what motives sinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdom, hath such store of morall impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sinne if it pleased him. His words are these, *Præter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientie & potentie promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur*. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sinne, and impediment effectuell. Effectuell is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuell, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuell. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe by his permission? Like as the Scripture is expresse to this purpose, as where it is said, that *Herod* and *Pontius Pilate* with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counsell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no lesse then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. *Acts 4. 28.* And *Revel. 17. 17.* God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regall power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.

2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to passe. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of nature,

nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them pass out of the condition of things meerly possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things meerly possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have existence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, *Extra Deum*, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confesse, that including the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concur with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhorre. Nothing remains to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futuration of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confesse in expresse termes, that Gods will is the cause thereof: But if they say the divine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheisticall opinions, that these Arminians doe improvidently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, *God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.*

In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was *Zeno* himselfe honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and vertuous conversation? Hath not *Erasmus* delivered it, as out of the mouth of *Hierome*, that *Secta Stoicorum* was *Secta simillima Christiana*? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supream God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himselfe a necessary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of *Ambrose* concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, *Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio*. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, *Nullo libertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio*.

And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteemes convincing.



THE SECOND PART
OF THE
FIRST BOOK,
Wherein are Examined
those Arguments against the Absoluteness of
DIVINE
REPROBATION,
WHICH
M^R HORD
Took to be of a
CONVINCING NATURE.



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M. D. C. LIII.



The Second Part of this Discourse, consisting of
 ARGUMENTS CONVINCING,
 whereof there are Five sorts.

*The First sort of Convincing Reasons
 Drawn from Scripture.*

D I S C O U R S E.

S E C T. I.



HOSE of the Second sort, by which for the present I stand convinced, that absolute reprobation is no part of Gods truth, are drawn from these five following heads,

1. Pregnant Testimonies of Scripture directly opposite unto it.
2. Some principall attributes of God not compatible with it.
3. The end of the Word and Sacraments, with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
4. Holy and pious endeavours much hindered by it, if not wholly subverted.
5. The grounds of comfort, whereby distressed consciences are to be relieved, are all overthrown by it.

It is contrary to pregnant places of Scripture, even in *terminis*, as will appeare by these instances. Repugnant to Scripture.

1. *Ezech. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but that the wicked turne from his waies and live.* And least men should say 'tis true, God wills not the death of a repenting sinner, the Lord doth in another place of the same Prophet, extend the proposition to them also that perish, *Ezech. 18. 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth.* In this Scripture we may note three things.

1. Gods affection to men set forth { 1. Negatively, *I have no pleasure in his death that dyeth.*
2. Affirmatively, *But that the wicked turne.*
2. The persons in whose destruction he delighteth not, wicked men, such as for the rejecting of grace dye and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much lesse in the death of men, either altogether innocent, or tainted only with originall sinne.
3. The truth of this affection, *as I live; cupit sibi credi* (saith *Tertullian, Lib. de penit. cap. 4.*) God would faine have us to believe him, when he saith I will not the death of him that dyeth, and therefore he bindes his speech with an oath: *O beatos nos quorum causa Deus jurat, O miserrimos si nec juranti Domino credimus.* Happy are we for whose sakes the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare, but most unhappy if we believe him not when he swears. Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation: for such a kind of decreeing men to everlasting death, is quite opposite to a delight in mens eternall life.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

TO say that this or that opinion is untrue, because it doth *in terminis* contradict places of Scripture, is a very superficial consideration: yet it is not the first time that I have found it to drop from an Arminians penne: But that it is a very superficial consideration, I prove thus; For to deny God the Sonne to be equall to the Father, is *in terminis* to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, *Phil. 2.* Where it is expressly said of God the Sonne, that he thought it no robbery to be equall to the Father: yet notwithstanding it is agreeable to that of our Saviour, where he saith, the Father is greater then I; and so *vice versâ*. In like manner to say that God cannot repent, is *in terminis* to contradict pregnant places of Scripture: again to say that God can repent, is *in terminis* to contradict other as pregnant places of Scripture; yet neither of these is unsound; because each phrase is agreeable to Scripture in some place or other. And the reason hereof is, because *in terminis* only to contradict the Scripture, is not to contradict the Scripture; But when we contradict the meaning of Scripture, then and not till then, are we justly said to contradict the Scripture; And the reason hereof is, because the word of God consists not in the outward barke or bone of the letter, but in the inward pith and marrow of the meaning. And as for contradiction unto Scripture *in terminis*, it may easily be proved, that to deny Gods delight in the destruction of obstinate sinners, is to contradict a very pregnant place of Holy Scripture, as namely *Prov. 1. 24, 25, 26.* *Because I have called and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have set at naught all my counsell, and would none of my reproofe: I will also laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your feare cometh; when your feare cometh as desolation, and your destruction as a Whirlewind.* And yet never a whit the more, is any contradiction found in Scripture for this: because though they contradict each the other *in terminis*, yet there is no contradiction if we consider the true meaning: As for example, it is both true that the Father is greater then the Sonne, as touching the Sonnes Manhood; And the Sonne equall to the Father as touching his Godhead. So of repentance, it cannot be attributed to God as it signifies change of mind or counsell; but it may be attributed unto God, as it signifies change of sentence; according to that of Gregory, *Deus mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam.* So as touching Gods pleasure or delight in the death of a sinner, as it is the destruction of the creature he delighteth not in it; but as it is a just punishment of the impenitent creature, he delights therein: Thus *Piscator* reconciles it, on *Ezech. 18. v. 23, & 32.* Surely God delights in the execution of justice, as well as in the execution of mercy, as *Jer. 9. 24.* *I am the Lord which exerciseth loving kindnesse, judgement, and righteousness in the earth, for in these things I delight saith the Lord.*

2. Here first, the Author declines from the former phrase, of having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, to *not willing* the death of a sinner; which phrases have no small difference, as *Piscator* observes upon that in *Ezech. 33. 11.* for saith he, *potest homo velle id quo non delectatur, ut egrotus potest velle potum amarum, quo non delectatur, potest enim eum velle non per se, sed propter aliud, nempe ad recuperandam valetudinem.* And to deny that God willeth the death of as many as dye, is *in terminis* to contradict a pregnant place of Scripture, as where it is said, that God worketh all things according to the counsell of his will, *Ephes. 1. 11.* And therefore seeing the inflicting of death is Gods work he must will it: But this Author is more happy for invention then his fellowes: For whereas others of his opinion, work upon the place as it is rendred in the vulgar Latine, *Nolo mortem peccatoris*: this Author hath found out an argument from the very phrase of our last English translation, to advantage his cause, as when from Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, he quaintly inferres, therefore God doth not of meer pleasure, will or decree their death; But how superficially this is also, and how foully it falls in the issue, upon the Author himselfe (as usually it falleth out with men, that affect new and quaint inventions) I hope to discover in due place.

Farther

*Nec putemus
in verbis
Scripturarum
Evangelium
esse, sed in
sensu, non in
superficie, sed
in medulla,
non in sermo-
num foliis, sed
in radice ra-
tionis. Hie-
ron. in Epist.
ad Galat. c. 1.*

Farther observe; that place, *Ezech. 33. 11. I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked*, according to our last English translation, and that, *Ezech. 18. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should dye*, doe differently render one and the same phrase in the Hebrew; that the wicked should dye *Ezech. 33. 11.* which is word for word according to the Hebrew; that the wicked should dye *Ezech. 18. 23.* which being not according to the precise termes of the originall, it followeth that hereby, our Translators did expound the sense of the Hebrew, which is word for word, in the death of the wicked, and so accordingly, that phrase, *Ezek. 18. 32. in the death of him that dieth*, importeth as much as this, *that he who dyeth should dye.*

And as for *Tertullian*, that which he alleadgeth out of him, neither makes for him nor against us: we all believe what the Prophet delivereth; but we enquire about the sense of it; But in the same place *Tertullian* interprets the place not absolutely but comparatively, thus, *Vivo inquit Dominus, & penitentiam malo quam mortem*, and indeed thus it is accommodated more then once in the Book of Common prayer, as first in the generall absolution; then, in one of the Collects upon Good-Friday: There is a double pleasure, that God may be said to take in the one, but a single pleasure only in the other. For in the death of an impenitent sinner, God delights only in the execution of justice: but in the conversion of such a one that he may live, God delights both in the execution of mercy, which is equivalent to his delight taken in the execution of judgement, and over and above he delights in their repentance; For like as of such as fall from God, it is said, *His soule hath no pleasure in them*: so of such as turne unto him, it is as true, that *his soule hath pleasure in them.*

3. But give we him leave to enjoy the interpretation he affecteth, yet consider I pray, whether he doth not enjoy it *tantum Diis iratis*, and to his bane: for marke I pray his argument, and consider whether I doe not from the same argument, most strongly conclude against him.

1. His argument runnes thus, *If God delighteth not in the destruction of wicked men, he did never out of his own pleasure, take so many millions of men lying in the fall, and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible damnation.* Now from the rule of contraries, I hence dispute thus; If this be a good consequence which he makes, then on the contrary it followes, that seeing God doth take pleasure and delight in mans eternall life (as this Author expressely acknowledgeth) therefore he did out of his own pleasure, take so many million of men lying in the fall, and seale them up by an absolute decree under invincible salvation. Now this conclusion is as directly opposite unto him in the poynt of election, as his conclusion is opposite to ours in the poynt of reprobation. And my argument must be of the same force and validity with his; because *Contrariorum contraria est ratio.* Yet I will not content my selfe with this answer.

2. Therefore consider I pray in the next place, the true meaning of this phrase *I have no pleasure*: in these places of the Prophet, the Author himselfe though he doth not plainly professe what is the meaning of it, as it became him to doe; and not to depend upon colour of words suitable; yet by his drift he manifests the meaning of it to be this, that God doth not bring death upon a sinner, of meere pleasure, but being provoked thereunto, (and that according to the purport of the first place *Ezech. 18.*) by the sinner himselfe; and also, (according to the purport of the second place) only in case of impenitency. And I concurre with him in this: And so I conceive it to be delivered in the same sense with that *Lament. 3. 32, 33. For though he cause griefe (to wit by reason of mens sinnes v. 39.) yet will he have compassion according to the multitude of his mercies, (to wit, in case he repents Jer. 18. 7. Iudg. 10. 16.) For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* Mark I pray, *not willingly*; to wit, in as much as he is provoked thereunto by sinne, and by refusall to repent. And this is in the former Scripture phrases, *not to take pleasure in the afflicting and grieving of men.* For if any work be such, as wherein pleasure is taken; we need not enquire after a cause why it is done, but though no pleasure be taken in it, yet for some benefit redounding thereby, a man may doe it, yea though it be grievous and bitter unto him: As a sick man is willing to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health. Now come we to the argument: *God takes no pleasure in the death of any; therefore he doth not of pleasure inflict death.* We willingly grant it, in as much as he never inflicts eternall death on any, that doth not dye in sinne unrepented of: And as he doth not inflict death on any of meere pleasure, that is, without just cause on the part of him that dyeth, deserving it: So we willingly

willingly confesse, that God did never decree to inflict death on any without just cause on the Malefactors part deserving death. And this is the uttermost whereunto this Authors argument can be extended. And all our Divines unanimously confesse, that God neither decreed to damne any man of his meer pleasure, but for his sinne wherein he died without repentance.

3. Observe the cunning of this Disputer, to deceive himselfe first, and then to abuse his readers: For whereas he should have proceeded in his argument by degrees, thus; *God hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, therefore he doth not of his own pleasure inflict death;* and thence proceed (if he had thought good) to conclude the like of Gods decree, thus; *if God doth not of his own pleasure inflict, then neither doth he of his own pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation:* This author leaping over the inflicting of death, as a block in his way (for the last consequence would have betrayed its own nakednesse) flyeth at first to the application of it, to Gods decree: Now I willingly grant, *that Gods having no pleasure in the death of a sinner, doth signify, that God inflicts death on no man without a cause, for that were of meer pleasure to inflict:* But dares he herehence inferre, *therefore God doth not of meer pleasure decree to inflict death and damnation on man for sinne,* for to this alone comes all the force of this argument. Now to shew the vanity of this consequence, consider I pray.

1. It is as if he should argue thus in plain termes; sinne is alwaies the meritorious cause of damnation; therefore sinne is the meritorious cause of Gods eternall decree of damnation: Now this Enthymeme hath no force any farther, then it may be reduced into a Categorical Syllogisme; and this Enthymeme is reducible into no other Syllogisme then this; Damnation is the decree of Damnation, sinne is the cause of Damnation, therefore sinne is the cause of the decree of damnation. But in this Syllogisme the proposition containes a notorious untruth: Or thus, Sinne is the cause of damnation; therefore the foresight of sinne is the cause of the decree of damnation: But this Enthymeme is not reducible unto any categorical Syllogisme at all, for as much as it consists of foure termes; all which must be clapt into the Syllogisme whereunto it is reduced, and consequently make that Syllogisme consist of foure termes, which utterly overthrowes the illative forme thereof.

2. We may as well dispute thus; *Good works as well as faith and repentance are the disposing cause unto salvation,* therefore good works as well as faith and repentance (or the foresight of them) are the disposing cause to Gods election, or to the decree of salvation.

But shall I tell you, the chiefe flourish whereupon this Author (and usually the Arminians) doth insist in this his loose argumentation, I conceive it to be this; they hope their credulous readers, unexpert in distinguishing between Gods eternall decree, and the temporall execution thereof, will be apt hereupon to conceit, that we maintain, that God doth not only of meer pleasure decree whatsoever he decreeth, but also that he doth decree of meer pleasure to damne men: which yet is utterly contrary (if I be not deceived) to the tenet of all our Divines: all concurring in this, that God in the execution of the decree of damnation, proceeds according to a Law, and not in the execution of reprobation only, but also in the execution of election. And the law is this, *Whosoever believes shall be saved, whosoever believes not shall be damned,* And like as he inflicteth not damnation, but by way of punishment, so he conferres not salvation but by way of reward. But in the execution of his decrees of election unto grace, and reprobation from grace; we willingly professe that God proceeds according to no law given unto men, to prepare themselves hereunto, but meerly according to his good pleasure, having mercy on whom he will, and hardning whom he will: And this indeed is the criticall poynt of this controversy: But neither this Author nor his complices (some of them of my knowledge) have any heart to deale on this. I come to his Second pregnant place as he calleth it.



DISCOURSE

SECT. II.

GOD hath shut up all in unbelieve, that he might have mercy on all. *Rom. 11. 32.* in these words of the Apostle are two [alls] of equall extent; the one standing just against the other; an [all] of unbelievers, and an [all] of objects of mercy; look how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of shewing mercy. And therefore if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy, And if every man be under mercy, then there is no antecedent precise will in God of shutting up some (and those the most) from all possibility of obtaining mercy; for these two are *ἀντιπαριστα* they cannot stand together.

TWISSE

Consideration.

I Willingly grant the word [all] in each place is of equall extent, but how? in the Apostles meaning in this place; that is, look in what sense the Apostle takes the word [all] when he saith *God hath concluded all under unbelieve*: in the same sense he takes the word [all] when he sayeth, *that he might have mercy upon all*. And accordingly in case when he saith the one he meaneth by the word [all] no more but Jewes & Gentiles: it followes that when he saith *God hath mercy on all*, by the word [all] he understands no more then both Jewes and Gentile, and that is, certain nations of men only, not all men of all sorts and conditions; And therefore although it were granted him, that all men of all sorts are unbelievers, yet unlesse he can prove, that in this sense the Apostle speaketh of [all] in saying *God hath concluded all under infidelity*, let any one that is indifferent, judge whether this argument be of any force. Thus our Divines understand it, to wit, of Jewes and Gentiles: Thus *Aquinas* and *Sasbatus* Popish Divines interpret it. *Aquinas* his words are these, *omnia, id est, omne hominum genus, tam Judæos quam Gentes in incredulitate conclusit, ut omnium misereatur, id est, ut in omni hominum genere misericordia locum habeat*; And again, *non est extendendum ad omnes homines sigillatim, sed ad omnia genera hominum: Fit enim hic distributio pro generibus singulorum, & non pro singulis generum*. So *Cajetan*. *Conclusit permissive omnes tam Judæos quam Gentes in peccatum infidelitatis*. The Text it selfe doth cleereely justify this, as appears by the two verses immediatly preceding, wherewith this coheres. *v. 30.* For even as the Gentiles in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy, through (the Jewes) unbelieve. *31.* Even so now have they (the Jewes) not believed, by the mercy shewed to you Gentiles, that they also, that is, the Jewes, may obtain mercy. This construction was embraced of old by *Austin*, as appears by *Beda* upon the Romans, alleading *August. de Civit. Dei lib. 21.* *Conclusit Deus omnes in infidelitate ut omnium misereatur. Quos omnes? nisi de quibus loquebatur, tanquam dicens & vos & illos. Deus ergo & Gentiles & Judæos, quos præcivit & prædestinavit conformes fieri imagini filii sui, omnes in infidelitate conclusit, & de amaritudine infidelitatis sue penitendo confusi, & ad dulcedinem misericordiae Dei credendo conversi clamaret &c.* And anon after, *Omnium itaq; misereretur vātorum misericordiae: Quid est omnium? & eorū scilicet quos ex Gentibus, & eorū quos ex Judæis prædestinavit.*

2. Observe how he hides himselfe under an ambiguous phrase, least he should come with his foule opinion to the light: As when he saith *every man of every condition*

is under mercy. The Apostles phrase on Gods part is *misereri*, to shew mercy; on mans part as partaking hereof is to *obtain mercy*. v. 30. 31. and to *obtain mercy is to believe*. v. 30. as appears by the opposition: for to *obtain mercy and not to believe*, are there made opposite, therefore to obtain mercy and to believe are the same: For to *believe and not to believe are formally opposite*. Now dares this Author avouch, that every man of every condition doth believe? Again the Apostles word *ut misereatur*, that he may shew mercy, is not spoken of the time present; for as much as for the time present, the Lord had mercy only on the Nations of the Gentiles: But the time should come, that God would also have mercy on the Jewes, and consequently on all. But when should this come to passe? Surely not 'till 1600 years after, to wit, when the time cometh which is appoynted for the effectuall and generall calling of the Nation of the Jewes.

So that the foundation being most rotten, no marvail if the edifice he builds hereupon must needs totter. For the Jewes were thus to be shut up under infidelity, for many hundred years, to wit, untill the time came which the Apostle prophesyeth of. And so were the Gentiles also before them, 'till the time came of their calling. And thus *Sasbuius* interpreteth the Apostle in this very place. *Sensus est* (saith he) *sic visum est Deo dispensare utriusque populi salutem, Iudeorum videlicet & Gentium; ut permitteret utrumque populum suo vitio concludi, sive constringi, sub incredulitate & damnatione. Concludi, inquam, ne ullâ ratione posset ex incredulitate suâ vinculo se liberare, ut ipsius misericordia gratuita locum habere agnosceretur in utroque populo tam Iudeorum quam Gentium.* Thus we see that both his [alls] are not worth a Bodkin; and to give him two [alls] more to encrease his store, we may justly say that all this is nothing at all to the purpose.



DISCOURSE.

SECT. III.

Iohn 3. 16. *God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Sonne, that whosoever &c.* God loved the World, that is, the whole lump of Man-kind, therefore God did not absolutely hate the greatest part of Man-kind. God loved it fallen into a guilt of sinne and misery, for he so loved them, as to send his Sonne to redeeme them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not therefore hate the most of them considered in the fall, for love and hatred are contrary acts, and cannot be exercised about the same Object. Many expositors (I know) doe take *World* here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the *World of believers* only, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for, 1. I think there can be no place of Scripture alleadged wherein this word *World* especially with the condition of *whole*, as in 1 Epist. of Iohn. 2. 2. (which is a place equivalent to this for the matter of it, and a comment upon it) I say (I think) no place can be produced where *World* doth signify only the Elect, or only believers; but it signifies either all men, or at least, the most men, living in some certain place, and at some certain time, but without distinction of good and bad: or if it be used any where more restrainedly, it is applied only to the wicked and Reprobate men, who are wedded in their affections to the World, and the transitory delights thereof, and therefore doe most properly deserve this name.

2. Suppose it be granted that *World* in some Scriptures is restrained to the Elect, yet it cannot bear this signification here; because,

1. The words then would have a bad and senselesse construction; for thus would they runne, *God so loved the Elect that whosoever believed in him should not perish &c.* And if they runne thus, then this would follow, there are two sorts of the Elect, some that *doe believe*, and shall be *saved*; others that *doe not believe*, and shall be *dammned*, which is a division or distinction unknown in Divinity.

2. *Believers and Unbelievers*, *dammned and saved* comprehend all Man kind, for there is no man but is one of these. Now *World* in this place includeth *believers and unbelievers*, the *saved and the dammed*, (as appears most plainly to him that considers the words;) therefore it signifieth here all Man kind without exception of any. Against this Scripture therefore fights this absolute reprobation and hatred of men.

T W I S S E

Consideration.

BE it the whole lump of man-kind (if that Lettice like his lipps.) I should think by World, is meant *homines in mundo degentes*, men at any time living in the World without any restraint: But herehence it followeth not, that God doth not absolutely hate the greatest part of man-kind; which this Author should have proved, but he doth not; therefore I will not only deny it, but disprove it. First therefore consider, this love is only *secundum Quid*, in reference to mens persons, namely, so farre forth as in case they believe, they shall obtain everlasting life through the Sonne of God: But if there were no farther love of God towards man, they might be damned, yea every Mothers sonne for all this. Secondly, if faith it selfe be a gift of God, and God gives it not to all, but to some only, and those but a few; (for even of them that are called few are chosen:) and withall if God hath absolutely decreed to bestow this grace only on a few, and deny it to the greatest part of the World, will it not manifestly follow herehence, that if absolutely to decree the denyall of faith be to hate, then surely God absolutely hates the greatest part of men, notwithstanding this love here mentioned, albeit we extend it to all and every one. Therefore it became this Author to prove, that God is indifferent to give Faith to one as well as to another: and that either absolutely, whence it would follow, that all and every one, should both believe and be saved; or conditionally, and therewithall represent unto us, what that condition is, whereupon God bestowes faith on one, and for the want thereof, he refuseth to bestow faith on another. This is the very criticall poynt about the controversies of Gods decrees. Here therefore he should have shewed his strength: For as for Gods purpose to damne, we willingly professe, that as God damnes no man but for sinne, so he purposeth to damne no man but for sinne. But as for his purpose to give or deny the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, we as readily professe, that not the purpose only, but the very giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of infidelity and hardnesse of heart in some, and the denying of it unto others, so to leave their naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart uncured, proceeds meereley according to the good pleasure of his will, according to that of the Apostle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*; And by a cloud of testimonies out of *Austin* we can prove, that in this very sense he understood the Apostle in that place. And indeed no other interpretation of that place, can with any modesty be devised, or obtruded upon us. As for the redeeming of all and every one by Christ, distinguisheth that which the haters of Gods truth doe delight to confound. There is a redemption from the guilt of sinne, and a redemption from the power of sinne: *For we are redeemed from our vaine conversation*. Christ came into the World to dissolve the works of the Devill: No greater works of Satan then *blindnesse of heart*, 2 Cor. 4. 3. and *hardnesse of heart*, Ephes. 2. 2. and 2 Tim. 2. last. The pardon of sinne, and salvation, God bestowes only on believers, and upon condition of faith: Now like as God is ready to bestow these benefits on all and every one, and that for Christs sake, in case they believe: so Christ hath merited pardon of sinne and salvation for all and every one, in case they believe. Such is the sufficiency of Christs merit, that if every one of *Adams* race should believe, every one should be saved: and this present Text proceeds upon this, namely, upon the sufficiency of Christs merits. But enquire farther whether Christ did not merit for us the grace of faith, and if he did, whether absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely then all must believe *de facto*, and be saved; if conditionally, then faith is a grace, which God bestowes on man conditionally. Now let this Author shew us what that condition is, upon performance whereof by man, God will give him faith, and let

him try whether he can carry himselfe so warily herein, as not to plunge himselfe into plain Pelagianisme. This poynt is a break-neck, or Crevecœur unto all Arminians, they generally avoyd the delivering of their minds clearly hereupon, as a man would avoyd a precipice. It is true some Divines doe interpret the word [World] here, of the Elect, as *Piscator*; *Rolloc* doth not, making no mention of the Elect hereupon. And *Piscators* meaning is no more then this, viz. that this love of God in respect of every gracious effect (I mean in the way of sanctifying grace) determines only upon the Elect; for in all likelihood, he followed Calvin in this, *Universalem notam apposuit* (saith Calvin) *tum ut promiscuè omnes ad vitæ participationem invitet, tum ut prædat excusationem incredulis*. To the same purpose (saith he) pertaines *nomen mundi, quo prius usus est*. And again, *se toti mundo propitium ostendit, quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem vocat*: But here he subjoynes a caution, thus; *Ceterum meminerimus ita communiter promitti omnibus vitam si in Christo crediderint, ut tamen minime communis omnium sit fides. Pater enim omnibus Christus & expositus est, solis tamen Electis oculos Deus aperit & fide ipsum quærant*. So that this gracious promise is generall to all and every one, *whosoever believes shall be saved*; But yet notwithstanding if it shall appeare, that God gives the grace of faith, to none but to a certain number, (which are his Elect) it followes, that the effect of this love of God, to wit, Salvation shall in the issue redound to none but Gods Elect.

1. As for the designing a place where the World is taken for the Elect; we need no such place, as I have shewed; yet *Piscator* conceives that so it is taken, *John 3. 17. That the World might be saved by him*. But what think you of *Rom. 11. 15. Where the casting away of the Jewes is said to be the reconciliation of the World*. And that *2 Cor. 5. 19. God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himselfe*. I say the reconciled World is only Gods Elect, for the reconciled are all saved, as I prove by the Apostles argument *Rom. 5. If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne, how much more being reconciled shall we be saved by his life. Ioh. 1. 29. The Lamb of God that taketh away the sinnes of the World*. Are their sinnes taken away that are damned for them? And *Ioh. 6. 33. He gives life to the World*; Is life given to any but to the Elect?

2. The second reasons, why in this place it cannot be so taken, are in effect but one, and that a weake one:

1. Because, that they that understand it of the Elect, understand it so in no other sense, but as I have expounded it.

2. If I should say of the twelve Apostles (*Judas* excluded, and *Matthias* substituted in his roome) that God so loved them, that he gave his only begotten Sonne, that whosoever of them believed in him, should not perish but have everlasting life; who can deny, but that this was a truth accommodated unto them? but will it here hence follow, that among those Apostles, some were believers some unbelievers? Suppose all the World were Elect, and it pleased God to give them all Faith, should this Doctrine be the lesse true, whosoever believes shall be saved? yet in this case it would not follow, that amongst the World of men some were believers, and some unbelievers.

But whereas he faines, that some of our Divines should interpret the word [World] here of Believers, that is such a fiction as is incredible. I come to the fourth.





DISCOURSE.

S E C T. IV.

1. **T**Imoth. 2. 4. Who would have all to be saved and come to the knowledge of his truth. In these words the Apostle delivers two things. 1. That it is Gods will, that all men should obtain an happy end, viz. Salvation. 2. That it is his will also, that they should use and enjoy the means, which is the knowledge of his truth, that so they might obtain the end, the salvation of their soules; there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved.

Two answers are usually returned, which give me little satisfaction: The first is, that by All we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in every sort and condition. It is true that [all] is sometimes so used in Scripture, but (I believe) not here: for the very Text shewes that we are to understand by it, the Individualls and not the kindes: v. 1. There is a duty enjoyned, *I will that prayers and supplications be made for all men*, and in this verse the motive is annexed, *God will have all to be saved*; as if he should have said, our charity must reach to all, whom God extends his love to: God will have all to be saved, therefore we must pray for all: Now in the duty All signifies every man, for no man though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our prayers; pray for them (saith our Saviour) *that persecute you*: And pray (saith the Apostle here) *for Kings, and all that are in Authority, men in those daies (though the greatest) yet the worst, yea very Wolves, and Lyons, and Bears of the Church; pray for them, and if for them, then for any other, thus: in the duty it signifies every man; and if it doe so in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; or else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty.* The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his revealed will, have Millions to be damned with his secret will. If this answer stand, then (in my understanding) these inconveniences will follow.

1. That Gods words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his mind and meaning, and by consequence are not true; for *Oratio quæ non est mentis significatio, simulatio est.*
2. That there are two contrary willes in God; a secret will, that many Sonnes of Adam shall irrevocably be damned; and a revealed will, that all the Sonnes of Adam may be saved.
3. That one of Gods wills must needs be bad, either the secret will, or the revealed; for of contraries if the one be good, the other is bad; and so of Gods contrary wills, if the one be good, the other must needs be bad, for *malum is contrarium bono.*

T W I S S E

Consideration.

THe Conclusion here is very loose; the Arguments being thus; *It is Gods will that all should be saved; therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousands of men shall never believe nor be saved*: and the vanity of this consequence, I will shew more waies then one.

1. The Apostle doth not say, *It is the absolute will of God that all men shall be saved*: nay *Vossius* interprets this place, and that according to the meaning of the Ancients, of *volutas conditionata*, a conditionall will in God, not absolute; and he gives instance of it thus; *It is the will of God that all shall be saved, in case they believe in Christ.* Hist. Pelag. lib. 6. 7. p. 638. Now albeit it be the conditionall will of God that all, and every one shall be saved in case they believe, yet this hinders not, but that it may be the absolute will of God, that many thousands of men shall never be saved; as in case his will be to deny the grace of faith and repentance to many thousands, as it is cleare and undeniable that he doth.

Absolute Reprobation not.

Nay the Remonstrants themselves, and particularly an Arminian that I had to doe withall lately, spared not to professe, that Election is absolute; if so, then reprobation also is absolute; and I doubt not but that they will all confesse, that howbeit Gods will be, that all should be saved, yet thousands are reprobated.

2. Suppose the Apostle had said, it is the absolute will of God, that all men shall be saved, yet I say it followes not herehence, but that by the absolute will of God many might faile of salvation: for it was the absolute will of God, that every foure footed beast should be represented to *Peter*, let downe unto him in a linnen vessell; yet neverthelesse it might be that many thousands were not represented to him, and that by the will of God.

Thus having discovered the vanity of this conclusion; I will now proceed to demonstrate that this place cannot be understood, of Gods will in proper speech, viz. willing all and every one to be saved.

1. Like as it is impossible, that a man at the same time should be saved and damned; so it is impossible, that God should at the same time and duration, both will to save and will to damne the same man: But God from everlasting did will to damne many thousands; therefore it was impossible, that from everlasting he should will to save them.

2. If it be Gods will that all and every one shall be saved; then all and every one shall be saved, For *who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9. 19.* And for confirmation hereof, we find in our selves, that if we will doe ought, we doe it if we can; and if we doe not ought, the reason is, either because we have no will to doe it, or because we have no power to doe it. In like sort, that God doth not save many thousands, the reason must be, either because he will not, or because he cannot; not because he will not, for these professe that it is his will to save all and every one; Therefore the reason why he doth not save all, must needs be, because he cannot save them: this was *Austins* argument 1200 years agoe. *Enchirid. cap. 96. and 97.* handling this very place of the Apostle.

3. If God did from everlasting will the salvation of all and every one, then either at this day he doth continue to will the salvation of all and every one, and shall continue for ever to will it, or no; if he doth continue to will it and ever shall, then say that God doth will the salvation of the damned both Men and Devils; albeit it is well known he damnes them. If he doth not continue to will it, then is God of a changeable nature; directly contrary to the word of God, as well as to manifest reason: *With him (saith James) is no variableness nor shadow of change. I the Lord am not changed, Mal. 3. 6.* As for that which he thrusts in, to help make weight, saying, that there is no let in God, but that all men may believe and be saved, this is a most improper speech; for no man is said (in proper speech) to be let from doing ought, but upon presupposition that he would doe it; now we utterly deny that God hindreth any man from believing and repenting, whose will is disposed to believe and repent. But seeing all men have infidelity and hardnesse of heart naturall unto them, as a fruit of that corruption wherein all are borne; we deny that God cures it in all, but only in whom he will, according to that of Saint Paul, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.* And our Saviour upon the same ground, is bold to tell the Jewes, saying, *Ye therefore heare not my words (that is, believe them not) because ye are not of God.*

Rom. 9. 18.
Joh. 4. 47.

2. The first exposition here mentioned was given by *Austin*, many hundred years agoe. *Enchirid. cap. 103.* and he proves this his interpretation of the word [all] by the congruity of it to Scripture phrasie in other places, as where it is said of the Pharisees, that they *tye every herbe*; his words are these, *Isto locutionis modo & Dominus usus est in Evangelio, ubi ait Phariseis, Decimatis mentham, & rutam, & omne olus: neq; enim Pharisei quacunq; aliena, & omnium per omnes terras alienigenarum omnium olera decimabant. Sicut ergo hic omne olus, omne olerum genus; ita & illic omnes homines, omne hominum genus, intelligere possumus: yet see the ingenuity of this great light of the Church of God: for forthwith he gives leave to devise any other convenient interpretation; provided that we doe not violate Gods omnipotency, by saying, that any thing that God would have brought to passe, is not brought to passe; his words are these, *Et quocunq; alio modo intelligi potest, dum tamen credere non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem Deum noluisse fieri, factumq; non esse; qui sine ullis ambagibus si in calo & terra (sicut & veritas cantat) omnia quacunq; voluit fecit**

fecit : profecto facere noluit, quæcumq; non fecit. This interpretation is generally received by our Divines, because of the congruity thereof to the Text it selfe; for as much as the Apostle having first admonished them in the generall to pray for all, forthwith he descends to specialls, as *Vossius* acknowledgeth, *Generi speciem subicit*; now look in what sort the Species is to be understood, after the same manner is the Generall to be understood. Now the Specialls mentioned, are certain sorts or conditions of men, as Kings, and such as are in authority; therefore the generall [all] must in like manner be understood of all sorts, and all conditions of men: upon this consideration also it was that *Austin* did insist, in the place before alleadged: *Præceperat* (saith he) *Apostolus ut oraretur pro singulis hominibus, & specialiter addiderat pro Regibus, & iis qui in sublimitate sunt, qui putari poterant fastu & superbia seculari a fidei Christianæ humilitate abhorreere.* Proinde dicens, hoc enim bonum est coram salvatore nostro Deo, id est, ut etiam pro talibus oretur; statim ut desperationem tolleret, addit, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Hoc quippe Deus bonum judicavit, ut orationibus humilium dignaretur, præstare salutem sublimium. Now I come to consider what this Author hath to say against this exposition, for he gives us very gravely to understand, that it gives him little satisfaction: we are therefore to expect some better satisfaction from him.

It is true that [all] is so used in Scripture, not only some times, but very frequently; let him come to instance in his sense, we are ready to instance with him for ours. But the Text (saith he) shewes we are to understand the individualls and not the kinds. Where first (I doubt) his ignorance, in understanding the distinction aright, is his best ground of opposition. When *Austin* urgeth for his interpretation, that of the Pharisees tything *omne olus*, every hearb, who doubts but they tythe Individuall hearbs. In like sort when *Peter* saw in a vessell let down unto him *καὶ τετραπόδιον* every foure footed beast; no question but Individuall beasts were let down unto him, not every one of every kind, but of every kind or of most kinds, or of many kinds some, so that the meaning of the distinction is not to exclude all individualls (as this Author seems to carry the matter,) but only, to exclude a necessity of understanding all individualls of all sorts. It is enough if God will save some of all sorts, that is, of all conditions some individualls. Then, seeing he undertakes out of the very Text, to give us better satisfaction, then either *Austin* or our Divines have hitherto received, it must needs be a shame for him to leave the present Text, and fetch grounds elsewhere, for the clearing of *Pauls* meaning here. Now let us observe, how congruously or incongruously to his own undertakings, he carryeth himselfe in this businesse: of the duty enjoyned, and of the motive annexed, there is no question: but whereas he shapes the coherence thus, and makes *Paul* in effect to speak after this manner; *our charity must reach to all to whom God extends his love to; God will have all to be saved, and therefore we must pray for all.* Though all this were granted him, it makes nothing for him: but over and above here are causelesse errors more then enough:

For, first, our charity must extend farther then Gods love; was not *Jacob* bound to carry himselfe charitably towards his brother *Esau*? though Gods hatred of *Esau*, we know, was as ancient as his love to *Jacob*.

2. We are not bound to extend our charity so far as God extends his love; for many thousands there be in the World, (not to speak of the Elect departed this life) towards whom it may be God extends his love, which yet are unknown to us; & are we bound to pray for we know not whom. Again, Gods love, with this Author, is extended as farre as his will to save, and that is extended to all and every one: and unlesse God be now changed, it must extend to them now after they are damned, and must our charity be extended towards them also? But he proceeds, let us proceed with him. Now (saith he) [all] in the duty signifies every man; but that we deny; he gives his reason, for no man though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our prayers.

Against this I have two exceptions, (and yet if the whole be granted him, it maketh nothing for him:) my first exception is this; he promised to give us satisfaction out of the Text it selfe; but who seeth not but that this rule of his, is brought in quite besides the Text: I from the Text have proved, and from the coherence between the generall and the speciall, that the speciall being certain particular conditions of men, the generall [all] must conformably be understood of all conditions.

My second exception is this; he obtrudes upon us, that no man, though wicked and prophane, is to be excluded from our Prayers. I confesse I doe not find my selfe apt to exclude any from my prayers; but I cannot endure, that a bold fellow should obtrude his

rules upon us as Oracles. The Apostle Saint *John* forbids us to pray for them that sinne a sinne unto death. But let all this be granted, what then? If it extends to every one in the duty, it must have the same extent in the motive too; but this I deny; he saith, else the motive will not reach home, nor have strength enough to enforce the duty: but this likewise I deny; and shew withall, how the motive shall reach home, and have strength enough even to enforce this duty, according to this Authors accommodation of it; albeit God hath a will not to save all and every one, but of all sorts and all conditions some; of Kings some, of them that are in Authority some; For seeing God saves of all sorts some, why should not every Christian Subject, pray for his Prince and Rulers, seeing it may be they are those some, whom God means to save, even of the ranke of Princes, of the ranke of Governors, and of men in Authority. For God hath not revealed to us, who they are whom he hath elected, and who they are whom he hath reprobated. If he had, *Austin* tells us what we should doe in that case, *De Civit. Dei. lib. 21. cap. 24. Si de aliquibus ita Ecclesia certa esset, ut qui sunt illi etiam nosset, qui licet adhuc in hac vitâ sint constituti, tamen prædestinati sunt in æternum ignem ire cum Diabolo, tam pro iis non oraret, quam pro ipso.* If it shall be farther urged, that we are to pray for all Kings, and all that are in Authority, not only for our own; I answer, that this is nothing agreeable to the end of such prayers here expressed by the Apostle, namely, *That under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and honesty.* And what have we here in England, to doe with the King of Bungo, that we should pray for him, or for the Kings in terrâ australi incognitâ, discovered by *Ferdinando de Quir*, or for the great Duke of *Crapulia*?

3. As for the second interpretation; I doe not find it so usuall with our Divines: *Cajetan* distinguisheth here between *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*; so doth *Aquinas*, and this distinction of *voluntas occulta* and *revelata*, is usuall reduced to that of *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*; But *voluntas signi*, and *voluntas revelata*, is more congruously applied to the things which God commands, then to the things which God himselfe worketh; as for example, he commands faith and repentance; and the commandements of God, are usuall called the will of God in Scripture, though improperly; and thus the distinction is plain. God commands one thing, but it is not necessary, that he should will, that that which he commands shall come to passe: As for example, God commanded *Abraham* to sacrifice *Isaack*, yet he determined that *Isaack* should not be sacrificed, as appeared by the event. In like manner he commanded *Pharaoh* to let *Israel* goe, yet withall told *Moses* he would harden his heart, that he should not let *Israel* goe. But this will of God called *voluntas signi* and *Revelata*, cannot so congruously be said to passe upon mans salvation. Yet because God may be said to command salvation, in as much as he commands faith and repentance, that we may be saved; and in this sense, men are exhorted sometimes to save themselves; As, *Save yourselves from this froward generation*; and *Save some out of the fire with feare*; and *That thou maist both save thy selfe and them that heare thee*; therefore we are content also to admit of this distinction, and consider with what judgement and sufficiency this Author doth impugn it.

Acts 2.40.
Jud. 23.
1 Tim. 4. 16.

1. By his first opposition, it appears, that meer ignorance bears him out against this distinction; For we doe acknowledge, that Gods revealed will, and his words revealing it, are true interpretations of his own mind and meaning; though not of such a meaning as he expects should be fashioned. For he conceives that Gods will in this case, is only of what shall be done; which is most untrue: Hereby is only signified, what is mans duty to doe, although it may be God will not give him effectuall grace to doe it. As for examples sake, when God commanded *Pharaoh* to let *Israel* goe; hereby was signified, that God would have it to be *Pharaohs* duty to let *Israel* goe; though withall he professes to *Moses*, that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, whereupon he should refuse to let them goe. So when God commanded *Abraham* to sacrifice *Isaack*, hereby it was signified, that it was Gods will to make it *Abrahams* duty to sacrifice his Sonne, albeit God had determined, that when *Abraham* came to poynt of execution of that which was enjoyned him, he would hold *Abrahams* hand, and content himselfe with *Abrahams* readinesse, and good heart to obey God in this.

2. As to the second; it is untrue that any such thing followeth as this Author pretendeth, namely, that two contrary wills shall be found in God; For first there is no contrariety in the wills here shaped by the Author himselfe; thus, *many shall be damned,*
and

and those, many may be saved. As for the word *irrevocable*, wherewith this Author stufes his proposition, that is no attribute of damnation, or the manner thereof, but rather of Gods decrees; wherein still he proceeds and spares not to foame out his own shame, desiring to make Gods decrees of a revocable nature. Secondly, he understands not the accommodation of the distinction aright, which is not directly to salvation and immediatly, but rather to *præcepta, consilia, remedia*, (as *Aquinas* expresseth it) of *voluntas signi*, which is all one in this case with *voluntas revelata*.

1. Applied to Gods commandment, joyned with a will not to give grace to obey his commandment, thus, *it's Pharaohs duty to let Israel goe; 'Tis not Gods will that Pharaoh shall let Israel goe*, for he meaneth to harden his heart to the contrary.

2. Applied to salvation, consequent or not consequent, according as men shall be found to obey or disobey Gods commandment: thus, *it's my will, that as many as believe and repent shall be saved*, and consequently it's true, *If thou believest (whoever thou art) and repentest, thou shalt be saved*. I will give grace to believe and repent to some only, whereby they may be saved; between those in like manner, there is no contrariety at all.

3. And if there be no contrariety at all, then surely it followes not by this Authors Logick, that if one of them be good, the other must be bad. I say by this Authors Logick; for now adaies men are given so much to Rhetorick, that they forget all good Logick, if ever they learnt any: who I pray gives any such rule, that if one contrary be good, the other must be bad? If heat be good, is cold bad? Or if white be good, is black bad? But as for the case we treat of, if these wills were found to be contrary, one of them should destroy the other, and the other should have no being at all; and in case it hath no being, shall it be said to be bad? Yes, like enough, by the learning of the Arminians. I come to the Fifth.



DISCOURSE.

SECT. V.

2. **P**eter 3.9. *Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance*. This Scripture is not so liable to those exceptions, which are made against the former testimonies, for it is a negative proposition, and must be taken distributively; and therefore speaks that in plain termes, which is contrary to absolute reprobation.

That which is usually replied is this, that the persons here spoken of, are the Elect only. God is not willing that any of the Elect should perish. But the contrary appears plainly in the Text; for the persons here spoken of, are those towards whom God exerciseth much long suffering and patience; and who are they? Are they the Elect only, or chiefly? No, but the Reprobates rather, that dye for their contempt of grace. Reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long suffering and patience, as we may see, *Rom. 2.4.* where the Apostle speaking of such as goe on in sinne, and treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, saith that God useth patience towards them, that so he might lead them to repentance: and *Rom. 9.22.* He endureth (saith the Text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. Reprobates therefore as well as others doth *Peter* here speak of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish; if they doe perish, it is their own fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have none to perish.

TWISSE.

Consideration.

Here be odde gambolls; as when he saith the proposition here is negative, whereas the propositions are two, and the latter affirmative, as well as the former is negative. As for the taking of it distributively, as he speaks, the Text expresseth the negative distributively; implying belike, that when we interpreted the former

Absolute Reprobation not

former place *de generibus singulorum*, it was not to be taken distributively, which is a very shallow conceit, for it is apparent we distribute it *de generibus singulorum*; and more then that, of the particulars of each kind, only we doe not distribute it of all the particulars. In like manner, though the Text in this place expresseth a distribution, saying, *not willing, any to perish*, this distribution is not extended to all: Nay, it admits of a greater limitation then the former place did by our interpretation; for *τις* here must be referred to that which goes before in these words, *God is patient to us ward not willing any to perish*, that is, *τις ἡμεῶν*, any of us to perish, but all to come to repentance, that is *πάντας ἡμῶν*, all of us; which can admit of no other sense then all such as the Apostle was; he saith it is contrary to *absolute reprobation*; that is wind; when he proveth it then we will believe it, his word is no oracle.

2. Let us see how he disproves their interpretation, who accommodate it to Gods Elect. The persons here mentioned (he saith) are those towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience, and demandeth whether these are the Elect only or chiefly? and answereth himselfe negatively; saying, that the reprobates are the proper objects of Gods long suffering and patience, which he proveth out of *Rom. 2. 4.* and *Rom. 9. 22.* and so concludes the argument very learnedly and judiciously Arminian like, *ex omnibus affirmativa, in secundâ Figurâ*; which of what force it is every weak Logician knoweth; for thus in effect is his argument, *They of whom God will have none to perish, are such towards whom God exerciseth much long suffering and patience; But the Reprobates are they towards whom God exerciseth much long suffering and patience; Therefore the Reprobates are they, of whom God will have none to perish.*

2. And whereas the Apostle saith, *God is patient towards us*, the meaning according to this Authors judicious enlargement is, *towards us who are partly elect and partly reprobates*: and so likewise when he saith, *2 Pet. 1. 2. To you who have obtained like precious faith with us*, that is, *with us of whom some are elect and some reprobates.* And *1 Pet. 1. 3. God hath begotten us to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ*, that is, *begotten us, some of whom are elect and some reprobates.*

3. Now because the Apostle saith plainly and simply, *who is patient towards us*; this Author desiring to frame it in a suitable manner, to that of the Apostle, *Rom. 2. 4.* whereunto he hath a hungry desire to reduce it, therefore he makes bold to say, that the persons here mentioned by Saint Peter are such, *towards whom God exerciseth long suffering and patience*: Thus again he is willing very obsequiously to follow *Lyanders* counsell, who advised, when a Lyons skinne would not serve the turne, to piece it up with a Foxe skinne. We on the other side, though it cannot be denied, but that God doth *μακροθυμεῖν* towards such as Saint Peter was, and those to whom he wrote, *who had obtained like precious faith with himselfe and his fellow Apostles, and other believers*; which cannot be denied to have been the elect of God, (so he calls them to whom he wrote, *1 Pet. 1. 2.*) yet we spare to draw any argument therehence, because we know full well, that God doth *μακροθυμεῖν*, and useth long suffering towards the Reprobates also. So that we could not conclude that we would herehence, but either by a Syllogisme vitious in the forme, as this Author doth, or by a Syllogisme, that would be as faulty in the matter, thus; God shewes patience to none but Reprobates; they of whom God will have none to perish are such, as towards whom God shewes patience; therefore God will not have any Reprobate to perish. And is not this a proper doctrine, that God will not have any Reprobate to perish, both for the overthrowing of Gods omnipotency; for is it not a cleare case and undeniable, that all Reprobates doe perish? As also for the overthrowing of Gods immutability; for can it be denied, that when God damnes them, he will have them to perish? Which if before he would not, can it be avoided, but that Gods will must be changed? And lastly, for the bringing in of manifest contrariety into the will of God; seeing they dare not deny that God did from everlasting ordaine every reprobate unto damnation: I say they dare not deny this in plain termes, though their carriage is such, as if their meaning were, that Gods will in decreeing their damnation is conditionall *quoad actum volentis*, as touching the very act of willing, whence it followeth that God shall not will their damnation untill their death in infidelity and impenitency; for it is fit the condition should exist before the thing conditioned, whose existence depends thereupon. As for that he addes in the close, *If they doe perish it is their own fault and folly*; we make no question hereof; though neverthelesse we may well maintain, that it is Gods absolute pleasure, not to take them off from their sinfull and foolish courses

courses, nor to set an end to these vitious courses of theirs, which he could if it pleased him, as well as he did set an end to the abominable courses of *Manasses*, as also to the persecution and bloody courses of *Saul*; towards whom he did undoubtedly *μακαροδομεῖν*, and exercise much long suffering and patience; though herein there is no difference between them and reprobates, or very little; according to that of *Austin*, *Istorum neminem (non prædestinatorum) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemq; penitentiam, quâ homo Deo reconciliatur in Christo; sive illis ampliorem penitentiam, sive non imparē præbeat: contra Julian. Pelagian. lib. 5. cap. 4.* I come to the last of this ranke.



DISCOURSE.

SECT. VI.

TO These testimonies, I may adde those conditionall speeches, if thou seek him he will be found of thee; but if thou forsake him he will cast thee off, for ever, *1 Chron. 28. 9.* If ye seek him, he will be found of you; but if you forsake him, he will forsake you. *2 Chron. 15. 2.* If thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? but if thou dost ill, sinne lies at the doore. *Gen. 4. 7.* The just shall live by faith, but if any man withdraw himselfe, my soule non approbabit eum, shall have no pleasure in him, he shall be a Reprobate. In all these and many other places it is cleare (for ought I can see) that God forsakes no man, considered simply in the fall, till by actual sinnes and continuance in them he forsakes God. Now if God reject no man from Salvation in time or in act and deed, till he rejects God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For Gods acts in time, are regulated by his decrees before time. *Ephes. 1. 11.* God worketh all things (saith the Apostle) according to the counsell of his own will; and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between *regulam* and *regulatum*, the rule and the thing measured by the rule. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the World, we may know what he purposed to doe before the World; and by his actual casting men off, when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before. Besides it is all one in substance, to cast a man off indeed, and to entertain a resolution to doe it; our *velle* and *facere* are all one in Gods account, and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and setled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder; much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent, and irresistible, and whatsoever he wills directly and absolutely, is certainly done when the time comes.

All these plain Scriptures doth this opinion contradict *in terminis*, and not only these, but the whole course of Scriptures, by which it is much safer for a man to frame his opinions, then by a few places pickt up here and there, and those obscure ones too: What Saint *Austin* speaks in another place, I may safely say in this, *numquid ideo negandum quod apertum est, quia comprehendi non potest, quod occultum est?* Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? *Aug. de bono persever. c. 14. Secundum plura (saith Tertullian) pauciora sunt intelligenda; q̄ ne unus sermo subvertat alios; secundum omnes potius quam adversum omnes intelligendus erit.* A few testimonies must be expounded according to the whole course of Scriptures, and not this according to a few testimonies. This is my first reason.

TWISSE

Consideration.

TO the places of Scripture here alleadged, I give the interpretation, to prevent the confusion of things that differ, which all affect who preferre the darkness

Absolute Reprobation not

nesse of Errour before the light of truth; for it is most advantageous to such, to fish in troubled waters.

To the two first, I say; God is first sought of us before we find him, as touching the obtaining of many blessings at the hands of God according to that, *Ezech. 36. 37. I will yet be sought of the house of Israel, to performe it unto them.* But as touching the obtaining of an heart to seek him, thus God is found of us before we seek him; according to that, *Es. 65. 1. I have been found of them that sought me not:* witnesse *Saul* marching with a commission from the Priests to Damascus, to bind all that called on the name of Jesus.

To the third I answer, by distinguishing acceptation, as we distinguish love; Love is either *complacentia* or *beneficentia*; so acceptation is either unto reward, or unto complacency; Rewards alwaies follow our doing well; but grace of doing well is alwaies a fruit of Gods favour towards us in Christ.

To the last *the just shall live by faith*; But there is a grace of God preventing faith; *cur ille credat, ille non credat*, what is the reason but the meere pleasure of God giving the grace of Faith to one, and denying it to another, according to that of the Apostle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. They that withdraw themselves my soule shall have no pleasure in them*; The meaning is, they shall feeble the smart of his displeasure; but before they withdrew themselves God took not that pleasure in them, as to give them his custodient grace, to keep them from withdrawing themselves; which grace, and that out of his good pleasure he afforded unto others: But this grace comes in no account throughout with this Author, like unto the Remonstrants, who would have no other notice taken of any other counsell of God, then that whereby he decreeth to save believers and damne unbelievers. But if you call them to enquire of Gods decree, to bestow the grace of Faith and repentance upon some, and not on others; as whether it proceeds absolutely or conditionally, they usually lend a deafe eare to this; whereby it is as cleare as the Sunne, what estimation they make of the grace of regeneration, of the grace of Faith, and of repentance; and after what manner they give God the glory of it. By the way observe I pray, how he makes the state of man in being a reprobate consequent to his withdrawing himselfe, which undoubtedly is a Temporall act, and accordingly the act of Reprobation, whereby a man is denominated a reprobate, to be meere Temporal; and consequently such an act must election be also, *viz.* not eternall but Temporall.

Still he keepeth himselfe in his strength of confusion, as most advantageous for him; as in saying, *God forsakes no man, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them, he forsaketh God.* But albeit God forsaketh no man, as touching the inflicting of punishment, untill man commits actuall sinne, and continueth therein impenitently; yet before this God did forsake him, as touching the denyall of this grace custodient from sinne; and the denyall of the grace of repentance to rise out of sinne, which yet he grants to many; as in shewing mercy to whom he will, like as whom he will he hardneth, and so accordingly cures in some, that naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart wherein we are all borne, and leaves it uncured in others. Now consider we his argument following, which is this. *If God reject no man from salvation in time, or in act and deed till he reject God, then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw would reject and cast off God.* Now this argument not one of our Divines deny, not only as it is applied to reprobation; but neither doe we deny it, applied unto election. For we willingly professe, that like as God bestowes salvation on none, but such as he then findes believers, penitent, and given to good works: in like sort wee all professe, that God decrees to bestow salvation on none but such as he foreseeth will believe, repent, and become studious of good works. Like enough, many doe wilfully dissemble the true state of the Question between us: others ignorantly mistake it. The question is not whether God decrees to bestow salvation on such as he foreseeth will believe, and reject those from salvation whom he foreseeth will not believe; but of the order of reason between these decrees of God, and the foresight of obedience on the one side, and disobedience on the other; that is, whether like as faith, repentance, and good works in men of ripe years doe

doe precede their salvation, as disposing causes thereunto; so the fore-sight of faith, repentance, and good works; precede election, as disposing causes or pre-requisites thereunto. In like manner on the other side, whether, as finall perseverance in sinne precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; So finall perseverance in sinne as foreseen by God precedes reprobation as the decree of Damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof: So that the argument here mentioned (which is all his strength in this place) rightly applyed must runne thus. Faith, repentance, and good works actually existent precede salvation, as the disposing causes thereunto; therefore faith, repentance, and good works foreseen precede election, as the disposing causes thereunto; and what is this, but as good as in expresse termes to professe, that election is of faith, repentance, and good works: though it be in direct contradiction unto Saint Paul, professing in *terminis* (to speak in this Divines language) that the purpose of God according to election is not of works. So on the other side, Finall perseverance in sinne precedes damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof; therefore finall perseverance in sinne foreseen, precedes the decree of damnation, as the meritorious cause thereof. And then what is to make reprobation to be of evill works, if this be not? Whereas Saint Paul, look by what arguments he proves that election is not of good works, *viz.* because before Jacob and Esau were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said of them the Elder shall serve the Younger: by the same argument it is equally evident that Reprobation is not of evill works. Yet we acknowledge an exact conformity between Gods decrees and the execution thereof: because like as God damnes no man but for sinne, so he decreed to damne no man but for sinne: where sinne is in each place made the meritorious cause of damnation, not of the decree of damnation. And like as God bestowes salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works, so he decreed to bestow salvation on no man of ripe years, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, and good works; where faith repentance and good works, are in each place made the disposing causes to salvation, but not to election. There was never any so madde (faith Aquinas) as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating, and Why? but because so is the cause of predestination to be enquired into, as the cause of Gods will is enquired into: but formerly he had shewed that there can be no cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing: Now let every one judge whether the act of reprobation, be not as clearly the act of Gods will, as the act of predestination, and consequently whether it be not equally as mad a course (in Aquinas his judgement) to devise a cause of reprobation, as to devise a cause of predestination on the part of Gods will. And no marvail, for the act of Gods will is eternall, all the works of the creature are temporall: Then, the act of Gods will is God himselfe, for there is no accident in God; and therefore they may as well set themselves to devise a cause of God, as a cause of Gods will. His phrase of casting off, is ambiguous; if it signifieth the denyall of salvation, it followeth disobedience; if it signifieth the deniall of grace, it precedes disobedience, in what kind forever.

3. Our *velle* and *facere* are both temporall; in God it is otherwise; for his deeds are temporall, and may admit the works of men precedaneous thereunto; but his resolutions are his decrees, and they are all eternall, and can admit no work of man precedaneous thereunto; yet is God as just in the one as in the other. For like as he damnes no man but for sinne, so he never decreed to damne any man but for sinne; But as touching the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance, in the granting and denying of this, the Apostle plainly tells us, he proceeds meerly according to the good pleasure of his will; as when he saith, *The Lord hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth*: And here also God is as just in his decrees as in his executions. For if it be just with him, to give this grace to whom he will, and deny it to whom he will; it is as just with him, to decree the giving of it to whom he will; and the denying of it also to whom he will. And why shall not the Lord take liberty to cure infidelity and hardnesse of heart in whom he will, as he cured it in Manasses and Saul; and leave it uncured in whom he will, as he left it uncured in many a proud Pharisee, and proud Philosopher,

Absolute Reprobation not &c.

notwithstanding all their Morality they boasted of? Very seasonably he confesseth Gods will to be omnipotent and irresistible, when nevertheless, he makes him to will the salvation of all Reprobates, though not one of them is saved. But by that which followes, by will omnipotent and irresistible, it seems he understandeth only will absolute, which he distinguisheth from will conditionate, which can be no other (I suppose) then this, my will is that all and every one shall be saved, in case he believe and repent. Now seeing it is as true, that 'tis Gods will that they shall be damned, in case they believe not and repent not, let every sober man judge, whether this deserve to be accounted, a will of saving rather then a will of damning; especially in case all men naturally, are farre more prone to infidelity and impenitency, then to faith and repentance. As for a will conditionate in God, like enough this Author carryeth it hand over head without distinction, as he doth many other things besides: whereas no such will is agreeable to the divine nature, *quoad actum volentis*, as touching the act of willing, as both *Bradwardine* by clear reason, and *Piscator* out of the word of God have demonstrated, but only *quoad res volitas*, as touching the things willed by him.

4. I have shewed the poverty of his performances, by the particular examination of every place alleadged by him, and made it plain, how he betraies his own nakednesse of interpretation of Scripture, and of argumentation throughout; and therewithall, the vanity of this his boast, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, doth contradict these plain Scriptures. But he like a brave fellow well conceited of his achievements, and having thereby gotten some authority to himselfe, is bold to give his word, that it contradicts also the whole course of Scripture; which I verily believe he is as well able to performe, as he hath performed the former; and very judiciously takes upon him to distinguish between the whole course of Scriptures, and a few places pickt up here and there, as if they were no part of the whole course of Scripture: Belike by reason of their obscurity, as he pretends, no matter if they were expunged; like as owles are offended with day-light. Our Saviour tells us of some that loved darknesse rather then light, because their deeds were evill. None hate the light of Gods truth, more then such as are possessed with errours, as with familiar spirits, especially when they have been found to play the Apostates from Gods truth. Whether I have dashed my selfe upon the rocks of *Austins* censure, by contradicting any Scripture that he hath brought, or only his corrupt and vile interpretation and accommodation of them, let the indifferent judge. Yet what more plain then this, Gods purpose of election is not of works; especially compared with the manner how Saint Paul proves it. What more plain then this? God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. It is apparent he utterly declines the criticall point of these controversies, which is as touching Gods giving grace, even the grace of faith and repentance; and of what spirit that savoureth let every one judge. As for interpreting any place, we doe not abridge his liberty in interpreting it after what manner he thinks good, but we are ready to weigh it, and if we find it too light, to esteem of it as it deserves: neither doe we refuse to take into consideration, what he or any of his complices are pleased to insist upon.

DISCOURSE.





DISCOURSE.

The Second sort of Arguments Convincing drawn from Gods Attributes.

SECT. I.

As touching the Generall.

SEcondly it fights with some principall Attributes of God, therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own glorious nature, and incompatible with those excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himselfe to men.

Two things are here to be premised.

1. That Gods chief Attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified, which are Mercy, Justice, Truth, &c. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these amongst men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and Sovereignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his Dominion and Authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

1. Power is no vertue, but mercy, justice, and truth are; acts of power are not Morally good of themselves, but are made good or evill by their concomitants: if they be accompanied with justice, mercy, &c. they are good, if otherwise, they are naught. For *justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur*.

2. Power and Sovereignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. *Saul* shewed his authority and power to the full, in slaying the Lords Priests; and *Nebuchadnezzar* in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and *Daniell* into the Lyons Denne; but no mercy, nor justice, nor any thing else that was good.

2. The second thing that is to be preconsidered is, that justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature with those vertues in men, though infinitely different in degree (as light in the aire, is the same with light in the Sunne in nature, not in degrees) and that which is just, mercifull, and upright in men, is so in God too. And by these vertues in our selves, and such acts as are conformable to them, *tantum expede Hirculem*, we may safely measure the same in God: For otherwise these things would follow.

1. The common and received distinction of Divine Attributes, into communicable and incommunicable, would fall to the ground: for against it this might be said; that the mercy, justice, truth, and other vertues that are in us, are not Gods perfections in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

2. Men cannot be truly said, to be made after Gods image, *Gen. 1. 27*. Nor when they are regenerated, to be renewed after the same image, *Col. 3. 10*. And to be made partakers of the Divine nature, *2 Pet. 1. 4*. That Picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in its parts and lineaments clearly resemble him; nor can we be truly the image of God, in respect of our graces, if in these graces there be not a resemblance of Gods Attributes.

3. We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded; *Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect*, *Math. 5. 48*. and *be ye holy as I am holy*. Nor when we shew forth mercy, justice, and truth in our actions, can we be properly said to imitate God, if these be one thing in God, and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, *viz.* that Gods mercy, justice, and truth, are three of his chief Attributes, in the exercise of which he takes himselfe to be much glorified, and that we are to measure these Attributes by the same vertues in ourselves. I come to the proove of my second reason against absolute reprobation, which is, that it opposeth some of Gods principall Attributes, particularly his justice, mercy, and truth.

T W I S S E.

Consideration.

I Cannot but wonder at the performances of the true Author of this Discourse, in comparing that which goes before; with that which comes after; His poverty of argumentation out of Scripture, and the exuberancy of his discourse following. Before he was in some straits, but now he seems to have gotten Sea room enough: yet this is my comfort, I seem to perceive out of what chimney all this smoak proceeds, and to be as well acquainted with the spirit that breatheth here, as if I were at his elbow while he penned it. *Agnoſco veteris veſtigia flammæ*: ſuch like are Doctor *Jacksons* diſcourſes; and him I have known of old, and his Ephreſion alſo; I profeſſe willingly of Scholar acquaintance, they were my greateſt and deareſt; But ſeeing it hath pleaſed God to put ſuch^a difference between us; I would have both them and the World know, I doe as little regard them as feare them.

Arminius himſelfe is never more plauſible, then in ſuch like extravagant diſcourſes as a poſitive Theologue: But theſe inſpirations were never derived from him; they are flowers of another garden. Theſe have been ſhapen in a more Philoſophicall brain whereof ſome having gotten the reputation, give Oracles therehence, firſt to forme interpretations of Scriptures, in congruity to theſe Theorems, as the true Author bluſheth not to profeſſe; which when he hath perſwaded the World of, I ſee no cauſe to the contrary, but he may adventure a degree farther, and perſwade the burning of the Bible, ſo farre as it concerneth the Doctrin of Predeſtination and Reprobation, Grace and Free-will, and content themſelves with theſe magiſteriall precepts, as moſt ſufficient and ſoveraigne for the endoctrinations of the Chriſtian World in theſe poynts. But he might have ſpared his pains in proving this conſequence, *that if our Doctrine of Reprobation be contradictory to Gods principall attributes it cannot be true.* I ſay he might have ſpared the prooſe hereof, for all that he brings in prooſe of this is but darkneſſe in compariſon of the domeſticall light, and ſelfe-evidence, which this conſequence carryeth with it. His premiſes here, and diſcourſe thereof is like unto the Turkes parly before the encounter, when he challenged any one of *Scanderbegs* army to a ſingle combate. For as that parley was meere complementall, and to no purpoſe, ſave only, as he might conceit, to abate the fervor of his oppoſite, who longed to be dealing with him; ſo this introduction, I find to be of no Scholaſticall uſe in the world, but meere Politick, to work ſome impreſſion upon the readers affections, where by it may come to paſſe, that when he reads of Gods mercy and juſtice, as here it is ſet forth, he may be the more enclined to judge thereof, according to the genius of human mercy and juſtice. Yet I am content to give my ſelfe to be wrought upon by theſe pretty contemplations, as farre as I ſhall be convicted of any truth and ſobriety in them: though I willingly profeſſe I am very ſuſpicious (for I love to betray my infirmities) that there is little or no truth and ſobriety at all in them.

1. Now becauſe he hopes to hatch much advantage unto his cauſe out of theſe attributes, and to that purpoſe he ſitts very long upon them, though his market may be never the better for all that. He tells us theſe are Gods chief attributes, and as it appeareth by that which followeth, his practice is to diſparage his power (which I call the Lords Sovereignty) in compariſon to theſe; Now it ſeems they are chiefe indeed in his opinion, for the furthering of his cauſe; but as for any abſolute chieftie they have in God, I am not as yet acquainted therewith, what I may be by this Authors performances I know not; yet in the next page ſave one, he profeſſeth expreſſely, *That all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another*; wherein I doe much approve his judgement, as favouring of more depth then this, which yet I think not that he, who pretends to be the Author of this diſcourſe, in reſpect of his minority, ſhould be likely to broach; as for other reſpects of principality, I ſhall be ready to take notice of them in due place. But when he ſaith, *God is moſt glorified in the manifeſtation of mercy, juſtice, and truth*, it is a very odde phraſe: For it is one thing to be glorious, another thing to be glorified; dare he deny that God is as glorious in his

his power and sovereignty, as in his mercy, justice, and truth? As for the glorifying of him, that depends upon the will of the creature. It may be some are more thankful unto God, for blessing them with health, and riches, and honour, and preferment; then for bestowing his Gospell upon them; but will it follow herehence, that his goodnesse in giving riches, &c. is more glorious then his goodnesse is seen in giving us his Word and Gospell? We read that when God laid the foundations of the earth, *the Starres of the morning praised God together, and all the children of God rejoyced, Job. 38. 7.* did these Angells glorify God for his mercy, justice, and truth, in the creating of them? We read sometimes of Gods power, sometimes of his wisdom manifested in the Creation, as *Jer. 10. 11.* and *51. 11.* and *Psal. 136. 5.* *Jer. 10. 12.* &c. But no where have I read (that I can remember) he made the World by his mercy, justice, or truth; and *Revel. 4. 11.* I find the glory of power given unto God in the creation, by the 24 Elders, but neither there, nor any where else (that I know) is the glory of his mercy, justice, and truth, given unto God therein. *Thou art worthy O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy will sake, they have been and are created.* And albeit men faile in giving God the glory of his power and wisdom as they should, will it follow herehence, that God is not so much to be glorified for his power and wisdom, as for mercy, justice, and truth? yet who failes in this, that failes not in the use of the Lords Prayer; the conclusion whereof is this, *For thine is the Kingdome, and power, and glory?* And indeed albeit Power and Wisdom may be shewed other waies, then in the way of mercy, justice, and truth; yet Gods mercy, justice, and truth, cannot be shewed without the simultaneous demonstration of his power and wisdom: And therefore when God comes to make good his gracious promise, for the delivering of Israel out of Egypt: which cannot be denied to have been a singular work of mercy, justice, and truth; the Lord professeth that then he would make himselfe known unto them by the name, *Jehovah*, by which name he was not known before. The Incarnation of the Sonne of God, was it not an admirable work, as well in the way of power, and wisdom, as in the way of mercy, justice, and truth? I am apt to confound Gods justice with his truth, ere I am aware, without having that awfull regard to the authority of this writer, as perhaps may seem fit: But I hope it is a pardonable fault, considering my education hitherto in divinity; whereby I have attained only thus farre, to the acknowledgement of justice Divine; for justice consisteth, in giving every one his due; now this due being either in respect of God, or the creature: Justice Divine in giving God his due, *Aquinas* hath taught me, that it is all one with Gods wisdom, promoting his ends by congruous means; justice Divine in giving the creature his due, I have learnt to depend wholly on Gods determination, manifested by his promises and threatnings, and this is commonly called *justitia fidelitatis*, which I take to be all one with truth. But I am very willing to be better informed by this Author, and I give my selfe to his contemplations, to have my thoughts fashioned by them as they can; and if hitherto they have not transformed me into a new Creed, I cannot help that. Now if it be so that Gods power and wisdom accompany the demonstration of his mercy, justice, and truth, I cannot see how God is honoured more by the exercise of the one sort, then of the other, but rather on the contrary. So that albeit a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his dominion and authority; yet I doe not easily perceive, how God is renowned more for his clemency, equity, &c. then for his power, &c. yet again this seems to me a very poore argument; to conclude Clemency to be a chiefe attribute of God, because men doe more magnify him for that, then for his Power. For consider, a Malefactor going to execution, is called back and saved by the Kings pardon, this man (be sure) will magnify the King more for his clemency in saving him, then he would for his justice in putting him to death: but will it follow herehence, that Clemency is a more chiefe attribute of a King then justice? *Solomon* the greatest of Kings hath said, the Throne is established by Justice: and it was wont to be said, *fiat justitia, ruat orbis*. No such thing is said of Mercy. Then again the King could not doe this but by vertue of his prerogative, yet the Malefactor magnifies him not for his prerogative, but for the favourable use of it for his good, for that is all he respects: yet aske I pray any man of judgement, which is the chiefer attribute of a King, and more glorious of the two; his prerogative or his clemency? Clemency is a very vulgar vertue, but the royall prerogative is peculiar to one; A Thiefe after a robbery committed on the high-way,

meeting

The Nature of Gods

meeting with a begger that beggeth a penny, if he astonish him with the gift of twelve pence, the begger is very likely more highly to magnify him, then any honest man going on the way, that bestowes but an halfe penny upon him; yet, Whose liberality is the greater of the two? Carnall men renowne others for the benefit they receive by them; not according to their true worth: yet there is a farther difference; humane authority may be abused, and Sovereignty on earth is not alwaies joyned with good Morality, much lesse with Piety; but in case a man could not sinne, the more honour and authority is laid upon him, the more glorious should he be; as being backt with the greater power to execute his goodnesse. Thus it is with God, it is impossible he should abuse his sovereignty; yea his mercy and justice are one and the same reality with his power: what a vanity then is it to discourse as this Author doth, in preferring one attribute of God before another, as if God were more glorious in the one then in the other. But he hath farther reasons for this, let us consider them: 1. *Power (saith he) is no vertue, nor morally good, but mercy justice and truth are.* I answer: Though it be so, yet who will say, the glory of vertue is greater then the glory of power?

2. Especially considering, that vertue is common to the meanest.
3. A little vertue joyned with power, shall bring forth farre better fruits, then a great deale of vertue without power.
4. Though it be so in man, whose power may be abused, shall we transferre it to God, whose power cannot be abused, his power and his goodnesse being all one?
5. Morall vertues denote a goodnesse removeable where it is, obtainable where it is not; but no such goodnesse can be found in God, and consequently no Morall vertue in proper speech, whatsoever is in him, that being naturall and essentiall unto him.

6. Lastly, to power only and sovereignty we owe obedience, and not to goodnesse, and jurisdiction is farre more glorious then subjection. Yet by the way it is untrue (in my judgement) that *acts of Power are made good by being accompanied with justice*, speaking of Morall goodnesse; as acts of vertue alone they are morally good, not as acts of power. If *justum oportet esse quod laudem meretur*; then justice if not alone, yet chiefly, shall be that whereby one is renowned: yet herehence it followes, that every act of Gods power shall *laudem mereri*; because it is impossible that any thing he doth should be otherwise then just, such a *justitia condecencie* followeth all his actions; otherwise we must grant, that God hath power to doe that which is unjust.

2. And accordingly, though power humane and Angelicall, may be shewed in barbarous actions; yet power Divine cannot; let him doe whatsoever he is able, it shall not be unjust; let God turne all the World into nothing, another manner of destruction then that of *Sauls* slaying the Lords Priests, or *Nebuchadnezzars* casting the three Children into the fiery Furnace, yet dares this Author say, that God herein should be unjust.

I come to the second of his premises.

2. We have had a tast of this Authors faculty in roaving at large, and within the Horizon of his own braine, we shall drink a deeper draught of it ere we part. And once again I willingly professe, it cannot enter into my believe, that these conceits have dropt from the fancy of a young Divine; some old beaten Naturalist rather doth imploy his braine to doe the Arminians this service. I never found hitherto that Arminius, or any of his Batavian followers have thus discoursed, that *justice, mercy, and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those vertues in men, though infinitely differing in degree.* I conceive Arminius (though wild enough in his 20 reasons, and especially in his reasons drawn from the consideration of Gods justice) to be more Orthodoxe, and farre more Scholasticall then so; though I nothing doubt, we have a generation amongst us, that affect to have all learning in Divinity, to goe by their rules of Philosophy, and yet the basest Philosophy I think that ever was devised. And this Author whosoever he be, seems herein to discourse after such a manner, as if he were of the number of those that heard the Devill read Lectures through a grate in the University of Toledo. If *justice mercy and truth in God, are the same in nature, with those vertues that are in men*, then there is something in man, that is the very essence of God; For undoubtedly whatsoever is in God, is of his essence; yet those are they that attribute Manicheisme unto us. And seeing the vertues of man are accidents, it followes that that, which under the same name is attributed to God, is either an accident in God,

or if it be his essence, then the essence of God, is of the same nature with accidents in man.

Thirdly; hence it followes, that the Divine perfections consist of degrees, and consequently must needs be accidentall unto him, not substantiall; for substance admits no degrees.

Fourthly; if justice humane be of the same nature with justice Divine, it followeth, not only that, that which is just in man is just with God, but that it must be after the same manner just; that like as mens justice consisteth in obedience to Gods law, implying subjection thereunto: So justice Divine must consist in obedience to Gods law implying subjection. And like as man is obliged to be just, in the same manner God is obliged to be just. And consequently like as *Saul* sinned and became unjust in slaying the Lords Priests, so had God been unjust in doing the like.

Fifthly; man sinneth in suffering his brother to sinne, when it lies in his power to keepe him from sinne; and consequently, if that which is unjust with man is unjust with God, God sinneth as often as he suffereth any sinne to be committed in the world, for undoubtedly he could prevent it. *August. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Nos certe, si eos, in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros, perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia illa permittit fieri ante oculos suos; quæ unquam si voluisset, nullâ ratione permitteret.* But let us see how he proves this, for he adventures upon it like a tall fellow, and that with variety of demonstration.

1. The first is drawn from the received distinction of divine Attributes, namely into such as are communicable unto the creature, and such as are incommunicable; but here he conceales his Authority. But let him bring forth the testimony of any Divine, that maintains any Attribute Divine to be the same *quoad nomen & nominis rationem*, with any Attribute humane. Yet we may talke of Gods Attributes so, as for distinction sake to say, some are such as are also Attributed to man, others are not; without maintaining, that humane vertues are of the same nature with Attribute Divine. Life is a Divine Attribute, it is also attributed to man, to a beast, to a plant; But will any wise man say that the life of God is of the same nature with the life of a Man, of a Beast, of a Plant? What more equivocall then the word *Canis*? Attributed to a Starre, to a Fish, to a Foure-footed creature on the Earth; I answer much more equivocall is every thing in common attributed to God and Man; For whatsoever is in God, is his Essence, but between the Essence of God, and the essence of Man, there is a vaster difference, then between the essence of a Starre, of a Fish, of a Dogge; how much more difference is there between the Essence of God, and an accident in man, such as his vertues are. In a word, the vertue of Man is of an annihilable condition, and if it be of the same nature with something in the nature of God, why should not something in the nature of God be of an annihilable condition? I marvaile not if men of this generation are apt to professe that they will turne Atheists rather then concur in some poynts with the Contra-Remonstrants; for their discourses breath Atheisme in a very high degree. It is a question among Schoolemen, whether *Ens* (the most abstract notion of all other) be predicated univocally of God and the creature; the Dominicans utterly deny it; *Scotus* maintains the contrary with some curiosity of argumentation; but his Arguments are answered by the Dominicans and particularly by *Versor* on the Metaphysicks; but never, I think, was it heard of *Scotus* or any other (till now) that the vertues of man are of the same nature with the Divine Attributes, differing only in degree.

I come to his second Argument.

2. It was wont to be accounted that man was the image of God, not in respect of the qualities of his mind and will only, but even in respect of his Essence also; And some have been anciently condemned for denying this: why then doe we not say that the Essence of man is of the same nature with the Essence of God differing only in degree. In the next place the power of understanding and liberty of will in man a bodily creature, brings him nearest to God, of all bodily creatures: it was wont to be said that all other creatures had *vestigia Dei*, but man was *imago Dei*; as in whom is represented the Divine Nature as intelligent and free; so farre forth, as a compound creature of

The nature of Gods

body and soule can represent him; but, who hath ever said that the understanding of God was of the same nature with the understanding of man: and the will of God of the same nature with the will of man? It is well known that the understanding, and will humane, are but naturall faculties in man; but the understanding and will Divine, is the very essence of God; and if mans essence be not of the same nature with his faculties, doth it become us to professe that the essence of God is of the same nature with the naturall faculties of man? As for the graces of Gods spirit, what are these but the three Theologicall vertues; all other are but Morall vertues sanctified by these; Now shew me what Faith there is in God of the same nature with our Faith differing only in degree? What hope there is in God of the same nature with our hope, differing only in degree, what charity there is in God of the same nature with our Charity, differing only in degree. These indeed being of all other the most peculiar fruits of regeneration, whereby we are renewed after the image of God, as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures, should have Attributes divine answerable unto them (if any) of the same nature with them, differing only in degree. Yet herein (as I conceive) consists not so much our participation of the Divine Nature, as in that, the Spirit of God the Father, and God the Sonne is communicated unto us, given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions spirituall in us.

3. And albeit these Attributes, which in common doe denominate God and man, are one thing in God, and in man another: yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God; and striving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures; like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator. And that I may represent some authority for my discourse, whereas this Author represents none for his, it is a poynt generally received in the Schooles, that in this weaknesse of our understanding, we come to know what God is by negation rather then by affirmation. Capreolus upon the first of the Sentences Dist. 2. Quest. 1. rehearseth diverse passages out of Aquinas to this purpose, as out of 1. *Contra Gentes* cap. 14.

In consideratione Divine substantie præcipue utendum est via remotivæ. Nam Divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, suâ excedit immensitate. Et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus, cognoscendo quid est, sed aliquantulum ejus notitiam habemus, cognoscendo quid non est; tantoque ejus notitiæ magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum poterimus ab eo remove. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscitur, quanto differentias ejus ab alio plenius intuemur. Quid in consideratione Divine substantie non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus, nec distinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere possumus; eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas. Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo, quia est, & quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens & ab omnibus remotus: & hoc est ultimum & perfectissimum nostre cognitionis in hac vitâ, ut Dionysius dixit lib. de Mysticâ Theologiâ. Cum Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur, quod quidem contingit, cum de Deo, quid non sit, cognosci-

In the consideration of the Divine Essence, we must chiefly use the way of negation: for the Divine Essence, through its immensity, doth exceed every forme that our understanding can conceive: So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is; but after a sort we have the knowledge thereof, by knowing what it is not. And so much nearer doe we approach to the knowledge thereof, the more we are able to remove from the nature of God. For every thing is known so much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we doe behold how it differeth from other things. Now in the consideration of the Divine essence, we cannot take any thing as the Genus thereof; neither can we apprehend its distinction from other things, by differences affirmative; and therefore we must apprehend it by differences negative. The same Thomas in his Third Book *Contra Gent.* cap. 47. By the effects of God (saith he) we may attain to know that God is, and that he is the cause of other things eminent above them, and removed from them all: and

this is the last and most perfect degree of our knowledge in this life, as saith Dionysius in his Book of Mysticall Divinity: We are conjoynd with God as unknown which verily comes to passe, when we know of God what he is not, but

Attributes in Generall.

127

mus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum: unde & ad huiusmodi sublimissimæ cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, dicitur de Mose Exod. 20. quod accessit ad caliginem in qua Deus erat.

what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us; and therefore to demonstrate our ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses Exod. 20. that he came unto the darknesse where God was.

The same *Capreolus* proceeds to shew out of *Aquinas* in 1 *Sent. Dist. 8. q. 1. art. 1. ad 4.* How we must make progresse in our knowledge of God, by way of remotion or negation.

Quando, inquit, in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis, primo negamus corporalia, & Secundo intellectualia, secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas & sapientia, & tunc remanet in intellectu Quod est, & nihil amplius, unde est, sicut in quadam confusione.

When (saith he) we proceed by way of remotion, or negation, in searching out the Divine nature, first we deny of him all corporall things, and secondly we deny of him all intellectuall things, after such a sort as they are found in the creatures, as goodnesse and wisdom, (mark this well for these and such like are the vertues

which this Author saith are of the same nature in God and man differing only in degree) and then there remains in the understanding, *id quod est* (as much as to say *τὸ ἔνς*) and nothing more; and hence the understanding remains as in a certain confusion. And indeed the notion of entity is most generall, most abstract, and if any notion signifies one and the same nature, such as may be affirmed of God and the creature, surely this is it. Now observe *Aquinas* his judgement concerning this, out of the same *Capreolus* in these words.

Ad ultimum autem, Essentiam ipsam, secundum quod est in creaturis, ab ipso removemus, & tunc remanet (intellectus noster) in quadam tenebrâ ignorantie; secundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viæ pertinet, optime Deo conjungimur, ut Dionysius dicit, & hæc est caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur.

To the last (I answer) the very entity or existence in the creatures we remove from God, and then our understanding remains in the darknesse of ignorance; according to which ignorance, so farre forth as it pertains to our condition (as *Viatores*) and in the way, we are conjoynd with God in the best manner; as *Denis* saith: and this is the darknes, wherein God is said to dwell.

By this let any man judge, whether this Authors discourse be not as opposite to the discourse of *Aquinas*, as touching the nature of God in resemblance to ours, as the Antipodes are to us. And withall I doe not find throughout his discourse following, that he makes any use of these premises. And indeed there is no need of them at all: For if he cannot prove this Doctrine of ours repugnant either to Gods Mercy, or to his Truth, or to his Justice, these premises will stand him in no stead: and if he can prove it to be repugnant to those Attributes of his, his argument shall stand in the same force, as well without these premises as with them.

Now, how well he makes good the repugnancy of our Doctrine to Gods mercy, we are in the next place to consider.





DISCOURSE.

SECT. II.

As touching the First Speciall. Gods Mercy.

1. **I**T opposeth Gods mercy. God is mercifull. It is a great part of his Title. *Exod. 34. 6. Mercifull and gracious. He is mercy in the abstract: 1 John 4. 16. God is love. A Father of mercies, and God of all consolations. 2 Cor. 1. 3. Σωτήρ, a Saviour of men. 1 Tim. 4. 10. Two waies is the mercy of God spoken of in Scripture, 1. absolutely, 2. comparatively. 1. Absolutely; and so it is set out in lofty and stately termes; its called rich mercy. Ephes. 2. 4. Great kindnesse. John 4. 2. Abundant mercy. 1 Pet. 1. 2. Love without height or depth, breadth or length, or any dimensions: love passing knowledge. Ephes. 3. 18, 19.*

2. Comparatively. It is compared with his own justice, and with the love that dwells in the creatures, and is advanced above both.

1. It is sometimes compared with his justice, and advanced above that, not in respect of its essence; for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; but in other things that concerne the expressions of it, particularly in theie;

1. In the naturalnesse and dearnesse of it unto God. It is said of mercy, *Mich. 7. 18. It pleaseth him, or he delights in mercy, but justice and judgement is called his strange work, alienum a natura sua. Isai. 28. 21. He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men. Lam. 3. 33.*

2. In the frequent exercise of it selfe, *Exod. 34. 6. He is slow to anger but abundant in goodnesse. Mercies are bestowed every day, judgements inflicted but now and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy. 2 Chron. 36. 15. All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people. Isai. 65. 2. that is, I have been patient a long time, and in that long day I have not been idle, but employed in exhortations, promises, and many mercies, whereby I might doe you good. God waits long for mens conversion, as the Marriner for the turning of the wind.*

3. In its amplitude or objects to whom it is extended. *Exod. 20. 5. Visiting the iniquities of Fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation, but shewing mercy to thousands:* implying that his mercy is more largely extended then his justice: and that look how much three or foure come short of a thousand, so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in exercise of it.

4. In the occasions that move God to exercise them: It is a great matter that moves God to punish, as we may see, *Gen. 6. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13. When the wickednesse of man was great upon the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way, then God thinks of punishment. He would not destroy the Amorites, till their wickednesse was full, Gen. 15. 16. Quoties volui (saith Christ to Jerusalem) Math. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered you, that is, I have not taken advantages against you: nor upon the first, second, or third unkindnesse cast you off, small matters have not moved me to destroy thee O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare man? When God had examined Sodome, and found their sinnes to be answerable to their crye, yet then for tenne righteous mens sakes would he have spared Sodome. Gen. 18. 32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet by searching, could have found one man that did execute judgement, and seek the truth Jer. 5. 1. What a small and slender Humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time. 1 King. 21. 29. And the repentance of Nineve, whose wickednesse cryed to the Lord for vengeance; Jonas 1. 2. did easily procure her a pardon.*

Thus is Gods Mercy advanced above his justice.

2. It is also compared with the affection of a Father to his Sonne, of a tender mother to her child, and of the most affectionate brute creatures to their young ones, and set above them all. It goes beyond a Fathers affection to his Sonne. *Math. 7. 11. If you that are evil, can give good gifts to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that aske him? What doth this [quando magis] imply? but that Gods love outstrips a Fathers? and so it doth a Mothers too, Isai. 49. 15. Can a Woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the Sonne of her womb? yea she may forget; yet will I not forget thee. Women are compassionate towards their Children, because they are the fruit of their wombes, and are a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children to whom they are Nurles, as well as Mothers, to their sucking children: and yet Women may forget their children, their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children. And as if those comparisons were too small to expresse Gods affection to his creatures, he proceeds farther, and compares himselfe, with one of the most affectionate Females, among unreasonable creatures, the [Hen] Math. 23. 37. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how oft would I have gathered thee, as a Hen gathereth her chicken under her wings? No bird (saith August.) expresth such tender love to her young*

young ones, as the Hen doth. *Videmus nificare Passeres quoslibet, ante oculos nostros, hirundines, circum-
as, columbas quotidie videmus nificare, quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parentes esse non agnoscimus. Gal-
lina vero sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiam ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intel-
liges: Ita fit alis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta, ut (quemadmodum
dixi) etsi filios non videas matrem tamen intelligas.* No Fowles discover themselves to be Mothers, so
much as Hennes doe: others when we see them in their nest with their young, we know them to be
Mothers, but no way else: but the Hen discovers her selfe to be so, even then when her Chickens doe
not follow her, her feathers stand up, her wings hang downe, shee clocks mournfully, and goes feebly;
so that we may know her to be a Mother, when yet we cannot see her brood. He hath also such an-
other speech in another place, and concludes it with these Words, *Quare ergo Dominus, nisi propter
hoc, Gallina esse voluit, in sanctâ Scripturâ dicens.* O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, quoties volui te congregare ut
gallina, &c. Our Lord and Saviour did therefore compare himselfe to a Hen, rather then any other
creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones; even when they are out of her
sight.

Aug. in Psal.
58. pag. 212.
B.C.

By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of Gods mercy, especially in the expressi-
ons of it to Mankind; To which testimonies let me adde these few more, *Psalm. 8. 4. Lord what is man
that thou art mindfull of him, &c. Prov. 8. 31. In the children of men did the wisdom of God delight him-
selfe, when the foundations of the earth were appointed. He took not the nature of Angels but the seed of A-
braham. Heb. 2. 16. When the bountifullnesse and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared. Tit. 3. 4.
(φιλανθρωπία) the originall word is: where doe we read of φιλαγγελία or φιλοκτησία. More
mercifull is God to man, then to all other creatures.*

With such a mercy cannot stand such a decree; absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may
(me thinks) more properly call God a Father of cruelties, then of mercies, and [harred then of
love:] and the Devills names, [Satan and Ἀπολλύων] an adversary, a destroyer may be fitter for
him then Σωτήρ a Saviour; which I tremble to think. Doth mercy please him, when he of his own
will only hath made such a decree; as shewes farre more severity towards poore men, then mercy? Is
he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of
men in Hell torments for ever; and for one sinne once committed, hath shut up the greater part of
men under invincible unbelief and damnation? Is his mercy abundant, doth it extend it selfe farther
then justice, when it is tacked up so short, limited to a few chosen ones, when too for one at least,
(take in all parts of the World) are unavoidably cast away, out of his only will and pleasure? Or
doth his love passe knowledge, when we see daily greater love then this in men and other creatures?
What Father and Mother (that have not only cast off Fatherhood and Motherhood, but humanity
too) (so the Authors Copy hath it) would determine their children to certain death, or to cruell
torments worse then death, for one only offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own
persons, but by some other, and only imputed unto them? How much lesse would they give them-
selves to beget Children, and bring them forth, that they might bring them to the rack, fire, gallows,
and such like tortures and deaths?

But to deliver things a little more closely. Foure things (in my conceit) being well and distinctly
considered, doe make it apparent, that this decree is incompatible with Gods mercy.

1. That Adams sinne was the sinne of mans nature only, and no mans personall transgression but
Adams; it was neither committed, nor consented to by any of his posterity in their own persons.

2. That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generation, for then the finnes of our Grand-fa-
thers and Fathers, would be our finnes also, because we come from them: and they would be our
finnes so much the more, by how much nearer we are to the stock, from which we doe immediatly
spring, then to the first root and common Father of Mankind. It is the sinne of our nature by impu-
ration only, it was Gods will that he should stand up for a publique person, and that in him all men
should stand or fall. This is generally granted by Divines, and particularly by that excellent servant
of God M. Calvin. *Neq; enim factum est (saith he) ut a salute exciderant omnes unius parentis culpa. And
a little after (he saith) Hoc cum natura nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili Dei consilio profectum esse minime ob-
scurem est. And a little after, thus: unde factum est, ut tot gentes una cum eorum liberis, infantibus, aeter-
na morte involveret lapsus Ada absq; remedio, nisi quia Deus ita visum est.*

3. That God did pardon it in Adam, who did actually and voluntarily commit it in his own
person.

4. That Christ came into the World to take away peccatum mundi, the sinne of the World. *Ioh. 1.
29. That God either did or might have satisfied his wronged justice in the blood of the Covenant
for all man kind, and without any impeachment to justice, might have opened a way of Salvation
to all and every man.*

These things being well considered, will make no man (I think) to conclude in his thoughts, that
if there be any such decree, God is not mercifull to man at all: much lesse is he more mercifull (sup-
posing this decree) to men, then he is to other creatures, but more sharpe and severe then he is to o-
ther creatures, to the Devills themselves.

1. To other creatures, because the most of men are determined by his omnipotent decree, to such
a being, as is a thousand times worse then no being at all; whereas other creatures, even the basest
of them, though they perhaps have but a contemptible being, yet they have such a being as is much
better then no being at all: it is farre better not to be at all, then to be eternally miserable without
any possibility of the contrary: for so saith our Saviour speaking of Judas: *It had been good for that
man if he never had been borne.* Men would not have accepted of life and being, when first they entred
upon possession of it, if they had known upon what hard conditions it was to be tendred, and that it
was to be charged with such an interest, as can no waies be recompensed by the benefits of life; or
(did men firmly believe this decree) they would at adventure, with Job, curse their birth-day, be
willingly released from the right of creatures, and desire that their immortall soules might vanish in-
to nothing. What *Minutius* saith of Pagans, might be truly affirmed of men in generall; *Maluit ex-
tingui penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari.* Nay Parents out of pitty to their Children, would wish that
they

Math. 26. 24.

Minut. Felix
P. 113.

The Sublapfarian Doctrine

they might be borne Snakes and Toads, rather then men; and creatures, whose being shall at last be resolved into nothing, rather then immortall Spirits.

2. Then to the very Devills also, who are set forth in Scripture, to be the greatest Spectacles of Gods wrath, and irefull severity. In one thing this decree makes most men and Devills equall, *Vtrisque, desperata salus*, they are both sure to be damned; but in three things men are in a farre worse condition by it.

1. In their appoyntment to Hell, not for their own proper personall sinnes, for which the Devills suffer, but for the sinnes of another man, made theirs only *By Gods order and pleasure*.

2. In their inevitable destination to destruction, under a shew of the contrary. The Devills, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they look for no other: but men, even those that are appoynted unto wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of Salvation, and made to believe that the whole businesse is put into their hands; so as that if they doe perish, it is not [*defectu misericordiae*] because God hath no mercy on them, but [*defectu voluntatis propriae*], because they will not be saved, when yet there is no such mercy. Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable, then the condition of men in this respect, is made by this decree to be worse then the state of Devills.

3. In their obligation to believe, and the aggravation of their punishment by not believing. The Devills, because they must be damned, are not commanded to believe in Christ, nor is their punishment encreased by not believing: but poore men, who (by this decree) can scape Hell no more then the Devills, must yet be tied to believe in Christ, and must have their torments encreased if they believe not. These things being so (I think) I may conclude that this decree of absolute reprobation overthrowes the mercy of God in generall, and toward mankind.

Nor doth that quiet my mind, which is usually answered to these objections; *viz.* That God by this decree, doth fully manifest his justice and his mercy too; his justice towards the Reprobates, and his mercy toward the chosen vessells: and that it is necessary that his decrees shall be so ordered, as that both these may be clearly manifested by them. This (I say) doth not satisfy; for,

1. Gods mercy is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension, and surmounting his justice, in its objects and expressions. Now such a mercy as this, set forth with such glorious titles, clothed with such lovely properties, and exceeding the ability of any mans conception, such a mercy (I say) is not manifested by this decree.

2. Neither is the pure and spotlesse justice of God set forth by this absolute decree, as I now come to shew. this being my second argument, drawn from the Attributes of God, against absolute reprobation.

T W I S S E.

Consideration.

HERE we have a great deale of noyse, and the most wastfull discourse that ever I yet met withall, in the enlarging of a most hungry argument; the answer whereunto himselfe perceives, and sets down (as he thinks good) in a few words, after three large leaves spent in the enlarging of his opposition; namely to this effect; that whatsoever he can say, in the advancing of Gods mercy we willingly acknowledge: but withall we say, this mercy of God which makes God so glorious, is peculiarly manifested towards the vessells of mercy, whom God hath prepared unto glory, in distinction from the vessells of wrath, as we read *Rom. 9. 23.* and that in a higher degree then he hath mentioned; this being one speciall end, why God suffereth with long patience, the vessells of wrath prepared to destruction, *Rom. 9. 22.* namely, *That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory, v. 23.* And after so much froth of words spent to no purpose unlesse to beguile his reader, and dull him with verbosity, that he might not attend, and observe how accurately he performes in the issue, that which he intends. Consider (I beseech you) what a meager and starveling reply he puts to this. *Gods mercy* (saith he) *is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, beyond apprehension;* we grant all this, and adde that it is glorious also; and makes the partakers of it to rejoyce, *with joy unspeakable and glorious;* but this belongs only to them that believe, and to certain who are called *vessells of mercy*, in distinction from *vessells of wrath*, *Rom. 9. 22, 23.* which *vessells of mercy*, in distinction from *vessells of wrath*, must needs be the elect only, in distinction from Reprobates: with what face can he deny, that such a mercy is manifested on the Elect by our Doctrine?

2. I farther adde that such a mercy is not manifested by his Doctrine as by ours, for the glory of Gods mercy consists in this, that it is of free grace pardoning our sinnes, regenerating us, changing our hearts, giving faith and repentance to some, when