



TO THE
Reverend and Learned
M^r IOHN GOODWIN.

S I R,



Have assumed so much boldnesse, as to examine some passages that you have in your Booke (entituled *Redemption Redeemed*) against D. *Twisse*: wherein I believe that you your selfe will acknowledg, that I have carried my selfe as a fair adversary, as an adversary only unto your opinions, and not unto your person, which I love & honour, as in other respects so for the good and great gifts and parts God hath bestowed on you. Many of my friends

have earnestly dissuaded me from this vindication assuring me that I must expect from you instead of a reply, nothing but a libell. But for my part, I shall hope and pray unto the Almighty for better things of you. However I am not hereby deterred from entering into the lists with you, neither shall I deprecate your utmost severity in rationally argumentation, for the discovery of any thing, that you conceive to be weake and unsound in this my discourse. You may perhaps think and say that so small a trifle is unworthy a diversion from your more serious employments; but for that, I am contented that the learned Reader judge betwixt us. Indeed I had long ere this finished an answer unto your whole Book; but that there was a generall, and (as I think) a just expectation, that some in the University of *Cambridge*, who dissented from you, would comply with your faire invitation of them, to declare themselves in some worthy and satisfactory answer to the particulars propounded in your Book: But upon their long silence (which I can neither excuse, nor will I accuse (as being altogether ignorant of the causes thereof) I renewed my thoughts of setting about this worke, and intended in the interim, to have annexed to this piece of D. *Twisse*, a Table referring unto such passages in this, and other of his Books, as doe in great part satisfy whatsoever you have delivered, in your forementioned Treatise, in opposition unto the absolutenesse of Divine Reprobation: But from these resolutions I was quite taken off, by certain information, that the Learned M. *Kendall* (heretofore Fellow of *Exeter* Colledge in the University of *Oxford*) hath undertaken you. But I detain you and the reader too long with Prefacing, I shall therefore presently without more adoe address my selfe unto the encounter with you.

E e e e

In

In three places you except against D. Twisse. I shall consider them severally.

To begin with the first.

MR GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20.

Dr Twisse.

IT is indeed the judgement of some Learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer such, or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to passe, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogisticall or consequentiall necessity) of the coming of it to passe. But that the truth lieth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration. If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to passe in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be, (or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be) must be, yea, and this necessarily. For (doubtlesse God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave naturall causes, generally, to their naturall and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, then ever they will doe, or shall doe. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire shall burne, what combustible matter soever it shall take hold of, or that shall be cast into it, that one sparke of it falling into a barrell of dried Gunpowder, should suddainly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the world, shall be burnt with fire; or that every barrell of dry Gun-powder shall be blown up with sparkes of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lords of Keilah to deliver up David into Sauls hand, in case he had

1 Sam. 23. 12. Stayed in their City, till Sauls coming to demand him: this is evident from the Text. But it did not follow from this permissive decree of God, that therefore these Lords must necessarily deliver up David into Sauls hand: for we know they did it not. So likewise, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane, in respect of a naturall power to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murther, or destroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatsoever, which is simply and purely permissive, doth import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to passe, of the thing so decreed. God permitted

Gen. 2. 16, 17 Adam to eate of every tree in the garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of good and evill only excepted) & therefore certainly had decreed, or intended this permission: yet was not Adam any waies necessitated by any vertue or influence of this decree upon him, to eate of every of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eate of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that, which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this garden following so suddainly after this patent, or permission granted unto him. The reason why no decree of God, that is purely and barely permissive, either induceth or supposeth any necessity of the coming to passe, of what is only so decreed, is this. First, because no such decree doth any waies interesse God to any manner of interposall, either by his wisdom, power, or providence in what kind soever, towards the effecting or bringing to passe of what is so decreed. So that such events, which are no otherwise decreed

creed by God, then thus, are in the same posture of contingency, in the same possibility of being, or not being, wherein they would have been, had there been no such decree at all concerning them. Secondly, neither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary for the bringing of things, so decreed, to passe, which will actually bring them to passe. Though God hath decreed, that a sparke, or coale of fire falling, i. e. in case it shall fall into a barrrell of Gun-powder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such sparke or coale, shall fall into it, without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this powder, will not come to passe. Or if he said, that God hath decreed that such a sparke, or coale, shall fall into the said barrrell of powder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which engageth the decreer to interpose effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to passe. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature we deny to be in God.

I E A N E S

D^R Twisse doth grant, that Gods permission in a *complicate notion*, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth inferre the things permitted: And what he saith of Gods actuall permission in time, is applyable unto his permissive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, so his permissions are suitable unto his permissive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, doe import any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to passe, of what is only so decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been so well versed in D^R Twisse, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digression, professedly impugneth; for which, you may see, how he is taxed (though very modestly) by M. Rutherford, in a Scholasticall disputation of his, *De Divina providentiâ cap. 8.* D^R Twisse in the third Digression of the second Book of his *Vindiciæ &c.* examineth that proposition of Perkins: *Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit.* That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to passe, because God doth not hinder it, (i.) because he doth permit it: where he not only professeth his dislike of it, but also refutes it. This Section then might very well have been spared, for in it you fight but with your own shadow, and doe not at all oppose the opinion of D^R Twisse, who fully accords with you in this particular; That Gods simple and sole permissions, and consequently his decrees, that are simply, purely, and barely permissive, are not illative of those things which are only so decreed, and permitted.

To cleare this I shall give you an abstract of this Digression.

He examineth the truth of this proposition. 1. In the matter, or object of an act naturall. 2. In the matter, or object of an act morall, good or bad.

1. First, as concerning naturall actions, he hinteth a distinction, between a proper permission of them, and a permission of them improperly

so called; *that* is opposed unto a *naturall, reall, or Physicall* restraint, *this* unto a *morall* restraint, which is by way of dissuasion.

First then if we take permission *properly*, as it is opposed, unto a *naturall, reall, and Physicall* restraint, and denoteth a suspension thereof, D. Twisse is so farre from affirming, that they come to passe, upon Gods single, sole, and bare permission, as that he maketh Gods positive effectiō (whether by way of predetermination, or concurrence, he leaves to be discussed in another place) requisite unto the existence of them, without which they never can exist; for God is the principall and immediate cause of all beings and entities, and therefore of all naturall actions.

Actio Dei
Physica five
naturalis ea
est, quā con-

currit cum omnibus causis secundis ad actus suos, five influendo duntaxat in actus ipsarum, quod placet Arminio, Jesuitarum vestigiis insistenti; five movendo causas secundas ad agendum, quod nobis verisimilius videtur, quemadmodum & inter Pontificios Dominicanis, quæ quidem controversia non est hujus loci, sed suo loco repetenda. Hujus concursus divini ratione, nobis videtur absurde dici rem aliquam ideo evenire quia Deus non impediatur. Omnis enim res, omnis actus, omnis entitas, ideo fit, quia Deus vult ut fiat, non permittendo sed efficiendo, idque principaliter. Etenim Deus est causa principalis, & immediata uniuscujusque entitatis, juxta omnes fere Scholasticos, Arminio etiam consentiente, pag. 177. Nec Arminianis, quod sciam, haftenus reluctantibus. Absurdè autem dicitur, Deum permittere id fieri, quod facit ut fiat, idque principaliter ipsum efficiendo. Neque hic opus est recurrere ad permissionem, cum omnes in rebus naturalibus agnoscant, & amplectantur Dei efficientiam principalem & immediatam. *Vind. lib. 2. pag. 131.*

And againe afterwards.

Quare ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permissio notat suspensionem actionis naturalis, sic Deus non versatur circa easdem dum fiunt, sed positive facit. pag. 132.

Secondly, if we take permission as it is opposed unto, and denoteth a suspension of, a restraint *improperly* so called, a *morall restraint* by way of dissuasion; so D. Twisse is expresse in deniall of any necessity to be inferred, from such a permission of the coming to passe, of what is so permitted. *Ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permissio notat suspensionem actionis moralis in suadendo aut dissuadendo posita, sic non sequitur, quicquid permittitur illud fit. Neque enim quod suadetur quocunque modo, & quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut fiat, nec quod dissuadetur quocunque modo quantumvis efficaciter, necesse est, ut non fiat; Ergo multo minus ex eo quod permittitur aliquid fieri, vel non fieri, sequitur necessario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri.*

Secondly, from naturall actions he proceeds on to *morall*, and he beginneth with good and gracious actions; in which he resolveth that naturall permission, *hoc est, non in genere morali sed Physico*, can have no place, for (saith he) this would suppose, that the creature can be carryed unto actions truly good, without any speciall supply or assistance of Gods spirit and grace, which we deny can be in the state of nature entire and pure, how much lesse is it possible in the state of nature corrupted: whence also (saith he) it would follow, that God doth not antecedently worke and cause every act truly good, and that by a speciall supply, aid, or assistance.

As for Gods permission of good actions in *genere morali*, he referreth to what he hath spoken touching the like permission of naturall actions, only he addeth, that God allwayes concurrerth unto an act truly good by a speciall assistance & that both as a Physicall and Morall agent: wherefore (saith he) in this gracious administration of things there is no place at all for permission, as it is opposed unto *effectiō* or farthering; for God worketh, causeth, and promoteth every good worke in his children; although permission may have roome there, as it simply signifieth *non-hindrance*, for questionlesse God doth not hinder the

the good workes of his people, which he himfelfe cauſeth and worketh. Thus you ſee, that by D. *Twiffe* his opinion; good workes, doe not follow upon Gods bare, ſingle, and ſole, permiſſion, for they cannot be performed without the powerfull operation of Gods holy ſpirit, which worketh in us both the will and the deed.

Laſtly, as touching evill or ſinfull actions, in them divine permiſſion challengeth a proper and peculiar place, both as permiſſion is oppoſed unto *efficiency*, as alſo unto *reſtraint*.

Fiſt, as 'tis oppoſed unto *efficiency*, for the obliquity of them being a privation, is not capable of an efficient cauſe.

Secondly, as 'tis oppoſed unto *reſtraint*, for God doth not hinder ſinfull actions many times, though it be alwaies in his power.

But now if we ſpeake of the permiſſion of ſinfull actions, in *genere morali*, or *ſuaſorio*; ſo all unanimouſly affirme, that God perſwadeth or exhorteth none unto evill: for if God ſhould interpoſe his authority, by commanding, adviſing, or exhorting, whatſoever ſhould be done hereupon, would be lawfully done.

But though God himfelfe doth not exhort or perſwade unto ſinne, yet he gives way many times, and that juſtly, unto the temptations of Satan, and his instruments; nay, he himfelfe by his providence, layes before men outward objects and occasions, ſuitable unto their inward corruptions; as a goodly Babylonish garment, two hundred ſheckles of ſilver, and a wedge of Gold of fifty ſheckles weight, before the covetous eyes of *Achan*: beautifull and naked *Bathſheba* before the luſtfull eyes of *David*. Next he ſuffereth thoſe corruptions, that is, either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace, or he doth not bridle them by his reſtraining grace, but lets them have their full ſwinge, without check or controll: In his children he doth not actuate and rouze their graces, but lets them lye as it were in a deep ſleepe, &c. Beſides, he concurrerh unto thoſe motions of the ſoule, (as touching the entity of them) unto which men are ſtirred, by view of objects, that are agreeable unto either their unſubdued or unbridled luſts. From the complication of all theſe, a particular obduration, and ſinfull action followeth, ſo that you take in alſo, the concurrence of God, ſo farre as concernes the ſubſtance, or matter of ſuch a ſinfull action. Now from this variety of providences going before a ſinfull action, D. *Twiffe* drawes this following concluſion. *Ex quibus manifeſtum videtur, ex ſolâ permiſſione nequaquam conſequi, quod fiat aliquid; & proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinsi, Quicquid Deus non impedit; ideo fit, quia Deus non impedit.* From which it ſeems manifeſt, that it in no waies followeth, that a thing cometh to paſſe upon Gods ſole permiſſion, and therefore that of *Perkins* ſeemes not to be true, whatſoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to paſſe, becauſe God doth not hinder it.

In the next place he bringeth in, and answereth objections.

Fiſt, This is the opinion not only of *Perkins* but of *Piſcator* alſo.

Secondly, our adverſaries (by name *Vorſtius* and *Arminius*) grant it, and their conceſſion ſhould be embraced, as making much for the defence of our opinion.

Thirdly, there is a reaſon, which at the fiſt bluſh ſeems convincing, unto which not only *Vorſtius*, but alſo *Piſcator* yeeldeth, and 'tis drawn from the nature of Relatives: For, ſeeing permiſſion and the thing permitted are Relatives, it ſeems neceſſary, that they exiſt together: upon ſuppoſall then of the permiſſion of the coming to paſſe of ſuch a thing

it seems necessary, that that which is so permitted, doe come to passe. Unto these he dispatcheth an answer severally, in the same order as they were propounded.

First, as for our Divines, he acknowledgeth, that they have so thought, but truth is to be preferred before any testimony; *Amicus Socrates, Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas*: For 'tis but reason that we should have regard unto, and care of, only truth, that so we may (with the Apostle) say, we can doe nothing against the truth, but for the truth.

Secondly, he sheweth, how that for the existence of a thing, *Piscator* doth not acquiesce in Gods sole permission, but flyeth unto Gods government, and that so powerfull, as that it bowes, bends, and turnes the wills of men whither he pleaseth.

Veruntamen
& hoc etiam
advertendum
est; cum con-

tra *Piscatorem* in hunc modum disputaret *Vorstius*, Permissio in eo, cui permissio fit, nihil omnino novi per se causat aut efficit, sed tantum vires & facultates semel illi datas, ab aliena læsione turas præstat, & liberum istarum exercitium eidem relinquit: imo nihil prorsus extra ipsum permittentem efficit, nisi quod actionem hujus impediens cohibet, aut potius retinet, & quasi suspendit. Est enim ipsa per se tantum decretum non impediendi: hoc est, foris non agendi. Quomodo autem is, qui non agit, eo ipso quod non agit, aliquid extra se causet, vel alteri necessitatem agendi offerat? Aut quomodo is qui necessitatem hanc alteri offert, eo ipso nihil agere, sed alterius tantum actionem permittere, sive non impedire, sine contradictione dici possit? Videas jam quomodo ad ista *Vorstiana* respondeat *Piscator*, in marginalibus suis annotationibus. At ego (*inquit*) non dico quod Deus tantum permittat ea quæ permittit: Sed dico quod illa ipsa etiam gubernat; *Respons. ad Amic. Collat. Vorstii* p. 231. Idem p. 131. Explicat quid sibi velit, cum ait, Deum gubernare. Denotant (*inquit*) illa effectiorem quandam Dei quoad peccata, sed non denotant effectiorem talem, quâ Deus ipse efficiat peccata, quatenus habent rationem peccatorum, seu quatenus sunt peccata; sed denotant gubernationem Dei, quâ ut Creator voluntates humanas flectit quocumq; voluerit. Ex his manifestum est, *Piscatorem* solâ permissione Dei minime acquievisse, ad hoc ut aliquid consequenter fieri dicatur, sed ad gubernationem Dei confugisse; & ejusmodi gubernationem qua voluntates humanas flectit quocumq; voluerit.

As for the concessions of *Arminius* and *Vorstius*, seeing they are erroneous, a patronage of our opinion drawn from them is not to be valued so much, as to be built upon. *Verum tanti non est hujusmodi patrocinium, ut erroneis quantumvis propitiis innitamur assertionibus.*

As for the reason, that is of no force or strength, for we may as well conclude, that because God did from eternall will or decree to create the World, therefore the World from eternall was created; or because God from eternall foreknew that the World should be, therefore the World did exist from eternall: for there is no lesse relation, between the willing of a thing, and the thing willed; the decree of a thing, and the thing decreed; the foreknowledge of a thing, and the thing foreknown; than there is, between the permission of a thing, and the thing permitted. And there is between them as a relation, so also a reciproca-tion: whereupon it followeth, that if God willeth or decreeth a thing, it is willed or decreed; if he foreknowes a thing, it is foreknown; if he permits a thing it is permitted: but as it doth not follow, a thing is willed or decreed, therefore 'tis actually existent; a thing is foreknown, therefore it is; In like manner it doth not follow, a thing is permitted, therefore it is actually: and indeed if Gods meere permission did inferre the existence of a thing upon this ground, because permission and the thing permitted are relatives, it would hold as well concerning the permission of man, as God; But 'tis manifest, that it followeth not upon mans permission, that whatsoever he permitteth, cometh to passe.

But it may be objected, it is necessary that whatsoever is willed by God, doe at some time or other, come to passe, therefore we may say the same of what is permitted by God.

He denyeth the consequence, and he giveth this reason for his denyall, because Gods permission is not so effectually unto the existence of a thing,

as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of consequence is true in naturall causes, but this is not in regard only of permission, but from the determination of a naturall cause to worke, unlesse it be hindered: as concerning rationall and free agents, this consequence, a thing is permitted to come to passe, therefore it doth come to passe, is of no force at all.

Ad rationem
vero quod
attinet, eam
nullius esse

pretii constanter affirmamus. Nam pari rationis efficacia concludi posset, quia Deus voluit ab æterno, sive decrevit mundum creare, ergo mundus ab æterno creatus est, vel quia Deus ab æterno mundum futurum præscivit, ergo mundus ab æterno extitit. Etenim relatio nihilo minus intercedit inter volitionem & rem volitam; decretum & rem decretam; præscientiam & rem præscitam, quam inter permissionem & rem permissam; Unde quamvis sequatur, Deus voluit mundum ab æterno, ergo ab æterno mundus est volitus; Deus scivit mundum ab æterno, ergo mundus ab æterno est scitus; Deus permisit aut permittit actum fieri, ergo actus est aut fuit permissus. Attamen inde nequaquam sequitur, ergo quod volitum est, existeret, quum primum volitum erat; aut quod permissum est, existeret, quum primum permissum est. Dices, atqui quod volitum est a Deo, necesse est ut aliquando sit; ergo & quod permissum, similiter necesse erit, ut sit. Imo, inquam, nequaquam sequitur. Neq; enim par est utrobique ratio, sed valde dispar; quod & cuilibet manifestum est. neq; enim permissio tam efficax est ad existentiam rei, quam volitio. Nec tamen differt hoc genus consequentiæ procedere in causis naturalibus, sed non ex solâ vi permissionis, sed ex determinatione causæ naturalis ad agendum nisi impediatur. De causis vero rationalibus & libere agentibus, nunquam obtinet hoc genus consequentiæ, permittitur aliquid fieri, ergo fit. At, inquires, sunt relata; & relata sunt simul naturâ. Agnosco esse relata, & quatenus sunt relata converti ad consequentiam. Positâ rei permissione rei, necesse est ut res sit permissa; perinde atq; positâ volitione rei necesse est, ut res sit volita; item positâ præscientia rei, necesse est ut res sit præscita. Sed quemadmodum non sequitur, res est volita, ergo est; aut res est præscita, ergo est; perinde etiam non sequitur, res est permissa, ergo est. Quemadmodum nec sola præscientia, aut volitio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res existat; ita etiam neq; sola permissio rei sufficit ad hoc, ut res extra causas suas constitutur. Hæc tamen ratio, fateor, impulit Piscatori, pag. 231. *Ad Amic. Collat. Vostii.* Ubi sic disserit; ubi autem permissio est, ibi etiam est factum quod permittitur. Quomodo enim dici potest permitti illud, quod non fit? Certe pari ratione dici potest, permitti illud quod non fit; quemadmodum dici potest, volitum esse quod tamen non fit; licet ad existentiam rei, multo efficacior sit volitio, quam permissio. Imo quomodo non dici possit, permitti aliquid quamvis non fiat, cum permittere nihil aliud sit, quam neq; facere ut aliquid fiat, neq; ne fiat impedire. Pergit Piscator, quippe, inquires, hæc sunt relata, & proinde simul natura. Quum igitur Deus decrevit permittere peccata, necesse est ut illa fiant. At jam ostendimus, ex eo quod relata sint, hoc tantum sequi, positâ permissione, rem esse permissam; sic & positâ volitione rei, sequitur rem esse volitam; & positâ præscientiâ rei, sequitur rem esse præscitam; at hinc minime sequitur propterea rem actualem aliquam existentiam sortiri: ita etiam, licet positâ permissione, res merito dicatur esse permissa, at hinc non sequitur propterea rem esse simpliciter, & extra causas suas actualiter constitui. Quod si hæc consecutio legitima esset, quod contendit Piscator, non modo ex permissione Dei, sequeretur rem e vestigio existere; sed & ex quavis cuiusvis hominis permissione; atqui manifestum est (nec Piscator credo resistet) ex hominis permissione nequaquam sequi, quicquid permittitur fieri, mox existere.

The last and principall objection is concerning the permission of sinne in particular; without grace sinne cannot be avoyded, and the permission of sinne stands in the denyall of grace: it is cleare therefore that upon the permission of sinne, sinne necessarily ensueth.

First, he answereth, this in no-wise followeth from the nature of permission in generall (as some Divines, have thought) but from a peculiar manner of Gods permission, standing in a constant denyall of grace without which sinne can be shunned by none.

Secondly he distinguisheth of a twofold consideration of sinne, *indefinite* or *definite*, and that either in regard of sorts and kinds, or else particular actions.

First, he grants, that upon the permission of sinne, that is, the denyall of grace, sinne followeth *indefinitely*, and in generall; so that as long as God with-holds his grace, a man sinnes, either in doing what is forbidden, or else in doing what is commanded in a wrong way or manner. He also sinnes in omitting what is commanded, or in abstaining from what is forbidden in an unholy, and ungratious way or manner. And this he exemplifieth both in the unregenerate and regenerate.

First, whiles God denies to, or withholds from, an unregenerate man, his habituall grace, or grace of regeneration; whilest he suffereth his spirituall diseases to goe uncured, his corruptions unsubdued, and unmortified, so long he cannot but sinne in all his *rationall and deliberate*, both actions and omissions.

First,

First, all his actions are finnes of commission, either a doing of what is forbidden, or a sinfull performance of what is commanded, not out of right principles, nor for the due and requisite end.

Secondly all his omissions are sinfull, for they are either of what is enjoined, or else if they be of what is prohibited, they are not sanctified, proceeding from the love of God, and directed unto the glory of God above all.

Next as for the regenerate, if God deny unto, or withhold from them, never so little a while, his actuall grace, the actuall supply, and assistance of his spirit, they sinne in whatsoever they performe, or forbear; And indeed it is no wonder, that upon Gods suspending the aide of his actuall grace, the regenerate breake out into sinne, in whom there is a flesh alwaies lusting against the spirit, whose graces are imperfect, and corruptions naturall, and therefore active, upon removeall of impediments; For sinne in *Adam* followed upon the sole suspension of actuall assistance to will that good, unto which he had an habituall fitnessse; and yet in him propension unto good was perfect, without any mixture of inclination unto evill.

Secondly, he denyeth, that upon the bare permission of sinne, sinne followeth *definitely*, either for sorts and kinds, or particular actions. But here first, he implyeth an exception of *generall*, and *comprehensive* finnes, that either lye at the root of, or are concomitant unto every sinne, as inordinate selfe-love &c. *Fortè dici potest, ex carentiâ justitiæ originalis, sequi necessario, ut creatura feratur in amorem sui inordinatè, adeo ut quicquid operatur, illud faciat propter se, non autem propter Deum.*

Secondly he desireth, chiefly to be understood concerning the *imperate* or *externall actions* of sin, and such actions of the will, as are of *efficacy*, purposes, resolutions, &c. For upon Gods permission, that is, not curing, or healing, not subduing of particular sinfull habits. *v. g.* Covetousnesse, luxury, there doe necessarily follow such sinfull actions of the will, as are stiled usually to be of *complacency*, that doe, *quoad specificationem*, for their sort and kind, answer such habits, to wit, velleities, desires, wouldings, and wishings, likeings, approbations, &c. A covetous man whilest under the reigne of covetousnesse, cannot but love, like, and covet after things which he judgeth to be gainfull; a luxurious voluptuary cannot but love, approve, and long after things which he knoweth to be pleasant and delightfull unto his senses. *Omnino videtur Deum non posse impedire, ne avarus velit & concupiscat ea, quæ videntur utilia; vel libidinosus ea, quæ titillant tanquam jucunda: nam velle & concupiscere, nihil aliud est, quam desiderare; at avarus quia avarus necessario talia desiderat & concupiscit, aliàs non esset avarus, & libidinosus quia libidinosus talia desiderat, aliàs minime dicendus esset libidinosus. Lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 15.* For habits work *ad modum nature* necessarily. A covetous person, as covetous, necessarily desireth and coveteth things profitable; a lustfull or uncleane person necessarily desireth such objects and actions as are uncleane, &c. And yet of these too, we cannot say that they follow meere upon his permission, secluding his concurrence.

These limitations premised; let us returne to consider what he denyeth, to wit, that upon the bare permission of sinne, sinne doth not follow *definitely* for sorts or kinds, or particular actions. *Sine gratiâ* (saith he) *abstineri potest a peccato definite quoad certam speciem, vel etiam in individuo consideratam.* There is no particular sinne, especially of commission, but may be abstained from without grace: And therefore upon the
meere

meere and bare denyall or with-holding of grace, this or that particular sinne doth not follow.

For first, those that are destitute of habituall grace, the grace of regeneration, may yet be free from diverse particular sinfull habits. *v. g. Covetousnesse, Luxury, &c.*

Secondly, in those that have such particular sinfull habits; those habits are not actuated, especially by outward actions, upon Gods bare and single permission, his sole denyall of grace. This he proves by reason and Scripture.

First by reason, because the subject of an actuall sinne of commission, is a naturall act, and unto the performance of a naturall act, Gods bare permission is not sufficient. *Malum (quod dicitur) semper habitat in alieno fundo; & peccatum omne quod in commissione versatur, semper habet actum aliquem naturalem substratum; adeo ut ejusmodi peccatum aliquod nunquam exeat in actum ex solâ negatione gratiæ, nisi etiam aliqua alia rerum administratio fiat, secundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur, quæ sit propria materia talis deformitatis.*

Secondly by Scripture, in which Gods wonderfull providence working and prostituting men unto sinne, is never set forth unto us, by a sole and single permission: But he is said, sometimes to give men up unto vile affections, unto a reprobate mind, unto strong delusions, to send an evill spirit between men, to put a lying spirit in their mouthes, to mingle a perverse spirit in them, &c. He told David, that he would take away his concubines, and give them unto his Sonne Absolon; He told Jeroboam, that he would rent the Kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and give ten tribes unto Jeroboam, which was done by their defection, and revolt from the house of Judah. Now they who think that all these things might be dispatched, and accomplished by Gods sole and single permission, take I confesse (saith he) a short cut, but they send away the Reader, that is desirous to find out the truth, empty and voyd of all satisfaction. Upon this he concludes, that as often as any thing comes to passe according to Gods permission, so often Gods permission is not solitary or single, but hath another government of things, another administration of divine providence, accompanying it; which he explaineth at large touching sinne: unto the performance of this or that particular sinfull action, there are required a leading into temptation, an affording of objects, occasions, and opportunities, a letting loose of Satan, the concurrence of God by way of previous motion unto the matter, or subject of the action, a removeall of all impediments, whether holy and gracious, or else but meereley naturall. The explanation of all which, you may there see at large in this digression.

Out of this he inferreth a distinction of permission, into *efficacious* and *inefficacious*, and concludes that the permission of sinne is not so much *efficacious* of it selfe, as in regard of that either obduration, or excecation, or both, concerning either temporall, or spirituall good things, with which it is conjoynded. *Hinc constare poterit permissionem peccati particularis commodè dividendam esse, in permissionem efficacem & inefficacem, & permissionem efficacem non tam ex sese efficacem esse, quam pro ratione ejus, cum quâ semper conjuncta est, obdurationis, excecationis, aut utriusque, sive quoad bona spiritualia, sive quoad bona temporalia.*

But I shall trouble neither the Reader, nor you, with transcribing any more out of this digression. And indeed this is enough to satisfy him,

and convince you, that you have wronged D. *Twisse*, in pinning upon him such an opinion, which he opposeth with farre greater strength of argument, then you your selfe. This is sufficient to answer this whole section; But I shall examine whatsoever is considerable in it.

The proposition you charge upon D. *Twisse* is this, *That the purpose or intent of God, to permit, or suffer such or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to passe, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogisticall or consequentiall necessity) of the coming of it to passe.*

He that is acquainted with the workes of D. *Twisse*, knoweth, that this proposition is to be understood. 1. Concerning only the permission of evill. 2. Concerning not only Gods act, the permission of evill, but also the being of evill by Gods permission. 3. Concerning not a single, sole, and bare permission, but an efficacious permission, that hath severall acts of Gods providence accompanying it.

First, it is to be understood only concerning the *permission of evill*, and that as touching the *Formall*, the pravity or obliquity of it, which being a privation is incapable of being an object of an effective decree. This I might cleare from most of those places, wherein this distinction between an *effective* and *permissive* decree is propounded; but I shall spare to name them at this present, and content my selfe, with the alleading of one place, where he expressly puts this limitation upon the proposition we speake of, *De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 133. col. 2. Non pauci sunt, non modo ex nostris, sed & ex Theologis nobis oppositis, tam Pontificiis, quam Arminianis, qui putant, infallibitè futurum esse, quicquid &c. Deus permittere decreverit, hoc est autem, duntaxat in genere mali. Nam quæ fiunt bona, ea fieri decrevit Deus non tam ipso permittente, quam faciente, in quocunq; genere bona fuerint, sive in genere boni moralis, sive naturalis sive supernaturalis; summa, sive in genere entis bonum fuit, sive in genere moris.* And by this it is apparent, that your instance in Gods decree to permit fire to burne combustible matter, is altogether impertinent, for that is *quid bonum in genere entis.*

Secondly, he makes Gods permissive decree to be, not only concerning Gods act, the permission of evill, but also the being of evill by his permission; so that not only the permission of evill is the object of his will, but the being of it also. *Sententia Perkinsi nostrorumq; Theologorum est, lapsum Adami evenisse voluntate Dei transcurrente, non duntaxat in suam permissionem, sed etiam in rem permissam, hoc est, Deum voluisse, ut Adamus laboretur, ipso permittente. Vindic. l. 2. part. 1. pag. 127.* What he speaks of Gods will, to permit *Adams* fall, may be accommodated to his permissive will or decree, of any other sinne.

Lastly, that he speakes of not a bare, but efficacious permission, so termed, not *Formally*, but by way of *concomitancy*, the Digression which I have abbreviated is a prooffe of undeniable evidences; And I am so confident of your ingenuity, as that I doubt not, but you will acknowledge as much: and therefore your objection, which runnes only concerning a decree that is *simply, barely, and purely permissive*, is nothing at all to the purpose.

Well then, take this proposition, (*the purpose or intent of God, to permit or suffer, such or such a thing to be done, inferreth a necessity of the coming of it to passe*) in the sense and meaning of D. *Twisse*, to wit, concerning an efficacious permission of evill; and if you can accommodate your objection unto it, I will confesse that you can work a miracle in Logick.

MR. GOODWIN.

BUt that the truth lyeth on the other side of the way, appears by the light of this consideration, If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe, in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be; or at least, ten thousand things more, than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily,

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IF you supply the propositions that are wanting, and make this a compleate Syllogisme, it will be in *secundo modo Syllogismi connexi, qui tollit consequens, ut tollat antecedens*. And then your conclusion, if your Syllogisme be true for forme, will be, *Therefore whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by vertue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to passe*. And then if in your Syllogisme there be not committed that fallacy, which is called *Ignoratio elenchi*, never Syllogisme framed in this world, was sicke of this disease; for the conclusion you inferre, is no-wise opposit unto any thing in *D. Twisse*. Can you (dare you) say, that *D. Twisse* any where affirmeth, that whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe, in any case upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, shall by vertue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to passe? Consult all his bookes that are extant, whether in Latine or English; and if you can prove any such passage to be in them, either in expresse termes, or by just consequence, I will acknowledge that I have wronged you, in as shamefull and publicke a manner as you will prescribe: and if you cannot make good, that *D. Twisse* hath said any such thing, it will be very agreeable unto justice, that you make a retractation of your mistake.

The palpable grossenesse of the injury that you doe *D. Twisse*, will the better appeare, if you compare the conclusion which you father upon him, with the example you bring a little after. *God intendeth, and hath decreed to permit, that fire shall burne what combustible matter soever it shall take hold off, or that shall be cast into it, that one sparke of it, falling into a barrell of dry Gun-powder, should suddainly fire it; but it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the World, shall be burnt with fire, or that every barrell of dried Gun-powder, shall be blown up with sparkes of fire falling into them*. Here you make as if the permissive decree *D. Twisse* speakes of, were concerning Gods permission of things to come to passe, not absolutely but conditionally, in such a case, upon such termes, upon such a supposition; and as if he affirmed, that whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to passe, only conditionally, should by vertue of such a decree come to passe absolutely, and necessarily. This is one of the absurdest assertions

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that ever dropt from the pen of a rationall man, and in D. Twisse there is nothing sounding like it: you doe very ill therefore (that I say no more) to asperse him with it. Nay D. Twisse is so farre from making a bare, permissive * conditionall decree, to be illative of the absolute existence of whatsoever God hath decreed to permit to come to passe conditionally, as that he denyeth any such inference to be made from an effective conditionall decree. Though it were very strange (saith he against Cotton pag. 97.) that any thing should not be accomplished which God doth will absolutely, yet surely, it is nothing strange, that that should not be accomplished, which God doth will to come to passe only upon a condition, for the condition failing, there is no reason why we should expect the accomplishment thereof: How often doth he tell you, that for God to decree the salvation of all men, only conditionally, in case they believe and repent, is no more to decree their salvation, than their damnation; for as he hath purposed salvation to men upon condition of faith, and repentance; so on the other side, it is as undoubtedly true, that God hath ordained, that whosoever, coming to ripe yeares, shall not believe and repent, shall be damned: and as to decree the salvation of all men only conditionally, is no more to decree their salvation than their damnation; so to decree to permit a thing to come to passe only conditionally, in such a case, upon such termes, upon such a supposition, is no more to decree the permission of it, than the not permission of it to come to passe: what is said of conditionall propositions, is true of conditionall purposes, both effective and permissive, *Nihil ponunt in esse, sc. absolute & simpliciter, & avum dicitur.*

To goe one step farther, D. Twisse is very unlikely to conclude from Gods decree, barely to permit a thing to come to passe conditionally, in such a case, upon such termes, or upon such a supposition, that therefore the thing so decreed, shall absolutely come to passe, because if we speake of positive things, he is clearely and constantly of the opinion, that we cannot say truly, that they shall come to passe, so much as conditionally in such a case, upon such termes, &c. Unlesse God decree not barely to permit, but to worke and effect the thing conditioned, upon supposall of such conditions, *De Scientiâ Mediâ. p. 430. Ad eundem modum concedimus omnem enunciationem conditionatam de futuris conditionatis esse necessariam, modo Deus decreverit, positâ tali conditione, rem ipsam conditionatam effectam dare: quod nisi ponamus Deum decrevisse, prorsus præter omnem Analogiam differit Suarez; dum prophetiarum comminantium & promittentium eandem rationem esse vult, atq; propositionum de futuris contingentibus conditionatarum qualiumcunq;, quas etiam prophetias appellat Suarez.* Now if he will not allow us to make any inference of the conditionall futurition of positive things, from a decree that is barely permissive, and conditionall, it would be very strange, if he himselfe should make such a permissive conditionall decree, to be illative of the absolute futurition of whatsoever is so decreed.

And thus have I done with your conclusion, which I affirme not to be opposite unto any proposition in D. Twisse his Bookes, and I hope you will pardon me, if I presume so farre, as to challenge you to prove the contrary.

In the next place, I shall make bold, to question the truth of the consequence of your Major proposition, which is this, *If whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe, in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or decree necessarily*

necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be, &c. must be, yea, and this necessarily. And the reason why I question it, is because I much doubt, whether God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to passe conditionally, in some case, upon some termes, or upon some supposition or other, all things whatsoever, that are possible, all things (I say) that are possible; (whether unto all *naturall* or *necessary*, or else all *free* and *rationall* agents) that is not only such as doe exist, have existed, or shall exist for the future, but also all that are in any possibility of existence, whose existence implyeth no contradiction.

And that your satisfaction unto this, may be the fuller and distincter, I shall branch it into some particulars, which I shall entreat you to cleare up unto me.

First, there are many things that are meerely possible, numberlesse millions of men and Angells, which have not, never had, never shall have actuall existence: and unto these there is possible, as great a variety of both actions and sufferings, which that God hath decreed to permit to come to passe conditionally, in some case, upon some termes, upon some supposition or other, is not (I confesse) within the compasse of my Creed; but yet I shall be willing to be instructed by you, provided that you prove what you undertake to teach me.

Now that I am not much to be blamed for making a doubt of this, will (I hope) be confessed by you, if you please to consider.

First, that *Didacus Alvarez* (a very learned man) holds it to be the more probable opinion that there are not in God conditionall decrees, concerning all future conditionall contingents, which may be framed by our understandings in infinite combinations, as well concerning things actually existent, as also things possible, but only in comparison of those future conditionals, which are revealed by God, Christ, or the Prophets, &c. And he insinuates this reason out of *Ledesma*, because other conditionall decrees would be in vaine, impertinent, and no waies conducing unto Gods providence, and government of the World: which reason is as well applyable unto conditionall permissive, as conditionall effective decrees. *Resp. &c. pag. 63. & 143.*

M. Rutherford (I know) argueth somewhat against this, but I believe you will not plow with his Heifer.

Secondly, that *D. Twisse* not only affirmeth but proveth, that things meerely possible, are not the object of Gods decree, in his Book against *Tackson* p. 283. 333. & 394. *Looke we* (saith he) *upon the decrees of men, the wisest of men, were they ever known to decree that a thing may be done? But rather supposing many things may be done, they make choyce to decree the doing of such courses, as seeme most convenient: things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God, but only in reference to his power. That is possible unto God, which he can doe, or which he hath power to cause, that it be brought to passe; As for example, before the World was made, it was possible that the World should be made; was this by vertue of Gods decree? Did God decree it to be possible? If he did, seeing his decrees are free, it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been possible or no.* His arguments are applyable unto Gods permissive as well as effective decrees, unto his conditionall, as well as absolute decrees. From agents *meerely possible*, passe we on unto such as doe exist in some difference of time or other, and unto them some things are possible only in regard of an *obedientiall power*, some things are possible in regard of a *naturall power*.

First some things are possible, and that unto all sorts of second agents, only in regard of an *obedientiall power*; thus tis possible for ten thousand Asses besides *Balaam's* to speake, for ten thousand peices of iron (besides that mentioned 2 *Kings* 6.) to swimme; tis possible for wine to be made of ten thousand pots of water &c. Besides those fixe we read of *Iohn*. 2. It is possible of stones to have children raised up unto *Abraham*. Now that God hath decreed to permit all things thus possible to come to passe conditionally, in some case, is as I take it false, hd I shall give you my reason out of *D. Twisse his Digression, De naturâ permissionis. lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 16. col. 2. Irrationalia dicuntur permitti, quoties sinuntur ferri secundum naturam suam, quemadmodum cum lapsis sinitur ferri deorsum; ignis sinitur grassari in domos hominum: itaq; circa agentia naturalia dum versatur permissio, palam est præsupponi, non modo propensionem, sed & determinationem ad agendum; non sic, quoties versatur circa agentia rationalia; nam & rationales substantiæ, quando permittuntur agere, sinuntur etiam ferri secundum naturam suam; aut alia esset ratio permissionis rerum rationalium, quam irrationalium, quod minime videtur.* Irrationall agents are said to be permitted as often as they are suffered to be carryed according to their natures; as when a stone is suffered to move downward, fire to rage upon the howses of men: So also rationall substances when they are permitted to act, they are suffered to be moved, or carryed agreeably unto their natures, *quoties permittuntur sibi pro domesticæ inclinationis ratione quâlibet feruntur; ib. pag. 11. c. 1.* or otherwise the nature of the permission of things rationall and irrationall, would differ in regard of forme, where as the difference between them is only in respect of the matter about which each is conversant, as he sheweth presently after the words quoted.

Againe of those things which are possible unto all sorts and kinds of agents, there are some which God hath absolutely decreed to effect, or bring to passe by his operation; some which he hath absolutely decreed to hinder or restraints. Now whatsoever God worketh or effecteth, he doth not permit, as permission is opposed unto effectiõ, and therefore it cannot be the object of a bare permissive decree, but of an operative or effective. Secondly, what he hindereth or restraineth either immediately by himselfe, or mediately by second causes, he cannot be at all said to permit, and therefore he never decreed to permit it; more briefly, God cannot be said to decree the bare and naked permission of that whose effectiõ or working he hath decreed; he cannot be said to decree the permission of that, whose hinderance or restraint he hath intended, but of things possible, he hath decreed the effectiõ of some, the restraint and hinderance of others: and therefore there are many things possible, which he hath not decreed barely to permit.

I but perhaps you will say, that though whatsoever God hath absolutely decreed to effect or hinder, he hath not decreed to permit to come to passe absolutely, yet he hath decreed it shall come to passe conditionally, *in such cases, upon such termes, and upon such a supposition.* But this is spoken gratis, and therefore I doe beseech you to evidence it by dint of argument, unto which if convincing, I hope I shall submit.

But I imagine I see a back-doore, at which you intend to runne away, and save your selfe the labour of medling with that worke, which I have here cut out for you, and that is the clause which you have added by way of Parenthesis in your consequent (or at least ten thousand things

more

more than ever shall be (Here your consequent hath two propositions in it, one universall, *then all things possible must be, yea and this necessarily*; another particular, *at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, and this necessarily*. And these two propositions are propounded in a disjunctive manner, so that if the first be routed and miscarry, the other may serve as a reserve to fly unto, this is the shift of a diffident and fearfull disputant, that knowes not well what to say or hold: and therefore beneath that *acumen*, which I may justly expect from a man of your great Wit and Learning: how commendable it is, will appeare, if you take your consequent by it selfe, and sever it from the antecedent, and then parralell it with others of the like nature which no man can deny to be absurd and ridiculous; as all men are white, or at least ten thousand times more then are blacke: all men are unregenerate, or at least more then are regenerate: all men are healthy and sound, or at least more then are sick.

But you pretend unto a proöfe of the consequence of your Major, we will heare what you say.

Mr GOODWIN.

For doubtlesse God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall causes generally, to their naturall and proper operations and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more, than ever they will doe or shall doe.

I E A N E S.

Your Major is, *If whatsoever God hath decreed or intendeth to permit to come to passe, in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, should by vertue of such an intention or decree, necessarily come to passe, then all things possible to be, or at least ten thousand things more than ever shall be, must be, yea and this necessarily*. Now how the consequence hereof is proved by this your proposition (I confesse) passeth my skill. The readiest way to examine the consequence in a connexe Syllogisme, is to reduce it unto a Categorical, and the way of that, every ordinary Logick will informe you is, by giving a reason of the consequence by a Categorical proposition, and placing it in the roome of the Major in your Categorical Syllogisme. Now take the proöfe that you bring of the consequence, or sequell of your major proposition, (*for doubtlesse God hath decreed, and intendeth to leave naturall causes generally, to their naturall, and proper operations, and productions, yea and voluntary causes also, under a power, and at liberty, to act ten thousand times more then ever they will doe or shall doe*) and let it be placed in the roome of your major, and then in what Moode and Figure will you inferre your conclusion, viz. *Whatsoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to come to passe, in any case, upon any termes, or any supposition whatsoever, shall not by vertue of such an intention or decree necessarily come to passe*.

And

And thus you see how weakly you impugne that proposition which is only of your owne setting up.

But let us look upon this passage in it selfe, setting aside the reference it carryeth of a prooffe unto the foregoing words, if you understand Gods leaving of naturall causes unto their naturall and proper operations, &c. And so also his leaving voluntary causes under a power, and at liberty to act ten thousand things more then ever they will doe or shall doe, so as to make it exclusive of that influence which is by way of previous motion of second causes themselves, whether naturall or voluntary unto all their operations, why your *doubtlesse* will not carry it, as long as the arguments, by which D. *Twisse lib. 2. Digres. 7.* proves, that God moves all second causes unto their operations, remaine unanswered by you, and you bring no prooffe to the contrary, but your bare word.

MR. GOODWIN.

SO likewise God hath decreed, to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (*I meane in respect of a naturall power, to doe the execution*) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man must necessarily murder or destroy the life of his brother that cometh in his way.

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UNto this I oppose these following arguments. First, God withholds many bloody minded men from actuall murder, as well as he did *Abimelech* from committing adultery, and unto him cannot be permitted the doing of a thing, who is restrayned therefrom; for permission and restraint are opposed *privatively*, and therefore cannot be found in the same subject at once, in regard of the same action.

Secondly, permission of the sin of murder essentially implyeth, a withholding of grace effectually and necessary, for the avoydance of the sinne of murder: but God doth not withhold from every man that grace, which is effectually and necessary for avoydance of the sinne of murder; And therefore he doth not permit every man to commit it.

Thirdly, permission of outward and imperate acts (as well as restraint, unto which it is *privatively* opposed) supposeth a propension or inclination unto them, a purpose or desire of them in the agents unto whom they are permitted: but there is not in every man a propension or inclination, a purpose or desire to murder every one that cometh in his way; Therefore God doth not permit every man to murder every one that cometh in his way. The Major is a principle with *Arminius* in his *Tra-ctate de permissione*; *in personâ cui permittitur, duo ponendâ, actus istius respectu, Primo, vires sufficientes ad actum præstandum, intellige, nisi impediatur: Secundo, propensio ad actum producendum, citra hanc enim frustra permittitur actus, citra illas omnino non permittitur; nam necessario ad actus præstationem*

stationem requiruntur: ut ut adsint illæ, nisi propendeat persona, cui permittitur actus, ad actum ipsum, nullo fine & in vagum permittitur. Imo nec recte dici potest, quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illius præstandi affectu nullo tenetur.

But this Testimony perhaps may be of small authority with you, however his reason deserves your consideration. D. Twisse indeed differs from him, as touching the permission of the *elicitæ acts of the will*, but fully agreeth with him, as concerning the outward and *imperate acts* thereof, Heare his owne words. *Circa irrationalia agentia si versetur permissio, præsupponit, fateor, ejusmodi propensionem &c. Agentia vero rationalia quoties concernit permissio, eadem ratio erit quoad actus ipsorum imperatos: Neq; enim proprie dicitur quis aut permitti, aut impediri, ne faciat aliquid exterius, nisi præsupponatur hoc ipsum velle, & intendere actu interno aut elicitæ: ex quo commodè dicitur vel permitti facere quod intendebat, vel ne faciat quod volebat impediri, hactenus itaque agnosco propensionem quandam ad agendum præcedaneam esse permissioni.*

Unto what Arminius and D. Twisse say, I shall adde this reason of mine own. Permission and restraint are opposed privatively, and therefore as Aristotle hath taught us: 1. Categ. Cap. 10. S. 11. *Sunt circa idem, Nulli rei competit privatio, cui non possit etiam competere habitus*; And therefore we call not any thing deafe, blind, or dumbe, but what is capable of hearing, sight and speech. In like manner no outward action can properly be permitted unto a man, but what he may be hindered and restrayned from: but now a man cannot be hindered, or restrayned from the performance of an outward action, unto which he hath no propension or inclination, of which he hath no purpose or desire, no more than he can be constrayned unto that, from which he is not averse, therefore neither can such an action be permitted unto him, if we take permission properly, (as Bannes saith) as it is not *nuda negatio, sed privatio*.

By this time the Reader, I suppose, is satisfied, that God doth not permit every man to murther or destroy the life of every one that cometh in his way; and therefore consequently, he hath not decreed or intended any such permission. As for the limitation which you bring to qualify your assertion, it nothing mends the matter: for I have proved the assertion to be false in it selfe, by arguments, that feare not the light of your tryall or examination: and false assertions cannot be made good by any limitations whatsoever; so much I learned when I was a Boy from Keckerm. *System. Log. lib. 2. cap. 4. Quicquid subjecto limitativè tribuitur, id verè tribuitur*. But suppose this assertion were justifiable, by some limitation or other, yet not by this, which you bring; because this naturall power to doe the execution, (as you speake) is *insufficient* to denominate the permission of murther; because 'tis *consistent* with the opposite of such a permission, restraint from murther, &c.

First, because 'tis *insufficient* to denominate the permission of murther: A naturall power to performe an action is essentially requisite unto the permission thereof, but it is not only the essentiall requisite thereunto, and therefore an insufficient ground for the affirmation of it. If it be lawfull to affirme a predicate of a subject in respect of the presence of one essentiall requisite unto the said predicate, when there are wanting any other things essentially required thereunto also, as absurd propositions as are imagineable, will be hence justified: As that

beasts and plants are men, and Men beasts; for of beasts and plants there are affirmed diverse things, which doe agree unto man essentially; and so on the other side, diverse things are predicated of men essentially, which are also essentiall unto beasts and plants.

Secondly, a naturall power to destroy the life of another, is *consistent* with the opposite of such a permission; to wit, restraint from the murther of him: a power to produce an act may be hindered *majoris aut æqualis saltem potentie oppositione*, saith your *Arminius*, by opposall of a greater, or at least an equall power: though a man have not only a power, but a will, a desire, and purpose to take away the life of another, yet he may be restrained, not only by feare of punishment, dictates of a naturall conscience within, but also by opposition of a greater or equall power without. Now permission and restraint are privatively opposed, and therefore we cannot say, that an action is permitted in regard of that which is common unto both permission and restraint, and may be found, as well when an action is restrained, as when it is permitted. If I should say that a blind man sees, in respect of the first naturall power of seeing; that a deafe man hears, in respect of the first naturall power of hearing; you would say that my limitation were absurd and ridiculous: because this naturall first power of seeing is found both in the blind and the seeing; and we may say the same of the first power of hearing. Yet this limitation is as justifiable as yours; for the naturall power you speake of, to doe the execution, is found as well in the restraint, as in the permission of murther

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GOD permitted Adam to eate of every tree in the Garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge of Good and evill only excepted, Gen. 2. 16, 17.) and therefore certainly had decreed, or intended, this permission: yet was not Adam any waies necessitated by any vertue, or influence of this decree upon him, to eate of every one of these trees; nor is it in the least degree credible, that ever he did eate of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this Garden following so suddainly after this patent, or permission granted unto him.

I E A N E S.

THE permission spoken of, Gen. 2. 16. was *Morall* or *Legall*, in *genere officii*, not *naturall* or *Physicall*, in *genere facti*, and therefore nothing at all to the purpose.

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Neither doth any such decree in God, suppose a futurity of such a concurrence of causes, simply requisite and necessary; for the bringing of
of

of things, so decreed, to passe, which will actually bring them to passe: though God hath decreed that a sparke, or coale of fire, falling i. e. in case it shall fall, into a barrell of Gunpowder, shall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any such sparke, or coale shall fall into it; without which notwithstanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this Powder will not come to passe.

I E A N E S.

First, *Arminius* tells you, that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint. *Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra, sufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius causæ necessariæ absentia.* And if this be true, then permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things so permitted to passe, which will actually bring them to passe if they be not hindered; and consequently a permissive decree doth, though not suppose (that's not our language) yet, inferre the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes.

Besides Secondly, *Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44.* out of *Zabarell* acquaints us, how restraint is sometimes taken privatively, *pro privatione actionis inferendæ*, and absence not only of one requisite and necessary cause, but also of one necessary condition is sufficient to denominate such a restraint: *Sic distantia loci* (saith he) *impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quasi distantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, sed solum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & passionis in calefactibili.* In regard of this acception of restraint, fire cannot be said to be permitted to burne combustible matter, unlesse there be an approximation of the fire unto the said combustible matter, for distance of place hinders the fire from burning: distance of place between fire and a barrell of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrell of Gunpowder, if you take hinderance or restraint in such a sence as *Scheibler* speakes of: Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrell of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is such a distance.

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OR if it be said, that God hath decreed, that such a sparke or coale, shall fall into the said barrell of Gunpowder, now is not the decree barely permissive, but operative and assertive, and such which ingageth the decreer to interpose effectually, for the bringing of the thing decreed to passe. But such decrees as this, in matters of that nature, we deny to be in God.

I E A N E S.

IF By matters of that nature you meane, in such contingent things as the falling of a Sparke or Coale into a Barrell of Gunpowder; why, Doctor *Twisse* hath an argument

ment which he takes to be unanswerable, clearly evincing, that whatsoever thing comes to passe, that is good with a transcendentall goodness, or Metaphysicall, God hath decreed it by an operative or effective decree. You have it in his examination of *M. Cottons Treatise &c.* p. 68, 69. As also in his Consideration of that Scoffing Pamphlet of *Tilenus*, viz. the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practise. p. 18, 19. *Nay I say more,* (saith he) *that every thing, which cometh to passe, in the revolution of times, was decreed by Gods, which I proove by such an argument, for answer whereunto, I challenge the whole nations of both Arminians and Jesuites. It cannot be denied, but God foresaw from everlasting, whatsoever in time should come to passe, therefore every thing was future from everlasting, otherwise God could not foresee it as future. Now let us soberly enquire, how these things which we call future, came to be future, being in their own nature meerly possible, and indifferent, as well not at all to be future, as to be future. Of this transmigration of things, out of the condition of things meerly possible (such as they were of themselves) into the condition of things future, there must needs be some outward cause. Now I demand; what was the cause of this transmigration? And seeing nothing, without the nature of God, could be the cause hereof (for this transmigration was from everlasting, but nothing without God was everlasting) therefore something within the nature of God must be found fit to be the cause hereof.*

And what may that be? Not the knowledge of God, for that rather presupposeth things future, and so knowable in the kind of things future, than makes them future: therefore it remaines, that the meere decree and will of God, is that which makes them future. If to shift off this, it be said, that the essence of God is the cause hereof; I farther demand, whether the essence of God be the cause hereof, as working necessarily, or as working freely; If as working necessarily, then the most contingent things became future by necessity of the Divine nature, and consequently he produceth whatsoever he produceth by necessity of nature, which is Atheisticall: therefore it remaines, that the Essence of God hath made them future, by working freely, and consequently, the meere will and decree of God is the cause of the futurition of all things.

He speakes indeed of Gods will and decree indefinitely, but that thereunder he comprehends an operative or effective decree, is undeniable. But the force of this reason, you may think easily to evade, by your denial of Gods fore-knowledge: your reasons for which denyall, I shall in the next place proceed to examine.

Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.

That Prescience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in God, is the constant assertion, both of ancient and moderne Divinity. The learned Assertours of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolemen, and Papists, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of Judgment about such a poynt as this; even between those, who have many Irons of

Quid est præscientia nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergraditur tempora? Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futura, sed presentes; ac per hoc non jam præscientia, sed tantum scientia dici potest. Aug. lib. 2. ad Simpl. vide plura, ib.

contention

contention otherwise in the fine, considering how obvious, and neere at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But impossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gain saying it. 2^d If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a fore-knowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing, or event fore-known, should in the interim actually come to passe, must needs cease, and be changed; in as much as there can be no fore-knowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being res. futura somewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with any thing which is in God. The reason is; because then, there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are impossible. But if Præscience or fore-knowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the same, with somewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge, properly so called, in God.

Nec zelus, nec ira, nec penitentia, nec proprie misericordia, nec præscentia esse potest in Deo.
Greg. Moral. l. 2. c. 23.

Quid est præscentia nisi scientia futurorum? Aug. l. 2. ad Simplic. q. 2.

I E A N E S.

Diverse Heathen Philosophers I have found censured for denying of Gods Præscience or foreknowledge, as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ. Dei cap. 9. Seneca by Aureolus 1. distin. 38. Aristotle by Vasquez and others. But that Christian Divines either ancient or moderne, (unlesse you will appropriate that name unto Socinians) are so unanimous in impugning of Gods foreknowledge, is great newes unto me, and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe, that have read any thing in either ancient, or Moderne Divinity. Hierome in his third book *Adversus Pelagianos*, teacheth (as Franciscus Aquinas informes me) that he who takes away Præscience from God, takes away the Godhead: *Eum qui a Deo præscentiam tollit, divinitatem tollere*. As for Austin, whom you quote in the Margent against this Præscience of God; let any one read that place but now quoted. Lib. 5. De Civ. Dei, cap. 9. and he must needs confesse, that he is a zealous Assertor of Gods foreknowledge against Cicero, who opposeth it in favour of the liberty of mans will. And so saith Austin. *Dum vult facere homines liberos, facit sacrilegos: multo sunt autem tolerabiliores* (saith he) *qui vel sydera fata constituunt, quam iste, qui tollit præscentiam futurorum. Nam & confiteri esse Deum, & negare præscentiam futurorum, apertissima insania est*. They who make the starres the fates of men, are more tolerable then he, who taketh away the foreknowledge of things to come. For to confesse that there is a God, & to deny him to be foreknowing of things future, is a most open madnes. And againe in the same place. *Sed quoquomodo se habent tortuosissima con-*

verum Deum, ita voluntatem, summamq; potestatem ac præscientiam ejus confitemur. Afterwards again, *Religiosus autē animus utrumq; eligit, utrumq; confitetur, & fide pietatis utrūq; confirmat;* that is, both the liberty of the will, & Gods prescience. *Quod verò Cicero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei præscientiæ notissimum, plus eum, quam Stoici, detestamur. Aut enim Deum esse negat, &c. Aut si esse constitetur Deus, quem negat præscium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quàm ille, dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus. Qui enim non est præscius omnium futurorum, non est utiq; Deus.* To confesse that there is a God, and to deny his foreknowledge, is to say with the foole in his heart, that there is no God: For he, who doth not foreknow things to come, is not God. Other testimonies you may see quoted in *Suarez lib. I. De scientiâ futurorum contingentium absoluta. cap. 2.* Out of other places of *Austin*, as also out of *Fulgentius*, and *Anselme*. But I may very well spare this labour of citing the Ancients, seeing *M. Hord*, or *M. Mason* (I know not well which) tells us that the Fathers did generally make sinne an object of Gods prescience, and therefore they maintained, That there was prescience in God. As for the Schoolemen they in their Commentaries upon *Aquinas. Sum. I. p. 2. 14. Art. 13.* And on *Lombard lib. I. dist. 38. 39.* doe generally resolve, *nemine contradicente*, (that I know) That Gods foreknowledge of things to come, is a point certaine *de fide*. And amongst those that are called *Protestants*, I know none that oppose it, save the *Socinians*; against whom, in this particular, you may read *Stagman Photinianis: disp. 13.* And *Johannes Junius in refutat: prælect. Fausti Socini, cap. 8. 9. 10. 11.* The Arminians, however now some of them walke in the cloudes, and will not speake out, yet at first the Ringleaders did not stick to professe, that election was upon foresight of perseverance in faith, and reprobation upon foreknowledge of perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. *D. Twisse* tells us, That Gods foreknowledge of things future; is a point assented unto by, and uncontroverted amongst all Christians; *De Scientia Media, p. 245.* *Extra controversiam est apud Christianos omnes, futura omnia, quantumvis contingentia, Deo nota fuisse, idq; ab æterno; neque mirum, cum nihil positivum aut sit, aut futurum sit in rerum naturâ, cujus productionem non operetur ipse Deus, idque in genere causæ efficientis, consequenterq; cujus productionem non ab æterno decreverit, quâ de re nulla fere inter Christianos hodie, saltem eruditiores, viget Controversia.* And hereupon it is that he censureth the proofes brought by *Suarez* for the confirmation of it, to be needlesse. *Pergit Suarez in confirmatione ejus, de quo Christianus nullus dubitat. ibidem.* And againe in his book against *M. Cotton* p. 69. he saith, *That for men with Cicero to deny, that God foreknowes things to come, is to turne Atheist.*

But against this cloud of witnesses I foresee that you will take sanctuary in those two termes, *Formally* and *Properly*, though none save Atheists, and Socinians deny the Prescience of God; yet notwithstanding this, it is, say you, the constant assertion both of Ancient and moderne Divinity, That Prescience or foreknowledge are not Formally or Properly in God. To make this good, you only quote *Austin* in your Margent and *Gregory*, unto whose sayings alleadged by you, every Schooleman almost, that dissenteth from the Dominicans about the presence of things in eternity, gives an answer, of which if you be ignorant, you must needs be a very great stranger to Schoole Divinity. You tell us next, *that the Learned assertors of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Schoolemen, and Papists in this assertion, That prescience or foreknowledge*

are not properly, or formally in God. This is a thing which those, that dissent from you, would in all likelihood question, and yet you bring not so much as one instance out of either Protestant or Papist to make it good. That there is such a peace and concurrence of judgement about this, between Protestants and Papists, I never read or heard of before. And if you can prove it by an induction, I will confess my ignorance. If any such unwary passages, as you here speake of, have dropt from the pennes of either Protestants or Papists, I suppose they are to be qualified, and understood in the like manner, that Suarez understands, and qualifyeth the speech of those, who deny knowledge to be properly and formally in God.

Ne in æquívoco labore-mus, supponendum est

quid nomine scientiæ significetur: non enim intelligimus qualitatem aliquam, vel habitum, aut actum propriè factum, seu elicatum à potentia, neq; etiã cognitionem per discursum comparatam, aut aliam similem imperfectionem includentem: in quâ significatione videntur accepisse scientiam, qui dixerunt non esse propriè in Deo, sed per Metaphoram vel causalitatem illi attribui, id est, quia causat in nobis scientiam. Hos enim non est verisimile intellexisse Deum ita carere scientiâ, ut sit prorsus stolidus: nam cum faterentur Deum esse fontem omnis scientiæ creatæ, non est verisimile credidisse Deum esse omnino inscium. Igitur, quia putarunt scientiam includere imperfectionem, ideo formaliter & propriè in Deo esse negarunt. Illæ autem imperfectiones quasi materiales sunt, ingentes in scientia humanâ, vel Angelicâ, non vero pertinent ad rationem formalem scientiæ, ut sic, quæ hic abstractivè sumitur, præscindendo à creatâ, & increata, & solum significat claram & evidentem ac perfectam cognitionem, seu perceptionem veritatis, seu objecti seibilis, sive illa perceptio fiat per qualitatem, sive per substantiam, sive cum effectione, & receptione, sive absq; his imperfectionibus. *Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 15. num. 2.*

They take (saith he) knowledge as signifying a quality or habit produced by some power or knowledge, gained or gotten by way of discourse or inference, or including some such like imperfection. In like manner if any either Protestants, or Papists, have denyed foreknowledge to be properly and formally in God, they are to be understood concerning such a foreknowledge, as is found in men, in whom tis clothed with many imperfections, from which tis abstracted, as it is ascribed unto God. But I shall take a more particular and distinct notice of these two termes *Formally* and *Properly* in reference unto the attribution of foreknowledge unto God.

And first let us enquire whether foreknowledge can formally be ascribed unto God.

The terme *Formally* may be opposed unto either *Eminently*, or *Extrinsicall* denominations.

First unto *Eminently*. Perfections are either *secundum quid*, in certo genere, after a sort, in such a kind, or else simply such.

The former doe so essentially imply some imperfection, limitation, or composition, as that they cannot possibly be abstracted therefrom, and therefore are ascribed unto God only *eminently* or *virtually*.

But now the latter doe include no imperfection, or repugnancy with, or opposition unto any greater, or equall perfection. And these perfections are ascribed unto God *Formally*, as you may see proved by Suarez *Met. Disp. 30. Sect. 1. num. 8.9. De perfectionibus ergo simpliciter dicendum est, omnes esse in Deo formaliter, quia in suo formali conceptu nullam imperfectionem, sed puram perfectionem involvunt, neque inter se repugnantiam includunt, unde sic illas habere, id est, formaliter, melius est, quam aliqua earum carere, & ideo de ratione Entis summe perfecti in totâ latitudine Entis est, ut has omnes perfectiones formaliter includat. Adde in his perfectionibus non posse cogitari altiorum modum continendi illas, quam formaliter, quia intra suam formalem rationem, nec limitationem, nec imperfectionem includunt, neque altior gradus Entis excogitari potest, quam ille, ad quem hæ formales perfectiones pertinent, qualia sunt vivere, sapere & alia hujusmodi.*

Now

Now *foreknowledge* is to be ranked amongst the perfections of this latter sort; because it may be sequestred or abstracted from all those imperfections, as it is found in Men or Angells. You think indeed that it will necessarily inferre mutability, but that is an imputation from which I will anon easily free it. Besides, a perfection simply such, is defined by *Anselme in Monolog. cap. 14. Quæ in unoquoq; est melior ipsa quam non ipsa;* that is, as *Scotus* expounds it in 1. *dist. 8. q. 1. Ad. 1. quolibet suo incom. possibili*: Now the light of nature evidenceth that the knowledge of things to come is better, and a more noble attribution then any thing whatsoever is repugnant unto such foreknowledge, and therefore this foreknowledge (in such an abstract notion as we speake of) may *formally* be ascribed unto God.

Respondeo,
verum esse
nullam per-
fectionem

But now this I would have to be understood as *Suarez* speakes of such kind of perfections in generall.

creaturæ, secundum adæquatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ, esse in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter tantum: non est enim in Deo sapientia creata, nam ut sic est accidens, & finita perfectio, & idem est de cæteris similibus. Dicitur ergo Deus quasdam ex his perfectionibus continere formaliter, quia secundum eas habet aliquam formalem convenientiam cum creaturâ, ratione cujus illa perfectio secundum idem nomen, & eandem rationem, seu conceptum formalem attribuitur Deo & creaturæ, salvâ analogiâ, quæ inter Deum & creaturam semper intercedit. Quando vero non est talis convenientia, nec formalis denominatio, sed sola efficacia divinæ virtutis, tunc dicimus intercedere convenientiam eminentialem. Atq; ita in Deo nulla perfectio est formaliter nisi vel secundum proprium conceptum Dei, vel saltem secundum conceptum abstrahentem a Deo, & creaturis. *Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 1. num. 12.*

And againe afterwards.

Recte, &c. intelligitur esse longe diversum modum vivendi divinæ & creatæ substantiæ: & quod de divinis attributis positivis superius diximus, in hoc manifestissimum esse secundum modum, quo sunt in creaturis, non esse in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter. Esse autem in Deo formaliter secundum modum altiorum, qui omnem imperfectionem creaturarum excludat. *Disp. 30. Sect. 14. num. 7.*

They are not in God *formally* in such a sense, or after such a manner; as they are in the Creatures, but they are in him *formally*, in a higher way and manner, which excludes all imperfections whatsoever of the Creatures.

Secondly, *formall attributions* may be opposed unto *extrinsecall denominations*. Now the word *foreknowledge*, signifieth something that agreeth unto God *formally*, and something that is ascribed unto him only by *extrinsecall denomination*.

For the understanding of which we must observe, that it is one and the same undivided knowledge, by which God without any the least alteration, understands things whilest future, when present, when past, and this I affirme to be ascribed unto God *formally*, because 'tis in him, and that by way of reall identity with his Essence, and all his other attributes.

But now this knowledge undergoes severall appellations, which are attributed unto it by *extrinsecall denomination*, from the various condition of the things known, so long as the things themselves are to come, it is called Fore-knowledge, when they come, co-knowledge, after they are gone and past, after-knowledge: D. *Twisse* against *Jackson* pag. 313, 314. I deny not then, but that the *formall denomination* of *foreknowledge* is *extrinsecall*. Gods knowledge is so denominatèd in regard of its pre-existence unto the thing known: but that which is affirmed of a thing only by way of *extrinsecall denomination*, may be ascribed thereunto *properly*, which brings me unto a second Quære.

Whether *Foreknowledge* is, or may be ascribed unto God properly?

The

The learned Assertors of the Protestant cause, you say, are at perfect agreement with their adversaries the Papists in this, That prescience, or foreknowledge, are *not formally or properly* in God. You will not deny D. Twisse to be a learned Protestant, and how he differs from this assertion which you father upon all Protestants, you may read in his book against Doctor Jackson p. 316. *The question only was (saith he) whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God, in respect of things to come: now I see no reason (saith he) but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man.* Amongst the Papists Suarez comes behind few moderne Schoolemen, and whether he thinks foreknowledge not to be properly in God, let his own words informe you. *Lib. 1. De Scientia futurorum absolute cap. 7. In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum, duratione antecedere omnium rerum creaturarum existentiam.* But Suarez is not herein singular. For the Schoolemen generally in their Commentaries upon Aquinas, and Lombard in the places but now quoted, having propounded this Question, *An in Deo sit scientia futurorum &c.* Resolve it affirmatively: And as at other times, so especially in determinations, and resolutions of questions, that Rule hath place: *Analogum per se positum stat pro famosiori analogato*; if a word have two significations, one proper, another improper or Metaphoricall, and it be put by it selfe without any thing to determine, or limit it unto the improper acception thereof, it must be taken properly. This to be the meaning of that rule Scheibler instructed me, when I was a Puny in Philosophy. *Met. lib. 2. cap. 6. num. 17. Respondeo, illam propositionem, Analogum per se positum, hoc est, sine aliquo addito, stat pro famosiori, valere solum de analogo proportionis, hoc est, quod de uno predicatur proprie, de alio improprie, per similitudinem, vel metaphoram, id positum sine addito significat suum principale analogatum, veluti cum de risu loquor, intelligo eum de risu hominis, non de risu prati.* Austin in lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 9. Censures the denyall of Gods foreknowledge as a madnesse, as a blasphemous, and Atheisticall speech &c. And this he would never have done, if he had thought as you, that foreknowledge is not properly in God: For that which is ascribed unto God only improperly, *metaphorically*, & by an Anthropopathy, as hands, eyes, eares, repentance, grieve, &c. may without madnes, blasphemy, or Atheisme, be denyed of God in propriety of speech.

How have the Schoolemen toy'd themselves, and puzzled their readers, about the reconciliation of Gods foreknowledge of future Contingents, with the liberty of mans will, and the contingency of things? This was a poynt that Armachanus studied for twenty years space*. Now * Twisse de had those men been so well read in ancient and Moderne Divinity as *Scientia Me-* you, they would have eased themselves of this labour. For you assure *dia. pag.* us, that it is the constant assertion both of ancient and Moderne Divinity, that prescience or foreknowledge are not properly in God. That this was reputed in the daies of Jeffery Chawcer, a difficult, nice, and controverted matter, which no one but an Austin or a Bradwardine could thoroughly discusse, or bolt unto the branne, appears by the verses of the said Chawcer, related by Sr Henry Savill, in his Epistle prefixed to Bradwardine, which I shall here insert.

*But what that God afore wote, must needs bee,
After the opinion of Certain Clerkis.
Witnesse of him that any Clerke is,
That in Schoole is great altercation
In this matter, and great disputation,*

H h h h

And

*And hath been of an hundred thousand men.
 But I ne cannot boult it to the bren,
 As can the holy Doctor S. Austin,
 Or Boece, or the Bishop Bradwardin.
 Whether that Gods worthy foreweting
 Straineth me needly to doe a thing,
 (Needly clepe I simple necessity)
 Or if the free choyce be granted me
 To doe the same thing, or doe it nought,
 Though God forewot it or it was wrought.
 Or if his weting straineth never a dele
 But by necessity conditionele.
 I will not have to done of such matere.*

Had you lived in those times, you could easily have put an end to all this great altercation; provided that they would have received that which you take here for a principle, that fore-knowledge is not properly in God. For if this be so, then all disputation concerning the reconciling of Gods fore-knowledge with liberty and contingency is frivolous, and to no purpose.

What anxious disputes have been amongst the Schoolemen for many hundred yeares continuance touching the manner or the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents? *Bonaventure* maintained that God did foreknow future contingents by the Idea's of them in his mind. *Aquinas* made the ground of Gods foreknowing them to be their *presence or existence in eternity*. *Scotus* his opinion was, that God foreknows them by seeing the determination of his own will touching their coming to passe. Other grounds of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents are assigned by others, which you may find mentioned almost in every Schooleman. *Bellarmin.* l. 4. *de grat. & libero Arbitrio*, and before him *Occam* and *Ariminensis* were of an opinion, that the way, or manner of Gods foreknowing future contingents, is a poynt that is incomprehensible, & unexpressible in this life. Were you called to be an Umpier between these great Schoolemen in this thorny, and knotty Question, you, instead of unloosing or untying this *Gordian* knot, would-like another *Alexander* have cut it in pieces, and have told them that they disputed like a company of *Buzzards* concerning the ground or manner of that which may in propriety of speech be denied of God. Your opinion you see doth not so fully accord with ancient and Moderne Divinity, as you pretend, & how dissonant it is from the truth will soon be manifested, by bringing it unto the rule of Theologicall truth, the Scriptures, in which the infallible prediction of things to come, doe clearly and abundantly witnesse, that foreknowledge is properly in God: for prediction presupposeth prescience, it being utterly impossible to foretell infallibly what one doth not foreknow certainly. Hereupon it was that *Tertullian* said *Deum, quot fecit Prophetas, tot habere testes præscentiæ suæ* lib. 2. *contra Marcion.* c. 5. That God hath so many witnesses of his prescience, as he hath made Prophets. This infallible prediction of things to come is so proper & peculiar unto God, as that thereby he distinguisheth himselfe from all false Gods. *Esay* 41. 21, 22, 23. *Produce your cause, saith the Lord (unto the Idolls of the Gentiles) bring forth your strong reasons saith the King of Jacob; let them bring forth & shew us what shall happen. Let the shew the former things what they be, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them; or declare us things for to come: shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that yee are*

are Gods. He that is God can shew the things that are to come hereafter, and therefore he foreknowes them; for that cannot be foretold, which is not foreknown. And that without a Metaphor, or any other Trope.

From Scripture goe we to naturall reason, and that will prove, that foreknowledge agrees *properly* unto God. Arguments of this sort may be drawn, First from the nature of foreknowledge. Secondly from severall attributes of God. Thirdly from his actuall providence or efficiency.

First, from the nature of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is a knowledge of things before their existence. And in God there is a knowledge of things before their existence. *Thou understandest* (saith David) *my thoughts a farre off.* Psal. 139. 2. This argument you may find in D. Twisse against Jackson. p. 314. Till things doe coexist with God, his knowledge of them, saith he, is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue; for if they did coexist with God, then they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. much lesse is it after them, for if so, then their coexistence with God were past; but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once be both past, and also to come. You have it also in Suarez in the place before quoted. *In omni etiam proprietate certissimum est scientiam Dei, sicut & Deum ipsum duratione antecedere omnium rerum creaturarum existentiam.* It is most certain that the knowledge of God, as well as God himselfe, doth properly or in all propriety of speech antecede in duration the existence of all created things whatsoever, and therefore it is properly foreknowledge. Unto Suarez who is no enemy unto Arminianisme, I shall adde D. Jackson a professed Arminian arguing after the like manner in his *Treatise of the Divine essence and Attributes* Sect. 2. Cap. 8. p. 105. *If God* (saith he) *as all grant, be before all worlds, his knowledge being coeternall to his being, must needs be before all worlds.* And Austin himselfe grants a *scientia* a science, or knowledge in God most infallible, of all things that have been, are, or shall be, before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the World it selfe, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet present, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or fore-decree them. And seeing God from eternity hath both known, and decreed the things that then were not, he is said; to have foreknown and fore-decreed them.

Secondly, Arguments proving foreknowledge to be properly in God may be taken from Gods Attributes; from his infinite perfection, from his infinite happinesse, or blessednesse, from his unchangeablenesse.

First, from his infinite perfection: He is of all beings the best, and most perfect, *Deus optimus maximus* was a title that the ancient Romans by the light of nature gave him. Nothing then can so much as be imagined to be better then God. But 'tis better to know things to come, then to be ignorant of them, And therefore we must either deny that there is a God, or else ascribe unto him the knowledge of things to come. This is Doctor Twisse his argument *De scientiâ mediâ* pag. 246. *Verum, si Deus is sit, quo nihil melius excogitari potest, & melius sit cognoscere futura, & quicquid cognoscibile est, quam ignorare; videtur hinc sequi, aut Deum prorsus negandum esse, aut scientiam futurorum contingentium ei tribuendam.*

Secondly, from his infinite blessednesse or happinesse, which is such as that he hath all things desireable. But if he should not have knowne things to come he should be without a perfection, desireable by every intelligent or rationall nature. This was *Bradwardines* argument, *Si Deus quædam vera nesciret, posset desiderare & velle scire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter scire desiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem universaliter efficacem, posset illa scire & non noviter; quia tunc non semper esset actualissimus, scientissimus, perfectissimus, beatissimus, & immutabilis penitus, contra tertiam partem & sextam: necessario ergo æternaliter omnia vera novit.*

Thirdly, from his unchangeableness, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and consequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whilst they were to come, it would by actuall existence of them be enlarged, and so changed. This argument is urged by *Durand*, *Cumel*, *Rada*, *Suarez*, and others. God knowes things whilst present, for otherwise he should be ignorant of that which men and Angells know, therefore he knew them whilst future, otherwise by the presence of them, something *de novo* should accrue unto Gods knowledge, which cannot be without a change.

Constat (saith
Durand)
quod Deus

cognoscit contingens dum est præsens, puta Socratem currere, alioquin ego cognoscerem illud quod Deus ignoraret: si ergo non cognoscebat hoc prius quando fuit futurum, sequeretur quod aliquid accrevisset suæ scientiæ quod est impossibile. In 1. lib. *Disposit.* 38. Q. 3.

Suarez also argueth to the same purpose.

Præterea declaratur hoc modo; quia vel Deus scit hæc contingentia, quando ponuntur in esse, vel non: Hoc posterius nemo dicit, quia angelus, vel homo hoc cognoscit, saltem quando sunt præsentia: Ergo multo magis Deus: si autem nunc illa cognoscit, Ergo & antea, quia scientia Dei augeri non potest, Ita ut aliquid novum sub illam cadat, tum propter immutabilitatem, tum etiam quia paulatim discere, quocumque modo fiat, magna imperfectio est; Confirmatur, quia si Deus in tempore aliquid de novo inciperet velle, imperfectionem in illo indicaret: Ergo multo magis si aliquid de novo scire inciperet. Lib. 1. *De Scientia futurorum contingentium absoluta*, cap. 2.

The last sort of arguments which I shall mention, are drawn from Gods actuall providence or efficiency. God is the cause of all things, of him (saith the Apostle) *are all things*, *Rom. 11. 36*. Now he is the cause of all things by his knowledge, and by his will.

First by his knowledge, and that practically, which is resembled unto that of an Artificer, who hath a foreknowledge of what artificiall workes he resolves upon; for he hath samplers and patterns of them in his

Cognitio divini intellectus (saith Aquinas)

quod Deus

ad res alias, sicut cognitio artificis ad artificiata, cum per suam scientiam sit causa rerum. Artifex autem suæ artis cognitione etiam ea quæ nondum sunt artificiata cognoscit, formæ enim artis ex ejus scientiâ effluunt in exteriorem materiam ad artificiorum constitutionem: unde nihil prohibet in scientia artificis esse formas, quæ nondum exterius prodierunt: sic igitur nihil prohibet, Deum, eorum quæ non sunt, notitiam habere. lib. 1. *contra gentes* cap. 66.

Deus est causa omnium rerum & futurorum contingentium, & liberorum (saith *Cumel*) in primam partem Summ. Q. 14. Art. 13. Disp. 1. Per suam scientiam practica, ergo prius scit & cognoscit futura contingentia & libera quam producuntur & fiunt; sicut artifex prius habet ideam artificiatum & cognoscit rem producendam & efficiendam, quam efficiat & producat postea ad extra in tempore; igitur Deus qui artifex est universorum futurorum contingentium prius cognoscit futura contingentia, quam illa in tempore fiant.

Rada propounds this argument very briefly.

Deus omnia operatur ad extra, ut artifex verò rem, antequam illam efficiat, præcognoscit: aliter enim irrationabiliter operabitur. Parte prima. *Controv.* xxx. pag. 487.

Secondly, the will of God is the cause of all things, as is demonstrated by *Bradwardine* and by *Aquinas* and such as Comment upon him, in *prim. part. Q. 19. Art. 4*. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within and

and irresistibile from without, and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknowne. *Bradwardine* (from *Esay. 46. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my Counsell shall stand*) inferres the infallibility of Gods prediction from the firmenesse, immutability, and unresistibleness of his will. The Prophet signifies, saith he, that he can therefore declare the things that are not done, because his Counsell shall stand, and he will doe all his pleasure: *Quasi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vel annuntiare possit ab exordio novissimum, quia omne suum consilium & voluntas immutabiliter stabit, & fiet. De causa Dei. lib. 1. cap. 218. pag. 224.* This argument *Camel* inforceth by comparison with mans foreknowledge of things in their causes. A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipse of the Sunne or Moone in its cause, and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will.

Effectus potest evidenter cognosci

antequam in tempore producat in sua causa, sicut Eclipsis evidenter cognoscitur in sua causa, antequam sit, a Mathematico, & ab Astrologo: sed Deus per seipsum & per propriam voluntatem est causa omnium Entium contingentium, & liberorum, & prædefinit illa futura contingentia & libera. Ergo Deus per seipsum & per propriam scientiam, quam habet, cognoscit futura contingentia & libera.

As for the testimonies you bring in the Margent, they and diverse others are alleadged generally by the *Dominicans*, to prove the existence of things in Eternity, and it is very strange unto me that you take no notice of the common answers that are usually given unto them. The place out of *Gregory* is misquoted, but that might be an escape of the Printer; in my booke it is, *Moral. lib. 20. cap. 25.* And a little after he gives the reason why prescience is not properly in God: *Præscire dicitur qui unamquamque rem, antequam veniat, videt: Et id quod futurum est, priusquam præsens fiat, prævidet: Deus ergo quomodo est præsciens dum nulla nisi quæ futura sunt, præsciuntur? Et scimus quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos præterita nulla sunt: præsentia non transeunt, futura non veniunt: Quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospectu præsto est: Et omne quod præsens est, scire potest potius quam præscire.* The ground upon which both *Austin* and *Gregory* deny foreknowledge to be in God is, because nothing is future but all things are present unto God.

Unto all these and diverse other Testimonies which occurte in the *Dominicans*, I shall rehearse the answers of severall men.

First, *Rada, Par. prim. contro. triges. Art. 2. pag. 493. Ad omnes auctoritates unica solutione fit satis. Dico enim quod non intelligunt sancti, omnia esse Deo secundum rem præsentia sed secundum esse objectivum & cognitum: omnia enim in seipso videt & intuetur.*

Secondly, *Suarez* gives the same answer, but he explaines himselfe more fully: The Fathers (saith he) speake by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactnesse of that knowledge which God hath of things to come, for he knowes them so distinctly, and accurately, with all their circumstances, as if they did exist actually present. This knowledge of them therefore is not so much abstractive as intuitive, not so much prescience as science.

Patres per quandam exaggerationem locuti

sunt ut declararent perfectionem scientiæ, quam Deus habet de futuris; nam illa tam clarè & distinctè cum omnibus circumstantiis intuetur, ac si præsentia actu jam existerent: ideoq; scientia illa non est abstractiva, sed propriissima intuitio. Ad hoc ergo significandum dixerunt illam non tam esse dicendam præscientiam, quam scientiam. Nam more humano loquendo, quæ præsciuntur, non ita clarè & distinctè cognoscuntur. Nam Astrologus qui præscit futuram esse Eclipsin, non apprehendit & cognoscit illum effectum distinctè prout in re futurus est cum omnibus conditionibus & circumstantiis ejus: & ideo non habet de illo scientiam intuitivam, sed abstractivam, At vero Deus tam distinctè intuetur futurum antequam sit, sicut quando est, tamq; veram scientiam intuitivam illius habet.

Quocirca in eo sensu in quo illi patres voluerunt illam scientiam propriè appellare præscientiam; Illa particula *Præ* non solum excludit realem existentiam, sed etiam præsentiam objectivam exactam, & omnimodam effectus sic cogniti.

Thirdly, D. Twisse *De scientia media* pag. 390. gives the same answer that *Bradwardine* did unto the like sayings out of *Boetius* and *Anselme* above 200 yeares agoe, to wit, That all things are present unto God *in esse voluto* as decreed by him, *sunt ei præsentia, id est per suam insuperabilem & immutabilem voluntatem, præsentia liter determinata, & decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura.* And this you may see how he cleares both out of *Austin*, and *Gregory*.

Fourthly, *Becanus* gives another answer which I take to be the more satisfying: And 'tis, that the scope of both *Austin*, and *Gregory* is to shew, That there is not such a prescience or fore knowledge in God, as there is in us, *viz* imperfect, and conjecturall. &c.

Respondeo, scopus Augustini est ostendere non esse talem præscientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis est. Nos enim imperfecte, & quasi per conjecturas præ-

scimus futura: at præsentia clare & perfecte cognoscimus. Deus autem tam perfecte cognoscit futura, quam præsentia. Hic patet discrimen inter nos & Deum. 1. Quia nostra cognitio perficitur ex præsentia rerum: non autem Dei cognitio. 2. Quia res futuræ sunt Deo præsentia per præsentiam perfectam nobis per imperfectam. 3. Quia nos eandem rem bis cognoscimus: semel imperfecte, quando futura est, & semel perfecte, quando præsens est. At Deus semel tantum, quia cognitio Dei est æque perfecta, sive res futura, sive præsens sit. Nec aliud vult Gregorius; uterq; negat præscientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis est. *Sum. Theolog. Scolast. part. 1. Tom. 1. cap. 10. quest. 10.*

From your Testimonies I come to the examination of your Reasons.

MR GOODWIN.

NOR is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of judgement about such a poynt as this, even between those who have many Irons of contention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is. For 1. if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things, be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are in the Letter and propriety of them, as competent unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But impossible it is, that there should be any plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his Nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it:

I E A N E S.

YOur Argument with open mouth gainsayeth that which no body will affirme, but is mute in the prooffe of that which only will be called for, to wit, That whatsoever is properly and formally ascribed unto God, is really distinguished from Gods Essence, and his other attributes. If you think I doe you any wrong by this censure, reduce your Argument unto Categorical Syllogismes, and make the best of it you can.

M. GOODWIN.

Mr GOODWIN.

SEcondly, if foreknowledge were properly or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing or event foreknown, should in the interim actually come to passe, must needs cease, and be changed, in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the propriety of it) being *res futura*, somewhat that is to come.

I E A N E S.

SEverall answers unto this trite and baffled argument you may read in Schoolemen commenting in *primam partem summe*. Q. 14. Art. 15. I will not trouble you with the rehearfall of them, but shall only propound that which I take to be most plaine and obvious unto even an ordinary capacity. We must distinguish betwixt Gods knowledge considered *in it selfe*, and the *extrinsecall denominations* thereof. Gods knowledge *in it selfe* is not changed by any variation of its objects, which are one while future, and then present, and anon after past and gone, but 'tis one and the same knowledge without any the least alteration (*ex parte Dei cognoscentis*) by which he knowes things whiles future, when present, when past; for he knowes and sees them *in esse voluto pro certo aut tali tempore*, as decreed to exist at such a time. And to know a thing as decreed to exist at such a time, is to know that it shall be future untill that time come; that it shall be present as soone as that time comes, and as long as it lasts; that it shall be past as soone as that time is gone and ceaseth to be: *Quare licet aliter atq; aliter cognoscat res futuras & presentes ex parte rerum cognitarum, non tamen aliter atq; aliter ex parte cognoscentis. Nam videre aliquid apud Deum in esse voluto pro certo tempore, est & videre illud futurum esse, donec tempus illud advenerit, & presens esse cum primum advenerit, & præteritum esse simul atque tempus illud elapsum fuerit.* D. Twisse *De Scientiâ Mediâ*. pag. 389. And againe, pag. 26. *Præsertim cum sub notione ista, esse voliti pro certo tempore, cætera notiones quales sunt esse presens, esse præteritum, esse futurum, mirabiliter uniantur, & amicissime conspirent; quippe cum esse volitum apud Deum pro certo tempore sit & esse futurum, donec illud tempus advenerit; & esse presens simul atque advenerit & quamdiu duraverit; & denique esse præteritum, quam primum tempus illud esse deserit.* So then you see these various considerations of the objects of Gods knowledge in regard of futuration, presence, preterition, are admirably united *in esse voluto pro certo tempore*, and therefore can be no prejudice unto the immutability of his knowledge; whence it is become a proverbe in Schoole Divinity, that God *non aliter novit facta, quam flenda*. But though Gods knowledge be in it selfe immutable, notwithstanding the succession that is in the coexistence of objects with it, as a rock in a river, stands unmoveable, notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it, yet this is no hinderance, but that there may be and is a change in the *extrinsecall denominations* of
 Gods

Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects thereof; so long as these objects are to come, Gods knowledge of them is termed foreknowledge; when they actually exist, then it looseth the denomination of foreknowledge, and may be called co-knowledge; and so when they are past and cease to be, it may be called after-knowledge. Now a change of these *extrinsecall denominations* doe not import any change in Gods knowledge in it selfe, because as *Vasquez* tells us, *Vera mutatio non accidit nisi per veram receptionem, aut amissionem formæ realis in ipsa re existentis*. A reall change is by a true and reall either receipt, or losse of a reall forme existing in a thing it selfe.

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THirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God. The reason is, because then there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the creature: both which are impossible. But if prescience or foreknowledge (being properly and formally in the creature) shall be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with somewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly so called, in God.

I E A N E S.

THe Minor of this Argument reduced into forme, which you place first, will be denied by the Scotists; The Major which you put in the second place, will be denied generally by the Thomists.

As for the Minor of this Argument put in the first place, *There is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God*. This the Scotists deny, as you may see in *Scotus* himselfe lib. 1. Distinct. 3. 2. 1. Distinct. 8. 2. 3. Rada part. 1. Controver. 21. *Faber Faventinus Philosoph. Natural. Theorem. 95*. And they bring such subtil reasons as you will confesse, when you read them, to be worthy of an answer. As for your reason, they are not within Gun-shot of it. For these attributes which they affirme to be in the Creature univocally the same with those in God, are to be understood *quoad communes non proprias rationes, quoad conceptum convenientiæ non discrepantiæ*. In such a notion and consideration as is abstracted from finite and infinite, and so more generall then either God or the creature. *Conceptus communis* (saith *Scotus*) *est ex se formaliter neuter respectu eorum quibus est communis*. But the objective concept of these attributes, which denominate God and the creature, is common unto God and the creature, and therefore formally neither finite nor infinite, but abstracting from both. But perhaps my dulnesse cannot pierce into the depth of this argument. You may doe well for my conviction to improve it unto the utmost, and yet, if I be not mistaken, the uttermost that you can prove thereby is, that which will not be denied unto you by the Scotists, to wit, that nothing, no not *Ens*, of all predicates one of the most abstract and transcendentall, can be affirmed of

of God and the creature *univocally*, in regard of a *physicall* univocation. *Rada part. 1. Controv. 21. Art. 1. pag. 328. 333.* and that these attributes which denominate God and the creature are predicated equivocally; if we speake of a * *Physicall* equivocation, it is manifest.

* Whereas
our Author

p. 125. Of the first book of this Treatise affirmeth, that every thing in common attributed to God and man, is much more equivocall then the word. *Canis* attributed to a Statre, to a Fish, to a four-footed creature on the earth, if he be to be understood in regard not of this *Physicall*, but of a *Logicall* equivocation, I must needs confesse; that I dissent from him for reasons that I shall presently specify.

First, because the objective concept of them, as denominating both God and the Creature is one and the same, only by the abstraction of the understanding, and not *Physically* or *a parte rei*. This you have yeilded unto by *Scotus* in answer unto the objection of *Henricus*, that *Primo diversa in nullo conveniunt, sed Deus est primo diversus a quacumq; creatura &c.* Unto this *Scotus* answers *lib. 1. distinct. 8. 2. 3. Deus & Creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus; tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate, quia in nullâ realitate conveniunt. Et quomodo esse possit conceptus communis sine convenientiâ in-re vel in realitate, in sequenti dicitur. Deus & Creatura* (saith *Rada* a famous *Scotist*) *sunt primo diversa subjective, quia scilicet in nulla realitate per differentias contrahibili conveniunt; sed non sunt primo diversa objective & quoad intellectum, sicut nec decem predicamenta, quia Ens de eis predicatur in quid. part. 1. controver. 21. Art. 2. pag. 214.*

Secondly, *Physically* and *a parte rei*, there is a greater distance between God and the creature, then there is between any creatures; for 'tis an infinite distance. This is all which is proved by that reason of *Bannes* in *1. par. Thom. 2. 13. Art. 5.* That all created perfections in comparison of uncreated, are but painted and umbratick, the best of created beings in comparison of God are but shadowes and pictures, *Esay 40. 17. All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him lesse then nothing. Omnis perfectio creata comparatione ad increatam perfectionem, est quasi depicta & umbratica, Ergo &c.*

The major of your Syllogisme put into forme, and placed in the second place, to wit, (If prescience or foreknowledge being properly and formally in the creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the creature *univocally* & formally the same with somewhat that is in God) will generally be denied by *Thomists*, who will acquaint you with a middle kind of predication, betwixt *equivocall* and *univocall*, to wit, *analogicall*, according unto which they affirme those attributes to be predicated, which denominate both God and the creature. In *1. part. Thom. 2. 13. Art. 5.* They instance in *Ens*, which is properly and formally predicated of God and the creature, and yet neither *univocally* nor *equivocally* but *analogicall*, *analogia quæ est per attributionem intrinsecam*, and not only *analogia proportionis*, as laughter is affirmed of a man and a green or flourishing meadow; nor yet only *analogia attributionis quæ fit per extrinsecam denominationem*, as when health is predicated of a sensitive creature in the first place, as the subject in which it is seated, and of meats, drinckes, medicaments, urines, secondarily, in reference unto, and by extrinsecall denomination from that health which is in a sensitive creature, unto which they are referred either as causes or tokens of it: see *Suarez, Scheibler, Morisanus, Logic. Mexic.*

To make this matter more plaine, I shall distinguish of a twofold acception of *Univocall*; one *Logicall*, the other *Metaphysicall*.

First *Logicall*, in which 'tis adequately opposed unto *equivocall*, and so every predicate is *univocall*, that is, not purely, & meerly *equivocall*, which

imparts only its name, and not any common signification thereof. Predicates thus *Univocall*, are said to be *Logically univocall*, because this kind of univocation is sufficient as to *Logicall* ends and purposes, as for the framing a contradiction, and to be the middle terme in a demonstration.

Secondly, there is a *Metaphysicall* acception of *Univocall*, in which 'tis inadequately opposed unto *Equivocall*, that is, partly unto *Equivocall*, and partly unto *Analogicall*. An *Equivocall* predicate only imparts its name, and not any common signification thereof. An *Analogicall* predicate imparts both its name and signification unto the things of which it is predicated, but unequally, in regard of that inequality, which is of essential dependency, *secundum prius & posterius*, as they say; so *Ens* is predicated of *substance*, and *Accident*; *analogically* of *substance* in the first place, and primarily, as its principall analogate; of *Accident* in the second place, with attribution, order, or reference unto, and dependance upon substance.

These things thus premised, I lay downe these two conclusions, against which whatsoever you object I shall be ready to answer.

The first conclusion, Diverse attributes, which denominate God, and the Creature, are predicated of them *univocally* in a *Logicall* acception of *Univocall*, as it is adequately opposed unto *Equivocall*; that is, they are not predicated of God, and the Creature, meerely and purely *Equivocally*.

For first, not only the bare words, but a common and abstracted signification of them is found both in God and the Creature, I might instance in *Ens*, substance, goodnesse, wisdom, justice, &c.

Secondly, because otherwise nothing can be known, or demonstrated of God by, or from the creatures, but still there would be the fallacy of equivocation, *Ex cognitione unius equivocati nihil potest cognosci alterius*. And this is as well against the Philosopher, who proveth many things demonstratively of Gods; as against the Apostle *Rom. 1. 20.* saying, *The invisible things of him from the creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternall power, and Godhead, so that they are without excuse.* This is a reason given by *Aquinas. p. 1. q. 13. art. 5.* *Nomina quæ dicuntur de Deo & creaturis, non dicuntur purè equivocè ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nil possit cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia equivocationis, & hoc est tam contra Philosophum 8. Phys. 12. Metaph. qui multa demonstrative de Deo probat, quam etiam contra Apostolum dicentem, Roman. 1. Invisibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur.*

This is all that the Scotists can prove by their arguments, which they bring to prove the Univocation of *Ens*, as predicated of God and the creature; and this they fully and strongly prove. And indeed if the matter be well looked into, the contention here between the Thomists and the Scotists, is a meere strife of words, *de modo loquendi*.

The second conclusion, No attribute whatsoever denominating God and the creature, is predicated of them *univocally*, as *Univocall* is opposed unto *Analogicall*: for those attributes which doe agree unto God most properly, are predicated of God, & the creature unequally, in poynt of essential order; of God primarily, & independently, of the creature secondarily, & dependently, with relation unto God. In God they are by his *Essence*, in the creatures but *by participation*. This I might exemplify by instancing in that which is under debate, infallible knowledge of things to come, that are contingent, is affirmed of God chiefly, & in the first place; of the creature only dependently upon, & derivedly frō God: whereupon an infallible, underived, & independent foreknowledge of future contingents is incommuni-

communicable unto any creature. *Iames* 4. 14. *You know not, saith Iames, what shall be on the morrow.*

Before I take my leave of this section, I shall desire you, that whereas I affirme, that what words are attributable unto God properly, *dicuntur de Deo prius quam de creaturis*, you would be pleased to understand it in regard of the things, or perfections signified by those words, and not barely in regard of their imposition. This limitation *Aquinas* puts unto the Question. p. 1. Q. 13. art. 6. *Nomina, quæ proprie de Deo prædicantur, quantum ad rem significatam per prius dicuntur de Deo, quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; sed quantum ad impositionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus, unde & modum significandi habent.*

Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.

IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge,
I answer

True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge, or in such a sense, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned doe infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject, or soule, wherein it resideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein; and of separation from it: Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himselfe, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will farther appeare in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formall conception of it, includes or supposeth a liablenesse to a change or expiration (viz. upon the coming to passe of the thing foreknown; which must of necessity come to passe in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetuall, and so is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.

I E A N E S

Here you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us: for you have not so much as the shadow of an argument to prove, that knowledge is not in God, according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge: but you spend a whole Section in the proöfe of that, wherein you are sure to meet with no adversary at all, viz. that there is no knowledge in God in such a sense, where in it is found in men; why Sir, the concession of this will no waies advantage you, or prejudice us: 'tis the first part of your disjunctive proposition that calls for proöfe, in which, why you are so silent, I cannot guesse, unlessse it be, that you are conscious of the falsehood of it, & therefore dar'd not to propound it Categorically, but only disjunctively; & the truth of disjunctive propositions is saved, if but one part of the be true. So the per-

haps you thought, how ever the World went you would be safe and secure, as having two strings unto your bow. I will say no more of this, but that it is very unlike M. Goodwin, thus to decline the combate, and runne unto the maintenance of a fort, where you could not reasonably expect so much as one assaylant. If you be pleased to returne into the field againe, and come up roundly to a charge, I meane a prooffe of that which you have not yet so much as offered, or pretended to prove, viz. That there is no knowledge in God according to the precise and formall notion of knowledge, I shall be willing and ready to encounter you, and I doe hope that by Gods assistance I shall be able to stand the shock of all your Argumentation.

MR GOODWIN pag. 105, 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14.

IT is the sence of one of the greatest Patrons of the adverse cause, that the precept, or injunction of God, is not properly the will of God; * because (saith he) he doth not hereby so much signify what himselfe willet to be done, as what is our duty to doe. I confesse that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willet, or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier: but yet that will, wherewith, or out of which, God willet or commandeth us to doe, that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willet, or decreeth things to be done. My will, or desire, that my Child should obey me, or, that he should prosper in the world, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose, to shew the respects of a father unto him in providing for him, being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act it selfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the Principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper, and others lesse, though some may be better, and others worse, But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. Therefore if the precept, or preceptive will of God, be not properly his will; neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly such. If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willet or injoyneth faith and repentance, and consequently, salvation unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willet the salvation of any man. Therefore if there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willet the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willet the salvation of All men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enter-faere, and contradict the one the other. Nor will that distinction of the late mentioned Author save a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth, between the Decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth, may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the thing which he commandeth; though the decree it selfe cannot be repugnant to the Command. The vanity of this distinction clearly appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that Acts are differenced and distinguished by their Objects. Therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed, or commanded by him, impossible it is but that the two acts

* Mandatum Dei non est voluntas Dei proprie dicta; quia illo non tam significet quid ipse vult fieri, quam quid nostri officii sit facere. D. Twisse. Vindicie Gratiæ. p. 171.

a Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare possumus; decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus. Twisse ubi supra.

acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other, the other, should digladiate, and one fight against the other. Therefore certainly there is no such paire, or combination of wills in God, as the distinction of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti (as applyed in the question in hand) doth suppose. It is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will, or desire, the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and injoyne the Physitian to doe the best to recover him.

I E A N E S.

DTwisse is not singular herein, diverse great Schoolemen, *Aquinas, Durand, Cajetan, Bannes, Gregory de Valentia*, and many others, say the same of not only Gods command, but all other signes of the will of his purpose or good pleasure. The words of some few of them, shall for the satisfaction of the reader be inserted in the Margent; and the rather, because you in the 16 Section of this Chapter, tell us, that the Schoolemen were the first coyners of this distinction of Gods will in *Voluntatem signi, & voluntatem beneplaciti*: and how their interpretation thereof, holds intelligence (as you speake.) with that sense of *D. Twisse* which you here impugne, the Reader may see *Vindic. Lib. 1. pag. 173.*

Dicendum
quod in Deo
quædam di-
cuntur pro-

prie & quædam secundum Metaphoram, cum autem aliquæ passionēs humanæ in divinam prædicationem metaphoricè assumuntur, hoc fit secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis Metaphorice significatur; sicut apud nos irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa punitio est signum iræ, & propter hoc ipsa punitio nomine iræ significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in nobis signum voluntatis, quandoq; Metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur, sicut cum aliquis præcipit aliquid, signum est, quod velit illud fieri; unde præceptum divinum quandoq; Metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud *Matthæi 6.* Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in cælo & in terra; sed hoc distat inter voluntatem & iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur, & ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas proprie, & Metaphorice dicta, voluntas enim proprie dicta vocatur voluntas beneplaciti; voluntas autem Metaphorice dicta est voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas dicitur. *Aquin. part. 1. Sum. Qu. 19. art. 11.*

Communiter dicitur quod distinctio voluntatis divinæ in voluntatem beneplaciti, & in voluntatem signi, est distinctio voluntatis in voluntatem proprie dictam, & Metaphorice, nam voluntas beneplaciti est voluntas proprie dicta, vel actus suus volendi, quo aliquid sibi placet, sed voluntas signi dicitur Metaphorice voluntas Dei, eo modo quo signum nominatur Metaphorice nomine rei, cuius est signum, ut imago *Herculis* vocatur *Hercules*.

Et hoc potest esse dupliciter, uno modo ratione similitudinis inter signum & signatum ut in exemplo jam posito; alio modo ratione proportionis quasi arguendo, Quod sicut se habent signum & signatum in uno, sic se habeant in alio; & sic est in proposito nostro: Quia enim in nobis ille qui præcipit, vel consulit aliquid fieri, videtur illud velle: similiter qui prohibet aliquid fieri, videtur velle illud non fieri; qui autem aliquid facit, vult illud fieri, qui vero permittit aliquid fieri cum possit impedire, videtur illud velle; ideo in Deo idem ponitur scilicet quod præceptum, consilium, prohibitio, operatio, & permissio sunt, vel dicuntur voluntas divina propter dictam similitudinem vel magis proportionem. *Durand. lib. 1. dist. 45. Q. 3.*

Hæc divisio divinæ voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti, & voluntatem signi, non est univoca in univocata, sed analogi in analogata. Nam de signo divinæ voluntatis non dicitur voluntatis nomen nisi Metaphorice, & analogice, propter habitudinem illius ad voluntatem divinam proprie dictam. Quam rem aliis verbis *Cajetanus* expressit in hæc quæstione. *Art. 11.* Cum dixit non dividi hic rem aliquam, sed vocem ipsam, seu nomen divinæ voluntatis *Gregori de Valentia. Tom. 1. Disp. 1. Q. 19. punct. 2.*

Some of them professe in *terminis*, that the will of signe or signification, is called the will of God only improperly, and metaphorically by way of similitude or proportion, and therefore the distribution of Gods will into a will of signe and will of purpose or good pleasure is not reall; but only verball, *divisio vocis*; from whom they doe not dissent, who say that 'tis *divisio Analogi in analogata*. For as *Scheibler* a *Lutheran*; and of your opinion for the maine in these controversies, observeth, that they are to be understood of such an analogy which is by *extrinsecall reference*

and denomination. Intelligunt enim eam analogiam, quæ est per extrinsecam habitudinem & denominationem. Voluntas enim signi vocatur voluntas extrinseca denominatione, in quantum scilicet significat beneplacitum divinum, quod absolute est voluntas Dei, ad eum modum quo multa dicuntur sana, per habitudinem ad sanitatem animalis, quæ primo talis est: Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 3. tit. 15. art. 4. punct. 2. n. 535.

For the will of signe is called will by extrinsecall denomination, as it signifieth Gods good pleasure or decree (which absolutely is the will of God) after the same manner that many things are said to be healthy or wholsome, in regard of reference unto the health of a sensitive creature, unto whom health is in the first place properly and intrinsically attributed.

Unto these suffrages of the Schoolemen, I shall adde reasons drawn from three attributes of Gods will properly so called; It is internall, eternall, irresistibile, and Gods precept or injunction is externall, temporary, and resistible.

1. Gods will properly so called is internall in God, really undistinguished from his Essence, whereas Gods precepts or injunctions, are eternall without him, really distinguished from him.

2. The proper will of God was from eternall, the commands of God are given in time.

From the Eternity of Gods will, I shall also draw this following Argument.

The will of God properly so called is incapable of interruption, reiteration, and multiplication, for in eternity there is a most absolute and perfect unity and indivisibility without any succession of parts, but now the Commands of God may be very often reiterated and multiplied, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line. *Esay. 28. 10. Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together. Math. 23. 37.*

3. The will of God properly so called is irresistibile. *Who hath resisted his will. Rom. 9. 19. Whatsoever the Lord pleased that did he in heaven and in earth, in the Sea and all deepe places. Psal. 135. 6. The Counsell of the Lord must stand and cannot be withstood. By all the powers of the World and darknessesse my counsell (saith the Lord) shall stand, and I will doe all my pleasure Esay 46. 10. But now Gods precepts and prohibitions are every day violated, broken and resisted by wicked men.*

Unto these reasons I might adde your own confession; *I confesse (say you) that no signification whatsoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be said to be the will of the signifier.*

Prælati enim religiosus quandoque præcipit sub-

dito aliquid grave, volens eum per præceptum ligare, & tamen nec vult, nec intendit, quod res quam præcipit fiat; unde cum subditus parat se ad exequendum præceptum, Prælati revocat; ita quod Præceptum est directe signum voluntatis præcipientis quod velit obligari subditum ad exequendum præceptum, sed non est directe signum quod velit rem præceptam impleri; talia enim præcepta sunt vel ad sumendum experimentum de obedientia subditi, vel ad ostendendum pluribus obedientiam unius quasi pro exemplo.

But now I subjoyne, Gods precept or injunction is only a signe of his will, and therefore however it be usually termed in Scripture the will of God *Mat. 6. 10. Mat. 7. 21. Rom. 12. 2. 1 Thess. 4. 3.* It is to be understood only improperly and Tropically; and that first Metaphorically, 2. Metonymically.

First Metaphorically, and by an Anthropopathy, when God commands a thing, he carryeth himselfe as men doe, when they purpose, will, desire, and

and determine that such a thing should come to passe; for amongst men usually their commands are manifestations and declarations of their purposes and desires; I say usually, because sometimes superiors injoyne some things to inferiors only for tryall, and, upon their readinesse to obey, recall and revoke such commands. How Gods commandements and other signes of his will, are the will of God *Metaphorically*, *Aquinas* illustrates in the place but now quoted; seeing passions are ascribed unto God only *Metaphorically*, hence the signes of such passions in us, when ascribed unto God, are called by the names of the passions themselves. Punishment is with us a signe of Anger, and therefore Gods punishments are termed his wrath or anger; so our commands are signes usually of our wills, of our desires, and intentions, and therefore the commands of God are termed in Scripture the will of God.

But I think with *D. Ames*, that the commandements of God are termed the will of God, not only *Metaphorically*, but also *Metonymically*, because they are signes of a proper will of God. *Media illa* (saith *Ames*) *per quæ voluntas ista revelatur, recte vocantur voluntas signi, non tantum Metaphorice, quia solent inter homines indicare quid velint: sed etiam Metonymice, quia sunt vel effecta, vel adjuncta, propriam Dei voluntatem ex parte indicantia. Medul. lib. I. c. 7. § 3.* And this also is observed by *D. Twisse*, in his consideration of the *Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice*, p. 54. Now we say, even Gods commandement notes the will of God also in proper speech, to wit, what shall be our duty to doe; for undoubtedly whatsoever God commands us, it is his will in proper speech, that it shall be our duty to doe it. However then, it is the sence of *D. Twisse*, that the commandement of God cannot properly be said to be his will, yet he doth not deny that it signifieth or betokeneth the will of God properly so called, in which regard it is termed the revealed will of God, because it revealeth Gods will: all the Question is, what will of God it revealeth or signifieth. *D. Twisse* (you see) roundly expresseth himselfe, that it signifieth, or revealeth Gods will of obligation, what he will oblige and bind men unto; what he will have to be their duty: but it doth not at all signify the will of Gods purpose concerning what shall come to passe actually; it doth not signify Gods will of operation or permission, *i. e.* it doth not reveale what good God hath decreed to worke, what evill he hath decreed to suffer or permit in all those to whom his commands are given; briefly, it signifieth or revealeth mans duty, and Gods will of obliging unto it. *Mic. 6. 8.* *He hath shewed thee O man what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to doe justly, and to love mercy, and to walke humbly with thy God. Obad. 12. 13. 14.* It doth not reveale the event or issue of things what shall actually be, by Gods working or permitting providences; This you have asserted by *Durand* an ancient Schooleman, *Præceptum* (saith he) *non semper indicat voluntatem præcipientis, quæ præcipientis velit rem præceptam fieri, sed illam quæ præcipientis vult obligare illum, cui præcipit, ad faciendum quod præcipitur, & hoc & semper.* And a little before in the same place, *Præceptum non est directè & semper signum quod præcipientis velit rem præceptam fieri, sed solum quod velit subditum obligare ad faciendum illud quod præcipitur, & hoc clarum est in præceptis divinis, per quæ Deus vult simpliciter nos obligare, sed non vult simpliciter rem præceptam fieri, alioquin semper fieret. Lib. I. dist. 47. Qu. 3.* Gods command unto *Pharaoh*, that he should let *Israel* goe, signified only his duty, that he was bound to let *Israel* goe, not the event, that he should actually consent unto their departure. Gods command
of

of Cain, Judas, &c. to believe, and repent, did not signify that God did will the actual existence of their faith and repentance, but only that it was his purpose to bind them to faith and repentance as a duty. And thus you have a confirmation and cleere explication of D. Twisse his meaning, against which your discourse in this Section, if it were reduced unto Syllogismes, would not conclude with the least shew of probability.

MR GOODWIN.

BUt yet that will wherewith, or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done.

I E A N E S.

First, here you make *to will* and *to command* termes equivalent or *Synonymous* (as you doe afterwards *to will* and *to injoyne*) which is very unreasonable, for 'tis the very thing in question, and D. Twisse affirmeth, that *to command* is to will only *improperly*, and therefore *equivocally*. For you then to use *to Will* and *Command*, as words of the same import and signification, before you have proved them to be so, serves for nothing but to breed confusion, distract the Reader, and disturb the course of Disputation.

Secondly, I confesse that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the same will really, distinguished only *ratione ratiocinata*, by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your subtilty in the following part of this Section, should object, that *acts* are *differenced*, and *distinguished by their objects*, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, be really distinguished from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, impossible it is, but that these two wills of his, should be also really distinguished, I shall for answer referre them unto *Ferrariensis* upon *Aquinas contra gentes lib. 1. c. 77. Adverte quod ex ista probatione* (viz.) (that *actus secundum objecta distinguuntur*) vult habere, *S. Tho. quod distinguibile proportionatum objecto est actus; & ideo si plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quaecunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde sensus illius propositionis est, quod actus est id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit.* The sence of this proposition, *Acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects*, is, that if many, or different objects doe inferre any plurality or distinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or distinction of objects doth alwaies argue a plurality or distinction of acts.

3. But thirdly, this concession will not in the least degree advantage you; for the inference that you make afterwards, That if the precept of God

God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his be properly such; for no rationall and Scholasticall Divine will deny Gods decree, of things to be done, to be properly his will; and I have made it good, that Gods commandment is not properly his will, and you bring nothing like an argument to prove the contrary: but in the next place, you illustrate this by a comparifon from the acts of willing, proceeding from the principle, or faculty within man of willing, let us heare what you say.

Mr GOODWIN.

M*T will or desire that my Child should obey me, or that he should prosper in the World, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpose to shew the respects of a Father unto him in providing for him: being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act it selfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different soever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the same. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no such difference between the acts proceeding from it, which should make some to be more proper and others lesse, though some may be better, and others worse, but this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God.*

I E A N E S.

FOr answer, I shall distinguish betwixt the *Elicite* acts of the will, which proceed from the will, as their only and immediate principle, and such acts of the will as are only *imperate*, that is, performed at the beck and command of the will, but proceeding immediately from other faculties *v. g.* the understanding, loco-motive faculty, the parts and members of the body, &c. as walking, speaking, writing, and the like. Now I confesse there can be no such difference between the *elicit* acts of mens wills, which should make some to be more proper, and others lesse: But yet notwithstanding this I affirme, that the *imperate* acts of mens wills, such as their injunctions, and precepts, whether by tongue, penne, or otherwise (to give an instance pertinent to the businesse in hand) are not called properly acts of their wills; and this I shall not dictate, but confirme by these three following arguments.

First, every act of the will properly so called, is voluntary, *intrinsically*, and of it selfe, but now these *imperate* acts of the will are voluntary only *extrinsically*, by denomination from an act of the will moveing, stirring up, and applying the power or faculty from which they proceed unto operation.

2. Those acts which proceed from other faculties, distinguished really from the will, are not properly acts of the will, or acts of willing (as you phrase it) but these *imperate* acts of the will proceed from other faculties really distinguished from the will, and therefore cannot properly be said to be acts of the will, and of these faculties too.

3. The acts of the will, are not properly objects of acts of the will. The act of willing is not properly a thing willed, a decree is not decreed. *Actus* (saith Suarez) *qui per seipsum est intrinsece voluntarius, non comparatur ut proprium objectum, vel effectus ad illum actum, quo est voluntarius, quia est voluntarius seipso, & non est proprie objectum vel effectus sui ipsius: habet ergo aliud objectum in quod directe tendat, & est effectus potentie, qua elicitur, & solum per quandam virtutalem reflectionem, quam in se includit, est voluntarius: unde dici solet volitus per modum actus, non per modum objecti. Met. Disp. 19. Sect. 5. n. 17.* But these imperate actions of the will are properly objects of the will, and things willed, and therefore cannot in strictnesse and propriety of speech be said to be acts of the will.

M. GOODWIN.

Therefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will be properly such.

I E A N E S.

I Have searched for the premises out of which you inferre this conclusion, and I must needs professe unto you, that I can find none: it is possible the fault may be in the dulnesse of my understanding, and you shall find me willing and ready to confesse as much, if you will put your argument into Moode and Figure for me, and conclude this proposition out of any thing you have delivered in the former part of this Section.

Mr GOODWIN.

If so, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willetth or injoyneth faith and repentance; and consequently salvation unto all men, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willetth the salvation of any man.

I E A N E S

First, untill you can find a Major and Minor unto your former conclusion, this which is inferr'd therehence is presumed and not proved.

2. You here make *Willetth* and *Injoyneth* all one, concerning the unreasonableness of which, I have spoken already.

3. I wonder what you meane in talking of an act of will in God, whereby he injoyneth faith and repentance. The injunction or precept of faith and repentance, is an act *without* God, not *in* him, and belongs unto his will; not *formally*, but *effectively*.

4. Your

4. Your mentioning of an act of will in God, hath occasioned mee to thinke of some thing, which for clearing of mine own meaning, and avoyding of mistakes, I shall communicate unto the Reader: And it is carefully to put a distinction betwixt these two expressions, *To be properly the will of God*, and *To be properly an act of the will of God*.

That Gods decrees are *properly* the will of God, may be demonstrated out of most Schoolemen; that they are properly acts of Gods will I deny, and that for two reasons.

1. If Gods decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is ascribed unto God, not as a power distinct from the act, but as an act not *elicit* but *subsisting*: And here I shall give you the words and reasons of *Suarez*, then whom there are few Moderne Schoolemen more rationally. He having proved that the will is not in God *per modum potentiae secundum rem, sed per modum actus ultimi & puri*, he propounds the doubt *secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum*, wherein heare his resolution: *In hoc eodem modo loquendum est, quo de intellectu & scientiâ locuti sumus, quod scilicet ex parte rei conceptæ, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non potest concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi potest quod sit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptæ involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere secundum rationem, non est agere, sed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, scilicet virtutem amandi se, ut sic, quam præscindimus ab actuali amore, sicut de actu primo & secundo in scientia diximus.*

But here I desire to be understood, as *Franciscus Amicus* explicates himselfe touching this particular *Curs. Theol. Tom. 1. Diss. 14. Sect. 1. Dupliciter considerari potest potentia vitalis; uno modo, ut dicit distinctionem ab actu; secundo, ut importat positivam perfectionem percipiendi aut tendendi ad objectum; primo modo involvit imperfectionem Deo repugnantem; secundo modo perfectionem Deo convenientem. Quare concedo in Deo esse voluntatem, secundum positivum conceptum potentiae; Nego autem esse potentiam, secundum imperfectionem distinctionis ab actu secundo, quam potentia ut sic per se importat.* The power of willing may be considered two manner of waies; First, as it implyeth distinction from its act; and so it involveth imperfection repugnant unto God, Secondly, as it importeth a positive perfection of tendency towards its object or thing willed, and so it may be attributed unto God.

2. If Gods decrees were properly acts of Gods will, then they should be properly *Elicite* acts, but they are not properly *elicit* acts, but *subsisting*: *Enunciantur fateor* (saith our Author) *tanquam actus a Deo elicti, & sic dici possunt per anthropopathiam, quemadmodum & passiones humanæ attribuuntur Deo. At eruditi probe norunt omnia decreta Dei esse unicumduntaxat actum volendi in Deo, qui quidem actus volendi non differt realiter ab ipsa voluntate Dei, quæ quidem voluntas Dei non differt realiter ab ipso Deo, qui est actus simplicissimus. Vind. lib. 2. p. 2. p. 101.* But I returne from this digression unto M. Goodwin.

M. GOODWIN.

T Herefore if there be any secret, or revealed will of God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time when he willeth the salvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will soever) these two wills must needs enterfeere and contradict one the other.

I E A N E S

T His you gather from what you have not at all proved, but only pretended to have proved, viz. that the precept or injunction of faith and repentance, is properly the will of God. And for the contrary I have brought undeniable proofes, and therefore though there be any secret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the destruction of any man, at the same time, when he willeth or enjoyneth his faith and repentance, those two wills doe not as you say enterfeere or contradict one the other. For unto contradiction it is required, that all the termes must be taken in the same sense and signification; now this condition is not here observed: For that he willeth the destruction of any man, is with a will in proper speech, that he willeth the faith and repentance of all men, unto whom the Gospell is preached, is with a will improperly so called, viz, his commandement.

Mr GOODWIN.

N Or will that distinction of the late mentioned Author, salve a consistency between them, wherein he distinguisheth betwixt the decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the thing that he commandeth, though the decree it selfe cannot be repugnant to the command: ^a

^a Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse dicimus, decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus. Twisse ubi sup.

I E A N E S

T His is not barely affirmed, but strongly proved by D. Twisse, and of his proofes you take no notice, but only object against what he saith: This if it be a laudable, is a very easy, and compendious way of handling a controversy, for it would save a man the labour of that, which hath still been accounted the most difficult taske in Polemicall Writers, to wit, solution of Arguments; but I shall acquaint the Reader with what you conceale, and I doe not doubt, but upon representation thereof, he will acquit the Doctor, and his distinction, from that vanity which you lay to his charge. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a

Deo

Deo mandata ; pugnare posse dicimus ; interea decretum Dei cum mandato pugnare posse non dicimus ; utrumque demonstramus. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare posse, sic ostendimus ; sacrificatio Isaaci & non-sacrificatio Isaaci pugnant inter se, sunt enim termini contradicentes. At harum altera fuit a Deo mandata Abrahamo, uti docet Scriptura, simulque eodem tempore non-sacrificatio fuit à Deo decreta, ut colligitur ex eventu. Nam Deus eam efficaciter impedivit, ne fieret. Quare res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re a Deo decreta. Rursus, dimissio populi Israelitici ex Ægypto, & non-dimissio pugnant inter se, sunt enim sibi invicem contradicentes: at altera, nempe dimissio, fuit a Deo mandata Pharaoni; altera, puta non-dimissio, fuit a Deo eodem tempore decreta. Nam & mandavit Pharaoni per Moysen & Aaronem ut populum dimitteret; simul etiam significavit, se obduraturum cor Pharaonis, ut non dimitteret; ergo res a Deo mandata, pugnare potest cum re à Deo decreta.

That things commanded and decreed by God, may be contradictory, the Doctor proveth by undeniable instances. The sacrificing of *Isaack*, and the not sacrificing of *Isaack*, are termes contradictory; but the sacrificing of *Isaack* was the object of Gods command to *Abraham*. Gen. 22. 2. The not sacrificing of *Isaack* was the object of Gods decree, as appears by the event. v. 11. 12. Therefore the object of Gods commandement, and the object of his decree, may be contradictory. Again, the letting of *Israell* goe out of *Ægypt*, and the not letting of *Israell* goe out of *Ægypt* are termes contradictory; but the letting of *Israell* goe was commanded unto *Pharaoh*, his not letting of *Israell* goe was decreed and determined by God. Exod. 7. 2, 3. and 10. 1, 2. God told *Moses* that he would harden *Pharaohs* heart, that he should not let *Israell* goe. Therefore a thing commanded by God, and a thing decreed by God, may be contradictory. Concerning the first of these instances, you say something pag. 451, 452. But there is nothing argumentative in what you say, but may receive an answer from your own rule of interpreting Scripture. pag. 92. 99. 108. 109. In the next place the Doctor proves, that the commandements and the decrees of God are not repugnant. *Nec tamen decretum pugnare cum mandato, sic probamus. Mandato significat Deus quid sit nostri officii, ut a nobis fieri debeat; decretum vero divinum nihil aliud est; quam propositum divinum de aliquo, ut vel fiat, vel impediatur ne fiat, idque efficaciter. Mandatum docet quid ipse probaturus sit, si modo ab homine fiat, quid improbatum si non fiat: decretum statuit quid ipse facturum sit, aut impeditum, ne sit. Ista autem non pugnant; tui est officii ut hoc facias, sed non est mei propositi per gratiam efficere ut facias. Pari ratione potest Deus mandare alicui fidem, & resipiscentiam, & interea apud se statuere, quod non credat, aut resipiscat, negando scilicet gratiam efficacem, qua sola fieri potest ut credat aut resipiscat.*

God by his command signifieth, and sheweth what is our duty, what ought to be done, or left undone by us; Gods decree is nothing else, but his purpose that things shall come to passe, or not come to passe; the command teacheth, what God will approve or disapprove; his decree determineth, what he himselfe will doe or hinder, &c. Now these are no waies repugnant: It is thy duty to doe this, but it is not Gods purpose to give thee grace for the doing of it: Thou art bound or obliged to doe this, but yet thou shalt never actually doe it: faith and repentance are thy duty, and yet thy faith and thy repentance shall never actually exist, or come to passe. By this that the Doctor hath said it is plaine, that there is no opposition between Gods command to all that heare the Gospell,

believe, and repent, and his purpose of denying faith and repentance unto many, nay most of them. And thus you see what the Doctor hath to say for himselfe, let us next heare what you can say against him.

Mr GOODWIN.

THe vanity of this distinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects; therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary unto the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impossible it is, but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is supposed to will the one, and by the other the other, should digladiate and one fight against the other.

I E A N E S.

First, here againe you perplexe the disputation with talking of two acts of Gods will, but supposing that by one of them you meane Gods decree which is in him, and by the other his commandement which is without him, performed usually by the Ministry of the creature, and therefore not his will properly so called, I utterly deny the consequence of your argument, and how just and reasonable this my denyall thereof is, will appeare, if you please to reduce your *Enthymeme* into a *Categoricall Syllogisme*, for then you will find the prooffe of its consequence to depend on this, That whatsoever acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, doe digladiate and one fight against the other; and this is a proposition so grossely false, as that I am very confident you cannot back it with so much as one, either testimony or reason. That acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is a common and received rule; but that all acts are opposite, whose objects are repugnant, is an assertion that as yet I never so much as read or heard of in any either Philosopher or Divine; and 'tis this alone will serve your turne to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the Decree and the Command of God from the opposition that D. Twisse admitteth to be between the things Decreed and the things Commanded.

2. If we take opposition and repugnancy as the Ramists, who divide it into *disparation* and *contrariety*, we may safely say, that Gods decree and his commandement are things opposite, for they are *disparate*; but this will no wise prejudice D. Twisse, who speakes in the language of the followers of *Aristotle*, neither will it any waies advantage you, for the opposition or repugnancy that is between things *disparate* is only as touching an *essentiall predication one of another*, we cannot say that Grammar is Logick, or that temperance in a man is fortitude, and so we cannot say that Gods decree is his commandement, or his commandement is his decree: not of a *denominative or concretive predication of the same subject*: the same man may be valiant, and temperate, a Grammarian and a Logician. See *Scheibler Top. cap. 14. n. 7. & cap. 15. n. 19.*

M. GOODWIN.

MR GOODWIN.

I*T is impossible that I should inwardly and seriously will or desire the death of my Child, and yet at the same time seriously also will and injoyne the Physitian to doe his best to recover him.*

I E A N E S

I*F you would hereby insinuate, that we affirme, that God doth inwardly and seriously will or desire the death or damnation of his Children, and yet at the same time also seriously injoyne his Ministers, who are spirituall Physitians, to doe their best to recover them out of the snare of the Divell, you doe wonderfully misconceive and misreport our opinion, for we say, that unto none hath he given power, right, or priviledge to be his Sonnes, but unto such as believe on his name; and all those who believe, he hath ordained unto eternall life, and will keepe by his power unto salvation; but of this see our Author, In the first Book of this Treatise. p. 133. 134. 137.*

What hath been said is sufficient to convince him, that will not willingly and obstinately shut his eyes against the light, that the command of all who heare the Gospell to believe and repent, and the purpose of God to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory. I shall, before I discharge my selfe of this Section, evince as much briefly concerning this latter purpose, and that purpose or decree out of which the command proceedeth, and which is signified thereby.

Here we must premise, that the commandement of God doth signify a decree or decreeing will of God, though not such a decree or will as the Arminians usually shape for themselves. 1. It signifieth the decree of God concerning the commandement it selfe, 2. Concerning the thing commanded.

First then, the command of God signifieth Gods will or decree of the commandement it selfe, of the *externall transient act of commanding*. Eph. 1. 11. *God worketh all things after the Counsell of his own will.* Gods commanding then of things in time, is a signe that from everlasting he did decree to command them. But secondly, It signifieth a will or decree of God also concerning the thing commanded, *viz, as touching the obligation to it*, not as *touching the existence or non-existence of it*, it signifieth, that God from everlasting did decree, that the thing commanded should be mans duty, should be a thing *Morally* good, but it doth not signify or reveale, that the thing commanded should actually exist, and be performed by every one unto whom the command is propounded. Indeed the obedience of the elect, for whose salvation only the commands of God are given, was both commanded and decreed, or determined by God Ezek. 36. 26, 27. And hence we may inferre, that the command of faith, repentance, obedience, &c. all which God hath determined to be necessary unto salvation, doe imply, and reveale in a generall, and indefinite way, that God from eternity did purpose to worke faith, repentance, and obedience in those, whom he had designed to salvation. But this concession will not satisfy Arminians, who will be contented with no-
thing

thing, unlesse we will grant them, that God willeth and desireth the faith, repentance, obedience, and salvation of Reprobates, which we cannot doe, but withall we must renounce and disclaime Gods omnipotency, and immutability.

These things thus briefly premised, That Gods purpose or decree of commanding faith, and repentance unto all that heare the Gospel, and his purpose or decree to deny faith and repentance unto many, are not contradictory, is manifest: because Gods purpose or decree of commanding faith and repentance, referres unto the thing commanded, faith and repentance, only as concerning the *obligation to them*, not as touching the *existence of them*; now to decree and purpose, to bind and oblige all to faith and repentance, and to decree and purpose, that some yet shall never actually believe and repent, cannot be proved by any rules of Logick to be contradictory.

Before I proceed unto the consideration of your next and last passage against D. Twisse, I shall only represent unto you, that our Author, whom you take to be one of the greatest patrons of that cause, which you account adverse, doth dislike the accommodation of that distinction of *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*, or a secret and revealed will, unto 1 Tim. 2.4. (the place which you have under debate,) as well as you, though, I confesse, upon different grounds. In his Booke against Jackson pag. 534. he informeth us, that neither Calvin embraceth it, nor Beza, nor Piscator, but all concur upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred years agoe. Peter Martyr proposeth it (saith he) amongst diverse others, but embraceth it not, neither doe I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it. Cajetan indeed embraceth it, and Cornelius de Lapide, and Aquinas amongst other interpretations; If you take (saith he speaking to D. Jackson) a liberty to put upon us the opinions, and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists, you may in the next place make doubt, whether we have not subscribed to the Councell of Trent. And againe in the next page 535. Neither doe I like (saith he) Cajetans interpretation after this manner, when he saith, *Est sermo de voluntate signi, qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus præcepta salutis, doctrinamq; Evangelii*; and that for two reasons: First, because God doth not propose his Gospell to all: Secondly, if God should propose the Gospell to all, and bid all men to believe, this is no certaine signe that God will have them to believe; like as it is no certain signe that God will give them grace to believe, without which they cannot believe; For it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance unto all that heare the Gospell, nor to a major part of them; but it is a signe I confesse that God will have it our duty to believe, by commanding us to believe.

The interpretation of this place, which D. Twisse sticks to, is that of Austin, that God will have some of all sorts or conditions to be saved, and he makes it good from the coherence, as here, so in his consideration of the doctrine of the Synod of Arles and Dort &c. p. 61. and p. 62, 63, 64. he gives a full and satisfactory answer unto that which you call more then a *Topicke argument* against this exposition, unto which why you doe not reply, I cannot but wonder, but perhaps you never read it; And yet againe tis very strange, that you, who have searched so narrowly and thoroughly into these controversies, as you professe, should be unread in all the workes of him, whom you confesse to be one of the greatest Patrons of the Adverse cause (as you call it) I will lay downe that which you call more then a *Topicke argument*, and compare it with
the

the objection of *Tilenus*, and then put downe D. *Twisse* his answer unto *Tilenus*, and referre it unto the Reader, whether it doe not fully satisfy, that which you suppose to be a demonstration.

M. GOODWIN.

pag. 104.

IF it may be said that God will have all men to be saved, because he will have some of all sorts to be saved, it may more properly & truly be said of him, that he will have all men to be destroyed (at least in their sense, who hold an irreversible reprobation of persons personally considered from eternity) because not simply some, but a very great part of all sorts of men now extant in the world, will in time perish, and that according to the decree or will of God, the tenour whereof is, that all persons dying in impenitency, and unbeleife shall perish: yet the Scriptures doe no where say upon any such account as this, either in terminis, or in substance, that God will have all men to perish, and not to come to the knowledge of the truth which is somewhat more than a Topicke argument, that God is not therefore said to will that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, only because he will have some, some few of all sorts of men to be saved, and to come to this knowledge, but simply because his will is to have all men without exception (viz. as they are men, and whilst they are yet capable of Repentance) to be saved, and in order thereunto to come to the knowledge of the saving truth. (i.e.) The Gospel.

T I L E N U S.

NOW if this New Evangelist doe tell the Infidell that the passages of Scripture, which say that God would have all men to be saved, are to be understood of some of every Nation, and condition, the Infidell will reply that then the Scripture ought with much more reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned, because that in every Nation there are farre more of these than of them, and how that in all reason the denomination should be taken from the greatest number.

DR T W I S S E upon the Synod of *Arles &c.*
Pag. 62, 63, 64.

I Deny that the Scripture ought with much more reason, or with any reason to say, that God would have all men to be damned, although put the case that in every Nation & condition there be more of these, than of them; and his reason drawne from the denomination to be taken from the major part is nothing to the present purpose. For the question here about the interpretation of Saint *Pauls* phrase is only this, whether the word *All* be to be interpreted of all sorts, or of all and every one; so that the rule of denomination taken from the major part is nothing pertinent to this, The question being only, whether *genera singulorum*, or *singula generum* be here meant, not whether some of all sorts, or all and every one of all sorts. Which being resolved, and that hereby is meant, *genera singulorum*, it may be farther questioned, whether *genera singulorum* doe imply every particular of these kinds, or only some of them? For it is well known, that the phrase is indifferent to the one as well as the other, and that *genera singulorum*, are equally preserved entire in some particulars, as in many, or most, or all. Like as the Species of the Sunne is maintained exactly as well in that one Sunne, which shines by day in the firmament, as if there were twenty Sunnes.

Secondly, though the reason here given from the denomination to be taken from the greater part, were pertinent, yet were it nothing pertinent to the Apostles purpose in this place, to say, that God would have all men to be damned; For this were no agreeable reason to move them to pray for all, for Kings, and all that are in authority. As if the Apostle should say thus, I will have you to pray for all, for God will have all to be damned; for saith *Austin*, if Gods Church knew who were predestinated to be sent into eternall fire with the Divell and his Angells, they would no more pray for such, than they would pray for the Divell himselfe.

So that this Author doth miserably overlash in this his subtilty, and betraies more nakednesse than any sober and wise Infidell were like to doe.

Then againe, the instances of Scripture are clearely against him. For when every foure-footed beast (as the Scripture speakes) was seen by *Peter* in a vision; in all likelyhood they were not the most part of every kind, but the smallest rather of every kind: and accordingly this Author might conclude, that considering denominations are taken from the major part, therefore it is rather to be said, that every foure-footed beast was not seen by *Peter*, for certainly the major part of every kind was not; yet in this sense to speake of it, in that case was nothing pertinent, but rather contrariant to that which followeth: Rise *Peter*, kill and eat.

In like sort seeing in all likelihood more people staid at home both in Jerusalem, and in Judea, then were they who went out to *John*, and according to this Authors rule, it were more fit to say, All Jerusalem and all Judea staid at home, when *John* the Baptist Preached: yet was it nothing congruous, but contrariant rather to the Evangelists scope to write so; His purpose being to set downe of what estimation was the authority of *Iohn* by the confluence of all people from all parts unto him & therefore

fore when he writes that all Judea, and all Jerusalem went forth unto him, the meaning can be no more than this, namely, that from all parts of Judea and of Jerusalem some flocked unto him.

JEANES.

I come unto the third and last exception in your Book against Doctor Twisse. pag. 245.

Mr GOODWIN.

Hanging upon the Crosse he prayed for his enemies, and those that crucified him, that they might be forgiven. May it not as well be inferred from hence, that therefore all his enemies, and all such, who (in any sense) crucify him, shall be forgiven by God; as it is argued from his praying for Peter, that his faith might not faile, that the faith of no true believer shall faile. Doctor Twisses notion upon the case is not so authentique, and though admitted, will not heale the difficulty: Christ (saith he) prayed for his enemies, *ex officio hominis privati*, i. e. according to the duty of a private man, but for his elect, as Mediator. This is said but not proved, nor indeed probable. For very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by meanes hereof in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest and duty of a private man; This would argue, that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectualnesse of desire to obtaine what he prayed for. But let it be granted, yet still it followes, that whatsoever Christ prayed for, was not simply, or absolutely granted or done; and if whatsoever Christ prayed for, was absolutely granted, it is not materiall, as to matter of impetration; whether he prayed as Mediator, or as a private man. But the intent of Christs Prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sinnes should be forgiven them, much lesse that simply and absolutely (i. e. without any intervening of faith and repentance) they should be forgiven (which had been to pray for that which is expressely contrary unto the revealed will of God) but that that particular sinne of their crucifying him should be forgiven them i. e. should not be imputed unto them, by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any suddaine or speedy destruction; or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldome or never repent.

I E A N E S

THis exposition of D. Twisse proceeds upon supposition, (not grant) that Christ prayed for all that had a hand in his crucifying; and taking this supposition to be true, this following argument, for the prooffe of this exposition, may easily be gathered out of D. Twisse. If Christ prayed for all that crucified him, then either according to the duty of a private person, or by vertue of his office, as he was Mediator; but he prayed not for all his persecutors by vertue of his office, as he was a Mediatur: therefore if he prayed for them, it was only in answer of his duty, as he was made under the Law, and a private person. The Minor which is only likely to be questioned, is thus confirmed; some that were guilty of his crucifying, were in all likelihood Reprobates, as is not only confessed, but proved by *Arminius*. *Oravit* (saith he) *pro iis qui crucifixerunt eum, pro inimicis suis, inter quos & non-electi fuerunt: Principes enim saculi crucifixerunt illum; at plurimis illorum sapientia Dei, & virtus quae est Christus, non est revelata.* The Princes of the World crucified the Lord of Glory. 1 Cor. 2. 8. And unto most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, is not revealed. Now in *Ioh. 17. 9.* where we have the modell, rule, or Epitome of Christs intercession, that is, of his praying as Mediator, he disclaimes all prayer, and consequently mediation for Reprobates. *I pray not for the World, but for them which thou hast given me.* Where *World* is taken *pro turbâ Reprobatorum &c.* (saith D. Twisse) for the rout or rabble of Reprobates: and he proves it thus; *In his, Mundus opponitur iis qui dantur Christo a Patre; at dari a patre, significat statum electionis.* *Ioh. 6. 39.* *Significat enim statum bonum precedaneum vocationi efficaci; omne quod dat mihi pater, veniet ad me. Venire autem ad Christum, est credere in Christum per vocationem efficacem.* *Vind. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 181.* The *World* in these words is opposed, unto them which are given unto Christ by the Father; but to be given unto Christ by the Father, signifieth the state of election, for it signifieth a good and happy estate or condition, precedaneous unto effectuall vocation, *Ioh. 6. 37.* *All that the Father giveth me shall come unto me;* but to come unto Christ, is to believe in Christ, by an effectuall vocation. Thus you see, that notwithstanding your pleasure to say otherwise, it is not barely said but proved by him, that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifiers by vertue of his office as he was Mediator.

In the next place, that Christ according to the duty of a private man, might pray for all that crucified him, even for those of them that were not elect, is rendred probable by two arguments in D. Twisse.

The first is, Christs subjection unto the Law. *Gal. 4. 4.* *He was made under the Law:* and therefore bound to fulfill all righteoufnesse. *Math. 3. 15.* And one branch of the Law, as is evident, by Christ his own glosse upon it, *Math. 5.* is to love our enemies, to forgive private & personall wrongs, to pray for them which despitefully use us, and persecute us. this was a poynt that he pressed much upon his Disciples in his life time, and it being a duty (though of frequent use) yet difficult and harsh unto flesh and blood, it is not unlikely but that he might exemplify it by his own practice at his death.

A second Argument in D. Twisse to prove that it is not improbable that Christ as a private man, *affectu humano*, prayed on his Crosse for all
his

his Crucifyers, even such of them as he knew, not to belong unto the election of grace, is drawn from comparison of such a prayer, with the like prayer, that Christ made in his agony in the Garden, *O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup passe from me. Math. 26.39. Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me. Luk. 22.42.* This bitter cup of his death and Passion, he knew full well that he was to drinke up, as a Mediator for his elect, both by his Fathers decree, call, cominand, as also by his own voluntary undertaking; for to this end and purpose he came into the World, and sanctified himselfe. *Ioh. 17.19.* and therefore though these words were part of a most solemne addressement unto God, yet were they not put up by him in the capacity, and according to the duty and interest of a Mediator for his elect. *Twisse Vindic. l. 1. p. 2. pag. 188.* And this is enough to satisfy you, that you are out in passing your censure upon D. Twisse his notion on this place, *that it is said not proved*, which I am perswaded you would have forborne, if you had so thoroughly persued him, as it was fit you should, before you had in publike thus censured him.

Let us see in the next place, with what strength of Argument you oppose his exposition.

M. GOODWIN.

NOr indeed is this probable, for very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should waive his interest in heaven, by meanes hereof, in his addressements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity, and according to the interest, and duty of a private man, this would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart, nor with an effectuallnesse of desire to obtaine what he prayed for.

I E A N E S.

First, you cannot deny but that in these words of Christ, *Father if it be possible, or if it be thy will, let this cup passe from me*, Christ prayed not as a Mediator for his elect, for so he was engaged to drinke off this Cup; but as a man naturally declining, and abhorring death, and the ignominy of the Crosse, as they are in themselves evill: and yet all your arguments, *mutatis mutandis*, with due change may be applied unto this interpretation, as well as unto D. Twisse his notion (as you call it) upon *Luke 23.34.*

Secondly, in answer unto your objections, we may make use of a distinction of prayer, brought by *Suarez in tertiam partem Sum. Aquin. q. 21. Art. 4. Prayer is nothing else but an unfolding of the will unto God.* Now in Christs manhood there was a twofold will, one absolute and effectuall, another conditionall and uneffectuall, which may otherwise be termed, a *velleity*, a will of simple complacency, a will of a thing only *secundum quid*, in some particular respect, according to some particular consideration: of such a will of his we read. *Mar. 7.24. He entred into an house, and would have no man know it, but he could not be hid.* Answerable unto these

two acts of the will in Christ, there may be attributed unto Christ two sorts or *kinds* of prayer; one proceeding from an *absolute* and *effectuall* will, and this was alwaies heard: the other from a *conditionall* and *uneffectuall* will, and this was not alwaies heard; such was his prayer in his agony, *let this cup passe from me*: and of this sort or kind of prayer, is that passage, *Psal. 22. 2.* In reference unto Christ, understood, *O my God, I cry in the day time, but thou hearest not, and in the night season and am not silent.*

Now to apply this distinction, Christ could not pray as a private man for those of his persecutors, for whom he did not pray as a Mediator, if we speake of that kind of Prayer, which cometh from an absolute and effectuall will, which is styled by *Gregory de Valentia*, *Voluntas rationis undequaque deliberata*, because it proceedeth upon regard had to all circumstances: And the reason is, because with this kind of Prayer, he never prayed for any thing, but what he knew would be granted; for he never absolutely and effectually willed any thing, but what was agreeable unto Gods absolute will, the will of his decree or good pleasure, and this is all that your arguments can prove. But yet notwithstanding this, he might pray (taking prayer for a representation of a conditionall or uneffectuall will) for the pardon of even those of his persecutors, who he knew should be condemned, and for whom therefore he prayed not as Mediator: or more plainly, he might expresse a velleity, a gracious, mercifull, and charitable desire, to have all his crucifyers pardoned, so as it were not contrary unto Gods decree, unto which he did submit, and in which he did acquiesce, as he did in his prayer for the removall of his Passion, *not my will but thy will be done.*

An answer very like unto, if not coincident with this, may be easily gathered out of *D. Twisse*; and it is, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors, taking prayer for an expression of Christs antecedent will, not as prayer is a representation of his consequent will.

An Antecedent will, as *Alvarez* explaines it, is the willing of a thing considered absolutely, as it is in it selfe, abstracting from all other considerations of it: A consequent will, is the willing of a thing considered with all circumstances wherewith it is clothed. Thus a Merchant willeth the preservation of his wares with an antecedent will, as the preservation of his wares is considered in it selfe; but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as it is considered with this circumstance, as 'tis accompanied with hazard, and danger of his life. Thus also a judge with an antecedent will, willes the life of a Prisoner, because his life is in it selfe, a thing good and desireable: but he doth not will it with a consequent will, as he is guilty of Murther, incest, or any the like capitall crime.

Now *D. Twisse*, though he reject the application of this distinction to God, with whose simplicity and infinite knowledge severall successive considerations of one and the same thing are utterly incompetible, yet he denyeth not, but it may have place in the manhood of Christ. *Ratione diversarum considerationum non nego (saith he) distinctiorem istam competere posse in hominem; quippe cui variae considerationes occurrere possunt invicem succedentes: sic Christus naturali sui conservandi desiderio ferebatur, cum a patre peteret, ut calix transiret; at considerata voluntate & decreto patris de Calice isto ad bibendum ipsi propinato, eidem se submittere consultum duxit.* This distinction in regard of diverse considerations of one and the same thing, may be ascribed unto man, in whom are found severall

severall considerations of the same thing succeeding one another : So Christ as man, out of a naturall desire of selfe-preservation ; prayed that the cup of his passion might passe from him; but the will or decree, the command of his Father, his owne office, and mans salvation being considered, he submitted himselfe to the drinking up of this cup, even to the very dreggs; *neverthelesse not my will but thy will be done.* Luk. 22. 42. *If this cup may not passe away from me except I drinke it, thy will be done.* Mat. 26. 42. He did not will his passion with an *Antecedent* will, but he willed it (you see) with a *Consequent* will. Job. 4. 34. And so he prayed against it, as a prayer is a propofall of an Antecedent, not consequent will.

Now that Doctor Twisse resembles this prayer of Christ, for the forgivenesse of all his crucifyers, unto Christs deprecation of his death and passion, and makes it to be as that, an expression only of an antecedent will, a desire of their pardon, considered absolutely in it selfe, abstracting from Gods decree unto the contrary, I shall evidence by giving you D. Twisse his own words. *Vind. lib. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. Non dicit Molinæus istam voluntatem Christi hominis, secundum quam oravit pro crucifigentibus ipsum, contrariam fuisse voluntati divinæ; potuit enim fieri cum submissione voluntati Dei tacite factâ, licet non expressâ, ad formulam precationis illius: pater transeat a me calix iste; Sed non mea voluntas fiat, sed tua.* And againe afterwards in the same page. *Annon homini sanctissimo convenit, privatam offensam remittere, & palam protestari, se (nisi Deus aliter statuisset) percipere ut ipsi ignosceret; de quibus tamen Deus aliter forsitan constituerit, quod & ipsi forsitan innotescit? Annon petiit salvator, & ardentem obsecravat, ut si possibile esset, calix transfret, cum tamen Deum aliter constituisse, ne scilicet eum transfret calix, ipse satis constaret? &c. Denique, Christum illis bene voluisse, ut homo erat, quos antedecano decreto ab omni boni spe ac possessione absolute exclusit Deus; hoc enim addendum fuit (licet illud fraudulentè nimium dissimulet Corvinus) etiam hæc sententia quid horrendi, queso te inculcat? Præsertim cum non sic voluisse dicamus, consideratâ istâ, de eorum a salute exclusione, voluntate divinâ; sed duntaxat, si per voluntatem Dei aliter constitutum non fuisset, & si penes ipsum esset, ut eligeret, utrum in persecutores ipsius vindictam exerceret, aut suspenderet; pro eâ quam ut homo in omnes (etiam in injuriis remittendis) charitatem exercere debuit, vindictam suspensam mallet quam exercitam.*

And this in generall unto all your Arguments, I shall say something to each of them apart.

Mr GOODWIN.

For very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, should wave his interest in Heaven, by means hereof in his addressments unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity and according to the interest and duty of a private man.

I E A N E S.

VNlesse variation of Phrases be argumentative, here is nothing but a begging of the question, only it is in state and good language.

M. GOODWIN.

MR. GOODWIN

This would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart.

I E A N E S

IF we understand Prayer in the sense but now mentioned, what absurdity is it to say, that Christ, as a private man, prayed for the forgiveness of all his persecutors with his whole heart, that is, as intensely, earnestly, vehemently, and zealously as he could, in the utmost degree possible to an humane nature. In *Luk. 22. 44.* 'tis said, that Christ prayed *ἐκτενέστερον* more earnestly, and his Sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling downe to the ground. That this prayer was with the whole heart of Christ, you will not deny, and yet the former part of this prayer (*if thou be willing remove this cup from me*) was not the prayer of Christ as Mediator, but only an expression of an antecedent or conditional will and desire, like unto this his prayer upon the Crosse for the justification of all his persecutors.

There is nothing considerable which can be objected against this, but that hereupon it would follow, that seeing prayer is a representation of the will before God, that therefore in Christ there are two contrary wills, if he prayed for the pardon of all his persecutors as a private man, and did not pray for it, but rather against it, as a Mediator.

But this receives a very easy solution. To will or not to will, or nill one and the same object, are not contrary, unlesse it be in respect of the same circumstances or considerations. For Christ as a private man, out of humane pitty to wish and desire the justification of all his crucifiers, as a thing good and desireable, if God had not decreed otherwise; and not to will, but rather nill the justification of some of them, upon consideration that they are not given unto him by the Father, but excluded from salvation by the will of his decree or purpose; these indeed are *diverse*, but not *repugnant* acts of the will, because they proceed upon generall considerations, and therefore though the object be one *materially*, yet 'tis *formally diversified*. Thus between Christs desire of declining his death, and his willing acceptance thereof, there was a *diversity*, but no *contrariety*, because they were not in respect of the same circumstances; he desired to decline it, as it was in it selfe evill, and contrary to nature; but as the meanes of mans salvation, he joyfully embraced it.

To cleare this farther, I shall propound a distinction of contraries out of *Rada. Part. 3. Controv. 10. Art. 2. Contraria sunt in duplici differentiâ, alia absoluta, quæ a quibuscunq; causis causentur contraria sunt, ut calor & frigus, quæ non dicunt essentialẽ ordinem, & dependentiam ad aliquid extrinsecum, exceptâ dependentiâ ad causam: Alia sunt contraria, quæ & dicunt ordinem, & dependentiam essentialẽ, non solum ad suas causas, sed ad alia extrinseca, & objecta; cujusmodi sunt scientia & ignorantia, velle & nolle, gaudium & tristitia; quocirca non erunt contraria nisi ad idem formale objectum comparentur.*

M. GOODWIN.

MR GOODWIN.

THis would argue that he did not pray for them with an effectualnesse of desire to obtaine what he prayed for.

I E A N E S

THis only prooves, what will easily be granted, that Christ prayed not for all his persecutors, with a prayer proceeding from an absolute and effectuall will. But there is one thing which I shall not dissemble, but freely acquaint the Reader with; And it is, that many great Scholers both Papists and Protestants doe deny, that the proposall, expresseion, or representation of a conditionll and uneffectuall will or desire, is properly a prayer: I shall alleadge but two; the first shall be a Papist, to wit, *Becanus Sum. Theol. Tom. 5. cap. 17. q. 3. Licet in Christo* (saith he) *distingui debeat duplex voluntas; una efficax, altera inefficax: non tamen distingui debet duplex oratio, una procedens ex efficaci voluntate, altera ex inefficaci. Nam oratio si vere oratio est, semper procedit ex absoluta & efficaci voluntate orantis, nunquam ex inefficaci. Qui enim petit aliquid fieri, efficaciter illud desiderat, & ideo adhibet orationem, tanquam medium quoddam ad obtinendum id, quod petit; hinc solet dici, orationem natura sua utilem esse ad impetrandum. Unde sic concludo: qui vult aliquid voluntate inefficaci nullum medium adhibet ad illud obtinendum; quia si adhiberet aliquod medium, jam vellet illud voluntate efficaci: at qui orat, adhibet aliquod medium ad obtinendum, nempe ipsam orationem: ergo qui orat, non vult voluntate inefficaci, sed tantum efficaci.* Although in Christ there ought to be distinguished a two-fold will, one effectuall, another uneffectuall; yet notwithstanding, prayer ought not in the like manner to be distinguished: for there are not two sorts or kinds of Prayer, one proceeding from an effectuall, the other from an uneffectuall will; for prayer, if it be truly prayer, alwaies proceedeth from an absolute and effectuall, and never from an uneffectuall will of the party praying: For he that petitioneth for the doing of any thing, doth effectually desire it, and therefore useth Prayer, as a meanes for the obtaining of that which he requests: Hence it is wont to be said, that Prayer is in its own nature usefull or profitable for obtaining or procuring. Whence I conclude thus; He who willet any thing with an uneffectuall will, applyeth or useth no meanes for the procurement thereof; because if he should make use of any meanes to procure it, he should will it with an effectuall will: but he who prayeth, makes use of a meanes for the obtaining of what he Prayes for, to wit, Prayer it selfe: therefore he who Prayeth, willet that he prayes for, only with an effectuall, and not with an uneffectuall will. He goes on in the confirmation of this opinion. *Hæc sententia est probabilior: pro quâ nota, aliud esse orare; aliud, simplex seu inefficax desiderium proponere: quod facile in nobis ostendi & explicari potest. Nam nostra oratio debet esse conjuncta cum certâ spe seu fiduciâ conse-*

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quendi id quod petimus. Iacobi 1. 6. postulet autem in fide, nihil hesitans. Et Math. 21. 22. Omnia quaecunque petieritis in oratione credentes, accipietis. Quando autem proponimus seu manifestamus alteri simplex seu inefficax desiderium nostrum, non facimus id cum certâ spe, seu fiducia consequendi illud, sed potius cum contraria affectu: ut si dicam,

O mihi præteritos reſerat ſi Jupiter annos.

This opinion is the more probable, for the opening of which we muſt marke, that it is one thing to pray, another thing to propound a ſimple or uneffectuall deſire; which may eaſily be ſhewen and explained in our ſelves; for our Prayer ought to be conjoyned with a certain hope or aſſurance of obtaining that which wee pray for. *Iam. 1. 6.* Let him aſke in faith nothing wavering or doubting. *Math. 21. 22.* And all things whatſoever ye ſhall aſke in prayer believing, ye ſhall receive. But when we propound or manifeſt a bare, ſimple, uneffectuall deſire, we doe not doe it with a certain confidence of obtaining what is ſo deſired, but rather with aſſurance of the contrary.

A ſecond testimony ſhall be taken out of Doctor Ames, an acute and learned Proteſtant. *Coron. art. 5. c. 5. Juxta ſententiam Arminii &c. nulla propria eſt oratio, quæ non ſit absoluta; quæ etiam ſententia non eſt temerè damnanda, cum inniti videatur rationibus non contemnendis; præſertim illâ, quæ deducitur ab orationis natura: Oratio enim eſt ſubmiſſa repræſentatio voluntatis noſtræ apud Deum ut ab ipſo perficiatur. Explicatio velleitatis, quâ quid vellemus, ſi aliud non obſiſteret, non eſt oratio proprie dicta. jam vero nihil volumus proprie, quod non absolute volumus; atque adeo nil petimus quod non absolute petimus, Quamvis in diſpoſitione precantium conditionis ratio virtualiter sæpe contineatur. Petimus quidem nonnunquam, ut unum fiat ſi alterum contingat; cujus quidem conſequentis rei futurity ut conditionata ſit rogamus; Sed ipſa tamen petitio eſt absoluta, quoniam absolute petimus, ut poſito uno, ponatur & alterum.*

According to the opinion of Arminius, there is no proper prayer, but what is absolute; which opinion is not raſhly to be condemned; ſeeing it ſeems to be grounded upon conſiderable reaſons, eſpecially that which is drawn from the nature of prayer: for prayer is a ſubmiſſe and lowly representation of our wills before God, to the end, it may be performed by him. The unfolding of a velleity, whereby we would will a thing if ſomething did not hinder, is not prayer properly ſo called: But now we will nothing properly, which we doe not absolutely will, and therefore we pray for nothing properly, which we doe not absolutely petition for, although the nature of a condition be often virtually contained in the diſpoſition of the parties praying, who may be ready to ſubmit their wills unto Gods. Indeed we ſometimes pray that one thing may be done, if another thing come to paſſe; and here we pray, that the futurity of the following thing be conditionall, but the prayer it ſelfe is absolute, becauſe we pray absolutely that one thing doe exiſt upon the poſture or exiſtence of another: If this which theſe men ſay be true, then Chriſt prayed for the juſtification of all his crucifiers, as a private man, only improperly, and not in the proper and ſtriſt acception of Prayer; for which improper notion of the word, we have warrant from Scripture, when Chriſt ſaid, *Father, if it be poſſible, let this cup paſſe from me, Non oravit* (ſaith Becanus) *ſed simplex nature desiderium propoſuit*: He did not pray but propound the ſimple, bare, and naked deſire

desire of his nature : but though this his expression of his naturall desire and love of life, be not a prayer in regard of either a *criticall or Philosophicall* use of the Word, yet you see, tis agreeable enough unto the language of the holy Ghost in scripture, to enlarge the signification of the Word so farre, as to apply it thereunto : for *Mathew* saies expressly that he prayed. *Math. 26. 39, 42.*

But here for mine owne part, I must freely professe that I better like *Aquinas* his interpretation of the place; that Christ prayed not for all his Crucifyers, but only for those of them, that were predestinate unto the obtaining of eternall life, by and through him.

And of this prayer what a fruitfull and plentiful Harvest he reaped, you may read in the 2, 3, and 4. Chapters of the History of the *Acts of the Apostles*. There you shall read, that the Lord daily added to the Church such as should be saved; at one time three Thousand, and another time five thousand; of whom a great and considerable number denied the Holy one and the just, and desired a murdurer to be granted to them, and crucified and killed the Prince of life. *Acts 2.36. Acts 3. 14, 15.* *Rivet on Psal. 2.* quotes a testimony of *Austin* favouring this glosse: *videbat quosdam suos, inter multos alienos: illis jam petebat veniam, a quibus accipiebat injuriam.*

In making good this to be the sense and meaning of the place, I shall proceed by degrees: proving first, that it cannot be gathered out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for all that crucified him.

Secondly, That the contrary may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it selfe, and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.

Thirdly, That those of his persecutors for whom he prayed were such as belonged unto the election of grace.

First, All the Logick in the World, though racked never so much, cannot inferre out of the Text, that Christ prayed universally for the pardon of all his Crucifyers: for out of an indefinite terme, a universall cannot be concluded, saith our Author, in defence of *Moulin* his denyall that Christ prayed for all without exception. *Vindic. l. 1. part. 2. Digres. 7. p. 136.*

Secondly, That Christ prayed not for all his Crucifiers without exception, may be cleared from the Text, both considered in it selfe; and compared with other places of Scripture, as also by reason.

First, From the Text considered in it selfe; *Father forgive them, for they know not what they doe*: Here *Moulin*, from the reason adjoyned to the Petition, concludes, That he prayed not for all that had a hand in Crucifying him; but only for those who did it out of ignorance; and in all probability some of them, especially some of the rulers, did it out of pure malice. And whereas *Corvinus* objecteth out of *Acts 3. 1.* against *Moulin*; That even the Rulers did it through ignorance: Doctor *Twisse* upbraideth him with his unskillfullnesse in framing consequences, and making an indefinite proposition equivalent unto an universall. It doth not follow, (saith he) The Rulers did this through ignorance, therefore all the Rulers did it through ignorance. That son did, is certain from that place; and so it is,

tance; and then I demand, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance or no? If you answer, that he did not pray for the Faith and Repentance of all and every one of them, then say I, neither did he pray for their pardon; for he that truly and sincerely prayeth for any thing, prayeth also by just & undeniable consequence for all the necessary antecedentes and consequents, causes and meanes, fruits and effects thereof: If you hold, that he prayed for the faith and repentance of all and every one of his crucifyers, then the argument may be renewed as in the beginning; for I aske you againe, whether he prayed for their faith and repentance absolutely or conditionally; if absolutely, then all and every one of them did believe and repent, which the Remonstrants themselves deny: if conditionally, then this condition is either on Gods part, or else on the part of the crucifyers of Christ; if upon condition on the part of God, it can be nothing but this, if he will or please, and then all of them should believe and repent, for (as Arminians glosse that text *1 Tim. 2.4*) God will have not only all sorts and kinds of men, but also all and every individuall man to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: if it be a condition on the part of those who crucified him, then pray doe you assigne that condition, and either I shall drive you upon the same rock of absurdity, upon which Doctor *Twisse* forceth *Corvinus*, to wit, that Christ prayed for his Crucifiers, that they should believe and repent, upon condition that they doe believe and repent; or else I shall renew the argument, so as that a progresse from one condition to another, and that without end, shall be unavoydable.

Lastly, that he prayed only for those of his crucifiers, who belonged to the election of grace, is evident from what hath been already said out of D. *Twisse* upon *Ioh. 17. 9*. For thence I have inferr'd, that he prayed only for his elect as Mediator, that Chapter being the platforme of Christs intercession, as mediator for his Church: and you affirme it to be improbable, that Christ prayed under the notion and capacity of a private man, for any for whom he did not pray as Mediator.

But now in the last place, let us heare how you expound this prayer of Christ.

Mr GOODWIN.

BUT the intent of Christs prayer for those that crucified him, was not that all their sinnes should be forgiven them, much lesse, that simply and absolutely, that is, without any intervening of faith and repentance, they should be forgiven; (which had been to pray for that which is expressly contrary to the revealed will of God) but that that particular sinne of their crucifying him should be forgiven them, i. e. should not be imputed unto them by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any suddaine or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldome or never repent.

I E A N E S

First, I say of this your comment, as you did of D. *Twisse* his notion upon the place, this is said but not proved,
Nor indeed probable, because

First, Scripture is a stranger to this acception of remission.

Secondly, 'tis very irrationall to take remission in this sense, which by your Doctrine may be consistent with its contrary: to wit condemnation. Though this particular sinne of their crucifying him, were not imputed to them by way of barre unto their repentance, either by any sudden or speedy destruction, or by delivering them up to such a spirit of obstinacy or obduration, under which men seldome or never repent. yet according unto what you teach of grace, and ascribe unto the power of mans will, they might notwithstanding all this not believe and repent, but resist the grace of God, and dye in finall unbelief and impenitency, even for this sinne, and so consequently be condemned for it. Christs prayer might be granted, this particular sinne of their crucifying Christ might be forgiven unto them, and yet they might be everlastingly damned for it, and their other sinnes. How you can reconcile these things passeth my understanding, but I shall not be unwilling to learne.

Lastly, you seem to intimate, that some sinnes are so foule, as that they are of themselves a bar to repentance, for the desert of which God doth sometimes deny men either time for, or the grace of repentance.

And hereby you entrench upon the freeness of Gods grace in mans effectuall vocation, which is the free gift of God, and therefore dispensed, not according to mens preceding carriages good or bad, but meere-ly according to the good pleasure of his will: but this argument I shall spare farther to prosecute, and referre you to our Doctor, who hath abundantly laboured herein, as in other places, so especially in his examination of Mr *Cotton* his Treatise of Predestination, a pag. 190. *usque ad* 204. and againe, p. 234, 235. &c. *usque ad* 246.

As for that which followeth, as also that which is in the beginning of this Section, the examination of it is beside my present designe, which is to vindicate Doctor *Twisse* from what you object against him.

Yet if the Reader desire satisfaction thereabouts, he may meet with it in Doctor *Ames* his *Coronis ad Coll. Hag. Art. 5. c. 5.* Whither I shall in this hast referre him.

And thus have I done with the defence of Doctor *Twisse* against your opposition of him: when I consider your fluent Wit, and ready Penne, I may expect from you a very speedy reply, Which may be, as sharpe, so specious and Rhetoricall enough. I shall desire this favour of the judicious Reader, that he would suspend his censure untill he hath my rejoinder, which I shall not deferre long, if God grant me his assistance.