


A
VINDICATION
OF
D^r. TWISSE
FROM THE
EXCEPTIONS
OF
M^r JOHN GOODWIN
IN HIS
Redemption Redeemed.

BY
HENRY IEANES, Minister of Gods
Word in *Chedzoy*.



OXFORD,
Printed for T. Robinson. 1653.

THE
SECOND BOOK,
BEING
AN EXAMINATION
OF

Certaine passages inserted into M^r H O R D's discourse
(formerly answered) by an Author that conceales his name,
but was supposed to be M^r M A S O N Rector
of Saint Andrews Vndershaft in
L O N D O N.



OXFORD,
Printed by H. HALL for T. H. ROBINSON. 1653.



TO THE READER.

THe Authour of this Treatise was perswaded to Pen the reasons of his opinion against absolute Reprobation, that he might satisfie a worthy friend of his, who required it. What satisfaction that learned Gentleman, his friend, hath received by these reasons, I know not: but sure I am, they have given good content to some others, who have read them, and doe still desire a Copie of them for their farther use. To ease whose paines in transcribing this Treatise, it doth now appeare in this forme. If any of contrary opinion, shall undertake to answer or refute it; I wish, he would set downe his opinion and reasons with that perspicuitie and modestie, that our Authour hath set downe his. Such a course of disputing will gaine more credit to himselfe and his cause, then voluminous Vagaries about impertinent things. If any shall use railing speeches, or unnecessary diversions from the cause; I shall ever interpret that to be a strong signe of a weake cause: or, at least, I shall think it to be an argument of an obstinate minde, who neither knoweth how to yeeld to the Truth, nor to defend his error. I hope the Reader, who loveth his owne salvation, will be a more indifferent Iudge in a question, which concerneth him so nearely.

And so I leave him to God's blessing.





T H E P R E F A C E .



When first I lighted upon a treatise intituled (*God's love to mankind*) and read a little way in it, I had reason to be acquainted with it; though the Authors face I had never seen: Upon the first relation of the change of his opinion in certaine controversies, as he pretended; I was intreated to conferre with him thereupon by word of mouth: My answer was, that it was more fit to conferre in writing, and if he would be drawne to communicate the reasons of his pretended change, I should willingly take them into consideration. This motion was made in the year 1631, being then at London; the year following in the month of July (as I remember) was the discourse of Mr *Hord's* sent unto me, and I was urged upon my former promise to make answer thereunto. At that time I had another business under my hand, which I could not dispatch in lesse then two months space or more: but I was wished to take my owne time. As soone as I was free from my former taske, I set hand to this, and returned my answer thereunto, unto the Gentleman that set me on worke, about the end of Hillary-terme *Anno Dom: 1632.* But observing the bulke of the treatise now in print, twice as bigge, as that in manuscript or more. I expected a reply to my former answer; but upon perusall, I found nothing lesse, whereat I wondred not a little, having never heard of any such treatise untill the last sommer, 1635: for surely they had time enough to answer it. To helpe the credit of their cause in this; it seemed good unto them to raise a mist, that their absurd carriage might not be discovered, to witt: by antedating the print thereof, which yet was but newly found creeping in corners. Another devise there is by a large interpolation and addition, here and there foysted into the body of the former discourse, and yet not all at once, but by pathes, a great part of it being but lumber; and the adding of more testimonies, as if the matter were to be carried by number and not by weight, or as if the Author of them were willing to make ostentation of the *πληροφεια*, and fullnesse of his common place booke. Only the upper way of our Divines maintayning the absolutenesse of *God's decrees* is here inpuigned at large, with the Authors best strength I doubt not; which taske was omitted by Mr *Hord:* And besides there is one Divine attribute more here mentioned, in contradiction whereunto the Doctrine of our Divines is pretended to proceed, and the prosecution hereof amongst the rest is here set downe, by way of superfatation upon the former, not only that so the argument might be the more compleat, but also to cast a colour; that this discourse of Mr *Hord's* hath not as yet been answered. It may be it would faine have shewed it selfe unto the world in this masculine shape and vigour before this time, if Doctor *Duppa* while he was *Vice-chancellor* at Oxford would have given way to the printing of it, if it be true as I have heard, that it was offered unto him to be licenced for the presse. Doctor *Potter* also of *Queenes Colledge* performed a freindly part to some body in checking the Stationers for selling the copies of it, for which courtesy, I doe account my selfe so much in his debt as that comes to; and should much more, had he sent me one of the copies, as he did noe lesse then six on the same day to his friend Doctor *Agleconbee*; as the Book-seller confessed to a Scholar a friend of mine. Well Mr *Hord's* treatise is at length come to the Presse, and shewes it selfe in publique without shame, though I thought it had been sufficiently confounded almost three yeares agoe; yet this Mistres blushes not, though dares not open her mouth to cleare her reputation in any one particular of that which I layd to her charge, manifesting her to be no Daughter of *God's truth*, but a meere Bastard, begotten by a carnall wit, upon a specious pretence by miserable deflowring and adulterating the word of *God; one builds a wall* as the Prophet speakes, *and another daubeth that with untempered mortar.* Mr *Hord* is well knowne to be the Author of the first by mee formerly answered. But what *Mason's* hand was used in the addition, that is concealed; but that may breake out into pregnant evidences before we have gone through with it.

The Prefacer at the first chop begins with a notorious untruth, and that in more particulars then one; for first, whom doth he meane by the Author of this Treatise? *M. Horde*? That which *M. Horde* sent to his worthy friend is yet to be seen, containing not halfe so much as this; it was not above 30 leaves manuscript, and that not closely, but written at large; And this contains 55 leaves in print. But it may bee *M. Horde* hath since enlarged his own discourse, and so continues to be author of it, not in part only, but in the whole. And I confesse it may be, he is as much the Author of the one as of the other; if it be true, as some have told me of the very first, sent to his friend indeed, namely that it was the very strength of *M. Mason*; him I knowe of old, and should be acquainted with his sufficiency, though it was a long time ere I had so much as heard of his zeale for the Arminian cause, and after I heard so much, it was yet longer ere I could believe it, untill I saw it under his own hand: And whereas *M. Horde* comming to his second convincing Argument, as he calls it, drawne from Attributes Divine, layeth downe certaine premises, the second whereof is this; *That justice, mercy, truth, and holinesse, in God are the same in nature with these vertues in men, though infinitely differing in Degrees.* I willingly confesse I stood amaz'd, and albeit I conceived it, and doe conceive it to be one of the absurdest positions that ever dropped from the pen of a Schoole Divine; yet the adventure was so great in my judgement, that I was apt to imagine that it proceeded not from a vulgar spirit. This conceit of mine was improved by the reasons he brings to justifie so strange a Paradox: for they are plausible & make a faire shew at the first, like the fruit of Sodom; but crush them once, come to the Scholastical discussion of them, & forthwith *In Cineres abeunt & vagant fuliginem*, they vanish into smoak and emptinesse. A second untruth is this, that he saith, *The Author was perswaded by a worthy friend to pen the Reasons of his opinion against absolute reprobation*; for he was only put upon shewing reasons of the change of his opinion in the controversies of late debated between the Remonstrants & their opposites, as *M. Horde* himselve confesseth in his Preface. *M. Horde* indeed is willing to drawe the matter unto the consideration of Gods decrees, as if that were the maine * *ζήτημα* most absurdly, and quite contrary to the doctrine of *Augustine*, who shapes the decrees of God in conformitie to the doctrine of grace; and accordingly to certifie the *Massilienses* in the doctrine of Prædestination, he thinks it most fit to begin with proving that *Faith is the gift of God*, yea the very beginning of it. Now he liked not to follow *Austins* course, and in the first place to deale upon the point of grace. And herein hee favours of *M. Masons* spirit, for that is his course, as I have seen under his hand; yet suppose that this be the maine thing controverted, namely the qualitie of Gods decrees, whether they be absolute or conditionall only. How doth he satisfie his friend, or performe the promise made in letting election passe untouched, and dealing only upon reprobation? And this I know also to have been *M. Masons* genuine course, far worse then the Remonstrants in the *Synod of Dort*, for they made a motion, that they might deal upon reprobation in the first place, and then upon election, wherein notwithstanding they were condemned in the judgement of all forraigne Divines, assistant there. But this Author and *M. Mason* too, on my knowledge, affect to deale upon reprobation only. Yet I have alwaies been, and still am glad to see the utmost of their strength, or any mans strength on any of the five points, and should be very glad to see what they could say upon the point of free will, which is most congruous for them, though they meddle not at all with grace. For even on that point I seem to have profited more, lately by dealing with some English Arminians, then ever before, having alwaies acknowledged, that to be a point very obscure, like as is the nature of originall sinne which was one of the three points, concerning which I did not look to live so long, as to meet with convenient satisfaction. *M. Horde* (I heard) conferred with *M. Mason*, about Election, and told him that the doctrine of our Divines therein seemed very comfortable to the children of God, whereunto *M. Mason* should answer, by granting that, but then adding, it was very prone to provoke men to loosenesse of life. This concession was as a shooring horne to draw *M. Horde* on to the Remonstrantiaall Tenet, nothing doubting, but in the end to take him of from entertaining so good an opinion of our doctrine of Election, as if it were not any such comfortable condition; & teach him to magnifie the comfortable condition of the adversaries doctrine, depending upon a threefold cord, which as the proverb saith, cannot easily be broken. 1. The universalitie of Gods love, 2. The universalitie of Christs redemption, 3. The universalitie of the Covenant of grace: Thus the comforts of the Remonstrants are multiplied and

* Thing enquired after.

and advanced, which in the issue comes to this, that their condition is as comfortable as any reprobates condition throughout the world, whether *Cain's* or *Ishmael's*, or *Esaï's* or *Doeg's* or *Juda's*, or the Grand Senior among the Turkes, or the whole guard of his Janisaries: for God's love is towards all, Christ's redemption extends to all, and the Covenant of Grace belongs to all. And what comfortable creatures must these needes be, upon so various and comfortable considerations? And the whole Nation of the Arminians, are herein inferiour to none of them all. And though they will not be so saucie as to promise unto themselves perseverance in the state of grace; yet they will be so bold as to promise both to themselves and to all their Profelites perseverance in this estate of consolation, nothing inferiour to any Reprobates consolation in the world. But the mischief is, that hence it followes, that the consolation of any of God's children, whether *Abraham*, *Isaack*, *Jacob*, *David*, or *Solomon*, Prophets, Apostles, Martyrs, the blessed Virgin *Mary*, nor any other excepted, was never greater, then the consolation of the wicked'st Christian that ever lived, whether prophane or hypocritically, Provided he did believe these mysteries of Arminian godlynes; namely that God's love is towards all, Christ dyed for the redemption of all, and lastly that the Covenant of Grace belongs to all; for these are the sweet and precious flowers of consolation that grow in the gardens and writings of these Divines; to the astonishment of the world, in considering the power and efficacy of Satan: and that, even in the Church of God, so many should be given up to so strange delusions. He doth not know what satisfaction that learned Gentleman his friend hath received by these reasons, nor I neither; for I am not privy to the least satisfaction he hath received. But on the contrary, rather how he hath found the vilenesse of these Remonstrantall Tenets discovered, and the vanity of all supports used to underprop them. Sure he is, *They have given good content to others*; give we him leave to be liberall in his owne commendations: we doe not know how farre he dwells from neighbours: yet no marvaile if they give good content to many, who have been seasoned with the like speculations: I have seen a manuscript with this inscription, *A survey of the new Platforme of Predestination*; the method of it is much like to this, and it ends with a dialogue in the point of consolation; as if both Authours had dipt their pen in the same inck-pot. And now to heare and see *Demogorgon* himselfe play his part, and explicate his *Moun-tebanck facultie* in displaying the strength of his *Opobalsamum*; as he did of his *Catholicon*, whom the Frenchman brings in his *Satyre Mennippised*, no marvaile if they are well perswaded that no Pandora can equall that for univrsalities of graces: when in the meane time they all fall short of that *unum necessarium*, which yet like enough they are ready to forswear, and professe they will turne * open Atheists rather then believe it: still he keeps himselfe upon the commendation of his Profelite, which cannot but reflect some sweet content upon himselfe, who is the Engineer and perhaps the Spirit that animates him and sets him on worke,

*For if the man such prayes have,
What then shall he that inspires the knave.*

* I have read this in one of their letters directed to a Scholler of Oxford who imparted it to me

He commends the Author for perspicuitie in writing and modesty, and he wisheth that whosoever undertakes to answer it fully will performe the like. For my part I cannot change my stile: but my desire is, I may discover their fopperies, as perspicuously as I can, and I hope nothing to faile in performance; like enough the Authour of the preface as well as the Authour of the discourse desires to be gently handled and that he calls modesty, yet when a man will have his horse to be well curried, it is not for want of love to his horse; but because the condition of his horse requires to be so dealt withall: I thanke God, I never projected any immodest carriage; never could any adversary move me so farre; But as an excellent footeball-player of our House, who would lay any man on his backe handfomly without hurt (and he was a Bishop's Sonne) being desired to shew any other how to doe the like, answered with protestation that he never proceeded by any rules: but as he found his opposite, so he Coped with him. In like sort, as I find my adversary; so I deale with him for the present, as the Condition of his carriage to my seeming deserves, and if I handfomly lay his opinions on the ground without doing him any harme, methinkes I should be rather loved then hated of my very enemies for this; As for the present my Opposite seemes to have a care of my credit, for the gaining whereof he chaulkes me out a way, to wit: by writing perspicuously, and modestly, without *voluminous vagaries* about impertinent

things. This he delivers very gravely and demurely, which is in my judgment very ridiculous; and, if I doe expresse it and answer it as it deserves, I think, I should carry my selfe decently in answering him according to his ridiculous condition, and telling him that he doth not well in shewing such charity towards his adversary, which the world will be apt to interpret, as proceeding from a cowardly disposition. The Spaniards at the Fort of Brest, when St John Norris went forth in hunting of the hare, and his hounds pursued the hare into the very Fort, they tooke his hounds and hanged them up over the wall, not in spite of so renowned a Generall, but to represent their feareles condition, and that they looked for no favour at his hands. Magnanimitie, not malice moved them unto this, which magnanimitie might strike feare into their Enemies, though it did not, who tooke the Fort, though it cost them deare. I write with a purpose to expose my selfe to the censure of the world as they shall find cause; but I regard not the censures of an Adversary: especially in such a cause which *Bradwardine Stiles, The cause of God against Pelagius*. And truly I confesse I get something by this very phrase of my Adversaries *Voluminous vagaries* about impertinent things; which makes me conclude, that certainly both this Author, and his Interpolator have seen my answer to Mr Hord's *Treatise*; wherein I have some vagaries I confesse, to refresh my Spirit upon emergent occasions. For, being taking of from my studies to see a stranger who desired my companie; I was suddenly instructed in a new learning of Nine causes, who never was acquainted with above 4. before in the Universitie, and one of the nine was *finding out*, of which I made good use upon my returne; in finding out the Sophistry of the Remonstrants, in certaine Arguments of theirs. This liberty of Spirit to refresh my selfe and my Reader, it may be this Author spites: whereas I am perswaded I should take no offence on his part for the like; But it may be his gravity transports him to be of the same mind with Raynold the Fox, who having lost his owne tayle in a Ginne afterwards he endeavours very composedly to perswade his fellowes to cut of their tayles also. And to that purpose suffered his wit to exuberate in representing and amplifying the incommodious condition of such a member: Railing speeches, I know no reason why any man should feare from his adversary; for such, *Hierome* hath taught me, doe defile the Railer only, not him that is railed on. And if any man be pleased to spit in my face that way, though I am naturally very melancholly, yet I am perswaded he shall find little melancholly predominant in my answering him. As for unnecessarie divisions for the cause, which he doth seriously and wisely admonish his Adversary to beware of, I willingly professe, I love to have Sea roome, and not to be confined unto straights by any sullen rules of my Adversarie; and truly I perscribe to none, but as I find him, so I frame my selfe to grapple with him, as congruously as I can. If God be on my side, why should I be afraid of any colours. Let the Divell and all his Angels of Darknesse lye in camp against me; I shall not budge: But here is danger mentioned, which I professe, I did not project, and that is the dashing of my selfe upon the rocks of my Adversaries displeasure. And his interpretation of my courses to my displeasure. For if I doe not conforme to his sullen rules of *Stoicall moralitie*, he shall ever interpret it; (I marke well the Phrase, he comes not willingly on to make harsh interpretations, but he shall doe it) as much as to say the uprightness of his judgment and the justice of his disposition will urge him hereunto, namely to interpret it, *As a strong signe of a weake cause*, or at least *an Argument of an obstinate minde*; But soft and faire, who made my Adversary my Judge; by whose interpretations I am to stand or fall? How Imperiously doth he carry himselfe in this; as if he were some Bugbeare, or dreadfull Adversary doe I say? or Magistrate rather; see the poverty of my wit and of my Spirit too; the one was never so inventive of any such trick, nor the other so audacious, or immodest (if I may be so bold soe to speak) as to serve my selfe therewith, to scarre my Adversary, desparing by faire waies to overcome him, and make him yeild, or else his obstinacy knowne to the world: for who seeth not, that I have as much authoritie to threaten him with the sharpnesse of my interpretations of him; as he to threaten me not with the like austerenesse of his? I am willingly content the world may judge between us, both of the cause debated and of our carriage therein throughout, and who hath the truth on his side, and shews most learning and honesty in the maintayning of that he undertakes; I willingly confesse, the five points controverted are tender points, and the knowledge of the truth herein, meerly concerning a mans salvation; But this Author deales only upon the halfe of one of them, and that most needlesse also: And the resolution of the Doctrine of Election depends upon the resolution

resolution of the doctrine of Election depends upon the resolution of an other point; namely, whether *Grace be conferred freely, or according to mens workes*; That it is conferred freely, and not according to workes; hereupon it is that *Austin* builds the absolute-nesse of predestination and election, whence it followeth evidently, that as many as doe maintaine the Decree of predestination to be conditionall, must also in *Austin's* judgment maintaine that *Grace is given according unto workes*, which was of old condemned in the Synod of Palzstine, and all along in divers Synods and Provinciaall Councells against the Pelagians. Now if Predestination be absolute and not conditionall; it followes that Reprobation also is absolute and not conditionall; which consequence I presume, the Author of these additions will not deny. But as there is a great deale of craft in dawbing; so these craftie Crowders are apt to worke upon generalities and in distinctions: Reprobation we know is as well from Grace as from glory, and God's reprobation from glory is joyned with a purpose to inflict damnation. Now as touching Reprobation from grace, we readily professe that God hath both ordained to deny grace unto *some* of his meere pleasure; like as he hath ordained to bestow that upon others of his meere pleasure; and also of his meere pleasure hath made such a decree. And these Authors dare not manifestly oppose us in this argument, lest the sower leaven of their Pelagian Tenet manifest it selfe to the whole world, namely in maintaining that grace is conferred according to workes: But as touching reprobation from Glory, and God's purpose to inflict Damnation, These Juglers so carry the matter, as if they would make the world believe our Doctrine is, that God decreed to deny men Glory and to inflict Damnation, not for their sinnes; but meereley, because it is his pleasure so to doe, a most unshamefast crimination: For albeit that God hath made no law, according whereunto, he proceeds in giving grace unto some, and denying it unto others, but herein proceeds meereley according unto his pleasure, and not according to men's workes; it being manifest *Pelagianisme* to affirme the contrary; yet we openly & willingly profes (And all the Christian world knowes it to be true) That God hath made a law whereunto according he proceeds in the distribution of rewards and Punishments, namely these, *Whosoever believeth shall be saved, whosoever believeth not shall be damned*: And according to this law, God hath decreed from everlasting to proceed in pronouncing the sentence of Salvation and Damnation on mankind, namely to bestow Salvation not of his meere pleasure, without all respect of the workes of men, but as a reward of their faith, repentance, and good workes, and to inflict damnation not of his owne meere pleasure without any respect to the workes of men, but as a due reward for their sinnes never broken of by repentance. Only this decree thus to proceed in the execution of rewards and punishments, we professe God hath made according to the meere pleasure of his will, whereby it is apparent, that these men play the part of notable Impostours, when they abuse the world's credulitie in making them believe, that we maintaine any such absurd decrees or executions of decrees, which they obtrude upon us; and to this purpose these are willing to take the benefit and advantage of *Confusion*; for it is most profitable for some to fish in troubled waters, and to walke in the darke: But when the light of distinction comes, this madd's them to see their impostures discovered, and their sophistications made to appeare in their proper colours. *The eye of the Adulterer* (saith *Job*) *waiteth for the twilight, and saith, no eye shall see me, and disguiseth his face, They dig through houses in the darke, which they marked for themselves in the day, they know not the light, but the morning is even to them, as the shadow of death, if one know them, they are in the terrours of the shadow of death*; Now there is a course of adulterating the word of God, and deflouring his truth every way, as abominable in the sight of God, as the deflouring of women; yea and much more abominable; In my answer to the former discourse, as I remember, I proposed certaine arguments to prove the absolute nature of Reprobation. This Authour doth not accommodate himselfe, nor his *Achates* neither to answer so much as one of them. Thus having Prefaced concerning these concealed Authours, and therewithall made answer to the Preface of this Interpolator, I come to make answer to the *Additions* themselves.

*The Answer to the Additions.**M. Mason's Additions pag : 2.*

S 1. Some say that God of his meer pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the Creature, originall, or actually, did decree to glorifie his Sovereigntie and Justice in the eternall rejection and damnation of the greatest part of Mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable sinne and impenitence, as the meanes.

2. The rest of that side thinking to avoid the great inconveniences, to which the supralapsarian way lies open, fall downe a little lower; and present men to God in his decree of Reprobation lying in the fall & under the *guilt* of originall sinne, saying.

3 That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in *Adam's* sinne, did decree, the greatest number of men (even those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation, by the preaching of the Gospel) to Hell torments for ever and without all remedie, for the declaration of his severe justice; This way went the Synod.

Answer

Let the Reader observe that this Authour in stating the opinion of our Divines alleageth no passages out of any of them, no nor so much as quotes the place of any of their writings where this doctrine is to be found in the terme wherein he delivers it, that so, he may take the greater libertie to shape their opinions according to his owne pleasure; first, as touching the first observe. 1. How he shapes this opinion. 2, the Persons to whom he imputes it; concerning the first, the Decree is shaped as consisting of two parts; The one sets downe the end, which God intended, the other the meanes whereby this end is procured.

1. As touching the end, it is hard to say, by his shaping of it, whether the manifestation of God's glory be made the end, or man's damnation; and if any one conceaves hereupon, that man's Damnation is the end which God intended in the opinion of our Divines, like enough this Authour will be well enough pleased with it. 2. Consider how God's Sovereigntie and Justice are coupled together, as appearing in the eternall rejection and damnation of his Creatures, as if both of them did appeare equally in each. 3. Then rejection is proposed without distinction and specification, that we might know whether he understands it of rejection from Grace, or rejection from Glorie. 4. And in the fourth place, he couples rejection with Damnation, as if both were of equall yoke; signifying Acts temporall; whereas rejection in the Common notion thereof is all one with reprobation, and reprobation is commonly taken for an act eternall, to witt, The eternall purpose of God to deny grace, permit sinne, and inflict damnation for sinne. 5. Damnation is here brought in as belonging to the Decree of the end; and quite left out in the Decree of the meanes: whereas by the very light of Nature it is apparent, that Justice vindicative is manifested no where more, then in the execution of punishment. 6. And lastly Damnation in it selfe is no manifestation of Justice any more, then of Injustice; unlesse it be executed as a condigne punishment for sinne; yet most absurdly he talks of manifesting justice in man's Damnation, without specifying the meritorious cause of Damnation; without consideration whereof, Damnation is no manifestation of Justice, either Divine, or humane. 7. Whereas he sets forth the Persons damned to be the greatest part of Man-kind, this is only to speak with a full mouth, and to gull a partiall Reader, who may be well pleased to have his mouth filled with an emptie spoone: For the Scripture teacheth expressly, that even of them that are called but few are chosen; and clear reason doth manifest, that look how God may deale with one, in the same manner it is lawfull for him to deale with Millions. We love to speak distinctly, and accordingly we say, that all God's decrees; are of doing something for the manifestation of his owne Glory. I say of doing something, for no glory of God is manifested in Decreeing, but in executing his Decrees; As when *Solomon* saith, *God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill* Prov: 16:4. So then the manifestation of God's Glory is the end of all his actions. And accordingly if rejection here be taken for God's Decree, no glory is manifested herein, and too absurd it is to account God's eternall Decrees to be meanes for the accomplishing of his ends: But if Rejection be taken here for a temporall Act, to witt: Of finall dereliction in sinne, then it may be a meanes for the manifestation of God's glory in a certaine kind, namely, his Sovereigntie; for like as God hath mercy on whom he will, in not leaving them finally in their sinnes; but delivering them from the power of it, by bestowing on them the Grace of Faith and Repentance. In like manner, God hardneth whom he will, in denying the same Grace of Faith.

Faith and Repentance, and so finally leaving them and permitting them to continue finally in their sinnes, without breaking them of by repentance. So that God proceed's herein merely according to his pleasure, for the manifestation of that Soveraigntie which he hath as a Creator over his Creatures. Even the same that the *Potter bath over his Clay, to make of the same lump one vessell unto honour, an other unto dishonour*. No Justice is manifested in this difference, I meane no such Justice as proceedes in reference to the workes of men; for he doth not bestow Grace upon men, because of their good workes; nor deny grace unto them, because of their evill workes; but finding men equall in the state of sinne, he bestowes Grace upon the one to cure sinne in them, and bestowes it not upon others. Yet God is just herein in another respect, namely in as much as he doth no other thing in all this, but such as he hath a lawfull power to doe; As for Damnation, that is clearly an Act temporall; and this the Lord inflict's on none but for their sinnes: And like as in giving or denying grace, God manifested no justice Compensative, but Soveraigntie, only proceeding therein merely according unto pleasure: So in inflict'g dānation & denying glory, he manifest's vindicative Justice alone, not proceeding according to mere pleasure herein but according to mens workes, and that according to a Law which himselfe hath given unto men, namely this, *Whosoever continueth in sin without repentance shall be damned*. 2. The second part of this Decree is concerning the meanes; and the meanes he makes to be sinne and impenitency: It is very well he tooke libertie to set downe their opinion without specifying their words, least they should fly in his face, and convict him of shamefull flaunder. He that intends the end is the Authour of the meanes: this is universall, we say that the permission of sinne and of impenitencie is the meanes, and this we acknowledge to make way, as well for the manifestation of his mercy in pardoning sinne, as of his Justice in punishing it; it being apparent that neither mercy in pardoning, nor Justice in punishing can have place, unlesse sinne be permitted to enter into the world: Over and above this sinne is stiled *unavoidable* without all distinction, such is the proper language of the Arminian Court; we say all sinnes are avoydable by Grace, and that no sinne can be avoided in an acceptable manner without Grace, and here I speak not of grace restrayning only, but of Grace sanctifying. Here if it pleased him, he might have put in Damnation also for sinne, as without all doubt a principall meanes of promoting the manifestation of God's Justice; and *Thomas Aquinas* expressely professeth, that *Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa*. Reprobation includes God's will to permit sinne, and to inflict Damnation for sinne; here is the Decree concerning meanes. And as for the end hereof, both *Aquinas* (and *Alvarez* after him) professeth, that the manifestation of God's glory in the way of vindicative Justice as intended by him, as the end of all this. 2. As for the Persons here named to take this way 1. *Calvin* though this Authour placeth him amongst the Supralapsarians, yet *Lubbertus* doth not in his treatise of predestination, but opposeth *Vorsinus* in this particular; *Cornelius de Lapide*, a Jesuite upon the 18. verse of the 9. to the Romans, agrees with *Lubbertus* in this; *Calvin's* owne wordes are these de predestinatione pag. 710. *Cum de Predestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordium esse constanter semper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes Reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt ac damnati jure perire, qui naturā sunt filii iræ*. When we treat of Prædestination, I ever taught and to this day teach, that we ought to begin it from thence; That all Reprobates are justly left in death, who are dead in *Adam*, and damned, and that they justly perish, who by nature are children of wrath. 2. *Lubbertus* shewes *Beza* also to concur in the same. 3. *Piscator* in a small Treatise of the object of Predestination, annexed to his answer to *Hennigius* of universall Grace, though he makes the Decree of making all men in *Adam* to different ends, and of permitting them to fall in *Adam* to precede the consideration of the Corrupt Masse, as it is evident they must, Yet the Decrees of Election and Reprobation he subordinates to the foresight of the corrupt Masse. 4. And as for *Zanchy*, let but his Generall definition of Predestination be considered, it will appeare that he distinguisheth the particulars of the Decree of Predestination as *Piscator* doth.

2. I come to the second opinion; and as for the great inconveniencies which here is pretended, that the Authours thereof desire to decline. I have answered hereunto upon the Treatise of *M. Hord*, and shewed that not so much to decline inconveniencies have some embraced this way, as rather because this way seemes to be more familiar and plaine, and chiefly because the formall Notions of the particulars of the Decrees of Election and Reprobation, the one in the Generall seeming to be a worke of mercy, the other of Justice, seeme to suppose a consideration of man in the state of miserie. But supposing that some

might take this way to avoid inconveniencies, yet I have shewed in my answer to *Arminius*, that none of these are at all avoided this way. And then againe both these opinions have I endeavoured to reconcile in my *Vindicia*, and withall shewed that the difference whatsoever it comes to, is but *in apice logico; in a point of logick*; both sides concurring in the maintenance both of God's Sovereigne Prerogative over his Creatures, to make one vessel unto honour, another unto dishonour, by giving faith and repentance unto the one, and denying it to others; as also in the prerogative of Grace as only effectually to the working of men unto faith and Repentance.

2. God decrees both to Create all men in *Adam*, and to permit them all to fall in *Adam*; These be the Divine Decrees concerning meanes tending to the manifestation of his Glory in the way of Mercy and Justice; except man were created, no Glory at all could be manifested in him; unlesse all were suffered to fall in *Adam*, there were neither place for mercy, nor Justice: these are generall decrees concerning all; then there are speciall degrees of difference to be joyned to these generall decrees; 1. The one is of raising some out of sinne by Faith and Repentance, and bestowing Salvation on them by way of reward for the manifestation of God's mercy. 2. The other is of leaving others in sinne, and permitting them finally to persevere therein, and inflicting Damnation for their sinnes, the end whereof is the manifestation of God's Justice: The decree of manifesting these is alone the decree of the end, all the rest are decrees of the meanes tending to these ends; whereof the two first are generall and concerne all; whether Elect, or Reprobate, the rest are speciall, concerning either the Elect alone, or the Reprobate alone. 3. Now here is a colour cast, as if the speciall Decrees did promise the two generall Decrees: But this is a mere colour, as I have shewed you in my *Vindicia*, 2. And even they that take this way, maintaine that God ordaines no man to Damnation but for sinne, and that both actually, as well as originall, which is utterly pretermitted by this Authour. 3. The Scripture is expresse that of them that are called, few are chosen. 4. It is untrue that the Synod went this way, they medled not at all with the ordering of God's decrees.

*M. Mason's
Additions p.
3.*

Maccovius also Professor of Divinitie at Franekar, a violent and stiffe maintainer of the most unfavory speeches which have been uttered in this Controversie, and one that undertooke in the very Synod to make good against *Lubbert* his fellow Professor, that *God did will sinnes, ordaine men to sinne, and would not at all that all men should be saved*. And besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that except these things were held and maintained by them, they could not possibly keep their owne ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants; This man was not only not censured, but publicly declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and dismissed only with this kind and friendly motion. *That he should hereafter take heed of such words as might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with those who are incapable of such mysteries*.

Answer.

For all this the Authour quotes *Antidotū Remonstrantiū* pag: 32, this booke I have not seen much lesse have I it at this time in my possession, and therefore I must take it all upon trust. And seeing this man was declared in the Synod of Dort, (as this Authour writes) to be pure and Orthodox, it seemes they did not censure these speeches of his as unfavory speeches, but rather justified them, though with acknowledgment, that they might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with those, who were as yet incapable of such mysteries; so that this Authour censurcth these speeches of *Maccovius* for unfavory speeches, without the least disproofe of them (yet is *Maccovius*, and then was, a Professor of Divinity in the University of Franekar.) In like sort by consequent he censurcth the judgment of the Synod, as an unfavory judgment, and their approbation of *Maccovius*, as an unfavory approbation; Let the Reader judge of what Spirit this Authour is, and whether it may not be said of him, as *Moses* said of *Corah* and his complices, *ye take to much upon you ye Sonnes of Aaron*: Nay what if this censure of his reflects upon the very Phrases of the Holy Ghost? The two first phrases namely, *to will sinnes*, and *to ordaine men to sinne*, are all one: For to ordaine men to sinne is but to will, that such men shall sinne, or that there shall be such sinnes of men. Now the Scripture frequently justifies this; for the 10 Kings to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, what is the meaning of it, But to imploy their Regall power in supporting the Pope-dome? Now was not this a great sinne? Yet the Scripture expressly professeth that is was the will of God it should be so. *Rev. 17. 17. For God hath put in their hearts to fullfill his Will, and to doe it with one consent, for to give their Kingdome to the Beast, untill the words of God be fulfilled*. As expressly doth Saint *Peter* testifie of some men, that they are ordained *to stumble at God's word, and to be disobedient, Christ is a stone to stumble at, & a Rock of offence even to them which stumble at the word, being disobedient, unto the which thing they were even ordained*: and by whom could they be ordained hereunto but by God? In like sort we know the abominable

Outrages

Outrages committed by *Herod, Pontius Pilate*, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, against the Holy Sonne of God (for *Judas* betrayed him, the high Priests suborned witnesses against him, *Herod* with his Herodians despitefully used him, *Pilate* condemned him, the Romane Souldiers scourged him, spit in his face, buffeted him, arraigned him like a King in scorn, and crowned him with a Crowne of thornes, and last of all Crucified him between two theeves) yet of all these the Holy Ghost testifies, *That in this doing against the Holy Sonne of God they did what God had determined to be done*; The words of the Text are these, and that as delivered with one accord by the Apostles and their fellowes; for when *Peter* and *John* were let goe, they came to their fellowes and shewed all that the High Priests had said unto them, *And when they heard it, they lift up their voices to God with one accord, and said, O Lord thou art the God which hath made Heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are therein, which by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, why did the Gentiles rage and the people imagine a vaine thing; The Kings of the earth assembled, and the Rulers came together against the Lord, and against his Christ, for doubtlesse against thy Holy Son Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israell, gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thine hand and thy Counsell had determined before to be done*. Now every one knowes that to determine to be done, and to ordaine to be done, and to will to be done are all one: why doth not this Authour censure these speeches for unsavory speeches, as well as those of *Maccovius*? Why doth not he expose this Synod of the Apostles and others to the same censure? whereunto he exposeth the Synod of Dort? Nay can it be avoided, but that already he hath done so, and that these censures of his must necessarily prove the powring forth of Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost? Seeing the speeches are used by the Apostles, which he censureth for unfavorie, being uttered by *Maccovius*; Is it not apparent that whosoever renounceth those speeches, must also renounce the word of God? And shall it be a reproach to us that we cannot keep our owne ground, unlesse the Holy Ghost keeps his ground, and maintaine his owne Dialect to be savorie in spite of the vile aspersions, that this Authour or any other of his Spirit doth usually cast upon it, not sparing to terme such speeches, unfavorie speeches. As for the last phrase, *That God would that all men should be saved*, this is no Scripture; nay it doth imply a manifest Blasphemy, namely that God cannot save them: It is true, the Scripture saith that God willeth that all men should be saved, but what is meant by this note of universalities in Scripture, let Scripture it selfe be Judge. The Pharisees did Tith the *omne olus* as *Austine* observes, not every particular herbe, to give the Tith thereof, but every kind of herbe to give the Tenth thereof; so *Peter* saw in a vessell let downe from Heaven *πᾶν τε θῆρον* not every fower footed beast in particular, but all manner of fower footed beasts; see Mat: 3. 5. It is said *all Judea went forth to John* and *all the region round about Jordan*, what can the meaning of this be, but that from all parts of Judea and the Region round about Jordan, of all sorts some went forth to *John*, not that there was not one man left behind in all Judea, and in all the Region round about Jordan. And accordingly Saint *Austine* interpreted this place above 1200 yeares agoe, namely that God will that of all sorts, some be saved, even of Kings and Nobles some, though but few of such 1 Cor: 1. 27. Now this is not denied either by *Maccovius*, or by any other of our Divines, only they deny it to be the will of God, that all and every one shall be saved; for if this were his will, it would follow, first that God is not able to save them, which is to deny the first Article of the Creed, as *Austine* in this very particular disputed many hundred yeares agoe. Secondly it would follow, that God is changed: for certainly when he damnes men he hath no will to save them. And what is Election Divine? is it any other then the will of God ordaining unto salvation? Now who dares say that all are Elect? Hath not our Saviour expressly told us, that even of them that are called, but few are chosen? Yet might that Synod well admonish *Maccovius* to take heed of such words as might give offence to tender yeares, and be carefull to expresse the same truth in as inoffensive way as we can: And accordingly having a digression in this very Argument, in my *Vindicia Gratia* I proposed it in this manner, *Whether the holy one of Israell without any injurie to his Holy Majestie, may be said to will sinne after a certaine manner*: and I maintaine the affirmative after this manner; *Deus vult ut peccatum fiat ipso permittente*, God will have sinne to come to passe by his permission; and *Bellarmino* confesseth that, *Malum esse Deo permittente bonum est*. It is good that evill should be by God's permission, which was also the saying of *Austine* long before. And that *non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo*: Not any thing comes to passe, except God Omnipotent will have it come to passe, either by suffering it, or himselfe working it; And the eleventh Article of the Church of Ireland

Concerning the Object of Predestination.

and framed in the dayes of King James runnes thus ; *God from all eternitie, did by his unchangable Counsell ordaine what soever in time should come to passe ; yet so as there by no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable Creatures , and neither the libertie , nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.* And *Arminius* himselfe professeth that *Demi voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere; God would have Achab to fill up the measure of his finnes,* and what is it to fill up the measure of his finnes; but to adde sinne unto sinne ? And this he delivereth without all qualification.

*M. Mason's
Additions
pag: 3.*

By these instances it appeareth, That they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference. And to say the truth, there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance for which they both contend.

1 That the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actual. 2. That the finall impenitencie and Damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by God's absolute Decree.

Answer

The difference which this Authour takes into Consideration is about the object of Predestination ; and the difference in opinion thereabouts is usually to be observed threefold (though this Authour is pleased to take notice of a secondfold difference,) for some conceive the object of Predestination to be man-kind as yet not created; others conceive the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not yet corrupted. A third sort maintaines the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted. Now D. *Junius* hath endeavoured to reconcile the three opinions , making place for each consideration in the object of predestination ; And *Piscator* after him adventured on the like reconciliation, and hath performed it with more perspicuitie and with better successe in my judgment, then *Junius*; And that according to three different acts concurring unto Predestination; The first is, saith he, God's purpose to create man-kind in *Adam* unto different ends, now this Act doth clearly require the object thereof to be man-kind not yet Created. The second Act he conceives to be God's Decree to permit all men to fall in *Adam*; Now this Act he conceives as clearly to suppose the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not corrupted. The third & last Act he conceives to be God's decree to choose some, to show compassion on them in raising them out of sinne by faith and repentance, and of Reprobating others, leaving them as he findes them, and permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne, to the end he might manifest the glorie of his grace, in saving the one; & the glorie of his Justice in damning others. Now this third Act he supposeth manifestly to require the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted: Now the Authours of these severall opinions have no reason to go together by the eares about these three opinions, but with Brotherly love to entertaine one another: First, because the difference herein is not so much in Divinitie, as in Logick and Philosophie; difference in opinion about order in interitions , being meerly Logickall, and to be composed according to the right stating of the end intended , and of the meanes conducing to the end; it being generally confessed, that the intention of the end is before the intention of meanes conducing thereunto. And that look what is first in intention, the same must be last in execution. Secondly, the Authours of these severall opinions about the object of Predestination , doe all agree in two principall points. 1. That all men, before God's eternall predestination and reprobation, are considered as equall in themselves, whether as uncreated, or as created, but not corrupted, or lastly, whether created or corrupted. 2. That God's grace only makes the difference, choosing some to worke the to faith, & repentance, & perseverance therein; while he rejecteth others, leaving the as he findes them, & permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne; whereby is upheld and maintained. 1. First, the prerogative of God's grace as only effectual to the working of men unto that which is good. 2. And secondly, the prerogative of God's Sovereigntie in shewing mercy on whome he will, to bring them to Faith and true repentance, and hardning others; that is, not bestowing of grace and repentance upon them. And seeing they all agree in these momentous points of Divinitie, they have no cause to take it offensively at the hands of one another , that they differ in a point of Logick. Now I have adventured, on this argument to find out to my selfe, and give unto others some better satisfaction, then formerly hath been exhibited , and that by distinguishing Two decrees only on each part, to witt, the decree of the end, and the decree of the meanes: As for example, 1. On the part of Predestination and Election, I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glorious grace in the way of mercie mixt with justice, on a certaine number of men. And the Decree of the meanes is to create them and permit them all to fall in *Adam* and to bring them forth into the world in their severall generations clothed with originall sinne; and to send Christ into the world to dye for

for them, and for Christ's sake first to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and finally to save them. 2. On the part of Reprobation I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of Justice vindicative; And the decree of meanes to be partly common and partly proper; the common meanes are to create them and permit them all to fall in *Adam*, and bring them forth into the world clothed with originall sin; the speciall meanes are to leave them as he finds them, and permit them to finish their daies in sinne, and so not shewing the like grace to them, which he shewed to others. 1. So that the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall and actually; like as on the other side, the moving cause of election is only the will of God, or not faith, or any good workes, whereupon this Authour is loath to manifest his opinion; This doctrine is not only approved by Doctour *Whitaker* Doctour of the Chaire in the Universitie of Cambridge, and that in his *Cyanea Cantio* a little before his death, but justified and confirmed by varietie of Testimonies both of Schoolemen, as *Lumbard*, *Aquinas*, *Bannes*, *Petrus de Alliaco*, *Gregorius*, *Arminensis*; of our owne Church and the Divines thereof, as taught by *Bucer* at Cambridge, by *Peter Martyr* at *Oxon*: professed by the Bishops and others, promoted by *Queen Elizabeth* and farther in the yeare of our Lord 1592: there was a famous recantation made in the Universitie of Cambridge by one *Barret* in the 37. of *Elizabeth* whereunto he was urged by the heads of houses of that Universitie. The Recantation runnes thus, *Preaching in Latine not long since in the Universitie Church, (Right worshipfull) many things slipt from me, both falsly and rashly spoken, whereby I understand the mindes of many have been griev'd, to the end therefore I may satisfie the Church & the truth which I have publicquely hurt; I doe make this publique confession, both Repenting and Revoking my Error; First I said that no man in this transitorie world is so strongly underpropt, at least by the certainty of Faith, that is (unlesse as I afterwards expounded it) by Revelation that he ought to be assured of his owne Salvation; But now I protest before God, and acknowledge in my conscience that they which are justified by faith have peace towards God, that is, have reconciliation with God, and doe stand in that grace by faith, therefore that they ought to be certaine and assured of their owne Salvation, even by the certainty of Faith it selfe.*

2. Secondly, I affirmed that the faith of *Peter* could not faile, but that other mens faith may; for as (I then said) Our Lord prayed not for the faith of every particular man, but now being of a better and more sound Judgment according to that which Christ teacheth in plaine words, *Joh: 17. 20.* I pray not for these alone, that is the Apostles, but for them also which shall believe in mee through their word; I acknowledge that Christ prayed for the faith of every particular believer, and that by the vertue of that prayer of Christ; every true believer is so stayd up, that his faith cannot faile.

3. Thirdly, touching perseverance to to the end, I said that, that certainty concerning the time to come is proud, for as much as it is in his owne nature contingent of what kind the perseverance of every man is, neither did I affirme it to be proud only, but to be must wicked; but now I freely protest that the true and justifying faith, whereby the faithfull are most neare united unto Christ, is so firme as also for the time to come so certaine, that it can never be rooted up out of the mindes of the faithfull by any temptation of the flesh, the world or divell himselfe; so that he that once hath this faith shall ever have it; for by the benefit of that justifying faith Christ dwelleth in us and we in Christ, therefore it cannot but be both increased (Christ growing in us dayly) as also persevere unto the end, because God doth give constancy.

4. Fourthly, I affirmed that there was no distinction in faith, but in the Persons believing, in which I confesse I did erre. Now I freely acknowledge the Temporarie faith (which as *Bernard* witnesseth is therefore fained, (because it is temporary) it is distinguished and differeth from the saving faith, whereby sinners apprehending Christ are justified before God for ever, not in measure and degrees, but in the very thing it selfe. Moreover I adde that *Saint James* doth make mention of a dead faith, and *Paul* of a faith that worketh by love.

5 Fifthly, I added that forgiveness of sinnes is an Article of faith, but not particular, neither belonging to this man or that man, that is (as I expounded it) that no true faithfull man either can or ought certainly believe that his sinnes are forgiven: But now I am of an other mind and doe freely confesse that every true faithfull man is bound by this Article of faith to believe the forgiveness of sinnes, and certainly to believe that his owne particular sinnes are freely forgiven him; neither doth it follow hereupon that, that Petition of the Lord's prayer (to wit) forgive us our trespasses is needlesse; for in that Petition we aske not only the gift but also the increase of Faith.

6 Sixtly, these words escaped me in my Sermon viz: As for those that are not saved, I doe
B b b 3 most

The opinions of the Supralapsarians

most strongly believe, and doe freely protest, that I am so perswaded against Calvin, Peter Martyr and the rest, that sinne is the true and proper cause of Reprobation; But now being better instructed I say that the Reprobation of the Wicked is from everlasting, and that saying of Saint Austine to Simplician to be most true; viz: If sinne were the cause of Reprobation then no man should be elected, because God doth know all men to be defiled with it: And that I may speak freely, I am of the same mind and doe believe concerning the Doctrine of Election and Reprobation, as the Church of England believeth and teacheth in the booke of the Articles of faith, in the Article of Predestination. Last of all I uttered these words rashly against Calvin, a man that hath very well deserved of the Church of God (to wit) that he durst presume to lift up himselfe above the high and Almighty God, by which words I doe confesse that I have done great injurie to that most learned and right good man, and I most humbly beseech you all to pardon this my rashnes, as also in that I have uttered many bitter words against Peter Martyr, Beza, Zanchy, Junius, and the rest of the same religion, being the lights and ornaments of our Church, calling them by the odious names of Calvinists and other slanderous termes, branding them with a most greivous marke of reproach; whom because our Church doth worthily reverence, it was not meet, that I should take away their good name from them. Doctor Fulke in like manner maintaines that reprobation is not of workes, but of God's free will, Rom: 9. Num: 2. His words are these, God's election & Reprobation is most free, of his owne will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them; for he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth ver: 18. Yet here is to be distinguished, for the explication of the truth, That God's decree of Reprobation may be considered either as touching the Act of God reprobating and willing, or as touching the things hereby willed or Decreed; As touching the Act of God reprobating, we say as Aquinas saith concerning the Act of God predestinating, namely that no cause can be given thereof as from man, like as no cause can be given of God's will; God's will being eternall, but whatsoever is in man being Temporall. But as touching the things decreed or willed by Reprobation, these are either the deniall of grace, or inflicting of damnation; As touching the deniall of grace we clearly professe, that like as God of his mere will and pleasure doth shew mercy on some in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them; so God of his mere will and pleasure doth harden others in denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; and thus it is that Doctor Fulke maintaines God's election & reprobation to be most free, of his owne free will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of the; but touching the inflicting of damnation, we maintaine that God neither doth inflict damnation, nor ever did decree to inflict damnation of his owne mere pleasure and will, but altogether for sinne, either originall or actuall: further we maintaine, that in no moment of time or nature God doth decree to damne any man before he foreseeeth the sinne for which they shall be damned. 2. As touching the second we willingly grant, that by vertue of God's decree, it necessarily and unavoidably followes, that whosoever dieth in finall impenitency shall be damned, neither doe I thinke this Authour dares to avouch the contrary.

Secondly, as touching finall impenitency, wee willingly professe that upon supposition of God's decree finally to harden a man and to deny a man the grace of repentance; (It being clearly the gift of God as Scriptures testifie, Act: 5. 31, and 11. 18. 2 Tim 2. 25) it is impossible that such a man should repent, nevertheless both repentance is possible, and finall impenitency is avoidable simply (to wit) by grace. 3. But this Authour loves not to explicate himselfe, but I suppose he secretly maintaines, that every man hath such a power, by grace, whereby he may repent if he will, concerning which Tenent of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power, but we deny that such a power is grace; we say it is nature rather, and that for this reason; looke by what power a man may repent if he will, by the same power he may refuse to repent if he will: Now if this were grace, then were grace inferior to a morall vertue: for no morall vertue leaves a man indifferent to doe good or no; to doe good or evil; but inclines and disposeth the will only to that which is good; so Justice disposeth a man only to just actions, not indifferentlie to that which is just, or to that which is unjust, 'Tis true nevertheless a man that is just may doe an unjust Act if he will, but this is not by vertue of the habit of Justice wherewith he is qualified; But only by reason of the freedome of his will which is naturall unto him; for justice undoubtedly inclines a man's will only to that which appeareth just, and so every morall vertue inclines the will only to a vertuous Act, not indifferently either to acts vertuous, or to acts vicious; like as on the contrary a vicious habit inclines the will of man only to acts vicious, not indifferently, to acts vicious or to acts vertuous! Secondly grace is supernaturall; it were a Monster in Divinitie to

say that supernaturall grace doth indifferently incline a man either to good or evill; it is impossible it should incline a man save to acts supernaturall; now every supernaturall act must needs be gracious, it cannot be sinfull or evill; lastly whosoever hath a will to repent, such a one hath not only a power to repent, but actually doth repent, as touching the cheifest facultie in, the change whereof repentance doth consist; for that is the will, and it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, in every kind of that which is truly good; and surely to have a will to repent is a good thing, if he want power, let him and us, pray for that out of that will and desire we have to repent, *ut quod volumus implere valeamus*, that what we desire to doe we may be able to doe, and we have no cause to feare that God will despise so gracious desires.

To these speeches let me adde that of *Remigius* Arch-bishop of Lyons, who, to *Rabanus* Arch-bishop of Mentz, objecting that *Saint Austine* wrote a booke called *Hypognosticon* against *Pelagius* and *Cælestius*, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly *prædestinati ad interitum*, *prædestinate to destruction*, answereth, that *Saint Austine* said not so (but some other man) as it is supposed to purge the Church of calumnie, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it; namely that it taught that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, and did withdraw the word (*Prædestination*) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and so gave great occasion of further Error and mistake; In this speech of his, it is clearly implied that it was the constant Doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition.

M. Mason's Additions p. 5.

Here we find inserted a passage taken out of *Remigius* Arch-bishop of Lyons his answer to *Rabanus* Arch-bishop of Mentz, as it is to be found in the Historie of *Gottescalcus* written by Doctor *Usher* Arch-bishop of Armach, pag. 107. Now that discourse of *Remigius* is not in answer to *Rabanus* Arch-bishop of Mentz, but unto *Hincmarus* Arch-bishop of Remes. And withall this Authour is pleased to geld it as he thinkes good: For whereas *Remigius* hath it thus; *quasi Deus sua prædestinatione necessitatem imponeret hominibus in suis impietatibus permanendi, & in æternum pereundi*: This Authour renders it thus; *That God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing*, leaving out altogether the former, namely of imposing upon men a necessitie of perishing in their impieties: And every sober man may well wonder at his dealing in this, especially seeing he hath left out that which is most materiall and most considerable; for neither by *Austine's* Doctrine nor by our Doctrine, hath God imposed upon any a necessitie of perishing, but such as finally persevere in their impieties: And will any man that is well in his wits oppose this? Sure I am, nor *Hincmarus*, nor any other was knowne to mee to oppose this in the Church of God. Neither is there any necessitie inherent in man, on whom it is said to be imposed, but a consequent denomination to God's unchangeable or irresistible will, to damne all such as persist finally in their sinfull courses, without breaking the off by repentance: All the question is about the necessity of Reprobates persisting in their impieties, which might be objected, & as it seemes was objected against *Austine's* doctrine of Predestination, & by this Authour is objected against ours: now by this objection, *Remigius* clears the Doctrine of *Saint Austine*, professing this to be a calumnious imputation, and such as needed not for the answering thereof, that any such course should be taken as the Authour of the booke (intuled *Hypognosticon*) takes; (to wit) by denying that God predestinates any to Damnation, for this necessitie of persisting in sinnes was not imposed upon them by predestination in their opinion, who thereby understood no other thing then Gods decreeing of such things which himselfe purposed to effect in due time; as both *Remigius* manifested in these words, pag. 155, of the same booke: *Non prædestinat nisi quæ fuerat ipse factururus, quæ utiq; omnia bona & iusta sunt*; And *Austine* in like manner, *de bono perseverantia*, cap. 17. *In sua quæ falli mutariq; non potest præscientia, opera sua disponere, illud omnino nec aliud quicquid est prædestinare*, so the Synod of Valens, Can. 3. *Prædestinatione autem deum ea tantum statuisse (dicimus) quæ ipse vel gratuita misericordia, vel iusto iudicio factururus erat. In malis vero ipsam malitiam præscisse quia ab ipsis est, non prædestinasse quia ab illo non est*: And that for good reason, because, *Malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem*, as *Austine* writes *De Civit. Dei lib. 12. cap. 7*. But as for this necessitie in sinning, this both we and they willingly professe to flow from the sinne of *Adam*, which God alone can cure in man and none other, as the same *Remigius* acknowledgeth *Histor. Gottesc. pag. 3*. *Anima humana & voluntas humana sicut verè manet in morte non diligendo, ita verè transfertur de morte in vitam diligendo*: But by whom is this translation wrought? that followes; *hac dilectione non fit verè liberũ arbitrium, id est verè libera voluntas nisi illo liberante, id est libertatem largiente, qui ait, si vos filius liberaverit, tunc verè liberi eritis, & nisi illo munere Spiritus Dei, de quo dicit Apostolus; ubi autem Spiritus Domini*

Answer.

Domini, ibi libertas: By this love the will is not made free, but he freeing it, who saith, if the Sonne shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed, and not otherwise then by the gift of the Spirit of God whereof the Apostle speakes, where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; nay I am verily perswaded that *Hincmarus* himselfe against whom *Remigius* disputeth, is more Orthodox in this argument then this Authour; for thus writes *Hincmarus*: as is to be seen in the same history of *Gotteschalchus*. pag. 39. *quosdam in Massa peccati & perditionis justè deseruit, à qua prædestinatione sua (id est in gratie præparatione) occulto (sed non injusto) judicio nequaquam eripuit*; Some men God justly deserted in the Masse of sinne and perdition; from which by his prædestination, that is, preparation of grace, he never delivered by judgment secret, but not unjust, whereas this Authour will have all men to be delivered from this Masse of sinne and perdition, by a certaine universall grace bestowed upon them, whereby they are put in a kind of indifferent estate to believe or not believe, repent or not repent if they will, which *Hincmarus* never acknowledged; yet this necessitie of sinning, incident to all that are brought forth into the world, in *Massa peccati & perditionis*, in the Masse of originall sinne and perdition; is not such either in their, or our opinion, as whereby they cannot but sinne; although they would abstaine from it; though this be obruded upon us as it was upon *Remigius*: whereupon he pleades for himselfe, and such as were of his mind in the Doctrine of prædestination after this manner, pag. 53. *Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei prædestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriæ voluntatis perversitate; sed Divina prædestinationis necessitate peccare videatur*; No man (saith he) doth so think or speak, as if God's prædestination made a man to sinne against his will, in such sort as he should seeme to sinne, not through the perversnesse of his owne will, but by the necessity of Divine prædestination, so say we; neither is this impotency of doing good, any where else, but in the Corruption of the will, it being a morall impotency according to that of Saint *Austine*, *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia*; Libertie without grace, is not Libertie, but wilfullnesse, and *Remigius* Histor. *Gotteschalch*: pag. 29. *Ex quibus (saith he) speaking of Reprobates, Nemo potest salvari, non propter violentiam aliquam Divinæ potestatis, sed propter indomabilem & perseverantem nequitiam suæ iniquitatis*; Not one of them can be saved, not because of any violence of Divine power, but by reason of the untameable & persevering naughtines of their owne iniquity, &c. p. 144. *De Reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimavi, non quia non possunt homines de bono ad malum commutari, & de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in melius mutare noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus usq; ad finem perseverare voluerunt*; not only of the Reprobates doe we judge to be saved, not because they could not be changed from evill to good, & of evill & depraved become good & right, but because they would not be chaged into better, & would to the end persevere in wicked workes; So then they could be changed but would not: But in what respect is it said they could be changed? was it in respect of the freedome of their wills without grace? Nothing lesse; see his owne words, pag. 34. *Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero bene uti potest Arbitrio, esset Catholicus*: Had he said generally that no man can rightly use his free Will, without the grace of God, he had been a Catholicque. But all the question is about the manner how this grace doth worke (to wit) whether God gives men grace to believe and repent if they will, and leaves to them to performe the Act of faith and repentance; or whether God worketh the very Act of faith and repentance, not to dispute of this point out of God's word, which clearely teacheth, that, *God workes in us the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure*. Philip. 3. 13. And that he makes us perfect to every good worke; working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through *Jesus Christ*: Let us take notice of the discourse between *Hincmarus* and *Remigius* on this argument; that till the love of God comes, man is dead; his will is dead to that which is good; Now love is only given to the believers, *posse charitatem habere naturæ est hominum, charitatem autem habere gratiæ est fidelium*, *De prædestinatione sanctorum*, cap. 5. For thus writes *Hincmarus*, pag. 3. 113. *Bonum quod agimus & Dei est & nostrum, Dei per prævenientem gratiam, nostrum per subsequentem liberam voluntatem*, The good that we doe is both God's worke and ours; of God by Grace preventing ours by free Will following: To this *Remigius* answers, and first he saith, *Hincmarus* discourseth after such a manner, as if a good worke were partly God's worke and partly ours: And againe as if the beginning of a good worke were God's, but the effect thereof of man's free will; although as he (*Hincmarus*) doth endeavour to temper this speech of his, by the addition of grace, not by the fulnesse of it, *gratia adjunctione non etiam plenitudine*, by the adjunction of grace, not also by the fulnesse of it: So he should have done saith *Remigius*, *cum verè totum sit Dei*; seeing indeed the whole is God's worke; As the truth it selfe saith, without me ye can do nothing: And the Apostle; what hast thou that thou

that thou hast not received? whence the blessed and glorious Martyr *Cyprian* hath so defined it, saying, *we must glory in nothing, seeing nothing is ours: and concludes thus; Bonum itaq; nostrum totum Dei est, quia totum est ex Deo; & nihil boni nostri, nostrum est, quia nihil boni nostri est ex nobis: Therefore our good workes, are holy God's, and noe good of ours is ours, because it is not of us; and to reconcile this seeming contradiction, in calling it our good, yet denying it to be from us, he concludes thus, omne bonum nostrum, & totum Dei est, donando; & totum nostrum est, accipiendo: Every good thing of ours is wholly God's in as much as he gives it, and it becomes ours full and whole, for asmuch as we receive it.*

Fulgentius is plaine for it to, lib. 1. ad *Monium*, pag. 6. These whome God foresaw would dye in sinne, he decrees should live in endles punishment; I may take in *Saint Austine*, and *Prosper* also, who are judged to be the Patrons of the absolute Decree, as it is set downe in the Sublapsarian way; even they doe many times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairely be reconciled with absolute Reprobation. I will only cite *Prosper*; for *Saint Austine*, speaks in him; he discoursing of some that fall a way, à *Sanctitate ad immunditiam*, 6. from holinesse to uncleannesse; saith, they that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse; lye not under a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were knowne to be such by voluntary prævarication.

Not long after speaking of the same men; he saith, Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free will; therefore, he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition. And againe in his answer to the twelfth objection, he hath these words. *God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience. because he hath not predestinated him; but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience; therefore he hath not predestinated him.*

They are I confesse the wordes of *Fulgentius* in the 25: chapter of his first booke *ad Monium*, and in the very next chapter, he doth expresse himselfe in this manner on the point of predestination unto glory; *prædestinavit illos ad supplicium quos à se præcivit voluntatis mala vitio decessuros; & prædestinavit ad regnum quos ad se præcivit misericordie prævenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordie subsequenti auxilio mansuros: He predestineth those unto punishment, whom he foresaw to be such as would depart from him through the fault of a naughty will; and he predestinated to the kingdome those whom he foresaw to be such as would returne unto him by the help of mercy preventient, and would persevere in him by the helpe of grace subsequent; So that upon the same ground he may as well deny predestination unto salvation to be absolute in the opinion of *Fulgentius*, as predestination unto damnation: Now *Vossius* in his preface to the *Pelagian Historie*, having first confessed that all Antients agreed in this, That God did not ordaine any other unto eternall salvation, then such who by his mere gift of grace should have the beginning of faith and good will, and persevere in that which is good, as it was foreseen by him: In the next place acknowledgeth, that *Austine* and *Prosper* and the Authour of the booke *de vocatione Gentium*; and *Fulgentius*, unto this common opinion of *Catholiques* did adde this, *That this præscience Divine did flow from God's absolute Decree to save them.* This I say *Vossius* writes, though, I see no cause to regard his judgment in this Argument. His distinction is very well knowne of will absolute and will conditionall; which will conditionate he examplifies thus, as when God will have salvation conferred upon a man in case he doth believe; what one of our Divines doth deny a conditionall will, in this sence in reference to salvation? Now what one of the Antients (the Pelagians excepted) can this Authour produce; that doth affirme any such will to be in God, for the bestowing of faith upon a man? For to maintaine this, were in plaine termes to maintaine, that it was the will of God that grace should bestowed according unto workes: But if the grace of God be bestowed merely according to the good pleasure of God, as *Saint Paule* saith; *God hath mercy on whom he will?* By this it is aparent, that this decree is absolute, and consequently that predestination is absolute; And thus *Austine* coupleth together the doctrine of the bestowing grace not according unto workes; And his Doctrine of predestination as inseparable, each to be granted or denied together with the other. Because this Authour pretends it to be needles to cite *Austine*, and sufficient to cite *Prosper*, adding that *Austine* speaks in him, to wit, after he was Dead; such is this Authours juggling course with his Reader; therefore I will represent *Austine* himselfe proposing the objection made by the *Massilienses*, against *Austin's* doctrine of predestination, as it was sent unto him by *Prosper*, and then answering it, not leaving it unto *Prosper* to answer for him: See the objection, *sed aiunt (ut scribitis) neminem posse correptionis stimulis excitari, si dicatur in conventu Ecclesia audientibus multis, Ita se habet de prædestinatione definita sententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obediendi voluntate, veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta perseverantia maneat in fide &c.* But they say (as ye write) that none can be stirred up by the Goad of correption, if it be said in the Con-*

*M. Mason's
Additions p.*

Answer.

gregation in the hearing of many, such as touching predestination is the determinate sentence of the will of God, that some of you receiving an obedient will, shall come from infidelitie unto faith, or receiving perseverance shall continue in the faith: But the rest, who continue in sinfull delights, therefore you have not risen, because the succour of commiserant grace, hath not as yet raised you. But if there be any not yet called whom God hath predestinated to be elected by his grace, (or whom his grace hath predestinated to be elected) ye shall receive the same grace, whereby to will and be Elect. And as for those that doe obey, if you are not predestinated to be Elect, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne that you may cease to obey: Thus farre the objection, *Austine's* answer followeth thus; When these things are said, they ought not to deterre us from confessing God's grace (to wit) which is not given according unto Workes, and from confessing predestination according thereunto; like as we are not terrified from confessing God's foreknowledge, if a man should discourse thereof in this manner before the people; Whether now ye live well or not well, such shall ye be hereafter, as God foresees ye will be, either good, if he foresees ye will be good; or evil, if he foresees he will be evil: for what if upon the hearing hereof some give themselves to sloth, and from labour prone to lust goe after their concupiscences; shall we therefore conceive that to be false which was delivered concerning God's foreknowledge? And so he proceeds to justify the truth of this doctrine which was objected against him by way of Crimination, I say to justify it as touching the substance of it, though as touching the manner of proposing it, he confesseth that to be unreasonably harsh in some particulars; and shewes how that may be proposed in a more decent manner, still holding up the same truth. Thus *Austine* was able to answer for himselfe, whilst he was living; Now let us consider how *Prosper* answers for him after he was dead. And first let us consider the objection it selfe; now it is this, That they who are not predestinate unto life, although they live piously and righteously, it shall nothing profit them, but they shall be reserved so long untill they perish: Now this is plainly a part of the objection made by the *Massiliens* and they were *Galli*, * whom *Prosper* answereth, for the objection proposed to *Austine* was, that, strength of obedience should be taken from them; But in the objection of the *Galli*, whom *Prosper* answeres it is set dowe in a milder manner, thus, They shall be reserved untill they perish. Now *Austine* himselfe accomodates his answer hereunto in particular, *De bono Perseverantie*, cap. 22. 1 For shewing the unreasonable harshness in this manner of proposing it: I wonder (saith he) if any weak man in a Christian people can by any meanes heare with patience that which follows; as namely when it is said unto them, ye that doe obey, if ye be predestinated to be rejected, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne from you that you may cease to obey; For thus to speake what seemeth it to be other, then to curse or to prophesie evil after a sort; Then he proceeds to shew the same truth may be delivered in a fairer manner, still holding up the truth of the doctrine of predestination; If (saith he) a man thinke good to speake something of such as doe not persevere, and need be so to doe. What failes of the truth of this sentence if it be delivered thus? But if some doe obey, that are not predestinated unto the kingdome and to glories they are temporarie ones, and shall not persevere in the same obedience unto the end. Then he proceeds to shew how the same objection may be framed against God's prascience, thus; *Et si qui obeditis, si prasciri estis, rejiciendi obedire cessabitis*; If any of you doe obey, if with all ye are foreseen to be rejected ye shall cease to obey, whereby ye may observe, how *Austine* in framing the objection, leaves out the Phrase of withdrawing the strength of obedience, as containing a calumnious imputation, and such as *Austine* had nothing to doe with in the course of his opinion concerning predestination. Thus *Austine* hath plainly answered for himselfe, and needs noe other to answer for him, and his answer proceeds without all colour of prejudice to his owne doctrine, concerning the absoluteness of predestination. By this let the Reader judge of the ingenuitie of this Authour, who conceales all this from his Reader, bearing him in hand, that *Austine* speakes in *Prosper* making answer to his objection, whereas indeed there is a vast difference between *Prosper's* answer for *Austine*, and *Austine's* answer for himselfe: But like enough *Prosper* was willing to condescend to the *Galli*, * and to gratifie them with an answer, that in his judgment might be more acceptable and satisfactorie unto them; To the consideration whereof I now proceed, and therein to consider *Prosper*, not *Austine's* mind, concerning predestination, as which he hath sufficiently manifested in answer to the same objection, as I have shewed; Therefore (saith *Prosper*) They are not predestinated, because they were foreseen to be such hereafter by their voluntarie prevarication, what will follow herence? That foresight of sinnes was the cause why they were not predestinated unto life? I answer, first by denying this consequence, for it may as well follow that the Creatours love is the cause why sinnes are forgiven him, for

* And it is sometimes more harshly proposed by the *Massiliens* then by the *Galli*.

the Gospell saith of the woman, *Luk: the 7. Therefore many finnes are forgiven her, because she loved much*; such illations are not alwaies causall, but very often merely rationall. Secondly, let it be causall, and that foresight of sinne is the cause of non predestination unto life, and accordingly of predestination unto damnation, yet here I have a double answer. First it is the most generall opinion, that reprobation as it signifies a purpose to damne, and accordingly to exclude from heaven, presupposeth the prescience of sinne: *M. Perkins* expressly professeth as much, and other Divines at the Synod of Dort; yet this hinders not the absolutenesse of reprobation, which appeares in the purpose of God to deny grace, and that absolutely to some, like as he bestowes it upon others; I meane the grace of faith and regeneration; otherwise grace should be given according to workes: Now let any passage be produced out of *Prosper*, or any other Orthodox writer among't the Antients to shew, that God in distributing these graces unto some, and denying them unto others, did not proceed absolutely, but according unto workes; and according to this doctrine, it is well knowne that *Austine* shaped his doctrine concerning predestination, as it hath been shewed at large in the answer to *M. Hord*, in the first section; secondly that there may be a cause of predestination and reprobation, *Aquinas* doth not deny, but how? *quoad res voluntas, as touching things willed, or, predestinatione & reprobatione preparatas, by predestination and reprobation prepared, and in this sense Aquinas* himselfe confesseth that, foresight of sinne is the cause of reprobation, the ninth to the Romans; & see how he explicates himselfe, his wordes are these, *Leet: 3. præscientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte pœna quæ preparatur Reprobatis: in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puni- turum malos propter peccata quæ à se ipsis habent, non à Deo.* The foresight of finnes may be some reason of reprobation as touching the punishment, which is prepared for Reprobates, in as much as God decreeth to punish wicked men for their finnes, which they have of themselves, not of God: But of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating, there can be noe more cause thereof, then there can be a cause of God's will as touching the act of God willing. And upon this very ground it is, that *Aquinas* professeth that * never any man was so mad as to affirme that there may be a cause given of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; Let us therefore forbear to impute any such opinion to *Prosper* or any other of the Antients; which none ever was so mad as to maintaine in the judgment of *Aquinas*. The same answer will serve for the next, derived out of the same place in *Prosper*: As for the third of withdrawing strength of obedience; This indeed was objected unto *Austine*, as if in his opinion God did so; whereas I have shewed also how *Austine* signifies that he had nothing to doe with that; and therefore he leaves that quite out. And indeed *Austine's* is cleare and expresse, that as many as God hath not predestinated, those he never bring's unto wholsome and spirituall repentance, whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ. *Contr: Julian: Pelag: lib. 5. cap. 4.* And consequently he never brings them to any true obedience: The whole sentence in *Prosper* hath no more moment then the former, and therefore admits the same answer.

p. q. 23. art: 3. in Corp.

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some person of note, and those Saint *Austine's* followers too, who lived about 400 yeares after Saint *Austine's* time. *Remigius* the great Patron of *Gottschalke* the zealous preacher and publisher of absolute reprobation in those times, in his answer to that epistle, which we suppose to be the Epistle of *Rabanus*; saying, that God did make the nations of the world, and that he doth will that all men should be saved; he gives such an answer as cannot stand with absolute reprobation; This, saith he, is very true, because God layeth on noe man a necessity of perishing, as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning; And a little after he is plainer; *Those whom God did fore know would live and dye in their wickednesses for reasons most just, should perish, as himselfe saith, Him that sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my Booke.* In the Valantine Synod assembled in the favour of *Gottschalke*, we may find these words; *Therefore doe the wicked perish, not because they could not, but would not be good, and by their owne fault original or actual, also, remained in the Masse of perdition*; And in the end of their 3. Canon: they pronounced Anathema to those, that hold that men are so predestinated unto evill as they cannot be otherwise. *That any should be (saith the Councell) predestinated unto evill by the power of God; so as he cannot be otherwise, we doe not only not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evill, with all detestation we denounce them accursed, as the Councell also did.*

M. Mason's Additions p. 6. 7.

This Authour grants *Remigius* to be a Patron of absolute reprobation: But these words of his, this Authour saith, cannot stand with absolute Reprobation: *Remigius* undoubtedly thought they could; otherwise he must have renounced the Doctrine of absolute reprobation and the Patronage thereof, which yet he did not; as this Authour acknowledgeth: Now is it enough for this Authour, to say that these words cannot stand with absolute Reprobation and barely to say it, without proving ought; and truly I have found such to be the imperious carriage of this Authour in manuscript, now I see it in print; But let us endeavour to cleare *Remigius*, by proving the Contrary.

indeavour to cleare *Remigius*, by proving the contrary. Therefore it is well knowne that the Terme *absolute* stand in opposition to *Conditionall*. Now this distinction of will absolute and will *Conditionall* *Gerardus Vossius* doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God, and gives instance of God's will of saving, which he saith is conditionall: forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any, but such as believe, faith being by God's ordinance the Condition of obtaining Salvation. In like sort Doctor *Jackson* in his book of *Providence* acknowledgeth the distinction of *voluntas antecedens*, and *consequens* is to be understood not on the part of God willing, but on the part of things willed: Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation, are two, contrary to things willed in Election: For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace, and the conferring of salvation; soe in Reprobation God doth will the deniall of grace and inflicting of damnation: Now *Remigius* in the passages here produced, speakes altogether of God's will to inflict damnation, and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on any man absolutely, but only conditionally (to wit) in case of finall perseverance in sinne, and so say we with *Remigius*: But as touching God's will to deny grace, we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition, for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof, but sinne either originall or actuall. And if upon such a condition, grace should be denied, it should be denied to all, seeing before grace is given, all are found to be under sinne actuall or originall, and consequently all should be Reprobates, even every mothers sonne. 2. And if to avoid this, it be said: although all be sinners, yet grace is denied to none, but such as want a certaine particular obedience; Then upon the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred; this is as much as to say that *Grace is conferred according unto workes*; which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians. Now the Apostle clearly makes for us in this, professing that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*. Now though these passages produced out of *Remigius* carrie some shew against absolute reprobation from glorie, or unto damnation; yet have they noe colour or shew of opposing absolute reprobation from grace; As for necessitie of perishing, that is merely conditionall (to wit) in case of finall continuance in sinne without repentance; And as for necessitie of sinning, that we confesse is found in all, in state of nature, *Corvinus* confesseth it to be the doctrine of *Arminius* that, *all men naturally are cast upon a necessitie of sinning*.

In answer
to charity
mistaken.

And Doctor *Potter* proposeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that, in a naturall man there is no *libertas à peccato*, *libertie from sinning*; which yet is to be understood aright, not but that it is in his power to abstaine from any particular sinfull act; for no supernaturall act is or can be sinfull, every sinfull act must needs be an act naturall; and power either to doe or to abstaine from any naturall Act, is not to be denied to any naturall man. But it is impossible that any naturall man should abstaine from any sinne, or doe any naturall good act (so commonly accounted) in a gracious manner, untill grace comes, so to season the heart of man as to love God, even to the contempt of himselfe, and out of his love to doe that good which he doth, and to abstaine from that evill, from which he abstaineth. 2. But if the question be of the manner how this necessitie of sinning is brought upon the nature of man; we say, it is not by the pleasure of God: But by the sinne of *Adam*, according to that of the Apostle, *Rom: 5. By one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne*: for man by reason of sinne was justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and begetting children in this Condition, he begets them after his owne image and likeness, that is bereaved of the Spirit of God: And we hold it impossible for a man bereaved of God's Spirit, either to doe that which is good, or abstaine from doing that which is evill in a gracious manner.

2. Secondly, I come to the Synod of Valense, when they say, *the wicked not perish because they could not doe good, but because they would not*. These words may seeme to imply that even the wicked could doe good if they would; and truely I see noe cause to deny this: But that we may safely say with *Austine*; that, *omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina precepta servanda se convertere, si velint*: Believe God if they will, and from the love of all things temporall convert themselves to the keeping of God's Commandements if they will; for if a man would goe to Church but cannot, because he is lame, would read in God's word, but cannot, because he is blind: These impotencies are naturall, not morall: but the impotency brought upon mankind by the sinne of *Adam* is morall not naturall. Now morall impotency is found noe where but in the will, or at least is chiefly there, and secondly in the understanding also, as touching knowledge practical; and accordingly when Scriptures testifie that they who are in the flesh cannot please

please God, *Rom.* 8: cannot repent, *Rom.* 24: cannot believe *Joh.* 12. This impotency consist's chiefly in the corruption of their wills, noted by the hardness of heart, *Rom.* 2. 4. *Eph.* 4. 18. Again I have already shewed out of *Remigius*, that a wicked man can doe that which is good, but by what meanes? (to wit) by grace, not otherwise. The words are these; *Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero bene uti potest arbitrio esset Catholicus*; had he said generally, not any man can use his free will without grace, he were Catholic. And pag. 36: the same *Remigius* hath these words, *In infidelibus ipsum liberum arbitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest*; free will so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead workes, in living workes it cannot: Yet pag. 174: thus he distinguisheth, answerably to the passage alleag'd by this Authour. *De reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimamus, non quia non possunt homines de malo ad bonum commutari, ac de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in melius mutari noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus usque ad finem perseverare voluerunt.* And pag. 143. *Florus* of the Church of Lyons where *Remigius* was Byshop, sets downe the same truth more at large, thus, *Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo voluntate propria inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium, quo potest assurgere ad bonum, ut autem assurgat ad bonum non est propria virtutis, sed gratia Dei miserantis*; Nam & qui mortuus est, potest dici posse vivere, non tamen sua virtute, sed Dei, Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatus, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen sua virtute sed gratia miserantis Dei, & ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum predicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum: ut verbo extrinsecus admonente & intus Deo suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant. Man hath after that damnation (to wit) such as followed after *Adam's* fall) free will, so that of his owne will he can be inclined and is inclined to evill, he hath free will whereby he may rise unto a good condition: but that he doth arise to that good condition, is not in his owne power; but of the grace of God compassionating him; for of him also who is dead, it may be said that he may live, yet not by his owne power but by the power of God. Soe man's free will also being once wounded, once dead may be restored, not by his owne power, but by God's grace pitying him, and therefore all men are admonished, to all the word is preached, because they have this that they may believe, they may be converted unto God, that by the word outwardly admonishing & God inwardly raising, they which beate may revive. As touching the last, condemning those who say that any should be so predestinated to evill by God, that they cannot be otherwise, this Authour would faine insinuate into his Reader an opinion; That wicked men may change from evill to good of themselves; But neither doth the Councill of Valens, or *Remigius* a chiefe man therein, intimate any such thing; But only that it is in God's power by his grace to change them, and so hath changed and will change the hearts of many, namely of all his Elect, but not of one other.

That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of, among the common people, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of, amongst the Judicious and Learned, who as the threshing Oxen who are to beate the corne out of the Huske, are to bolt out those truthe which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures. That the doctrine which is loath to abide the trial even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of fallhood, the heathen Oratour shall witnesse for me; who to *Epicurus* seeing that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people; who might happily take offence at that, answereth thus. Declare thy opinion in the place of Judgment, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare that in the Senate amongst those grave and judicious Persons. Thou wilt never doe it, and why? but because it is a fowle and dishonest opinion. True religion (as *Vives* saith) is not a thing guiled over but gold it selfe: the more it is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and so is the truth. *Vives de Verbo fidei, lib. 1. pag. 16.* Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can; let us not feare therefore (saith he) lest our faith when it is laid open appeare filthy to the beholders. *Id ibi* Let false and superstitious religions in which there is noe soundnesse be afraid of this.

The Jew is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law: And the Turke is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their religions are brittle like glasse broken with the least touch, *Vives lib. 4. pag. 479.* But the Christian who is confident of the goodnesse of his faith feareth noe examination; but rather as much as may be, solliciteth and provoketh his adversarie to the Cumbate. Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best when it is uncovered.

Of the five considerations proposed in this discourse, as it was first penned and transmitted to a friend, the fifth is changed and in the place thereof this incerted, and it concerns the third instance given of the Synodical Divines in the Synod of Dort. Now it is already shewed in the answer to the former discourse how immodestly the Authour carrieth himselfe, in charging that Synod with unwillingnesse to come to the triall, who justified their proceedings in the judgment of all the forraigne Divines there present, for whereas the Remonstrants did once and againe professe that they could not in conscience

*M. Mason's
Additions p.
8. 9. 5.*

Answer.

The Contrary Remonstrants falsely charged

any longer stay in the Synod, vnlesse it were provided for, that they might treat of Election and reprobation. And that after that manner which they had set downe in their Theses and writings exhibited to the Synod; hereupon the Synod to give them satisfaction herein ordered, that their opinion not only concerning Election, but also concerning reprobation should be weighed and examined: soe far forth as they in conscience should judge to be sufficient, for the glory of God, for the edifying and quieting of the Church and all mens consciences; but as touching the manner of proceeding herein, it perteyned to them to consider and ordeine as they thought good. And it became not those who were cited to appear, to prescribe unto the Synod. This decree being read the 40 session conteynes the altercation hereabouts, betweene the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod, *de modo agendi*; The Synod must not unto them.

The Synod hereupon intreats the judgment of forrain divines. And they all with one consent professe that the Synod had granted the *Remonstrants* as much libertie for the defence of their cause, as in Equitie could be granted and could well stand with the honour of the Synod. And therefore there is no cause why the decree of the Synod should be altered, or why the *Remonstrants* should complaine or decline the Authority of the Synod; that nothing was put upon them burthen some to their consciences: And therefore it was in vaine to pretend scruples of Conscience, as in the Session 42 there is a representation made of their unreasonable demaund; namely in the first place to deale upon reprobation &c: whereupon the opinion of forrain divines was required; as whether it was fit to yeild unto them in this, and to treat of reprobation before they treated of Election, who declared by concurring suffrages that course (proposed by them) to be most unreasonable: now let the reader judge how unshamefast that crimination is, which this Author chargeth that Synod with, and consequently all the the forreine divines therein assembled, who justified those Synodical proceedings with their unanimous consent. Surely this Author hath an high opinion of himselfe, and his owne sufficiencies, who thinks this Bolt of his soone shot, more worth then the concurrent verdict of all those divines, Chosen as eminent persons by their severall Churches, and sent unto that Sinod from many places of Christendome. Now hee who in the progresse of his unshamefast discourse, spares not thus to Taxe a Synod and all the forrain Divines that assembled therein, no mervell if he forbears not to charge the *Contra Remonstrants* in the Hague conference with the same Crimination, though never so injuriously; Thus indeede the *Remonstrants* in the Synod of Dort, Criminate their adversaries as appeares in the *Synodalia Dodcaca* pag: 136. In the conference at Hague the *Contra-Remonstrants* deprecated that they might not be put to deale on Reprobation, and more at large pag: 159. in the same writings; We reade how *Festus Hommius* one of the *Contra-Remonstrants* in that conference at the Hague, hereupon stood up, *Exposu- itque paucis quod non bona fide hac de illis dicerentur*, how unfaithfully this relation was made, *se libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos ne de reprobatione ageretur*; That they did not in their supplication intreat that no disputation should be had of reprobation, and therewithall the truth of the matter as formerly I have set downe in answer to the former discourse, and as for Beza in the conference with *Jacobus Andreas* in the point of predestination: It is true at the first motion he declined it, and he gives his reasons, 1. namely that they were not called by the prince of Mompelgard to dispute on this Article but on another which was expressed in the princes letters, as *Jacobus Andreas* acknowledgeth: 2 and accordingly they had Commission from their Church that sent them, to dispute on that whereunto they were called and not on any other. 3. and soe they came provided to dispute on that which was expressed in the Princes letters who invited them. 4. Then againe it was in a *Lutheran* assembly. 5. neither would *Andreas* yeild to *Beza's* motions that the conference might be transacted by writing. 6. nor that which was to be delivered by them should be taken by notaries. 7. Yet they offered to propose their doctrine on that Argument before the Prince, and to heare what *Jacobus Andreas* had to say against it and promised to returne him an answer thereunto; Thirdly, consider it was not predestination alone, whereof they were unwilling at that time and in that place to conferre about, But two other Articles also, namely as concerning Baptisme, and Images in Churches; why then, doth not this Author plead as well for Images in Churches, as for the conditionall nature of reprobation: as well he may upon the same ground? Fourthly, what

foottishnesse possesseth this Authour to conclude, that because *Beza* at such a time, and in such a place, and upon such and such tearmes, did refuse to dispute thereon; Therefore all that professe the same doctrine with *Beza* doe refuse to come to triall thereabouts, and consequently that doctrine is suspectable of untruth; whereas it cannot be concluded of *Beza* simply that he refused to come to a triall, because once at a certaine time and in a certaine place, and in a conference upon certaine termes he did refuse to come to a tryall: For my part, I refuse not to come to a triall with any of them upon any particular: But I noe way thinke fit to entertaine a conference here about by wordes of mouth, but rather by writing; so it will be more quietly carried, so it will be more free from aliene discourse; so each party shall have time both duely to weigh the Adversaries Argument and with due consideration to put in his answer thereunto; And is it not farre more decent that the holy things of God should be handled premeditately, rather then subitanously? Fiftly, what if *Beza* were of opinion that God hath chosen some unto eternall life, and passed by others without any respect had to the personall goodnesse of the one, or naughtinesse of the other, and that this is Saint *Paule's* doctrine, *Rom. 9.* This was Saint *Austin's* opinion also as *Vossius* acknowledgeth in his historie of *Pelagian hereses. p. 655.* Now will any man thinke him well in his wits who discourseth after this manner; surely *Austin's* doctrine concerning election and reprobation is suspectable of untruth; Because *Beza* maintaining the same doctrine some 1200 yeares after, was unwilling to come to a tryall thereabouts at a certaine time in a certaine place, namely at *Mompelyard* before the Duke of *Wirtemberg*? Lastly, observe the strange inconsiderations of this Authour, for the Authour of the former discourse promised the Gentleman his friend to whom he wrote, to give him the reason of his change in opinion, not in this point only of reprobation, but in the other points also, for he perceived he was become an *Arminian*: Now whereas he gives him the reason of his change in one point only, declining all the rest, doth he not manifest his unwillingnesse to deale on all the other 4 points? And may not wee conclude after this Authours manner, that this betrayes no small suspicion, that certainly his cause is weak, and ill grounded in all the rest? In like manner doth this *Achates* carry himselfe, he that helps of the other to make his taske for him. It is his usuall course to deale only upon the point of reprobation, as in this place, so in a writing of his to a certaine Scholer, and as I have seen under his hand; It seemes he is well conceited of his sufficiencie on this point: And truely I am very glad to see what he can say for himselfe, even on the point of reprobation. That which followes is to little purpose, save to shew the *plerophorie* of his common place-book: and how easily it is for him to abound, not only in things necessary, but in things unnecessary also: Therefore he tells us what *Cicero* writes of *Epicurus*, which may with a farre better grace be retorted upon himselfe then upon *Beza*, or the *Contra-Remonstrants* at the Hague conference, or the Fathers of *Dort*, how unfacetiously it is applyed unto them I have already shewed, and further it is well knowne both by *Calvins*, and *Beza's* writings, and by that which was done in the *Synod of Dort*, set forth to the veiwe of all the world, that they have not concealed their opinions from the world on those points controverted; All that are able to read and understand Latine, may soone come acquainted with them: And *M. Hord* dealing only upon reprobation which is but a part of one of the five Articles, and forbearing to meddle with Election or any other of the five, contrary to the promise made by him unto his friend, doth he not hereby bewray consciounesse of his owne insufficiencie to meddle thereon? And like enough he hath learned this wisdom from his Abettor (and this is his course) who loves to deale in hugger mugger, and sets others on worke, contented to blowe the coales; yet walkes gloriously at the light of his owne fire, and the sparkes that he hath kindled, vaunting (as I heare) that his peece cannot be answered, and in such termes he commends it unto the Country.

In like manner let the indifferent Reader judge, whether, that which he produceth out of *Lodovicus Vives* be more against us, then against the Authour himselfe that produceth it, for both *Calvin*, and *Beza* and generally our Divines have publicquely professed their opinions, not on predestination only, but on reprobation also, and upon all other points controverted between us and the *Arminians*; whereas this Authour sculkes and pulls in his hornes as if he dared not to be seen on other points; only declares himselfe upon the point of reprobation; I meane *M. Hord*; but as for the other which blowes quick-silver into him, he is loath to be knowne, as if his occupation were with *Brontesq.* *Steropesq.* & *nudus membra Pyraemon*, to take paines to make thunder-bolts for *Jupiter*, or for *Mercury* rather; for he is content an other should be the chiefe speaker. sly. The Jew he saith, is loath

loath to reason with the Christian touching his law, and the Turke is forbidden to speak of his *Alcoran*; But have I shewed my selfe loath to reason with this *Brontes*, in any particular difference between us, or with any amongst them that weares a head upon his shoulders? I trust, I never shall, as long as I breath. As for this Authour, the world is witness how deeply guilty he is in this kind, contrary to his owne promise: But he may thanke his prompter that he deales in this, and he indeed had made noe such promise to confine him, but out of his fox-like carriage, makes choise to deale only on this, where he hopes to meet with a favourable winde from vulgar and popular conceits, to fill his sailes to carry him prosperously into their affections, be his *Arguments* never so weak: never so insipid. Now it is well knowne unto him, that my answer to the former discourse hath now been in the hands of others for the space of two yeares and a halfe, and not the smallest passage thereof doe I find answered here. And this seconds conscience knoweth whether he hath not been full well acquainted with it, before this peece of his did see the light of the presse: Now because this alone might justly prove notoriously prejudiciall to the whole, see what a dog-trick hath been played, to antedate the edition thereof, as if it were printed *Anno 1633*, when it hath been but a few monthes since this hath been knowne unto the world, that the Reader may imagine if it please him, that this was printed before my answer was returned to the former discourse. And to what purpose is the discourse brought to the *Bulke*, which that hath at present, so many odde things being inserted thereunto; but to provide for their indemnity that shall say, *This was never it answered*, whereat I wouder not a little, namely at the cunning and crafty carriage of this second, who for good reason may be accompted the first, in as much as he useth the other but as a stalking-horse to promote his owne game, I say I may, and doe wouder not a little at this, for he both carrieth himselfe and others boast of him, as if he were some formidable Creature, and Lyon like to affright all others that should deale with him, when in very truth all his performances savour farre more of the Fox then of the Lyon.

M. Mason's And it is also distastfull to all the *Greek Churches*; *Moulin* in his *Anatomy* speaking of the *Supralapsarian* doctrine; saith, if it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sinne, or hath ordained them to sinne. Yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them rather then to utter them: because, when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with sceptles, and give occasion to the adversaries to the defaming the true religion.

pag. 10.

The same may as truly be said of the *Sublapsarian* way, for as I have said, they are in substance all ones; And *Sir Edwin Sandes* is of the same mind too; for in his most excellent booke caled *A survey of the State of Religion*, in the westerne part of the world; speaking of the deadly division between the *Lutherans* and the *Calvinists* in *Germany*, he hath these wordes; *that, though the Palgrave and Lansgrave have with great judgment and wisdom, to slake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the Charitie and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwise; for both the Lutheran Preachers raille as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as greave detestation, not forbearing to professe openly, that they will returne to the Papacie rather then ever admit that Sacramentary and predestinary Pestilence.* And as for the *Grecians*, we learne also by *Sir Edwin Sandes* his relation, that they doe mightilie dissent from the doctrines touching the eternall Counsell of God, which *Calvin* (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and some of his friends and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodnesse of God, and directly immediately opposite to his very nature, In regard of which, on of their Bishops hath written a booke against it, which hath been sent to *Geneva* and there received.

pag. 11.

pag. 12.

And to say on thing more, besides this infamy among Christians, it is very probable that among the too many scandals given to the *Jewes* by Christians among whom they dwell; This doctrine is not on of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they thinke it a bad opinion (saith the same judicious and learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures, for the shewing of his justice and severitie in tormenting them, or that the calamitie, casting a way and damnation of some, should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glorie then the felicitie of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath noe affinity with rigour and misery.

pag. 13.

And secondly the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that preceeds the end, as if a man before determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sinne else he could not be damned.

Answer.

As touching this paticular of *M. Moulyn*: I have addressed an answer puctually thereunto in my *Vindicie* amongst my degressions touching predestination, yet I am content to say something concerning the point it selfe and his judgment thereupon. Reprobation hath two parts, which this Authour most judiciously confounds, the one is God's decree to deny grace, the other is his decree to inflict damnation; As touching the first, the very execution thereof proceeds merely according to God's pleasure, how much more the decree it selfe, which is eternall, and cannot possibly have any precedaneous thereunto; whereas the execution is temporall, and temporall things may have somewhat precedaneous

precedaneous thereunto. Now that the execution thereof is merely according to God's good pleasure is apparent; the execution thereof being no other then the denyall of grace; And as God of his mere pleasure gives faith and repentance to whom he will; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others; otherwise grace should be conferred according unto workes, which was condemned in the Synod of *Palestine*, *Pelagius* himselfe subscribing thereunto above 1200 yeares agoe, and all along afterwards it was condemned in divers Synods gathered together for suppressing of the *Pelagian Heresie*. Now did M. *Moulin* think it noe wise part to publish this doctrine, That grace is not given according unto workes; but according to the mere pleasure of God? Nothing lesse; Saint *Paul* plainly professing that *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth*. Come we to reprobation as it signifies God's decree to inflict damnation without consideration of sinne, our adversaries would faine shape our opinions thus, and none more eager this way, then this Authour, I meane him that is thought to be the suggester at first, and since the *Interpolator* and *Promotor* of all this; But this is a most notorious untruth; nay how can we maintaine this, who imbrace the definition of reprobation given by *Aquinas*, where he saith, that *reprobation includes a will to permit sinne, and to inferre damnation for sinne*, so doth M. *Perkins*, and him have I justified against *Arminius* in my *Vindicia*; And not any one of our Divines doth maintaine that God intends to damne any man but for sinne, and finall perseverance therein without repentance. And the former point concerning the first act of reprobation, being granted, which neither Sir *Edwin Sandes*, nor any *Lutheran* that I know, denies; the doctrine concerning this latter act of reprobation will be found to containe noe difficultie at all, forasmuch as we utterly deny that God either doth inflict, or ever did decree to inflict damnation according to his mere pleasure; but merely for finall continuance in sinne without repentance. Now let every sober Reader consider, whether there be any harshnesse in all this: But as M. *Moulin* discourseth here, so did the *Massilienses* of old concerning *Austine's* doctrine, as which they would not have at all broached, as appeares in the Epistle of *Prosper*.—Yet I commend this Authour for his ingenuous confession, that the same may be said of the *Sublapsarian* way. But to our prejudice he tells us that Sir *Edw. Sandes* is of the same mind, and therefore considering the excellencie of the booke, written by him, whereunto we may adde the excellencie of the discourse written by this Authour; let us for the credit and transcendent sufficiencie of these two, renounce not *Calvin* and *Beza* only, (poore Snakes as they were) but the whole *Synod of Dort*; and all the outlandish divines assembled there, and manifesting their concurrence in opinion with those *Synodical Divines*, yea and *Fulke* and *Whitaker*, and the *Universitie of Cambridge* as they were then affected, when they drave *Barret* to a recantation; Yet Sir *Edwin Sandes* in the place produced, betraies not his owne judgment, but makes relation of the bitternesse of *Lutherans* in opposing *Calvinists*: In like manner both *Jewes* and *Gentiles* did oppose *Christians* even unto blood, for preaching *Christ* crucified, which was a scandall to the one, foolishnesse unto the other. And shall the truth of *Christianitie* be any whit the worse thought of for this? why then shall our Doctrine of predestination and reprobation be suspected as untrue, because the *Lutheran* partie, doe also bitterly oppose it? especially considering, that we with *Austine* no otherwise maintaine predestination then as it depends and is grounded upon this, that grace is not given according unto workes, as *Austine* professeth to have been his opinion, *de bono perseverantia*, cap. 14. And we are ready to renounce whatsoever contradicteth this: and the *Lutherans* themselves professe concurrently with us, that grace is not given according unto workes. And by the way observe the *Lutheran* spleen is exercised not only against the predestinary pestilence, (as they call it) but the Sacramentarie pestilence also. That is, against their doctrine who oppose their ubiquitie and consubstantiation, yet in the very next page the same Knight affirms, that all the *Lutherans* are not carried with the same sterne humour, but they only who are called *Lutherani rigidi*, & that the greater part perhaps which are the *molles Lutherani*, are quiet enough, neither accompt they otherwise of the *Calvinists*, then as of erring brethren; whom the *rigids* have (as is said) threatened to excommunicate as *Schismaticques* and *Heretiques*.—3 The *Grecians* are said to oppose the doctrine of *Calvin* in the point of predestination; yet we know our English Divines subscribed unto the same Doctrine in the *Synod of Dort*; together with all the forraigne Divines there assembled, and the summe therof is but this, that God, both in the election of some, and preterition of others, had noe respect to the personall goodnesse of the one, and personall naughtinesse of the other. And that this was the very doctrine of *Austine*, and of Saint *Paul* also in the opinion of *Austine*, *Vossius* acknowledeth, and *Austine* professeth

fesseth that this doctrine herein is shaped merely according to the rule so generally received in the Church of God against *Pelagians*, that *grace is not given according unto merits, de bono per se*: cap. 15.—4. Concerning the *Jewes*, this doctrine of ours, this judicious (not *Sir Edwin Sandes*) thinks it probable that doth hinder their conversation: And indeed that learned Knight doth professe, that they are opposite to the doctrine here recited by this Authour, and in the same sentence he professeth them in like manner opposite to our doctrine, in maintaining that the divell and his Angells shall be cast into everlasting fire; for thus goes *Sir Edwin's* relation, *as they thinke it a bad opinion which some men seeme to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute power should affect the extreame misery of any of his Creatures as here it lyes, so contrariewise, they think with Origen, that Hell in the ende shall utterly be abolished; and that the divells themselves after a long course of bitter repentance, and punishment shall find mercy at his handes, that did create them*: But as touching our difference from this in this particular; This Authour doth not expresse ought so much as probable, to hinder their conversion; as touching the former he hath; for that served his turne, this doth not, and his wit and wisdom being so nere of kinne, noe mervaille if he makes the one to performe service of love to the other: But let me say something concerning the opinion it selfe here related, as in the first place; That God doth not effect the extreame misery of his creatures in his absolute pleasure, what is the doctrine opposite hereunto but this, namely that God decrees to damne no man but for sinne, and not according to his absolute pleasure? Now what one of our Divines was ever knowne to contradict this; and to affirme that God intends to damne many of his creatures not for their sinnes, but of his owne absolute pleasure? for my part I never read any that maintained this: But we generally say that God in electing some and passing by others, as touching the conferring of grace, proceeded and decreed, and that from everlasting to proceed, not according to mens workes, but according to his absolute pleasure; now this was *Austin's* judgment as well as ours; and *Saint Paul's* too, in the opinion of *Austine*, as *Vossius* acknowledgeth in the place formerly cited: And *Saint Paul* speaks plainly, when he saith, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, and as plainly in saying, *That, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evil, that election might stand not of workes but of him that calleth, it is said that the elder shall serve the younger, As it is written Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, Rom: 9. 11, 12.* And I durst appeale to every sober man's conscience whether one of these *Jewes* in reading this would not as readily condemne *Saint Paul* himselfe, as they condemne us: As for the other part of the doctrine here proposed, namely that the damnation of some should redound more to God's glory, then the felicity of them all. I answer that it is as cleare as the light, that the glory of God in the way of vindicative justice had not at all appeared, if all had been saved, no nor the riches of his glory upon the Vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, if God had not suffered with long patience some vessells of wrath prepared to destruction, if we believe *Saint Paul Rom: 9. 22, 23*: rather then the *Jewes*; and it is apparent that the Lord God, who made all things for himselfe, tooke this course, namely, *to make even the wicked against the day of evil*, and accordingly as *to shew mercy on whom he will, so to harden whom he will*, also *Rom: 9. 18*: otherwise as I have often said, grace should be conferred according to merits, that is according unto workes, which is expressly contradictory both to the word of God. *2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit. 3. 5.* And to the decrees of Synods and Councils, all along against the *Pelagians*. — 5. I willingly grant that the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes, that not only preceed but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sinne is the meanes of dānation, we say rather that permission of sinne is the meanes, whence notwithstanding it followes, not that sin shall come to passe unavoidably, but rather avoidably; whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinfull act is a naturall thing, and undoubtedly man hath free will as to doe, so to abstaine from doing any particular Act: and albeit God hath determined that these particular sinfull Acts (instance the particular outrages committed against the holy Sonne of God by *Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, Acts 5. 28.*) shall come to passe by his permission; yet seeing withall he hath ordained thē to come to passe contingently, that followes that they shall come to passe in such a manner, as joyned with a possibility of not cōing to passe, otherwise they should come to passe, not contingently, but necessarily. But it is growne to be this Authours naturall genius miserably to overreach; while he keeps himselfe to his own formes in shaping the opinion of his adversaries, impatient to be beaten out of them, and to have his *veteres avias à pulmone repelli, old grandmothers vain conceits to be pulled out of him*.

Prov. 16.4.

Lastly this Authour shapeth us to make damnation an end intended by God, which we cōceive to be a very shallow project; we know nothing but Gods owne glory that can be this end: And therefore even there where *Solomon* professeth that *God made the wicked against the day of Evil*: herewithall acknowledgeth that *God made all thinges for himselfe*. *Pro: 16. 4.*

At length we have gotten cleare aboard to come acquainted with this Authours full discourse, and not by patches, as hitherto we have done. For here he promiseth to acquaint us with the reasons that have convinced him of the untruth of absolute Reprobation as it is carried the upper way and like a Martialist, a man at armes, he tells us they fight against it, and thus the interpolator discourseth.

The first part of the first Argument against the supralapsarians. *sett: 1.*

They are drawn *ab incommodo* from the greater evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: *M. Mason's Additions. p. 14. 15. 16.* which may be referred to two maine heads. 1 The dishonour of God. 2 The overthrow of religion and government.

It dishonoureth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, (no wayes agreeable to his nature.)

1. Mens Eternall torment in Hell. 2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First It chargeth him with Mens eternall torment in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principall, and invincible cause of the damnation of Millions of miserable soules: The prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction of his owne voluntary disposition, antecedent to all defects in them; and the Principall and invincible cause, because it maketh the Damnation of Reprobates to be necessary, and unavoydable thorough Gods absolute and uncontrollable decree; and soe necessary that they can no more escape it, then poore *Ahtyanax* could avoyd the breaking of his necke, whenthe *Gracians* tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.

Now this is an heavy charge, contrary to scripture, Gods nature, and sound Reason. 1 To Scripture, which makes man the Principall, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine. *Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel, but in me is thine help. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked. Turne yee, turne yee, why will yee dye. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* To which speech for likenesse sake I will joine one of *Prospers*. Gods predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling. 2 It is contrary to Gods nature, who sets forth himselfe to be a God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodnesse &c. And he is acknowledged to be soe by *King David*. *Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great Kindnesse to all them that call upon thee: And by the Prophets Joel, Jonah, and Michah. He is gracious and mercifull, slow to anger, and of great Kindnesse. And who saith Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity &c. He retaineth not his wrath for ever because mercy pleaseth him.*

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extreame cruelty, and consequently remove it from the father of mercyes. We cannot in reason thinke that any man in the world can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himselfe to marry and beget Children; that after they be borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare thir flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones, with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by thus torturing them he may shew what his Authority and power is over them. Much lesse can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so farre forget himselfe as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such infinite multitudes of his Children, made after his owne image, to everlasting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter; to shew his power and soveraignty over them. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked, temporally, be such a peece of injustice, that *Abraham* removeth it from God with an *Abst*, wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be farre from thee O Lord. shall not the judge of all the world doe right? How deeply (may we thinke) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire.

Here this Authour carrieth himselfe like another *Ptolomæus Ceraunus*; or as if he had some cheife place in the lightning legion, not by his prayers, but by his discourse, he seemes to thunder and to lighten all along. When the Lord appeared to *Elias*, he was neither in the mighty wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in the still and soft voyce. I hope to prove all this to be but *Ignis fatuus*; Mountebancks use to make great ostentation and crackes, but commonly they end in meere impostures, and it is nothing strange, when men opposing the grace of God, loose their owne witts, and please themselves in the confusion of their owne senses. For when men are in love with their owne errours, they hate the light; yea the very light of nature in the distinct notice of it, would be an offence unto them. Can this Authour be ignorant of that which every meane *Sophister* knowes, that there be foure kinds of causes, Materiall, Formall, Efficient, Finall; that he should expatiate thus in speaking of a cause without all distinction? Is it strange that God should be a prime cause, and principall in execution of vengeance? Doth he not professe saying *vengeance is mine, and I will repay*? Is he not called the God to whom vengeance belongeth? And are not his magistrates his Ministers to execute vengeance temporall here in this world? And can any sober man doubt whether God be invincible whom the Apostle pronounceth to be irresistible? Again an efficient

M. Mason's Additions. p. 14. 15. 16.

Hof: 13. 9. Ezech: 33. 11. Lamet: 3. 33. Resp: ad 12. Object: Vincent: Exod: 34. 6.

Psi: 86. 5. Joel: 2. 13. Jon: 4. 2. Micah. 7. 18.

Gen: 18. 25. Answer.

Deut. 32. 35. P/: 94. 1. Rom: 13. 4. Rom: 9. 19

Jer. 29.

Gen:18.25.

Eph:1.11.

Eph:1.4.

efficient cause admits farther distinctions; for it is either Physicall or Morall: Physicall is that which really workes or executes any thing; as every tradesman hath his worke, which his hands doe make; so God hath his worke, which he executes, and his worke is judgment as well as mercy. *I am the Lord which shew mercy and judgment and righteousness; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord;* and he would have us when we doe glory glory in this, that we doe understand and know him to be such a God. A Morall efficient is twofold, being only of a moveing nature, to move others to doe somewhat, as namely either by perswading, or by meriting or deserving: He that perswades moves an other to doe some what; he that meriterh, thereby moves another, either to reward him or punish him. Now to walke in the light of this distinction, and not to please our selves by walking in darkness; though God be the prime, principall, and invincible cause of man's damnation in the kind of a cause efficient physicall (which should not seeme strange to an ordinary Christian, who knowes full well that vengeance is God's peculiar worke, as the Judge of all the world, and that he delights in the execution thereof) yet this hinders not but that man may be the cause of his own damnation in the way of a meritorious cause, justly deserving it. *Omnis poena Deum habet Authorem, All punishment hath God for the Authour of it:* This is a principle acknowledged both by the *Arminians* and *Vasquez* the Jesuite; but never is punishment inflicted on any by the hands of God, save on those who formerly have deserved it. Consider we farther, as touching the severall kinds of causes formerly mentioned; if the question be which is the principall, *Aristotle* answereth, that this is not confined to any one kind of them; sometimes the materiall cause, sometimes the formall cause, sometimes the efficient, sometimes the finall cause is the demonstrative cause, the cause *propter quam*, the cause by vertue whereof the effect hath its existence; but this peculiar and speciall cause is described thus, It is that whereby satisfactory answer is made to the question demanding why such a thing is. Now in execution of punishment or condigne vengeance, this satisfactory answer is made by representing the meritorious cause, never by representing the efficient cause: as for example, if it be demanded why such a malefactor is executed upon the gallows; no sober man will answer, because the Sheriffe commanded it to be so, or because the Judge would have it so; but because he robd upon the high way, or committed some criminall fact or other, which is capitall by the lawes of our land, and to be punished with hanging upon the gallows. In like sort if question be made why devills or wicked men are damned, is it our doctrine to referre the cause hereof to the mere pleasure of God? Doe not all confesse that God inflicteth damnation upon the merely for their sinnes and transgressions wherein they have continued unto death without repentance? Yet we acknowledge that God could have taken them off from their sinnes while they lived if he would, by giving them repentance, as he hath dealt with us, and that merely of his free grace. For we willingly confesse that our sinnes are our owne, but our faith is not, our repentance is not. When I say our *owne*, I meane in respect that they are of our selves; otherwise we acknowledge both faith and repentance to be our owne *accipiendo*, in asmuch as we receive them; but they are God's gifts, and so they are his *dando*, in asmuch as he gives them as *Remigius* speaketh. Now what is become of this Authours pompous discourse? Is it not the like the cracking of thornes in the fire, making a great noise, but the light of distinction, like fire, sets an end unto it, and makes it appear in its owne likenesse, and proves nothing but a squib. For albeit God in his decree makes the damnation of reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable; yet seeing he makes it not to fall on any but for their sinnes, what colour of dishonour unto God, in ordaining that *Judas* shall necessarily and unavoidably be damned for betraying the Sonne of God, and afterwards most desperatly murthering himselfe? If hereupon he could no more avoid his damnation, then *Astionax* could the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the tower of Troy; will any man that is not bereaved of common sense make strange of this? It is true God did appoint both *Judas* and all other wicked persons, that never break off their sinnes by repentance, unto destruction, of his own voluntary disposition. For God workes all things according to the counsaile of his will, and if it pleased him he could annihilate them upon the fresh foot of any sin; or after they have suffered the vengeance of hell fire, as many yeares in hell as they lived here in sinne; yea and the devills in hell; as *Origen* was of opinion; and the Jewes at this day are of the same by Sir *Edwin Sander* his relation; whether this Authour be of the same or not, I know not. And lastly we willingly confesse that the decree of God was antecedent to the deserts of men; for reprobation is as antient as election; and election was made before the foundation of the world. if we believe Saint *Paul* rather then any other, who either by

word

word or deed doth manifest himselfe to be of a contrary opinion. Still damnation is inflicted by God only for sinne, and in degree answerable unto their sinnes; and only because of their sinnes as a meritorious cause thereof; though God makes use of it to his owne ends and the manifestation of his owne glory as Solomon professeth namely, that God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evil. And Saint Paul tells, that as the Lord suffereth with long patience the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction that he might shew his wrath and make his power known. So likewise another reason hereof he specifies to be this. That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory. For when we shall behold the unspeakable misery brought upon others by reason of their sinnes, how rich will God's glory appeare unto us, when we consider that had it not been for his free grace delivering us from sinne, we had been swallowed up of the same sorrowes. And thus *Alvarez* writeth, disput. III. *The glory of God's mercy in his elect, and in like manner the manifestation of divine justice on Reprobates; is truly and properly the finall cause why God did permit sinnes both in Reprobates and Angells.* And he proves it out of this passage of Saint Paul. So *Aquin: 1 p. pag. 23. art. 5.* This is the reason saith he why God hath chosen some and Reprobated others, that representation might be made of Gods goodnesse towards the Elect in the way of mercy pardoning them, and on the Reprobates in the way of justice punishing them. And *Alphonſus Mendoza* a Scotist concurreth with them in this; and we see they make Saint Pauls doctrine their foundation. And indeed albeit at the day of judgment there will be found a vast difference between the Elect and Reprobates, the one having departed this life in the state of faith and repentance, the other in infidelitie and impenitency, in such sort as God will bestow on his elect eternall life by way of reward, and inflict eternall death on the other by way of punishment; yet in conferring the grace of regeneration, of faith and repentance upon the one, and denying the same graces unto the other, the Lord carrieth himselfe not according to mens workes, but merely according to the pleasure of his owne will, shewing mercy on whom he will and hardning whom he will; in which respect he is said to make men in what condition he will; as *Rom: 9. 20. Shall the thing formed say to it that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?* Though indeed he makes but one sort of them after a new fashion, leaving the other in the state of naturall corruption wherein he findeth them: And likewise is compared by the same Apostle to a Potter, who out of the same lump makes one vessell unto honour, and an other unto dishonour. But to returne, I have, I trust, sufficiently shewed that in all this which he hath delivered, when things are rightly understood, and duely considered, ther's nothing found alien from the holy nature of God, no more then it is repugnant to his holy nature to decree and execute vengeance, condigne vengeance, even the vengeance of damnation on men for their sinnes; in such sort that it shall unavoidably overtake all those that breake not off their sinnes by repentance before their death. Nothing more agreeable to Scripture, nor to the nature of God revealed unto us in holy Scripture then this, and consequently nothing more agreeable to Christian reason. But as for naturall reason; God forbid we should make that the rule of our faith, as concerning the resurrection of the dead and the powers of the world to come, the rewards of heaven, and the torments of hell, where the worme never dieth, and the fire never goeth out. And may it not seeme very strange, that a Christian and a Divine, and one magnified by the *Arminian* party for great abilities should undertake to prove this doctrine to be contrary to Scripture, to the nature of God and to sound reason.

Well let us proceed to observe how well he performes what he undertakes. And here he saith, 1. *That the Scripture makes man the principall, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine.* We answer, the Scripture makes man the only cause of his owne ruine, in the meritorious cause; thus man's destruction is of himselfe; But this nothing hinders God from being the cause why vengeance, destruction and damnation are executed upon man; for he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, & he delights as well in shewing judgment, as in shewing mercy. Indeed did we maintaine that God damnes the Reprobate whether man or Angells of his mere pleasure, this Argument of his were seasonable. We know full well that God of his free grace shewes mercy; but judgment only upon provocation, and herein he proceeds slowly too; for he is slow to wrath, and easie to be intreated. Yet God's afflicting is not alwaies for sinne; neither doth it alwaies proceed in the way of punishment: when we suffer for Christ we have cause to rejoyce that he counts us worthy to suffer for his name; neither were the afflictions of Job brought upon him for his sinnes, but for the tryall of his faith, and to make him an example of patience to all succeeding generations; and as for that of *Ezech: I will not the death of the Wicked;* it

Eph: 1. 11.

Jer. 9. 24.

is the usuall course of men of this Authours spirit thus to render the wordes, whereas our last English translation renders them thus, *I have noe pleasure in the death of the wicked*. Now as a man may will that wherein he takes noe pleasure; as a sick-man takes a bitter potion sometimes for the recovery of his health; so God may will that wherein he takes noe delight. And whether it be meant of first or second death it cannot be denied but God wills it; *for he workes all things according to the counsell of his owne will*. Then againe if we consider the infliction of death as an execution of judgment, God not only willeth this, but *delights* therein also, as it is expressed. That of *Prosper* is nothing to the present purpose, we treating here of the cause of damnation, not of sinning; we say God is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, not to whom sinne belongeth. Besides sinne, as sinne, hath noe efficient cause at all, but *deficient*, as *Austine* hath delivered many hundreded yeares agoe. It is true, it is in Gods power to preserve any man from any sinne; it is in his power to take any man off from any sinfull course by repentance, if he will; but he is bound to none, *he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*; and in all this he is not culpable.

Rom: 9. 18.

Rom: 9. 23.

In the next place he tels us; It is contrary to God's nature. but what? To damne men for their sinnes neverbroken off by repentance? for all our divines maintaine that God is Authour of damnation to none but such; and to such God is not mercifull nor gracious, nor suffersthem any longer, nor shewes any goodnesse towards them; while they lived he did; yea *much long suffering and patience*, inviting them thereby to repentance; yea and by his word also inviting many; but after they dye in sinne, therewithall an end is sett to the dispensation of Gods gracious proceedings with them. Much lesse doe we deny him to be good and mercifull and of great kindnesse to all that call upon him. For Gods mercy doth not exercise it selfe by necessity of nature, but by freedome of will; yet he heareth the cry of Ravens and not a Sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our heavenly father, and the very Lyons roaring after thir prey, doe seeke their meat at the hands of God: These mercyes are temporall; but as for spirituall mercyes, for the working and cherishing of Sanctification these are not extended unto all, but to some only, even to whom he will. And accordingly the elect of God are called *vessels of mercy*. Yet to the execution of damnation on any he proceeds not till after death, and stayes no longer; so flow to wrath he is towards the worst, and no more slow to the best of them. *Who is a God like unto thee*, saith *Micah*, *that taketh away iniquity*? here this Authour out of wisdome maketh a stoppe, leaving out that which followeth and passing by the transgressions of the remnant of his heretage: That restriction belike he did not so well brooke; but having leapt over that; he is content to take in that which followeth, *he retaineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him*: to witt, towards the remnant of his heritage, of his people. But I hope nought of this can hinder God from being the Authour of damnation to all that dye in sinne without repentance without any prejudice to his holinesse, though he retaineth wrath for ever against them.

We come to his reason which he calls *sound*, saying that *it cannot but argue such a decree of extreame cruelty*. But what decree? of that wherby he hath decreed to damne all that continue in sinne without repentance? For to none other hath God decreed dānation in the opinion of any of our divines. But that which he cōmends as *sound* let us examine. We cannot in reason think, sayth he, *that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature as to resolve with himselfe to marry & beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by thus torturing them, he may shew what his authority and power is over thē*. Much lesse can we beleave that God should ordaine infinite multitudes of his Children to everlasting fire. Is it credible that this Authour himselfe doth not beleave that very doctrine which here he impugneth? Doth he not beleave that God hath ordained infinite multitudes of those who he calls Gods Childrē to everlasting fire? doth he not I say beleave this as well as we? Doth he not beleave that whosoever dyeth in sinne without repentance shall be damned? doth he not beleave that God of his mere pleasure hath made such a decree? It is incredible he should not be of the same faith in this. Are not all Gods ordinances made of his mere pleasure? could he not both ordaine and execute the annihilation of sinners if it pleased him? and that either immediatly upon the committing of sinne, or after some certaine yeares enduring the punishment of hell fire. And as for hell fire it selfe, could not he qualifie or increafe the tormenting nature thereof as he should thinke good? All this I nothing doubt but he believes, unlesse with Origen and the Jewes, he be of opinion that the fire provided

provided for the devill and his angells is not everlasting: what madnesse then, what phrensy possesseth him so to dispute against us, as to dispute against himselfe? Vndoubtedly this Authour would have his Reader so propitious unto him, as to understand and interpret him beyond that which his owne words doe import; as namely thus, That God hath not only of his absolute pleasure made such an ordinance, that all who dye in sinne without repentance shall be damned; but rather thus; That God hath ordained that Infinite multitudes of his children shall be damned, not for their owne sinnes, but only out of his absolute pleasure. For this is generally the unshamefast carriage of men of this Authours spirit. Now what one divine of ours can he shew to have maintain'd this? Yet this is the imputation he chargeth upon us, that by our doctrine *God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules, eternally in hell fire.* Yet this is a very Ambibolious expression. For when were they innocent in his meaning? when they were damned? If this be in his meaning, can he name any divine of ours that affirms this? Or doth he meane they were innocent when God entertained this resolution? And doth not he as well as we maintaine that there was a time, when Angels were innocent though afterwards they became devils; yet both then and from all eternity God had entertained such a resolution; For his decrees were everlasting as we say; neither hath he hitherto manifested his opinion to the contrary; whether he maintaineth such an opinion secretly in his brest, I know not; If he doth, and shames to declare it let him pull himselfe by the nose; in the passages he produceth out of *Cicero* concerning *Epicurus*, and out of *Virius* concerning such like pag: 9. Yet we doe not say they were innocent when God made his decree of Reprobation. I should shew my selfe an *Ignoramus* to say so, We say they were neither innocent nor nocent then, forasmuch as till the Creation no Creature had any being but God's decree of Election (and consequently of Reprobation also) had its being before the foundation of the world. 2 This manner of reasoning which this Authour calleth *sound*, I have found long agoe in *Castalio*, as superfluous a Divine as ever put pen to paper. And by the way observe, all the *Devils* and *Damned men* he calls *Gods Children*: this is the language of their Court. Now what one Divine of ours maintaines that any of Gods children are destined to eternall fires? *S. Paul* tells us *We are all the sons of God by faith in Christ Jesus: and because we are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his sonne into our hearts crying Abba Father; And that as many as are led by the spirit of God. And if we are children we are also heires, even the heires of God. and heires annext with Christ.* And this distinction to witt the children of God, and children of the Devill, hath beene ever since the fall of man, as *S. John* signifieth where he sayth. *In this are the children of God knowne, and the children of the Devill, whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.* And anon after he giveth instance in *Cain* and *Abell*. Yea & our Saviour gives us to understand the same, where he saith to the Jewes, *Ye are of your father, the Devill, and the lusts of the father ye will doe.* And whereas we read that *in the dayes of Enosh men began to call upon the name of the Lord*; forthwith we read c. 6. 2. (For the 5. chap. coming in betweene contains only the Genealogy of the world from Adam) of the distinction between the *sonnes of God* and daughters of men, thus, the *sonnes of God* saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and they tooke, them wives of that they liked. It is true, *Adam* is called the sonne of God in reference to creation; And noe marvaile; For he was created in the state of grace: so likewise the Angells for the same reason. *When the starres of the morning prayed them, and all the Children of God rejoiced.* It is true we thus read, *Have we not all one father? hath not one God made us?* *Piscator* interprets these two interrogatories into one: As if God in the first place were represented as a common father unto all; but our *Geneva Divines* doe not; but the name of father in this place they referre to *Abraham*. And in not referring it unto God they have the consent of the Jewish Rabbines *Aben Ezra* and *David Kimhi*; who yet more handsomly doe referre it to their common father *Jacob*, then to *Abraham*, the Covenant of God including all the Sonnes of *Jacob*; not so all the Sonnes of *Abraham*, no nor the Sonnes of *Isaak*, but *Jacob* only. 3. Consider is it decent to conforme the courses of God with the courses of men? May not we consider in like manner against the Lord's foreknowledge, as well as against his decree, & reason thus: what man of common humanity would resolve with himselfe to marry and beget children, did he foresee their wicked courses, and what will become of them for it, namely, to be condemned to everlasting fire with the Divell and his Angells? what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked waies and ungodly courses of all Reprobates, that they would continue in them and die in their sinnes without all faith in Christ and true repentance towards

Eph: 1. 4.

Gal: 3. 26.

Gal: 4. 6.

Rom: 8. 14.
vers. 17.

1 Jo: 3. 10.

Jo: 8. 49.

Gen: 4. 26.

Job. 37. 7.

Mat: 2. 10.

towards God? And if he did foresee what would be the ends of them in case he did create them and bring them forth into the world, yet seeing he would nevertheless create them and bring them forth into the world, one after another in their severall times and ages, shall we brand the holy name of God, and reproach him for unnaturallnesse, and barbarous crueltie? Rather I will say what meanes this Authour so unconscionably to corrupt the state of the question, by mentioning only the shortnesse of their life, and utterly concealing the wickednesse of their life, the only meritorious cause of their torments which they suffer, and accordingly to shape the ends intended by God, to be only the demonstration of his power and Soveraignty over them, without all mention of his justice; whereas we say that in the inflicting of damnation, the cheife glory which God manifests is only the glory of his justice, proceeding herein according to a law which himselfe hath made (as most fit it is the Creatour should give lawes to his creature) and the law is this, *whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved, whosoever dyeth in sinne without repentance shall be damned.* Not one of our Divines (that I know) maintaines, that inflicting damnation, the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of his will, in the communicating of faith and repentance, we willingly confesse the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of his will; and it is expresse *Pelagianism* to affirme that *grace is given according unto workes.* And herein this Authour is very well content to walke in the darke and conceale his most corrupt opinion most opposite to the grace of God. But that damnation should be inflicted without respect to sinne as the meritorious cause thereof, what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth? Yet thus he is pleased to disguise our opinion (when he findes the poverty of his strength to wage faire warre) and so expose it to the hatred of me; as if God ordained to damne men not for their sinnes, but of his owne mere pleasure. Thus of old the enemies of the Gospell dealt with Christians: for first they would cloath them with beare skinnes, and then set dogges upon them. All that he hath to say to excuse his shamelesse crimination (though so much he doth not expresse here) is only this, that our Divines maintaine the decree of damnation to preceed the foresight of sinne. Yet this is untrue of the most part of them, who premit both the foresight of sinne originall before reprobation from grace, and of sinne actuall before the decree of damnation; I willingly confesse for my part, that I concurre with neither; and if I should, I should withall make the decree of permitting of sinne to preceed the decree of damnation, for which I see no reason; but yet I doe not make the decree of permitting sinne to follow the decree of damnation. I hold these decrees to be simultaneous, thus, that God at once decrees both to create men, and suffer them all to fall in *Adam*, and to bring them forth in their severall generations into the world, and to bestowe the grace of faith and repentance upon the one, and so to save them, and to deny the same grace unto others, finally permitting them in their sinfull courses, and so to damne them for sinne; and all to manifest the glory of his mercy to the one, and the glory of his justice on the other, yea and his soverainty too, but wherein? not in rewarding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other; but only in giving grace to the one, and not to the other. And all the difference between our Divines is merely in *apice Logico*, a point of Logick To wit, as touching the right ordering of decrees, concerning ends, and meanes tending to the ends; all concurring in this, that, *God hath mercy on whom he will*, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and *whom he will he hardeneth*, in denying the same graces unto others. Now when this Authour shall fairly prove that according to our opinion, *God destroyeth the righteous with the wicked*; then and not till then, shall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of *Abraham*. What Divine of ours was ever knowne to affirme that God damneth any one that dyeth in repentance? Yet it cannot be denied but that temporall judgments befall the righteous, as well as the wicked. When the Lord swept away 70 thousand with a three dayes pestilence in the land of Israel; was it not possible thinks this Authour, that any of God's deare children should perish by that pestilence? To be caried away into captivity by an heathenish nation, I should thinke is a greater calamity then to dye of the pestilence; yet those who were carried away into *Babylon* with King *Jechoniah*, the Lord represents by the basket of good figgs; and those the Lord professeth that he had sent them away into *Babylon* for their good. Were all damned will this Authour say, that perished in the flood? Saint *Peter* seemes to be of an other opinion, where he saith, *To this purpose was the Gospell preached, also to the end that they might be condemned also to men in the flesh, but might live according to God in the spirit.* Truly I doe not say so much of them that perished in the conspiracy of *Corah*, when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up the conspira-

tours;

Jer. 24.

1 P. 1. 4. 6.

tors, nor them only but their wives and children also; especially considering that *inter potentem & fontem*, mercy may be sought and mercy may be found.

Sect. 2.

Containing the first Objection With the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto.

M. Mason's
Additions p.

16. 17.
Object.

But God say some is soveraigne Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and doe with his own what he will?

The question is not what an almighty soveraigne power can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power that is just and good may doe. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or soverainty, but by the power of a Judge, so wit, that a actuall power of his, which is alwaies clothed with goodnesse and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theis preexisting in his eternall mind.

Answer.

It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendring to every one his due; and that is vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obitinate and impenitent. *God is good, saith Saint Augustine, and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot without evill deserving condemne any man, because he is just.* In an other place also he saith, *If God be beleived to condemne any man that by sinne deserves it not, he is not to be beleived to be free from injustice.* 2. Nor is it compatible with goodnesse which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himselfe unto his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable creature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it.

As touching the Objection I hope this Authour will say so too. As touching the first, *Reply.* namely, *that he is the soveraigne Lord of all creatures;* and our Saviour Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, *that it is lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne.* But I find noe need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his former vaine discourse; for he may see plainly that I have made noe use of these principles; but they have their place to justifie God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing children for the sinne of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporall; as in the conflagration of *Sodom*, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damming many Infant children of heathen men dying in originall sinne unremitted; as M. *Mason* in his lectures at *Magdalen Hall* maintained, that, *the punishment of originall sinne unremitted was eternall damnation.* And M. *Herd* confesseth as much in his preface, *Sect. 4.* 3. Yea and in making the Soule of Christ the holy Sonne of God an offering for the sinnes of others. But consider we his answer.

To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintaine that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sinne? They doe not, and therefore this Authours disconrse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The distinction which here he makes is the distinction of *Arminius*, who maintained that God can doe that *per potentiam*, by power, which he cannot doe *per justitiam*, by justice, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my *Vindicie*; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Authour once offer to answer. And this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to doe that which is unjust. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both *Snarez* and *Vasquez* opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, doe yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and ordinance as I have shewed. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the justice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paine) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Innocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much lesse annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict *Arminius*. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell paines on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternall mind, then either Christ suffered not the paines of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those paines upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of beleife at his pleasure.

Lib. 1. p. 2.
digres. 4.

Vindic. l. 1. p.
3. digres. 1.

1 By what right is vengeance due to the obstinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other

right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it please him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleased to punish it, cannot he punish it as well by annihilation of the obstinate (so to set an end unto his sin as to himselfe) as by condemnation of him? That of *Austine* is spoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evill deservings he shall not be condemned (yet Christ suffered hell paines without any evill deservings) In respect of the like law, he shall be unjust, if he should not reward them, who dye in faith and repentance, with everlasting life. This is only in respect of *potentia ordinata*, such a power as is ordained by his will. But as for *potentia absoluta*, power absolute, all confesse that God can annihilate the holy Angels.

2. How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by necessity of nature, or freedome of will? Philosophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that *Bonum est sui communicativum*, That which is good is apt to communicate it selfe, yea naturally and necessarily. And therefore God being *optimus* the best, as well as *maximus* the greatest, was most communicative, and that naturally and necessarily. If the same be this Authours opinion, he is as *Atheisticall* as they: But if by freedome of will he communicates his goodnesse, then he communicates his goodnesse, as when he will, so likewise how he will, and to whom he will. As *Saint Paul* expressely professeth, saying, *God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*, of such places as these this Authour takes no notice, but so much the more *Atheologically*. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that *God is good to all*; And so he is in doing them good, many and sundry waies; in maintaining their being; But he is not in such sort good to all as he is said to be good to *Israel*. For he hath not dealt so with any nation, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himselfe: for the good which is in himselfe is of a more transcendent nature, then to be communicable unto creatures; such conceits are *Manichaicall*. God is essentially whatsoever he is: But the goodnesse this Authour speaks of, is of an accidentall nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transforme the essence of God into an accident, that so it might be communicated to the creature.

Rom:9.18.

Pf:73.1

Pf:147.20.

3. If Gods goodnesse incline him to communicate goodnesse unto the creature, as farre as he can without wronging justice, then it inclines him to communicate holinesse unto all to preserve all from sinne, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and so to save all. For how could his justice be wronged in this?

4. When he saith, that God of himselfe cannot without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries; observe what an hungry proposition this is; for will he say the God can provide for any creature the greatest misery save one though not the greatest of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can so provide the greatest save one, why not the greatest of all? What colour of reason to put any difference in this! And if the greatest save two, why not the greatest save one? And so we may goe on till we come to the least misery, thereby to convince the unreasonableness of this assertion. For in cleare evidence of truth, reason cannot discover where to make a stand.

5. And what is the motive he meanes, but the motive of sinne? And what sinne did God the Father see in Christ the Sonne, that moved him to ordaine his deare Sonne to the suffering of hell paines?

6. And as he alledgeth *Austine* to little purpose, so to the contrary what he writes de *predestinatione & gratia* is well known. *Si humanum genus quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo; sine debito mortis nasceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic.* If mankind which is well known, at first to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and sinne; Yet if the Almighty Creatour, would damne some of them to eternall destruction, who would say to the Almighty Creatour, why hast thou done so? And observe his reason, *Qui enim cum non essent, esse donaverat, quo sine essent habuit potestatem.* For he that gave them being when formerly they had no being had power to dispose to what end they should be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confesse that that this book though it

Raynaud: in
adit. ad lib.
Intitul. Vale-
rianus Inte-
ger doctrina
labiſq; purns.

goe under *Austine's* name, yet it is thought to be none of *Austine's*, and that amongst other considerations, by reason of this very sentence in particular, which seemes unto me very harsh, and contrary to *Austine's* doctrine in other places. But *Raynaudus* hath discovered at large the vanity of this reason, and shewes by variety of testimonies the concurrence of Antiquitie in bearing witnesse to the same truth. And albeit he confesseth the book not to be *Austine's*, yet he proves that *Fulgentius* was the Authour of it, alwaies accounted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of *Austine's*. See: 3.

Sect: 3

Containing a Reply to the second Objection, and Answer thereunto.

M. Mason's
Addit. p. 17.

18. Object, 2.

Perkins lib.

de predestin:

p. 25.

Answer.

It is further objected, that we doe and may slaughter our beasts for our dayly use, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoynt as many of us as he pleaseth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be just and good to notwithstanding. For there is a greater disproportion between God and us, then there is between us and beasts.

1 For answering hereunto we are first to premise thus much, namely that our slaughtering of Beasts for our dayly use is by Gods ordinance, and appoyntment. We had not the authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see *Gen: 9. 2, 3.* Where we may observe, 1 That God delivereth up all creatures, Beasts, Birds, and Fishes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth so, is that they might be meat for men, and consequently they might be slaine. Which being so, our slaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our dayly use is to be accounted Gods doing, rather then ours. And therefore the objection should be made this. God may without any breach of goodness or justice appoint brute creatures to be slaine for mans use, therefore he may ordaine men to be cast into hell torments for his owne use, that is for the declaration of his soverainety.

2 This being premised I answer further that this comparison holds not, For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and lesse between the acts.

1 There is but small proportion between the Objects *Beasts* and *Men*. creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are voyd of reason and liberty in their actions; creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made only for the use and service of men upon earth. But men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to discern between good and evill, they are the very Image of Gods purity and eternity and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven. So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts. It followeth not therefore that if God may appoynt beasts to be killed of his owne free pleasure for mans use. he may with like equity and reason appoynt men of his owne will to destruction, for his owne use. We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifice, but not one man. The first borne of other creatures he charged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beasts) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed. Which sheweth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beast. Besides in the 9 of Genesis he gives men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures; but he straightly forbids them to shed mans blood, and gives this reason of the prohibition, *Man is the Image of God;* so that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the Objects compared, men, and Beasts in respect of this Act of killing and slaughtering. 2 There is farre lesse or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared *Killing and eternall tormenting.* A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it, that he may dayly vex and torture it, to shew what power and soverainety he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not, I say, but God may kill a man of his owne free pleasure; yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keepe him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to shew his soverainety. For this is to inflict an infinite evill upon a guiltlesse creature, to whom he had given but a finite good. And so is the comparison most unequall too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth just nothing.

Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authours acute observations out of *Gen: 9. 2, 3.* (For he would not seeme to be any of the blunter sort) doe sin as often as they kill a chicke to feed upon, though beasts of prey doe as much as this comes to, and more without all sin. 2 Yet M. Perkins thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawfull, without enquiring whence this authority proceeds. And noe Christian doubts, but our very bodies, and soules and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beasts for meat? Or hath not man power to slaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Authour find this in *Gen:* May we not kill Lyons, Beares, wolves, unlesse we eat them forthwith, or powder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? so of snakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that *Lybia* brings forth? 4 I deny that our slaughtering of oxen is in this respect, or in any respect to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. For Gods appoyntment in this, is but of the nature of a permission, not of a command. We may live by fruits and hearbs and Marmalads and sucketts, or butter, milke and cheefe, if we think good. Were it a Commandement, yet would it not follow that it is Gods worke rather then ours. For he commands good workes and forbids evill workes. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good workes are rather Gods workes then ours. I trow he will not. 5 Therefore wee keepe to our owne argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty case, if we should suffer our adversaries to shape our Arguments. If they once have the grinding of our Tooles, no marvaile if they soone grind out all the edge of them. We say

it is lawfull for man to doe all this that is spoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and shall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apostle himselve dispute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equall to the power which the Potter hath over the worke of his own hands and over the clay also. *Shall the thing formed say to it that formed it why hast thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour?* We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawfull power to inflict pain upon another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greatest pain upon us, and that without all respect to sinne? And that this God can doe as Lord of life and death, both *Vasquez* the Jesuite acknowledgeth, and *Medina* pronounceth *ex concordi Theologorum sententiâ*, by the unanimous consent of all Divines, as elsewhere I have shewed and proved by variety of demonstration; like as *Raynaudus* confirmes it by the concurrent testimony of the Antients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his answer, and saith that the comparison holdes not. And I commend this Authours wisdome in troubling himselve with no more objections, then he thought himselve able to Master. For who would not keep his shins whole the best he can? But I wonder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of such adversaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with.

Rom: 9. 21.

1. Little proportion will serve turne; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and surely there is lesse proportion between the Creatour and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet sure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble then a creature without life, such as a Potters vessell is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his vessell, the Apostle tells us that God hath the same power over his creature man. Secondly, the Authour was sensible of the weaknes of this bowstring, and seeing it would not hold, therefore he relies upon another, and thats his owne deforming and disfiguring our argument, drawing it from the comparison of man's power over his fellow creatures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creatour hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's grunt hath power over his fellow creatures. From this due course of comparison which we propose, this Authour drawes us to a wild comparison of the power of God over beasts, with the power of God over man, which is not ours, but an immodest and unshamefast fiction of this Authour; and that grounded upon immodest foundations as before hath been shewed. Thirdly, yet why not so great a difference between God and man, as between God and beasts? Is not the distance infinite? Is it possible to be lesse, seeing man is but finite, and God infinite? For still the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfection is of a transcendent nature it being uncreat: which when School-men have considered, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be measured not by approximation to God who is, *ens primum*, the first being, but by their remotion rather *à non esse*, from not being; As I remember to have read long agoe in *Paulus Venerus*, and which then seemed to me most congruous, neither to this day doe I see any just cause to oppose it. 2. I come to the second answer; And here I find this discourse to breath the spirit of *Arminius*, as truly as if it were spit out of his own mouth. Now *Arminius* on this point I have answered at large, as this Authour well knowes: he is content to passe that by, and keep himselve still like a Sow in beanes, without raising any noise of solving ought hath been delivered in prooffe hereof. But though he lets passe that wick I have delivered without answer, renewing only *Arminius* his objection; yet I will not let this his answer to his own objection passe without a reply.

Exam: prae-dest.

Perkin: p. 41.

1. Therefore whereas he saith there is no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting. I marke his cunning carriage, he doth not say there is no proportion between killing and tormenting which are two acts; and acts are somewhat capable of proportion. And surely if he had, killing would appeare to be the worst of the two; since to kill is to torment and somewhat more, even to destroy the being of a man. Therefore the comparison which he shapes is between killing and eternall tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pretends to from the comparison, but between one act, and the eternall duration of an other act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, such is this Anthours juggling. Yet notwithstanding the disproportion of these things, hence it followes not, that killing is the more desirable of the two; considering that many again there is which man would be content to endure, rather then to loose his life? So farre is it from being worse, and that beyond all proportion. *Austine* somewhere professing of infants pain in hell, that is *pena mississima*, the mildest pain, & such as they had rather endure then to have no being at all.

2. But

2. But take it for an intollerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting; whereas there is some proportion between man and beast, then it were reasonable for any man to desire to be turned into a beast rather then to be eternally tormented: now let every reasonable creature consider, the sobriety of such a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, then it is not to be denyed, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thousand or ten thousand yeares may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternall torment cannot. Yea and so ten thousand to an hundred thousand yeares, and so forwards untill it comes to be eternall, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impossible to attaine from a beginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantitie, *Aristotle* hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impossible that the whole consisting of finite parts can be infinite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Authour will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the least sinne committed by man. And this was it that I proposed in my answer to *M. Hord*, to shew the power of God in such a kind, wherein it were abominable cruelty in man to exercise his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of *Tiberius* is set forth by them that write the history of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to resolve how it can stand with justice divine thus to deale with a creature, though a sinner. Yet I know many courses are taken to solve this difficultie, and the best that I have met with is this in my judgment; That a man dying in sinne, his sinne continueth eternall (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flawes, and will not satisfie. So that the best and finall resolution is to have recourse to God's absolute power, as a Creatour over his creatures. And that absolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature, as over a creature nocent. And it were very strange to affirme that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beasts, namely to put them to pain, to doe us service. Now if it be lawfull to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reason can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if so why not three, and so ascending to the highest degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict such a pain for an houre, he may as well for two houres; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two daies, yea for a week, if for a week, he may as well for a moneth, and if for a moneth, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for six; and if for six, as well for twelve; and if for a yeare, as well for two; and as well for foure, and so in infinitum; from tens to hundreds, and from hundreds to thousands. For no reason can possibly make evidence where we ought to make a stand; in such sort as that an affliction in such a degree is lawfull, and immediatly after increasing becomes unlawfull. 2. Yet consider we speak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the objection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execution, sinne may intercede by God's permission, and that necessarily thereupon as *Arminius* himselfe confesseth. But now to the point whereon we are in present, we suppose the person to be most holy, even as holy as the Sonne of God; on whom notwithstanding were inflicted, as all confesse, either hell paines, or that which was equivalent to hell paines. 3. Yet this evill thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, still it continueth finite, though in infinitum; it being utterly impossible by addition to make that which is finite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authours caution would help us against the Authour himselfe. For the good which God hath given such a creature, is also infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preserve that creature from sinne, which by *Arminius* his confession, makes a man more miserable, then hell paines it selfe. Lastly that there is such an absolute power in God *Raynaudus* justifies both out of the twelveth of wisdom. *Cum sis justus, juste omnia disponis. Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnare externum existimas à tuâ virtute.* This reading he professeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading ought to be this, *Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas.* And shewes that this reading is followed by *Austin*, q. 53: and Saint *Grigory*. 3. *Morall. cap. 11.* This also he justifies to be Orthodox by the testimony of the Antients. *Macarius homil. 15. Deus sui juris est, quod vult facit. Si velit pro potestate & jure suo mittit justos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum.* Out of *Chrysostom*, l. 2. *De compunctione cordis sub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum est conjici jubcat Dominus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi potestas.* Out of *Austin* in *Psal. 70.* in

Austin

the beginning *Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia justus est; Amor quia misericors est. Quis enim diceret ei quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia ejus est, ut justificet injustum?* Then he represents the School-men maintaining the same *Animinenſes, Camaracenſes, Medina, Secarium in cap. 7. Joſue q. 39. and Lorinus in cap. 12. Sap. v. 12.* Yet is not *Raynaudus* of their opinion who maintaines reprobation to be before the foresight of evil workes; nevertheſſe he is peremptory in juſtifying this; And *Fulgentius* whom he conceives to be the Authour of that book *de predeſt. & gratia*, which goes under *Auſtin's* name, in a little treatiſe of his intituled *Cenſura inofficioſa cenſura*, which is added to his *Valerianus integra vitæ labiſq; purus*.

Seſt. 4.

M. Maſon's
Aditiōs p.
18. 19. D.
Twis: his Vin-
diciæ l. 2. p. 1.
Digreſ. 1.
Answer.

But it is replied by ſome (who will rather ſpeak unreaſonably and againſt common ſenſe then lay down the concluſions which they have undertaken to maintain) that it is more eligible to be tortured in hell then to want or looſe a being. For he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being, and by conſequent ſomething that is good. If therefore God may take away a man's being that is innocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleaſure, much more may he torment him in hell.

I am glad to ſee my name ſo often remembred by this Authour in his margent; for a long time I deſired to know his way by certaine evidence; for I would not ſuffer my ſelfe to be carried away with rumours; and withall I found ſome contradiction in the relations I received from different perſons, but at length I was ſo happy as to ſee it under his own hand, and there to obſerve not his judgment only, but the ſtrength of his affections alſo. Now let the Reader obſerve the cunning carriage of this Authour, and how farre off it is from all ingenuitie. For what I diſcourſe, being drawne thereunto by *Arminius* his excuſions, that this Authour obtrudes upon me, as if the defence of the cauſe I tooke in hand had drawn me thereunto, notwithstanding that I have profeſſed the contrary. For thus I write l. 1. pag. 1. *De electione Seſt. 4. pag. 127.* In the canvaiſing of this ſection *Arminius* runs out at large, ſaving that moſt of theſe things which here he heapes up are aliena, and nothing pertinent to the preſent purpoſe; as pertaining rather to the decree of reprobation, then to the decree of election. And a little after I write thus; Hence it is that *Arminius* expatiates and transfers his diſputation from the point of election, to the point of Reprobation too unreaſonably: Yet wiſely affecting the incolumity of his wavering cauſe. By that right (ſaith he) which God hath over his creature, he cannot ordaine any man to the ſuffering of pain without the foresight of ſinne. To wit that his cauſe might ſtand upright, and that this examiner might omit nothing that tends to the making of his opinion plauſible with his propitious reader, it was needfull that he ſhould make uſe of ſome ſuch tranſition, though never ſo unreaſonable. but ſeeing ſuch are the wiles and artifiſes of our Adverſaries to confound all ſcholatiſtical method, it ſhall not be unreaſonable for me to weigh what he delivers as briefly as I can. Therefore after I had reſuſed *Arminius* on that point, where he denies, that God can doe that injuſtice, which he can doe by power; after this manner I enter upon a new digreſſion concerning this point. Hitherto have I followed *Arminius* in his extravagants. For *M. Perkins* hath not proceeded ſo farre; as to affirme that God hath power to afflict an innocent creature, neither hath his Adverſaries objected any ſuch thing unto him, as juſtly inferred from ought delivered by him. So that all ſuch have well hardened their foreheads, who faigne that our opinion cannot well ſubſiſt without the help of ſo horrid and ſo harſh an aſſertion, to wit, That it is better to be miſerable, then not to be at all. It is true, ſome may conceive that though this were a truth, it were to be ſuppreſſed, rather then affirmed by reaſon of the harſhneſſe of it. Let every one conſider aright that I undertake the defence of *M. Perkins*, and it is he that hath uttered this harſh aſſertion, (namely, That God can inflict hell paines without any demerit in the creature) out of *Camaracenſis*. And it ſtood me upon to defend *M. Perkins* ſo farre as I had reaſon for it. Now finding the maine argument whereby *Arminius* maintaines the contrary (to that other, yet more harſh propoſition) to be moſt unſound; and even this aſſertion which ſounds moſt harſh in the eares of many, not only to be maintained by *Auſtine* himſelfe and and divres Schoole-Divines, but answered by many arguments, the ſolution whereof was never expedited by any; have I deſerved ſo ſharply to be cenſured for repreſenting all this in the way of juſtifying *M. Perkins*, whoſe defence I undertook againſt *Arminius*?

1. My words are theſe tranſlated, God can annihilate the holieſt creature, which *Arminius* confeſſeth, how much more is it in his power to afflict an innocent creature, and that for ever, conſidering that not only according to Schoole-divines, but alſo according to *Auſtine*, yea according to the truth it ſelfe, it is more to be deſired to have being under

der any pain, then to have no being at all. And afterwards I propose not one argument of mine own for the justifying of this, but only represent the discourse of *Austine* hereupon, as it is analized by *Durandus* that Schoole Divine. Now why are not the Schoole-men censured, as men speaking unreasonably and against common sense? Nay why is not *Austine* censured as one that had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense, then lay downe the conclusion which he hath once undertaken to maintain, as well as my selfe? Yea and much more considering that the discourse proving this, is Saint *Austine's*; and had I not added on the by these four words *etiam secundum ipsam veritatem* there had been no place at all for any censure to be past upon me. If a man finding himselfe convicted by *Austine's* discourse shall confesse that what he writes is true, is it equity to censure him as one who had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense, then lay downe the conclusions which formerly he hath undertaken to maintain. When in the mean time no censure is at all passed upon *Austine*, who alone is the player of the game, he that stands by professing only in his judgment, he playes his game well.

2. If *Austine* hath spoken unreasonably and against common sense, how comes it to passe that this censurer hath not taken the paines to represent unto the world the unreasonableness of his argument? This authour spends his mouth frankly in censuring, but takes no paines to free his Reader from error, by solving arguments produced by *Austine* for the proove of that which this Authour conceives to be an error.

3. Nay he doth not so much as answer that one argument, which here is proposed by me. An argument which the Schoole-men use as sufficiently convincing the truth, as *Durandus* and *Ricardus*. Yet considering the unreasonable condition of such adversaries, who take no course to convince or confute their opposites, but imperiously to cry them down; I have taken the paines to call to an account both *Austine's* arguments and others proposed by Schoole-Divines, and to devise with my selfe what answer might be made unto them, so to performe that for my adversaries, which they shew no hart to performe for themselves, and I was borne in hand that such a digression of mine should be extant long ere this.

4. Yet by the way I wonder not a little that one thing is pretermitted. For if I mistake not, this very Authour is the man that heretofore hath been very full mouthed in censuring, not so much the doctrine it selfe, as a certain answer I made to an argument brought out of Scripture against it, namely from those words of our Saviour, *It had been better for that man if he had never been born*. My answer was, that it was spoken according to the judgment of man, though indeed erroneous, and that after this manner phraseologies of Scripture doe proceed I there shewed. Now this Authour hereupon spared not to professe, that if this were true he would turne Atheist. I wisht that friend of mine to whom he spake this, to perswade him the next time he met with him, to enquire and consider well, whether *Maldonat* the Jesuite doth not imbrace the same interpretation. And indeed if such protestations would carry it, this Authour would prove a very potent and formidable adversary, I have seen the like under his own hand, namely this, *As Plutarch said of the old heathens who sacrificed men that they might pacify their gods; sh. t it had been better with Diagoras to say, There is no god, then to think that God is such a one that delights in the blood of men: And hereupon he adds this Protestation, I protest unto you I think it less dishonourable to the blessed Trinity, to say with the Atheist, there is no god, then to feigne such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants makeih him to be*. This man I find is resorted unto and consulted with by the *Arminians*, as if his judgment were an oracle; and I willingly confesse he deserves to be in some great place unto them; and no place in my judgment more fit then to be unto the, a protestationibus. Yet I doe not prescribe but leave it to their discretion to prefer him as they think good; but how comes it to passe, that here he is silent in reviving the reproaches he cast upo my answer to the Scripture before mentioned? Is it because *Maldonat* the Jesuite hath been since found by him to embrace the same interpretation? And he is loath to fall so foule in censuring such as he is? Yet here he falls foul on me for professing my approbation, not of Schoole-men but of *Austine's* discourse. This makes me call to mind what was delivered of him sometimes by a London Minister; as that he should perswade a young Divine to study *Bellarmino* as also what censures others have passed upon some writings of his. And it hath been my hap to see under his own hand such a counsaile as this give to a friend of his. *These things have I represented unto you the rather, because I would give you occasion to learne that in your younger dayes, which I have learned by late and long experience in my selfe, and that in these two things. First in reading Bellarmine and other adversaries to our Church; I have divers times*
noted

noted such speeches in them, as to my thinking involved contradiction, or had shew of absurdity, or might either give advantage to our selves, or breed prejudice unto them; but when after ward I came in cooler blood to weigh the words better, and to consider the circumstances more narrowly. I found that I did mistake their meaning, and that an itching desire to find an advantage, made me to take shadows for substance. And the like mistake in my selfe I observed, when I read the fathers, or the Scriptures, ready to interpret every thing either in favour of mine own cause, or in prejudice of the adversaries: And concludes sententiously thus; *Nimirum ita est ingenium nostrum, facile credimus, quia nimirum volumus.* If such be the genius of this Authour, though he thinks not good to spare me for Austin's sake, yet methinks he should spare me for Richardus sake, or at the least for Maldonat's sake. This calls to my remembrance an Epigramme which D. Hoskins my chamber-fellow in New-Colledge sometimes made upon the fleas, (that sore troubled him as he lay in his bed.) And the conclusion was thus;

*But if ther's nothing that can slack
Your rage and your correction,
Yet ô remember you are black;
And spare me for complexion.*

So we proceed.

SECT. 5.

M. Mason's
Aditions p.
19.20.

To the first part of this reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in hell, then to be nothing. I oppose three things. 1. The speech of our Saviour concerning Judas; *Woe be to that man by whom the Sonne of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born.* Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour. First the misery of Judas the betrayer of the Lord, *Woe be to him*. Secondly, the greatness of his misery, *It had been good &c.* It is as much as if the Lord had said, *Judas the traitour shall be damned,* and therefore so woefull will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never received a being; good in earnest, as the Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteem of weak minded, faint-hearted-men only as some few understand it. For first let it be granted that Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to men's opinions, yet without reason to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to doe, as dunces doe in the Schooles, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle where-with they are charged, shift it off, and say, (*loquitur ex aliorum sententiâ, he speaks according to the opinion of others.*) 2. This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded. First because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth and greatnesse of the misery of Judas, *Woe to the man &c.* And why woe? Because it had been good &c. But it were no argument to shew his woefull estate by, to say that it had been good for him, that he had never been born in the opinion of men, who mistake the case but not in truth. 2. because this exposition would teach and encourage men to be *Atheists* and *Epicures*. In the second of *Wildome*, we read how voluptuous men doe stirre up one another to enjoy the good things, that are present, to fill them selves with wine and ointments, to leave some token of their jollity in every place, and to practise all manner of wickednesse. And what is their motive? a false perswasion that their soules shall dye with their bodies; and that they should have noe being after death. If this conceit would flesh them thus in their opinions and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, if they could be but once perswaded, that, after all their pleasure they should be in better case then if they had noe being? Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall wee pick out a man, but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be cast into hell. What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with *Job* they curse their birth day, and wish an hundred times over that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments, but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, then no being any where? And why are men who are sensible of hell fire so strongly curbed in the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of terribles? Feare of being annihilated can never doe that, which the feare of hell doth,

Aug. Epist.
ad Bon. 160.

Answer.

M. Mason went great bellied with these choise conceits, and therefore he will bring them in though it be by the eares, in spite of his own friends: like as *Arminius* did before him, to vent a certaine argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy issue to the betraying of the Authours nakednesse most shamefully; and his argument was this, *To be happy is better thē simply to be; therefore to be miserable, is worse then simply not to be;* now the consequence is most inconsequent. For therefore to be happy is better then simply to be; because, *to be happy*, includes being, & addes hapines thereunto. And one good added to another good must needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, *If to be miserable* doth include the evill of not being and adde another evill thereunto, the whole compound must needs be worse. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, *to be miserable* doth not include the evill of not being, but the good of being rather; and consequently there is no just proportion between misery and happinesse, And therefore though to be happy is better then simply to be (as including being, and some good thing more) yet thence it followes not, that to be miserable, is worse then not to be; for as much as, *To*

be miserable, doth not include the evill of *not being*, and adde some evill more to it. Now the first that affirmed this harsh position, namely, that *to be miserable is not worse then not to be at all*, was *Austin*, and he not only affirms it, but disputes it, and proves it by variety of arguments, not one whereof is answered by this Authour or by any freind that I know. And from *Austin* the School-men have taken it, and added this one argument to confirme it over and above those of *Austine's*, *To turne a man into nothing is to destroy a man's universall being; but to inflict torment upon him doth destroy only particular being*, to wit, his being in ease and pleasure. Now to have a man's particular being destroyed is not so bad, as to have a man's universall being destroyed. Now I come to consider how this Authour carrieth himselfe in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the position impugned by him, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of *Austin* and of divers School-men) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an answer made by us to any of our Adversaries objections (as this Authour doth) as if we stood in need of any such aide, is a mere fiction. And first he states it at pleasure to serve his own turne, of *being in hell to be more desirable*, whereas the Authour whom he opposeth, delivers it of, *esse miserum to be miserable*: and misery is as well in respect of sinne, as in respect of bodily torment. Nay it is confessed by *Arminius* himselfe, *That the misery of sinne is greater, then the misery of torment*. So, that if it be uncouth to say, that to be under the torment of hell, is better then not to be at all; it ought to seem more uncouth to say, that it is better for a man to be guilty of sin, then to have no being at all. Now I doe not find that this Authour in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into consideration. Again when it is said, *That to be miserable is better then not to be*, this is to be understood aright, not as if misery it selfe were desirable, but *being only*, though with the adjunct of misery, thus, *to have a being though in misery is more desirable, then to have no being at all*. And so if it be applyed to the misery of torment, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, *To have a being though in hell is more desirable then to have no being at all*. And it is apparent, that, *in not being at all*, there is nothing at all desirable, but in being; though under the greatest pain there is something desirable, to wit, being. Now I consider his reasons.

He objecteth the saying of our Saviour to *Judas*. *Woe be to that man by whom the sonne of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born*: and indeed the betraying of the Sonne of God his Lord and master, was a most facinorouse act, especially being committed by the way of a kisse, & with sweet words saying, *Hail Master*. And School-men doe distinguish between, *the misery of sinne, and the misery of pain*, in such sort that albeit they deny the latter to be worse then *not being*, yet they doe not reason so of the former. But because *Judas* was not so sensible of the miserable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Saviour sets forth the woefull condition of that state whereof he, and generally all are most sensible. Whence we may well argue, that our Saviour speakes in conformity to man's sense and judgment, and it was not long ere the terrours of a guilty conscience took hold of him, and he went forth and hang'd himselfe. Yet our Saviour saith not, *It had been good for Judas if he had never received any being*, but only this, *If he had never been borne*. now being is not received in a man's birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if *Judas* had perished in his mothers womb it had been much better for him. As *Arch-bishop Whiggit* sometimes in the Court of high commission said, of one that was accused and convicted of some foule crime committed by him in the very house of God, *That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the first, then that he should live to be so scandalous to the Church of God*. And yet as if our Saviours wordes were not enough for this Authour in saying, *It had been good for that man*; therefore he patcheth it out with a supplement of his own, thus, *It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being*. So that whereas *Aristotle* made happinesse to consist in an aggregation of all good things, this Authour with his divinitie thinks good to mend *Aristotle's* Philosophy, by placing happinesse in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciously. *Vulcan* who made thunder-bolts for *Jupiter*, when he was cast out of heaven had a shrewd fall, and contracted such lamenesse, as stuck by him ever after. So this Authour who forgeth thunder-bolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon opposition to the prerogative of God's grace and his Sovereignty over all creatures; not marvaile if his logick and philosophy halteth; and his infirmity so contracted may increase so farre, as in the end to bereave him of common sense. He contents himselfe as his manner is with saying, that Interpreters doe generally expound it as he doth; some few he confesseth understand it other wise, but most concurre with him, to wit, that, *it is delivered in earnest*; what a jest is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to say, that our Saviour spake

Ezech: 22.
14.

not in earnest. Neither doe I know any that interpreteth the place as he shapeth it, as if our Saviour spake according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any such difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet speaks of the stoutest, as well as the weakest, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be strong in the day that I have to deal with thee, or the Lord rather by the Prophet. The School-men suppose without difference, that the damned wish they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into passionate expressions in the time of their extremity; *Maldonate* on this place gives instance in many; but the question is, whether these proceed from the judgment of right reason; or erroneous rather, through the vehemency of passion, whose course is as *Aquinas* observes, *extinguere rationem, to extinguish reason*. And it is one of the three things as *Aristotle* observes in his bookes *De Anima*, that hinders the mind in her judgment. The other two are, *Night a Disease*, *and Sleep*; the third is passion; how much more when passion is stirred up by the forest disease of all other the torments of hell fire?

1. But if I am glad to see the issue whereto he drives his discourse. For he grants that the scripture speaks sometimes according to men's opinions: but without reason to fasten such an expression upon any Scripture, is to doe as *Duns* doe &c. he gives no instance; I will supply the want thereof, and that out of one of those duns, a follower of *John Duns* an eminent school-man, from whose name school-men are called duns, whom this Authour was wont to magnifie; *Lychemus a Minorite* is the man, who is the first that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpose of election of any particular man may cease; and the purpose of reprobating the same may come in the place thereof. So the purpose of reprobating *Judas* may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a dayes growes in request. *Penotus* hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And *Franciscus à sanctâ Clara* after him, and some of our *Arminians* I find enamoured with it. Now this *Lychemus*, when he is charged with the doctrine of *Scotus* as directly opposite hereunto, his answer is in part that he speaks according to the opinion of others. Now I desire not upon better termes to contend with *M. Mason*. For *Austine* hath given many reasons to prove that simply and absolutely not to be, is not a thing desirable, above being, though joyned with never so great misery of pain. And the School-men acknowledge that *Austine* herein delivers his judgment, and withall they concur with him, as *Scot*, *Biel*, *Durandus*, *Maldonat*. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an universall destruction of being, so is not inflicting of punishment, as both *Durandus* and *Maldonat* argue the case. And saying that not to have any being at all is better for *Judas* then to be in torment, here is something affirmed of a subject that makes him of a better condition then otherwise, which hath no place, but upon supposition of a subjects existence, & that in distinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which constitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reason of being nothing, should be better then something, is one of the wildest expressions, I think that hath been heard of since the world began; And therewithall creatures began to have a being. Againe consider, take *Gabriel* the Arch-Angell most holy as a creature, and let every sober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I should think that albeit God should torment me with hell fire yet if he should preserve my soule from sinne & in the love of him out of the sense of his love towards me, I should have infinitely more cause to rejoyce then to complain, how weak soever I am at this present. Thirdly, if it be better and more desirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be understood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in respect of everlastingnesse, then it followes it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man shall not everlastingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thousand yeares, not only twise told; but a thousand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically; and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to suffer hell torments so long, then it is better to have no being at all, then to suffer hell torments halfe so long. For no reason can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to suffer hell torments one houre, or halfe an houre, or a quarter, or a minute, or halfe a minute. For no reason can define the bounds within which it will be better to suffer the paines of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worse. But *M. Mason* saith secondly. This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded: And he

he gives his reason for it : Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the greatnesse or truth of the misery of *Judas*; and I pray let every sober man judge, whether this be not a sufficient amplification of that misery, that they shall wish they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather then suffer such torments. How many preferre death before this worlds misery, and so goe on to destroy themselves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it should be an utter abolition of man, is not so bad as to suffer the miseries of this world. The mistake of a damned person wishing not to be, consists not in conceiving his torments to be unsufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he should have ease, which is a most absurd conceit, arising merely from distraction of mind throug extremity of anguish. So that all things rightly considered, here is no encouragement for men to become *Atheists & Epicures*, unless this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain shall be so extreme and unsufferable, as to make them desire, and utter they know not what, such distraction of mind and perturbation of judgment shall surprize them. A false perswasion that mens soules shall die with their bodies, and that they shall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleasures while he may; whether this delight and pleasure be taken in courses vicious, or in courses vertuous, because death sets an end, as to them; so to their pleasures and delights. But if their greatest happinesse, or misery doth begin in joy, or sorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: sober reason doth suggest unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happinesse, and declining that unhappinesse, above all other, according to that *Ladies* resolution in *Sophocles*, and that upon this ground *ἡ δὲ αἰὶν ἡντιναι*, there I shall continue for ever. But when he saith the wicked will the more eagerly pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, because after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgment of any lewd person throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to sinfull courses from this; that albeit he shall be cast with the devill and his Angels into hell fire, that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, then not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition consists only in this, that being is better then not being; not in this, that he hath any ease, or is lesse obnoxious to torment and sorrow, which shall be so unsufferable, as to provoke him to wish, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing.

Secondly, I oppote common consent. Where shall we pick out a man but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be cast into hell? What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with *Job* they curse their birth day, and with an hundred times over, that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into that place of torments; because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, then no being any where? And why are men, who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbed and held in with feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihilated can never doe that which feare of hell doth.

*M. Mason's
Addis. p. 20.*

And is he well in his wits that talkes of a thousand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with such like wild discourses, even to runne out of common sense at last. Yet all this that he discourseth of, for the substance of it is no other, then *Ausline* hath taken notice of in his very argument, and shewes the vanity of it, and the error of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of ease and rest from sorrow & pain; againe aske the same men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogges, wolves, snakes, toades, rather then to be under the torments of hell fire; aske againe whether they would not be content, to be turned into devills, so they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Aske the Adulterour whether he would not be content to lye with an other mans wife all his daies, rather then to suffer (shall I say) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather then dye possest of the joyes of heaven. Aske this Authour whether he would not be content to maintaine stiffly, that grace is given according to workes, and that a man is justified by his workes, rather then suffer the paines of hell fire, yea though it were against his own conscience. As for me were I a damned creature, yet according to this judgment which God hath given me considering that the glory of Gods justice is manifested in my condemnation, though extreimity of pain would transport me into as wild wishes, as this Authour justifies, yet according to right reason I should rather be content to suffer, then wish that I were turned into a brut beast, or into a devill, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of sober divines would justifie me.

Answer.

in this undoubtedly God is able to worke me or any man to this resolution without sin.

2. If, because men through feare of hell and expectation of eternall vengeance doe with *Job* curse their birth day once, and wish they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the same reason, because they doe no other then *Job* did, it must follow, that it was better for *Job* to be nothing, then to be under such torments. But if *Job's* desire was an unsober and unreasonable desire in this, why might not their desire be as unsober and unreasonable also, proceeding not so much from calme reason, as from the strength of passion inflamed and disordered through extremity of torment. We know that men upon the rack doe sometimes make confessions, even against the light of their own consciences. And feare of evil sometimes distracts as much as the sense thereof; as in him who hearing the sentence of death passed against him at *Paris*, fell into a sweat of blood. And it was wont to be said, that *pejor est malo, timor ipse mali*. *Francis Spira* in the time of his distraction confest as much of hell it selfe. And if one desire, once having course, prove unreasonable, why should the renewing of it a thousand times over prove lesse unreasonable. And let the judicious observe the hand of God, in striking this Author with such giddinesse even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantageous to his cause) so as at every turne to supplant himselfe, and to betray the shamefull nakednesse of his discourse. As first, in talking of a thousand nothings. Secondly, In putting the case of some cursing their birth day, but how? as *Job* did. Now will any sober man make the like collection of *Job's* cursing his birth day, as this Author doth from others cursing theirs. Thirdly, and lastly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who seeth not that this proceeds in reference to such things, which as they are feared, soe they may be felt; and supposing a subject existing, as to feare it before it comes, so to feele it when it is come; but such is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feignes us to conforme to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilation to be a thing feared, he pleaseth himselfe in his owne fictions. He no where finds me to speake of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more then I speake of it as of a thing that is to be felt. Onely I say that it is a condition no way desirable by a reasonable creature, no more then the suffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be suffered of any unlesse he hath a being, here is something found desirable, to wit the continuance of being: But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found any thing to be a fit Object of mans desire.

M. Mason's The third thing which I oppose is common sense; which judgeth paines, when they are extreame to be worse then death. Hence it is that *Job* being tormented in his body by the Devill cursed his birth day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himselfe in the grave, plainly preferring the losse of his being, before that miserable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by dayly experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) choose rather to have no bodies at all, then bodies tormented with the stone or gout, or any other sharpe and sensible disease. It is a known saying grounded on this judgement of sense, *Præstat semel quàm semper mori*, better it is to dye once then to be alwayes dying. This the tyrant *Tiberius* knew very well, and therefore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but by lingring torments. And *Suetonius* reporteth of him in that chapter, wherein he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell praetises; These, sayth he, who would have dyed through the extremitie of their torment, he used meanes to keepe alive (nam *mortem adeo leve supplicium putabat*) For he accounted death so light a punishment; that when he heard that one *Carnilius*, a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cryed out, *Carnilius me evasit*, *Carnilius* hath escaped mine hands. To a prisoner entreating him to put him quickly to death he gave him this answer, *Nondum tecum redii in gratiam*, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it a great kindnesse to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured. Many that were called into question did partly wound themselves in their owne houses, *ad vexationem ignominiosam vitandam*, to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they should endure; And partly poyoned themselves in the mid'd of the Court, as they were going to their arraignment for the same cause *Seneca* speaking of one *Mecænas*, who was so a frayd of being dead, that he sayd he would not refuse weakenesse, deformity, *vel acutam crucem*, no nor the sharpest crucifying, so that he might live still in these extremityes, he calleth his desire, *Turpissimum votum*, a base, and most ignoble, and unnaturall wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; because in all his evylls he was afraid of that which was the end of all evylls, the privation of his being. And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones, rather then flesh and blood, who can so put off all feeling, and sense, as to thinke a tormented being in hell, to be a lighter and lesser evill, then no being at all.

Answer.

We know that death to such as *Job* was, is not only better then extreame paines, but better then all the joyes of this world; by how much to be present with the Lord Christ, is better then to be absent from him; and we know, sayth *Paul*, to the unspeakable comfort of all true Christians, that when the earthly house of this our tabernacle is dissolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternall in the heavens.

So

Durand.

Durand. analyzerth *Austine's* discourse hereupon. Then he proceeds to shew that the deliberative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evill, save only according to erroneous reason. All which this Authour takes no notice of, but pleaseth himselfe in his own confusion. All creatures have in them, *vestigia Dei*, saith *Luther*, to wit, in respect of their being; But man is, *Image Dei*. Shall right reason suggest the destroying of this for pain's sake? *Durandus* proceeds & shewes how according to erroneous reason a man may destroy himselfe, by reason of some present miserable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he shall arrive to some secret existence wherein he shall be free, as from the good things, so from the evill things of this world. *Unde Augustinus ubi supra dicit, quod aliqui urgente miseria sese interimit, eo quod confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint.* A second manner is this, the vehemency of evill suffered may so over-cloud and trouble reason, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better then to be in misery, which is absurd, saith he; for as much as the privation of evill is not good; but by reason of obtaining of the contrary good; but no such good can be obtained in being nothing, howsoever men through error of judgment may faine it otherwise. In which case he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of something) and consequently his election is erroneous, as *Austine* concludeth. But *Seneca* is the best flower in this Authours present discourse; and the censure which he passeth upon one *Mecenas*, who, so he might live, would not care what torments he suffered. Where by the way I observed; that albeit this Authour represents the common sense of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the same mind. Secondly, I observe that *Seneca* who censureth him did look for an immortall condition after death, which it seemes was no part of *Mecenas* his Creed. And upon this ground his censure might proceed. And indeed otherwise it is very strange that he should censure him for effeminatenes, in respect of a resolute mind to endure tortures, which we know full well is usually accounted *virile aliquid*, rather then *muliebre*, the part of a man, more then the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in *Austine*, that this was the opinion of *Varro* and the Stoicks, that it became a man to destroy himselfe, rather then to endure some evils, and in this doctrine of theirs, he findes some contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, *Hanc esse natura primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat.* This is the first and greatest voice of nature, that man should be at one with himselfe, and therefore naturally flieth death. And herein *Austine* himselfe acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now consider, is a man at one with himselfe when he destroyes himselfe? Is he not rather at odds with himselfe in making a man's fortitude to be a selfe destroyer? If so be that deserves to be called fortitude, as there *Austine* speakes: Or how can the duty of preserving a man's selfe, be the greatest voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature countermanding it, and commaunding a man to kill himselfe? In suffering evils there is place for the exercise of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter destruction of nature there is no place for the exercise of any vertue: which vertue was so farre advanced by the Stoicks, as touching the power of it, as to be able to descend into *Phalaris* his Bull, as *Cicero* discourseth in the last of his *Tusculane* questions. Yet not only great evils, for the insufferable nature of them did urge them to destroy themselves, but meaner evils most unreasonably. What moved *Cato* to destroy himselfe, but because he would not come under *Cesar*? His stout spirit could not endure subjection. Yet he read over *Plato's* discourse of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his sword, which some censure as an argument of some pusillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipt through *Paris* never changed his pace, affecting to maintaine the reputation of Spanish gravity and resolutenesse, though he smarted the more for it. And shall not our being in the likenesse and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with any dolorous suffering: when this Authour will have *no being*, to be a lighter and lesser evill then hell paines; doth he not most manifestly signifie that it is a burden more easie to be borne? Thus ere he is aware most contradictionously he supposeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it possible that an evill can be borne, and that with more ease then some other evill, by him who hath no being at all. But let him straine his wits to devise where first pain begins to be so great, that a man's utter destruction is to be preferred before it, seeing it is apparent that all pain is not such.

The 6. Sect:

M. Mason's To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is, *melius est esse, quam non esse.* It is better to be, then to have no being. I answer that it is a Sophisme or, a fallacy a non distributo ad distributum. To be in it selfe is better then not to be; but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again it is true in some cases, & ex hypothesi.

thefi, & cætera fua paria; If there be any equity in the Adjuncts, It is fo farre from being fimpli true, that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a cafe wherein it is not true but the contrary to it is true: That is the cafe of Judas of which we have faid fomewhat before. *It had been good &c.* Which words St. Hierome expounding faith; it is fimpli and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being, then an evil being. This was the judgment too of Job. *Why died I not faith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why did I fuck the breasts? For now fhould I have lyen ftill, and been quiet, and fhould have fleep when and been at reft.* In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it better to have had no birth and being, then fuch a painfull and miserable being. This was alfo the opinion of Solomon. So I returned faith he, and confidered all the expreffions that are done under the funne; and behold the teares of fuch as were oppreffed, and they had no comforter &c. Wherefore I praifed the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive. Tea better is he, then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not feen the evil works that are done under the funne. The words doe clearly fhew that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, then to be oppreffed by the mighty, and to be without comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournfull being.

*Hierom: in
Matt: c. 26.
v. 24.
Job: 3. 11. 12.
13.
Ecclef: 4. 1.
2. 3.*

Indeed fo *Hierome* faith, but that is not all he faith. For he labours to prevent fufpicion that *Judas* had fome being before he was borne: which was the error of *Origen*. And the words of our Saviour feemes to favour it as *Jansenius* obferves. *Quibus verbis Origenianum quid fignificare videtur, quafi homo ille fuerit antequam nafceretur, quia nulli potest bene eſſe niſi ei qui fuerit.* And *Hierome* himſelfe upon *Ecclef. 4. 3.* writes that ſome were of that opinion; namely, *Arminas noſtras antequam ad noſtra corpora iſta deſcendant verſari apud ſuperos, & tam diu beatas eſſe, quam diu cœleſti Hieruſalem & choro perſeuerant Angelico.* Neither doth *Hierome* there paſſe any censure upon the Authours of ſuch an opinion. Here indeed upon *Mat. 26. 24.* he faith, *We muſt not hereupon think that Judas had a being before he were born, becauſe a well being can agree to none but ſuch as have a being.* Which argument *Hierome* doth not anſwer. For when he adds, *ſed ſimpliciter dictum eſt, multo melius eſſe non ſubſiſtere quàm male ſubſiſtere.* This rather confirms the antecedent, namely, that it had been well for *Judas*, if he had not been; then gives any tolerable or colourable anſwer to the conſequence made therehence. And is not the authourity of *Auſtine* as good as the authourity of *Hierome* in this? *Jansenius* embraceth *Hieromes* expoſition; but *Maldonat* doth not, but at large diſputes for another interpretation, the very ſame which I delivered before I were aware of *Maldonates* expoſition. And *Jansenius* though he followes *Hierome* in expounding this place, yet he profeſſeth, that both *Euthymius* of old, and *Caetan* of late do underſtand this place in the ſame manner that *Durandus* doth, namely, *de nativitate ex utero*, of *Judas* his bringing forth into the world, diſtinguiſhing his birth from his conception, *ut ſit ſenſus, after this meaning, Bonum erat vel fuiſſet ei, ſi cum erat in utero matris ſuæ non fuiſſet editus in lucem, ſed mortuus tunc fuiſſet, & ſepulchrum ipſius uterus matris exiſtiſſet; ſi enim tunc mortuus fuiſſet, non incidifſet in tantam & talem condemnationem, quantum & qualem natus propter immanſum perditionis ſcélus erat excepturus.* It had been good for him, if being conceived in his Mothers wombe he had never been brought forth, but then had dyed, and his Mothers wombe had been his grave. For had he then dyed his condemnation had been nothing like ſo heavy, as now it is. Let me adde here *Maldonat's* interpretation of this place which is memorable. Of this paſſage ſome diſpute ſubielly more then enough, how it could be better for *Judas* nor to have been, whereas not to be is no good; to be damned is ſome good (meaning in reſpect of being) For he that is damned is ſomewhat, and every thing that is, as it hath a being is good. *Hierome* ſignifies that ſome thought *Judas* had a being before he was born; and that *Chriſt* of purpoſe ſayd no, it were better for that man, if he had never been; but if he had never been born, to ſignifie that though he had not been born; yet he ſhould have had a being, and ſo to have had naturall good things without evil. I imagine that *Hierome* therein noted the *Originiſts*, whoſe opinion was that as ſoules were from the beginning created, and each according to his merit either to remaine without a body, or to be caſt into a body as into a priſon. And indeed *Origen* ſo writes on this place, as he ſeemes not to be farre off from ſuch an opinion. After the ſame manner almoſt doth *Euthymius* interpret this. But ſuch like phraſes of ſpeech are not to be accommodated to the ſubrility of the Schooles. For they ſpeak proverbiall ſpeeches and vulgar, which commonly are ſomewhat hyperbollicall, as *Job 3. 11.* *Why haſt thou brought me out of the wombe? would I had periſhed, that the eye might not ſee me, that I had been as if I had not been, from the wombe carried to the grave.* And *Jer. 20. 14, 15.* and chap. 33. *Let the day periſh wherein I was born.* For all theſe proceed not from any deliberate judgment of the mind; but by way of complaint, whoſe courſe is to amplifie evils. *Chriſt* therefore in like manner ſpeaks of *Judas*, as it was to be thought he would ſpeak of himſelfe being in torment. Now it was very credible that he would ſay; I would I had never been born, it had been better for me never to have been born, then to ſuffer theſe paines: conſidering that *Job* and *Jeremy* moſt holy men have uttered the like ſpeeches, under farre leſſe ſufferings. Adde to this that *Chriſt* ſaith no, *It had been better that Judas had not been born;*

Answer.

born; but that it had been better to him, to wit, in his opinion and judgment: As we see it befalls many suffering bitter evils, to preferre death before life, sorrow & pain before judgment, whereas without doubt to live is better then to dye.

*Eccles. 4. 1,
2, 3.*

In the next place this Authour saith, *this was also the opinion of Solomon. Better is he then both they, which hath not yet been;* The words, saith he, do clearly shew that Solomon did thinke it better to be dead and deprived of being, then to be oppressed of the mighty, and to have no comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournfull being. Surely Solomon was not ignorant that of them that are dead there are two conditions; some in the state of damnation; others in the state of salvation. To be with God in the state of salvation, we make no question but that it is a better condition, then to be living here on the earth in the greatest happinesse that the world can afford. But to be dead and in the state of damnation, can it enter into the heart of any sober Christian, to believe that Solomon ever thought such a condition to be better then to live here on earth, in the most afflicted condition that is incident to the sonns of men? And doth this Authour well in coupling death with deprivation of being, as if every one, or any one that is dead, were deprived of being? Surely all the dead are not deprived of all kind of living. For God is the Father of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; And he is not the God of the dead but of the living. Again consider who are more oppressed by the men of this world then the Children of God? For as our Saviour told his disciples *The world will love her own, but because ye are not of the world, and I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.* All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution, saith Paul, and through manifold temptations we must enter into the kingdome of God. And our Saviour forewarned his disciples, *Ye shall be hated of all men for my names sake.* Now is it credible, that this Authour should believe or conceive that ever King Solomon was of such an opinion, as to professe, that it is better for the Children of God to be deprived of being, then to live in oppression? Consider farther, the words chiefly pertinent to this Authours purpose alleaged out of King Solomon are these, *Better then they both is he which hath not yet been.* Now I presume this is spoken not of such an one, who as yet hath not been; though hereafter he shall be. For such an one may be in as great oppression when his time comes, as any other is, or hath been, amongst those that have lived before him. But rather of such an one as never yet hath been, nor never shall be. Now judge whether this can admit any sober sense, unlesse in a vulgar phrase, according to the intemperate expressions which in time of oppression are uttered by men, wherein as Maldonat observes, there is allwaies something hyperbolicall, and such as must not be examined according to the subtilty of the Schooles. For consider, is there but one such that never yet was, nor ever shall be; or are there many such? If many such, how come they to differ, who have nothing wherein to differ? What a vaine imagination is it to talke of particulars that never had, or shall have existence, to ascribe unto them a better condition then is found in them, that have not being only but life also? We know Cicero hath professed & that according to the opinion of Stoicks, that a vertuous man may descend into Phalaris his Bull without any destruction of his happy condition. I have consulted Solomo Jarbi upon this place, and he tells us what he hath seen in the Jewes Midrach, namely, that there are 974. generations which have growen old and wrinckled from the creation, who yet never were created, and belike the Authours thereof conceive that Solomon spake of one of these. Rabbi Aben Ezra, proposeth the question, how can any better condition be said to be unto him, who was never created. And his answer is, that we must not wonder at such a speech of Solomon; for such speeches have their course. *וְעָבֹר קִצְרָה לָשׁוֹן* by reason of the shortnesse or streightnes of the languages; and therefore we must expresse our selves figuratively, and to speake hyperbollically is to speake figuratively. I betake me to Mercer hereupon to acquaint my selfe with his judgment upon this place. *Hoc autem dicitur;* saith he, *semper magnitudine arumnarum huius vita considerata. Cæterum Christus aliâ ratione habitâ beatos pronunciat, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam maximè & Dei nomen; quia spiritualia & cœlestia considerat repositam illis coronam gloria in futurum. Noster Solomon externa tantum & presentis vita incommoda perpendit quæ verè hydra est.* Thus he speakes allwaies having his eyes fixt upon the greatnesse of the miseries of this life, but Christ in an other respect pronounceth them blessed who suffer persecution for righteousness sake, especially and for the cause of God, because he considers spirituall and heavenly things, the Crowne of Glory laid up for them against the time to come. Our Solomon considers only outward things and the incommodities of this life present, which indeed is as it were a Serpent with seven heads. This is the first expression of Mercer in his interpretation of this place, which is as much as to say, that, Solomon speaketh herein according to the judgment of a naturall man. But

Mercer

*Tusculan,
quest. 5.*

Mercer hath yet a farther reach then this, which followeth by way of instance or exemplification thus, *Sic enim earum ratio habeatur ab eo qui illas perferit, mortem peroptat, aut etiam nunquam fuisse.* For when he that suffers these miseries shall consider the weight & heaviness of the he wil be ready to wish he were dead, or that he had never been; & no marvels: For as Maldonat obseiveth, even holy men of God such as Job & Jeremy, have broken forth into such imprecations, *judicio dolore corrupto*, as he speakes, the pain which they suffer corrupting their judgment, this is to speake not only according to the judgment of a naturall man, but according to the judgment of a man himselfe that suffers such miseries. Furthermore Mercer taketh notice of the School-mens discourses to the contrary *juxta Scholarum subtilitatem*, according to accurate judgment, as Maldonat speaketh. *Sophisticantur nostrorum nonnulli, prastare adhuc malè esse, quàm omnino non esse.* Some of our dispute that it is better to be in an ill case, then to have no being at all. Now doth Mercer oppose this? Nothing lesse he rather admits it, and without contradiction thereunto, proceeds in his interpretation. *Sed ut ne sit, vis malorum consideratur.* But howsoever that be, the force of the evill is considered, to wit, as before hath been shewed. 1. As in the judgment of a naturall man looking no farther then to the evils of this world. And 2ly, according to the sense & judgment of him that suffers them, *Quomodo & Christus dicebat de Judà, melius fuerat homini illi si nunquam natus fuisset, gravitatem providens tormentorum istius.* After which manner Christ sayd of Judas, *It had been better for that man if he had never been borne, foreseeing the greivousnesse of his torments.* The Antient Greeks and Latines used the like proverbe, *Optimum non nasci, aut ubi natus sis, quàm occissime aboleri.* *Græcum epigramma inquit*

Ἦν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτον ἴδεν ἀπασις ἦν τοῦ γένεσθαι

Μήδ' αὖτις, ἢ τὸ θανάτῳ αὐτίκ' περὶπαύειν.

The best condition was not to be borne; the next to dye sooneſt. Such were the conceits of naturall men in consideration of the evils of this world. And Cicero is full of such passages in the first of his *Tusculans* questions. In the last place I meet with a faire translation of this passage of Solomon in *Piscator*, who sets his translation on the other side to the translations of *Junius*, & thus it runnes. *Sed beatiore utrisq; judicabam eū, qui non videt facta ista mala, qua fiunt sub sole.* But more happy then both I judged him that hath not seen the evill workes that are done under the Sun. For albeit in the Hebrew something more there is, which is not here expresseſſed, to wit, *which hath not been.* Yet he conceives the last words to contain the full sense of them; and therefore he interprets these words of those who have perished in their Mothers wombe, or in their infancy or childhood, not of those who never had any being, perceiving manifestly the foule absurdity of such a speech according to accurate calculation. And Mercer himselfe professeth that both these expressions are of the same force in *Solomon*, and so that is more plainly set downe in the latter, which is more obscurely expressed in the former, which is a very usuall course in Scripture.

To this assenteth Sir Francis Bacon in his Colours of good and evill; where against this Mathematicall position (as he calls it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing, and that therefore the degree of privation seemeth greater then the degree of diminution; he excepteth that it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this namely, when the degree of diminution is more insensive then the degree of privation. In this case a totall privation is much better then a diminution. Hence these usuall formes of speech, *Better eye out the alwaies aking, Make or mar &c.* Some evils or paines (perhaps) either for their lightnes, because they may be well endured; or for their shortnes, because they are quickly over, are lesse then resolution into nothing. And a man had better for a while indure them, then loose his being to be rid of them: because his being may afford him presently, or afterward such and so many desirable good things, as will more then recompence his paines. But when his paines are so many and violent, that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or so pinch him, that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that remaine, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being; and such are the paines of hell, which for their greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and wailings & gnashing of teeth all symptomes of intolerable griefes, and for their length eternall. The worme never dieth, the fire is never quenched, but the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone doth kindle it for ever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of, much lesse by that poore little entitative good, which is all the good the damned enjoy in hell.

This Sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like fort notwithstanding, I doubt not, but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damnation of so many millions, cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice & cruelty which may in no wise be imputed unto God. *Plutarch* speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women; it had been much better with *Diogenes* and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to thinke he delights in the blood of men. How much rather may we say it were better to be an Atheist and deny God, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Soules of men? The like argument is pressed by *Eusebius* against those cruell and merciles gods of the Pagans, doubles, saith he, if there were any foot-step or sparke of goodnes in them for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to doe good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice and take a care of men. And being such how could they delight in their slaughter &c. Yea he concludeth that they were devills or evill spirits; and not Gods or good spirits, because if they were good they would doe good; whereas those that are evill use to doe hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of *Proſper*, *God indeed is the Creator of all things, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned is*

Answer.

The Authority of S. Francis Bacon is most aliene from the present purpose, according to the instance given by him, which is onely of a destruction of a member, as *Better eye out then allwayes akeing*. Yet this holdes not, save of such an akeing, as is more evill and dangerous, then the sight is beneficiall, but we speake of the universall destruction of the creature. The same appears by the generality of the exception given, as in case *the decree of diminution be more sensible* (for so I conceive it should be, and not sensitive) *then the decree of privation*. Whereby it is manifest that he speakes of such a privation whereof the creature is sensible, though sensible with lesse smart and paine then the decree of diminution. Otherwise if it be taken in comparision of no sense of the one, and some sense of the other, it would follow herehence that death is to be preferred before a paine: For every man is sensitive of the one, no man is sensitive of the other. I desire no fairer way to come to an issue in this particular, then that which is here proposed by this Author. He grants that *some evil & pains, either for lightnes or shortnes are lesse then resolution into nothing*. Yet with a perhaps only: As if by reason of a pain in his back, he were in doubt to resolve whether it were better for him to be turned into nothing, then to endure it. Is this man yet resolved whether it be better for him to suffer Martyrdome for Christ, then to be (I do not say resolved; for as I know no composition of nothing, so neither do I know any resolution into nothing) turned into nothing? It is not credible: How then comes in this parenthesis of a *perhaps*, was it to let a good face, upon his argument? or was it because he saw the dangerous consequence of this his concession, being direct & absolute? For I find him more cunning then solid throughout, like a crafty Crowder. For seing himselfe confesseth that some pains & Sorrows are willingly to be suffered by every reasonable man, rather then that he should be turned into nothing. Let us divide the latitude of pains & sorrows into a thousand degrees, if he think good: And then let him set down unto us at which degree it begins to make a mā more miserable, then to be turned into nothing. In like manner as touching the durance of these sorrows; if he sayth that the suffering of hell pains for an hour, for a day, for a year doth not make a mā worse, then to be turned into nothing. Let him define unto us where that proportiō of time in suffering hell begins, which makes a mā more miserable then to be turned into nothing. Divers Divines maintain that Christ suffered hel pains for us: Wil this Author say that this made him more miserable then to be turned into nothing? Had he suffered the to this very day, what helhound wil dare to say it had been better for him to be turned into nothing? If S. Austin prayed, *Da Domine quod jubes & jube quod vis*. Lord give me grace to do what thou commādest, & the comand what thou wilt. (Pelagius spighted *Austin* for this.) May we not in like maner pray; Lord give us grace to bear what thou layest upon us, & then lay upon us what thou wilt? Nay is it not *Austins* profession that the punishment of infants dying in Originall sin is *mississima* & such as they themselves would not choose to be turned into nothing, to be freed fro it? And is it not in the power of God to give a mā strength to bear the very pains of hel & that without sin? Did not Christ suffer the without sin, even such sorrows as the Greek Church professed in their Liturgy to be *unknown sorrows*, as Bishop *Andrews* sometimes observed in a passio sermo of his? And if it be in the power of God to enable a mā to bear the pains of hel for an hour, a day, a year; is it not in his power to enable then to hold out in suffering the, & that without sin for the space of ten thousand years, & that in *infinitum*? Again at this while this Author tak's no notice of the misery of sin, which *Arminius* (his wel beloved) professeth to be greater then the misery of punishment. And he gives his reason for it, because *illud bono divino, hoc humano oppositū est*. That is *opposit to a divine, this to a humane good*? Wil he say that it is better for a mā to be turned into nothing, then to rob, steale, take the name of God in vain, profane the Lords sabbath, to ly with another mans wife, to oppose truth against his knowledge & cōscience? If this be his opinio can he plead the comon consent of the world, or the comō sense of mā for this? See by the way how he vilifies the being of mā which he calls a *poore little entitative good*. God looked upon al things that he had made, & beheld they were *very good*; not the least fly, or ēmet, or worm is excepted fro the comandatio, yet mā was made after the Image & likenes of God. In other creaturs are solid *vestigia Dei*, footsteps of God, as Martin Luther observes out of the Antients, but mā is *Imago Dei* the very Image of God; Yet this Author calls it a poor little entitative good; & barely sayth it, & when he hath done, wipes his lipps fro al sophisticatiō, & elaps that upon the back of his adversaries very authoritatively. Then the question is onely of *Miseria pena*, whether it makes a mā worse then annihilatio, not in a complicate condition with sin, which is the condition of the dāned. Yet thus he carrieth it to serve his turn; whereas in *Arminius* his opinion, the sinfull condition of the dāned, makes them more miserable then thir torments. But if the torments of hell in theselves are able to make a man in a worse condition then to be turned into nothing, then an holy Angell or Saint should choose rather to be turned into nothing, then to suffer the torments of hell. And the Schoole divines dispute severally of the misery of sinne, and the misery of torment, & that with such different resolutions upon the point, as to maintaine, that albeit the misery of torment is not so bad as utter anihilation, yet the misery of sinne, is. Yet therein I willingly professe I am not of their mind. For

Exam.
Predest.
Perk. p.
103.

what? are not the Children of God sinners? Now what sober Christian will affirme, that it were better for them to be annihilated, then to be sinners. If you say, therefore it is not better for God's children to be annihilated then to be sinners; because they are not only sinners, but they are in the state of grace. I proceed farther, and demand whether God's Elect before their calling, being yet in the state of sin, as *Manasses* and *Saul* before their vocation, were better to be annihilated, then to be as they are. What if I am a sinner, yet while I have any being I may mourne for my sinne, I may serve God, I may enjoy his favour in the pardoning of my sinne, is not this a better condition then not to be, which is a condition conjunct as well with the destruction of sanctity, as of sinne?

But the former argument, which he takes so much paines to enervate, he calls a sophisticall evasion, and addes that so are all others of the like sort, very magisterially and resolutely. But what those others are he doth not so much as name. Not so much as one of *Austin's*, whose discourse alone I proposed on this point; together with an argument of *Durand's*, neither of all which doth he touch yet I am the marke set up by him to shoote at, not *Durand*, not any one of the School-men, not *Austin* whose discourses alone I proposed. And as for the argument here mentioned, *melius est esse, quam non esse*; It is better to be then to have no being, therefore it is better to be in hell torment then not to be. This is neither argument, nor any of those that I proposed out of *Durand* and *Austin*. *Durand's* argument is, *To be annihilated is an universall destruction of man's nature, not only of his well being, but of being; but hell paines is the destruction only of his well being not of his being*. Neither is it answerable to the argument formerly mentioned by him p. 19. which was this. *He that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell hath a being, and by consequence some thing that is good*. Now this argument cometh nearest to *Maldonats* discourse upon that of our Saviour, speaking of *Judas*. *It had been good for that man he had not been borne.* *Mat. 26.24.* Some, saith he, dispute subtilly more then enough, how it could be better for *Judas*, not to have been; whereas not to be is no good, to be damned is some good. For he that is damned is somewhat; And every thing that is, as it hath a being, is good. And we know that man's being is no common good but a speciall one, as being made after God's owne Image and likenesse. And looke with what judgment this Author extenuates, being humane, calling it a poore, little entitative good; with the same judgment he might extenuate Angelicall being. For even among Angells some have their portion in hell fire. But now he comes to his first proposition, that unavoidable damnation of so many millions can not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice and cruelty. The question is of the suffering of hell paines, whether it be worse then to be annihilated? This Authour runnes upon the terme damnation, which is a civill and judiciall act. Is there no difference between these? They that say Christ suffered the paines of hell, doe they say Christ was damned? Then to speake with a fuller mouth he puts in the damnation of so many millions, whereas if the damnation of one may be intended by God without injustice after what manner soever, undoubtedly the damnation of never so many millions may. Then he helps himselfe with the Epithite of unavoidable added to damnation, and the terme absolutely affixed to God's intention, to no purpose that I know, but to abuse himselfe and others by confusion; for feare least the truth should break forth to their conviction. To intend damnation avoidable, what is it but to intend it conditionally. And to intend damnation not absolutely, is all one with to intend it conditionally. Now to intend the damnation of any man conditionally is with this Author as much, to intend his salvation as his damnation. Yet this he calls the intention of damnation. And *Bradwardine* hath long agoe maintained and demonstrated by evidence of reason, that there is no conditionate will of God: And this Authour will not say (I suppose) that God did intend that Christ should suffer hell paines conditionately, or that if he did intend it absolutely, he was unjust in so doing. Now both *D. Jackson* expressly confesseth, that the distinction of will antecedent and consequent in God, is to be understood, not as touching the act of willing, but as touching the thing willed. And *Gerardus Vossius* acknowledgeth that after the same manner must the conditionate will, which is ascribed unto God, be interpreted. Now we willingly confesse that the thing willed and intended by God to Reprobrates, namely, damnation, befalls none, but in case they dye in sinne without repentance. And as already I have shewed not any of our Divines maintaine that God intended to damne any man but for sinne. Only the maine point of difference between us is, as touching the conferring & denying grace, even the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance. Herein we willingly confesse that God carrieth himselfe merely according to the pleasure of his own will, according to that of the Apostle, *He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*. Now on this point this Authour keeps himselfe close, and

earthes himselfe within his own concealements, lest he should betray the bitter Leven of *Pelagianisme*, in maintaining that *grace is conferred according unto workes*, which cannot be avoided by him; if once he comes to deale on this Argument. He thinks he hath great advantage in the point of Reprobation, and very free he is here, but declines the point of election, and point of conferring grace, which argueth a naughty disposition, practising by indirect courses to circumvent and suppress the truth, rather then conferre any thing for the clearing of it: yet see his confused carriage in the very point. For when he speaks of damnation avoidable and unavoidable, he takes no paines to manifest in what sense he takes it to be avoidable; as whether by power of nature, or power of grace. Is it his meaning that any man's damnation is avoidable by grace? We deny it not. Or is it his meaning that it is avoidable by nature? we utterly deny this. But this man counts it his wisdom not to speake distinctly, but worke his advantage upon confusion of things that differ; but let all such take heed, least utter confusion be their end. But if it be his meaning that all men have power to avoid damnation if they will; to wit, in as much as they have power to beleive if they will, to repent if they will: I would he would deale fairly once, and come to this. The Scripture is expresse, *That they that are in the flesh cannot please God, that the naturall man discerneth not the things of God, that they are foolishnesse unto him, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. That, they cannot beleive, cannot repent.* Of the Children of Israel in the wilderness, that *God had not given them eyes to see, eares to heare, nor hearts to perceive* fourty yeares. And truly we take faith and repentance to be the guift of God. And the habits of them not to be a power to beleive and repent if a man would, but an habituall and morall inclination of them to beleive, to repent. And habits (as it was wont to be said.) *Agunt ad modum natura, doe Worke after the manner of nature.* And it is very strang that supernaturall grace should not. And long agoe I have learnt in *Austin*, that to doe good, and obey God if a man will, is rather nature then grace. For the will alone is all in all as touching acts morall, good or evill; and till the will be changed, we are as farre off as ever, from performing any thing that is pleasing in the sight of God. This is the peculiar glory of God's grace, *To make us perfect to every good worke, and to worke in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ*; and this he doth according to his good pleasure. For grace is not conferred according unto workes. That was condemned as a pestilent doctrine long agoe in the *Synod of Palestine*, and all along in divers Councells against the *Pelagians*. How gladly should I embrace any delineation of this Authours opinion in the point of grace and free will, the rather, because I seem to smell who he is by this which followeth. For I remember sometime under whose hand I read it; namely, that, *Plutarch speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women, should say, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God, to think he delights in the blood of men.* But albeir this supercilious and confident professor be of *Plutarch's* mind in this, I willingly professe I am not. I know no naturall reason why he should delight more or lesse in the blood of beasts, then in the blood of men. Only it pleased him by the blood of Bulls and Goats to represent the delight he took in the satisfaction made in the blood of his own Sonne. We know in what errand the Lord sent *Abraham* three dayes journey, namely, to sacrifice his Sonne upon mount *Moriab*; had not God hindred him it had been done; *Abraham* knew no other but that it should be done, when he answered his Sonne saying, *My God will provide himselfe of a burnt offering.* *Abraham* did not break forth in this man's language, to say he would rather deny there was any God, then beleive he delights in blood; neither had he delighted in blood, though *Isaak* had been sacrificed, but in the obedience of his servants. Nor had *Isaack* received any losse by this. For *Abraham* knew that God was able to raise him from the dead. Did not *Samson* sacrifice himselfe. Christ was content to shed his precious blood for us, and we by his grace shall be content to shed our blood for him, & that according to his good will and pleasure. Let heathens thus discourse who are nothing acquainted with the powers of the world to come; but a foule shame it is for Christians to comply with them. But, how much rather, saith this Authour, *may we say it were better to be an Atheist, then to beleive or report him to be a devourer of the soules of men.* Yet I cannot be perswaded it is better to be an *Atheist* then to beleive even this. For I must not give ground to a confident *Theologue* for his bare protestation sake. What is it I pray for God to be a devourer of the soules of men? Is it any other then to be a tormenter of of them in hell fire? Now doth not this man beleive that God deals so with millions of soules? Doth not he professe, that, *the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone, doth kindle that fire*? what outrecydanace hath poss-

test the spirit of this *Cavaliere* that he should flaunt it to the world in this manner? It seemes his atcheivements known so well to the world have puffed him up, that he swells with the conceit of it: And 'tis enough for him now to brave it with protestations instead of arguments, wherein having known him so well heretofore, I cannot but wonder at the poverty of his spirit; he will battle so long upon his credit and reputation with the world, that it will crack at length; and he prove bankrupt: So that protest what he will no man will trust him for a groat. Now in that manuscript of his, which it was my hap sometime to have a view of, his protestation upon the book of that saying of *Plutarch* was somewhat different, thus. *I protest unto you, I think it was lesse dishonourable to the blessed Trinity to say with the Atheist there is no God, then to forme such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants, maketh him to be.* This protestation though it had course in private, yet here it is changed that it might not see the light of the Presse. For it is well known that this toucheth nearely a whole Synod of the Church reformed; and that countenanced by King *James* and divers worthy Divines of this Kingdome subscribing to it, some yet living, and two of them in *Apice Episcopali*, in *Episcopall* dignity. Yet what is that doctrine of the *Contraremonstrants* that he pincheth upon? It is well knowne that their generall tenet is that God ordaines no man to damnation but for sinne; some difference there hath been, and is about the ordering of God's decrees, which is merely *apex Logicus*, & what my opinion is thereabouts is well known; namely that in no moment of time or reason doth God ordaine any man to damnation; before the consideration of sinne, more particularly thus; that all besides the Elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt masse, and to permit them to their selves, to go on in their own waies, and so finally to persevere in sinne, and lastly to damne them for their sinne, for the manifestation of the Glory of his Justice on them, & of the greater mercy on the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory; inasmuch as he hath of his free grace provided better for them, then for millions of others. Only as touching the grace of regeneration, of faith and of repentance, he did not only ordaine of his mere pleasure to bestow that on his Elect, and not on Reprobates; but in time he doth of his mere pleasure conferre that grace on some; denying it to others. This doctrine is so dishonourable to the *Trinity* in this Authors judgment, as that to deny there is any God at all, he thinks to be lesse dishonourable: A prodigious assertion! We have the lesse cause to be moved, when he preferred the annihilation of our natures, before the suffering of hell paines. When he seemes to preferre the annihilating of the blessed Trinity, before the renouncing of his own vile fancies. As for that of *Eusebius*, true it is, the gods of Paynims sought only the destruction of those that served them, and that not of their bodies but their soules also. The true God put *Abraham* once upon the sacrificing of his Son, for the tryall of his faith and obedience, but perceiving his obsequious readinesse, took a course to restraine him, Of him it is true, *He saveth both man and beast, and the eyes of all doe wait upon him, and he giveth them meat in due season, he heareth the cry of Ravens, and not a sparrow lights upon the ground without his providence; The very Lyons roaring after their prey do seek their meat at (the hands of) God.* Yet if he be pleased to save our soules, we have reason to submit unto him in doing what he will with our bodies, which yet one day he will raise, glorious bodies, when mortality shall be swallowed up of life. We acknowledge no other end of man's creation, and of all other Divine Acts of God, but his own glory. For even there where *Solomon* professeth, *God hath made even the wicked against the day of evil*, he withall acknowledgeth, that both them and all things, he hath made for himselfe. God of his mere pleasure created all, but of his mere pleasure he damnableth none. But every one that is damned is damned for his sin, & that willfully committed & contumaciously continued by them that come to ripe yeares. For as *Austin* saith *Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia; Liberty without grace, is not liberty, but willfullnesse or contumacy.* I come to the second part of his first argument.

The second part of the Argument. Sect: 1.

M. Mason's
Addit. p. 24.

25.

Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens finnes on earth, and makes him the Authour, not of the sinne only that entred by *Adam* into the world, but of all other finnes, that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end. No murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of God Almighty's decrees. The Scripture I am sure teaches us another lesson. *Thou art not a God, saith David that hast pleasure in wickednesse.* And the Prophet *Esay* tells the people, that when they did evil in the sight of the Lord, they did chuse the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he

Psal. 5. 4.
Ef. 66. 4.
1 Jam. 1. 13. 14

1 Jo: 2. 16.

Eccles. 15.
12.Prosper relp.
ad Object. 11.
Vincent.Resp. Obi. 4.
Vincent l. 1.ad Monim. c.
19. l. 2. cont.
Marcion. c. 9Basil. Homil.
Quod Deus
non est &c.

Answer.

he is drawn away with his own concupiscence. And St. John when he had referred all the finnes of the world to three heads, *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life*; tells us that, *they are not of the Father, but of the world*. To which Speeches let me adde the speech of Stracides (though not of the same authority.) *I say not thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath caused me to erre; for he hath no need of the sinfull man.*

2. Pious antiquity hath constantly sayd the same, and prest it with sundry reasons; some of which are these as follow. If God be the Authour of sinne, then he is worse then the Devill; because the devill doth only tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may be resisted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted. This is *Prosper's* argument, who to some objecting that by St. *Austin's* doctrine, when *Fathers* defile their own Daughters, and *Mothers* their own Sonnes, *Servants* murder their masters, or men commit any horrible villanies, it cometh to passe because God hath so decreed. Answereth that if this were layd to the Devils charge, he might in some sort cicare himselfe of the imputation. *Quia est d. testatur est furor peccantium, probaret tamen se non inulisse vim criminum.* Because though he be delighted with man's finnes, yet he doth not, he cannot compell men to sinne: What a needesse therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be justly fathered upon the Divell.

2. He cannot be a punisher of sinne: For none can justly punish those offences of which they are the Authors. This is *Prosper's* argument too. It is against reason to say that he which is the slayer of the Devill would have any one to be the devills Servant. This reason *Fulgentius* useth likewise *illius rei Deus ultor est*, 19. l. 2. cont. *cujus Auctor non est. Tertullian* also before them hath sayd. *He is not to be accounted the Author of sinne, who is the forbiddor yea and the condemner of it.*

3. He cannot be God, because he should not be just, nor holy; nor the Judge of the world, all properties essentiall to God. And this is *Basil's* reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. It is all one (saith he) to say that God is the Author of sinne, and to say he is not God.

4. Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the finnes of men, is neither good nor true.

It is first layd to the charge of our Divines that by this their opinion, they make God the Authour of sinne, not of the first only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other finnes, that have been, are, or shall be committed in the world, as murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations. But in all these wastfull discourses not a word of prooffe. The charge is made in the first place, the prooffe last. All that he labours to prove here is, that God is not the Author of sinne. *Bellarmino* hath bestowed, or rather cast away a whole book on this crimination, so him *Arminius* refers *Perkins*, telling him that he should have answered *Bellarmino*. I have taken some paines to performe that taske upon that motion of *Arminius*. I would I could receive from this Authour a reply to any materiall particular thereof, the rather because I understand in part his Zeale for *Bellarmino* in his age, correcting the harsh exceptions he hath made against him in his younger dayes. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Authors discourse, with that discourse of *Bellarmino*, and judge indifferently what an hungry peece this is in comparison to that of *Bellarmino's*; And whether his paines had not been better bestowed in replying upo my answer thereunto, then to adde such scraps as these to that full table of *Bellarmino's* provision; and whether these deserve any answer, that whole discourse of *Bellarmino* being refuted throughout. *Bradwardine* disputes the question, *Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum*. I say he disputes it indifferently on both sides; and let every Schollar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argument, and consider well his resolution, and where he differs any thing from our Divines in this *Calvin* observing how frequent the Scripture is in testifying God's hand to be operative in abominable courses, thereupon writes a Treatise. *De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo*; in all which he exactly conformes himselfe to Scripture expressions. And these and such like vile Criminators may as well taxe God's word for making God the Author of sinne, as *Calvin*; who most accurately conformes himselfe to the testimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a disputation sometimes at *Heidelberg* on this Argument, where *Copenius* the President or Moderator made manifest, that look upon what grounds they criminated *Calvin* for making God the Authour of sinne; upon the same grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of sinne. For *Calvin* throughout in his expressions conformes himselfe to the language of the holy Ghost. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, *God takes pleasure in sinne*. *Piscator* confesseth that, *God taketh no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth*, upon that place in *Ezechiel*; how much lesse in wickednesse. And he illustrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denied, but that God willeth the death of him that dyeth. For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth; yet he takes no pleasure in it. Like as a sick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleasure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, *God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe*; and as the Apostle speaks, *hardeneth whom he will*. Whereby it comes to passe infallibly that they doe not obey the Gospell, as appeareth by the objection following.

Why then doth he complaine. For who hath resisted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expostulate with him in this manner; *Why hast thou caused us to erre from thy wayes, and hardened our hearts against thy feare?* Yet we know that God takes no pleasure in disobedience, or in the hardnesse of any mans heart, nor can be the Authour of evill, with Sir Francis Bacons distinction in the booke formerly mentioned by this Authour. *Non quia non Author, sed quia non mali.* So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto disobedience, & in the prophet *Esayes* phrase *causeth men to erre from his wayes.* Yet the Lord himselfe we know *is righteous in all his wayes, & holy in all his workes,* though we are not able to dive into the gulfe, and search out the bottome of his judgments, and no marvaile. *For they are unsearchable;* Yet we make no question but through Gods mercy convenient satisfaction may be found without any such shæfull course of dismēbring scripture, and taking notice only of such passages as represent Gods displeasure against sin & sinners, and dissembling all other passages which drave Austin to confesse, *occulto Dei iudicio,* by the secret judgement of God, *fieri perversitatem cordis, the perversity of mans heart hath its course,* much lesse by setting the together by the eares. And I nothing doubt but the issue will be on the part of such, as are of this Authours spirit, either wholly to deny originall sin, or so to emaculate the vigor of it, as to professe that it is in the power of mā to cure it; or notwithstanding the strength of it, to beleive & repēt if he will, which though they pretēd to be wrought by a certain universal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we shall be able to prove that such a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it so that wicked men in their wicked courses *do choose the things that God would not,* Who would thinke that this Author, who makes such a flourish should content himselfe with such beggarly arguments; or that the world should be so simple as to be terrified with such scar-crowes? For is it not apparent that in scripture phrase there is *voluntas precepti,* a will of commandement, as well as *voluntas propositi,* a will signifying Gods purpose and decree? So thē though they chuse the things that God willed not in reference to his will of commandement; yet it might be Gods will, that is his purpose that even such sinnes should come to passe. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh should not let Israel goe for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpose that so he might make himselfe knowne in the land of Egypt by his judgements? & did he not reveale this to *Moses* to the cōfort of the childre of Israel, & keepe the from despaire in contēplation of the obstinacy of Pharaoh's spirit, when they were assured that God had an hād in hardening Pharaoh to stād out? And doth not Bellarmine professe that *malū fieri permitt sin & Deo bonū est, it is good that evill should cō to passe by Gods permission?* And shall it be unbecōing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he opposeth the same Doctrine of ours which this Authour doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Authour betrayeth, and withall carryeth himselfe with farre more ingenuity. For he takes notice of those places of Scripture whereupon our Divines do build, and accommodates himselfe to āswer them by some intepretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Authour doth not. 2. But what if there be no such text as this Authour builds upon? For looke what the word is, used in the originall *Pf. 5. 4.* the same is used. *Ef. 66. 4.* Now that in *Pf. 5. 4.* This Authour renders not *that wouldest not iniquity,* but *that hast no pleasure in iniquity.* And why then shall not that *Ef. 66. 4.* be accordingly rendred thus. *They choose the things wherein I had no pleasure, or wherein I had no delight,* and not as he expresseth it *the things that I would not.* Hereupon I imagined our English translation had thus rendred it, but consulting that, I found the contrary. For thus they render it. *They choose the things wherein I delighted not.* It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to preferre and follow the Geneva translation before the last and most authentick translation of the Church of England? In like manner the practise of Geneva must be of authority to cry us downe in the point of the morality of the fourth commandement. Were not the man well knowne to be found at heart, his favourites might well suspect him to pravaricate, in making so great a cry, and yet yeilding so little wooll. In the next place he alleadgeth that of *James.* *Let no man say when he is tempted that he is tempted of God. For God tempteth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawen away with his owne concupiscence* *Ja: 1. 13. 14.* Now *Peter Martyr* on the first to the Romans deales at large upon this place, and disputes strangely indiscounting of Gods providence in evill. I would this Authour had taken the paines to answer him at least, that he might performe somewhat *santo dignum hiatu,* worthy of the great gaping he makes. It is true Bellarmine hath

Ef. 63. 17.

Ef. 63. 17.

Rom. 11.

Aug: de
grat: & lib:
arbit.

Ef. 66. 24.

Lib. i. de A-
miss. gratia.

Ja: 1. 13. 14.

Col. 2. 11.
Gen: 5. 3.
Pf. 51. 5.
Job. 3. 11.

taken him to taske after a sort in his eighth chapter of his second book *de Amiff. gratia & statu peccati*. And I have replied upon *Bellarmino* at large in my *Vindicia*, in that large digression wherein I take *Bellarmino* to taske in that book of his, whereunto I referre the Reader. Yet to say somewhat of this place befor I passe. It is apparent that the Apostle in this place doth not so put off from God the workes of tempting as to cast it upon Satan; but onely so as to shew; that whatsoever the divine providence is there about, either by the ministry of Satan (who is God's minister in hardening men to precipitate courses. (1 Kings the last) or otherwise, yet still the sinner is unexcusable; for as much as he is then only tempted (*effectually*) For so it is to be understood; otherwise it were not true, as it appears in the case of *Joseph* tempted by his Mistris when he is drawn away by his own concupiscence. It is true, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world, they are the members of that body of sin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by naturall generation. Holy *Jacob*, the Son of holy *Isack* a Patriarch, & of holy *Rebecca* a Prophetesse was borne in sin as well as *Esaú*; and *Seth* as well as *Cain*, and this seemeth to be called the Image of *Adam*, after his fall. Behold I was shapen in wickednesse, sayth *David*, and in sin hath my Mother conceived me. And except a man be borne againe he cannot see the kingdome of God. This, though a mystery, yet is nothing strange to us, whom God in mercy hath reserved unto these times of grace; But it was very strange to *Nicodemus* a Ruler in *Israel*. This hath been the condition of man ever since the fall of *Adam*; and arising merely from the withdrawing of God's spirit from him, and that most justly upon their first sin in tasting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the sin of our first parents in the way of a meritorious cause, so from the just judgment of God taking his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to doe, as appears by this, that by vertue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in *Christ*, he doth not take his spirit from us, though too often we sin against him. No not from *David*, notwithstanding those foule finnes committed by him, as appears by his prayer unto God; that, he would restore him to the joy of his salvation; signifying thereby that he had lost that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifesting hereby that still he retained that. And considering that God proceeded with *Adam* herein in the way of judgment, *Austine* acknowledgeth *Concupiscence* to be a punishment of sinne, as well as sin, and a cause of other finnes, in his fifth book against *Julian* the *Pelagian* cap. 3. As for that of *Siracides*, say not thou, God hath caused me to erre. As it is true that no man must cast the blame of sinning upon God, & think himselfe blamelesse. So it is as true that in consideration of our own inability to stand of our selves, & prone to fall (evē to fall away like water spilt upō the ground that cannot be recovered; containe it selfe it cannot, but it may easily be contained) the Church doth sometimes expostulate with God (such is the liberty and παρρησια which he vouchsafeth unto his Children.) in an holy manner saying, Wherefore hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts against thy feare; Not that this he doth, infundendo malitiam, by infusing malice into them, but, non infundendo gratiam, by not infusing such grace into them, as to preserve them from sin. For as *Martha* said unto *Jesus*, Lord if thou had'st been here our brother *Lazarus* had not dyed. So may we say if the strength of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not sined in this or that particular. It is true God hath not need of the sinfull mā: much lesse of his salvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleasure manifest his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of justice punishing, he must permit sin to enter into the world, & forbear that providence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angells, so he might have kept man also from sinning. As for the reasons of pious Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Author of sin, they are very needelesse in this controversy between us & our adversaries, the question between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adversaries so denying him to be the Author of evill, as withall they deny him to be the Author of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, so to maintaine that God is not the Author of sinne, that withall we maintaine that he is the Author of all good, both morall and naturall, and much more supernaturall. Yet as I have considered the seven reasons of *Bellarmino* to this purpose collected out of the Antients; so I am content to take into consideration the three reasons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the first, to manifest how superficially and absurdly he carrieth himselfe therein, observe the wildnesse of his reasoning besides all rules of sobriety. If God (sayth he) be the Author of sinne, then he is worse then the Devill, because the Devill doth only tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may be resisted

ited. Let all the Universities of the world be judge between us of the shamefull irregularity of this discourse. His syllogisme is hypotheticall; for the first proposition is hypotheticall and conditionall. Now all such syllogismes by the rule of all Schooles must proceed either from the negation of the consequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the consequent; but no such processe is made here. And indeed it should be framed thus to inferre the proposition undertaken to be proved. *If God be the Authour of sin, then he is worse then the Divell: but God is not worse then the Divell; therefore he is not the Authour of sin.* But this Authour disputes after no such manner. But his affection carrying him all along to cast some soule aspersiō on our Doctrine in some particular or other, and being withall in heat of passion, he doth most shamefully involve and entangle himselfe. And indeed quite besides his present purpose, he aimes only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerfull and effectuall decree, doth more make God the Authour of sin then the Devill, which is utterly aliene from that he proposed in this place. Yet I am willing to doe him this favour, to help a lame Dogge over the stile, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he cannot so dext'rously deliver himselfe though quite besides the purpose. Thus therefore the argument should proceed according to his irregular intention. *If God doth will and procure sins by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted, then is God worse then the Devill. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure sins by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be resisted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worse then the Devill.* Thus have I endeavoured to bring this argument to some shape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me shew the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may discerne what spirit he breathes, that is the Authour of it in a mixture both of ignorance and abominable profanenes. And first I begin with the major proposition. And here first let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authours opinion, that, God doth will and procure sin by some decree, though not by a powerfull and effectuall decree that cannot be resisted. For otherwise did he acknowledge every will of God as it signifies his decree, to be powerfull, and effectuall and irresistible, what need he cumber his Reader with such unnecessary Epithites, cast in like lumber only to trouble the course of disputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree sin by a powerfull and effectuall decree. 1. He must contradict himselfe. For formerly he cited, *Es. 66. 4.* to prove that men in wicked courses, doe choose the things that God would not. 2. If God doth will it, but not by a powerfull and effectuall, & irresistible decree, let him shew what that decree is, whereby he wills sins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditionall; and let him speak plainly then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure sin in the world, and I am verily perswaded he is to seek what to answer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it cannot be avoided, but it must be, by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be resisted; seeing the Apostle saith plainly speaking of his decree, that it *cannot be resisted*. Upon these considerations I am perswaded, that this Authour doth utterly deny that God doth at all will sin, or decree that any such thing shall come to passe in the world, & that these attributes of powerfull, and effectuall, & irresistible, are used by him not for distinction sake, but meerly for amplification, that so he might speake with a full mouth. Now having brought this Authour home to himselfe, and delivering himselfe and his meaning plainly, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having so fully disputed the point in a certaine digression in my *Vindicia lib. 2. Digrees. 4.* The title whereof is this *Whether the holy one of Israel without any blot to his Majesty may be said to will sin.* And forthwith I answer, that, *God may be said thus farre to will sin, in as much as he will have sin to come to passe.* And for explication sake it is added; that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether naturall, morall, or spirituall come to passe by his working of them: Only evill things he will have come, to passe by his permitting them. But this Authour affects to worke upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their braines with answering my reasons, least thereby he should raise many spirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this discourse of *M. Hord's* some of that sect thought good to have it coppied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and so more fit to promote their edificatiō in the plausible way of *Arminian* religion: well therefore in the prooffe of this tenet, namely, that God will have sin come to passe by his permission. I prove first by Scripture. *God hath put in their hearts* (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) *to fulfill his will.* Now marke what is the object of God's will, in the words following, *and to agree, and give their kingdōes unto the beast untill the words of God shall be fulfilled:* now by giving their Kingdōes unto the beast, is not to depose or dethrone themselves, or to part with their Kingdōes, but only to submit their regall authority to the executiō of the beasts wrath

1 Pet. 2. 8.

2 Thes. 2. 11.

Rom. 1. 24.

Acts 4. 28.

Amos. 7. 16.

17.

Prov. 22. 14.

2 Sam. 12.

11.

1 Kings. 11.

31.

against the Saints of God. Like as in the dayes of Poperie, when the Saints of God were by Popish Prelates condemned for heresies, then they were delivered into the hands of the secular powers, the sherifes to burne the at a stake. Now this the holy Ghost makes the object of Gods will, and their agreement thus to execute the Popes Antichristian pleasure is said to be Gods worke. For God is said to put it into their hearts to doe this evill of his. Of disobedient persons the Apostle professeth that *they are ordained to stuble at Gods word*, wherein undoubtedly they sin. Paul likewise testified of some that *God sends the strong delusions, that they should beleive a lye*. of others that *God gave them up to uncleannes through the lusts of their owne hearts to dishonour their owne bodies betweene themselves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient*. Now let every sober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardned the harts of the other, it were not his will, that those foule things which were committed by them should come to passe by his permissiō. Then consider what the Apostles with one consent testifie concerning those abominable acts committed against the holy son of God, namely that both *Herod & Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Israel, were gathered together to doe what Gods hand & his counsell had before determined to be done*. This the Apostles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditatiōs. And let every Christian consider, whether it the Scripture, had not made mention of this, & any one of us had used the like prayer & meditatiō, this Author & all that are of his spirit, would not have beene ready to spit in our faces & cry us downe for notorious blasphemers. Yet the Apostles indued with the spirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lords holinesse in all this. Hence I proceeded to the passages of the Old Testament for the confirmation of the same truth. As namely that whereas the desolatiō of the holy Land begun by the Assyrians, finished by the Babylonians, could not cōe to passe without many enormous sins. Who can deny, that it was Gods will that these things should come to passe, considering that *Assur himself is acknowledged by God to be the rod of his wrath and the staffe of his indignation, whom God would send against an hypocriticall nation, & against the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the spoyle, & to take the prey, & to tread them downe like the mire in the streets?* Hence I proceeded to shew how that it is Gods usuall course to punish sin with sin. Now when God exerciseth his judgments, shall not those things justly be said to come to passe by his will, which are punishments of foregoing sinnes? See the judgment of God denounced against *Amaziah the Preist of Bethell. Thou sayst prophecy not against Israel, & drop not thy word against the house of Isaac. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot in the cities, & thy sons & thy daughters shall fall by the sword. And in like manner Solomon saith The mouth of a strange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein. The incest of Absolom defiling his fathers cōcubines in a shameles manner, came it not to passe by the will of God, whose word is this; Behold I will raise up evil against thee, out of thine owne house, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, & he shall ly with thy wives in the sight of this sun?* The defection of the ten tribes frō the house of David, came it not to passe by the will of God, when God himselfe testifies that it was his worke, & not his will onely? Thus saith the Lord the God of Israel, *I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee, speaking to Jeroboam; here we have Gods will for it. And againe the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God saying, speak to Rehoboā the son of Solomon King of Judah, & unto all the house of Judah & Benjamin, & to the remnant of the people, saying, Thus saith the Lord, ye shall not goe up, nor fight against your brethren, the children of Israel; returne every man to his house; for this thing is from me.* Here we have Gods word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of *Pharohs* heart, that he should not let Israel go; the selling of *Ioseph* into Egypt by the hands of his unnaturall brethren came to passe, by the will of God? I proceed to prove the same truth by evidence of reaso. First because God permits sin to come to passe as all confesse, though he could hinder it, if it pleased him, & that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it? but because he would have it come to passe, & accordingly *permissiō* is reckoned up by Schoole Divines, amongst the sinnes of Gods will, like as also is Gods commandment. Now what God commandeth if it be done, it is said to come to passe by the will of God; albeit the things that God commandeth, seldome, the things he permits, allwayes come to passe; according to the common tenet of Divines, even *Vostius & Arminius* not excepted. Againe it is the common opinion of all, that therefore God permits sin, because he can and will worke good of it, which plainly supposeth that sinne shall come to passe if God permits it, & consequently it must needes be the will of God, it shall come to passe. Thirdly it is granted on both sides that the act of sin is Gods worke in the way of an efficient cause, not the outward act onely which is naturall, but the inward act of the will

will which is morall, even this as an act is the worke of God: How can it be then but the deformity and vitiouſneſſe of the act, muſt come to paſſe God willing it, though not working it, conſidering that the deformity doth neceſſarily follow the act, in reference to the creatures working it, though not in reſpect of Gods working it? Laſtly all ſides agree that God can give effectuall grace, whereby a man ſhall be preſerved from ſin infallibly. Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give, doth it not manifeſtly follow that he will not have ſuch a man preſerved frō ſin? To theſe I added the teſtimony of divers; as that of *Auſtin*. *Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe Good will have it come to paſſe, either by ſuffering it to come to paſſe, or himſelfe working it.* If good 9. 5. he workes it, if evill permits it, tis true of each that he wills it. & cap. 96. *It is Good, ſaith Auſtin, that evill ſhould come to paſſe.* And *Bellarmino* himſelfe ſo farre ſubſcribes hereunto, as by profeſſing that *It is good that evils ſhould come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion.* The ſame *Auſtin* confeſſeth that *The perversity of the heart comes to paſſe by the ſecret judgment of God* And againe that *after a wonderfull and unſpeakable manner, even thoſe things which are committed againſt the will of God (to wit againſt the will of his commandment) do not come to paſſe beſides the will of God; to wit the will of his purpoſe.* *Anſelme* the moſt ancient of ſchoole Divines in his booke of the concord of foreknowledge with free will; *Conſidering ſaith he, that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills, that the will of mā ſhall not be conſtrained by any neceſſity: to will or no; and withall will have an effect followe the will of man. In this caſe it muſt needs be that the will of man is free; and that alſo which God willeth ſhall come to paſſe, to wit by that will of man.* Now obſerve what in the next place he concludeth hence *In theſe caſes therefore it is true that the worke of ſin, which man will doe, muſt needs be, though man doth not will it of neceſſity.* And in his concord of predeſtination and free will. *In Good things God doth worke, both that they are, and that they are good, in evill things he workes onely that they are, not that they are evill.* *Hugo de ſancto Victore* 1. *De ſacr.* 4. p. 13. *When we ſay God willeth that which is good; it ſounds well; but if we ſay God willeth evill it is harſh, to eares, neither doth a pious mind admit of the good God, that he willeth evill for hereby he thinkes the meaning is that God loves and approves of that which is evill, & therefore the pious mind abhorres it; not becauſe that which is ſaid is not well ſaid, but becauſe that which is well ſaid is not well underſtood.* To theſe I adde the teſtimony of *Bradwardine* at large. A man reputed ſo pious in thoſe dayes, that the Kings proſperous ſucceſſe in thoſe dayes was cheifly imputed unto his piety; who followed him in his warres in France as Preacher in the camp. In the laſt place I make answer to the Sophiſticall arguments of *Aquinas* and *Durandus*, and the frothy diſputation of *Valentianus*, all of them ſtanding to maintaine the contrary. Now let every ſober Chriſtian judge of this Authours propoſition, when he ſaith that *If God doth will and procure ſin &c. he is worſe then the Devill.* For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture teſtimonies, by reaſon, and alſo with the concurrence of diſverſe learned Divines; that it is Gods will that ſin ſhould come to paſſe, even the horrible outrages committed againſt the holy ſonne of God were before determined by Gods hand and counſell. Now what followes herehence by this Authours diſcourſe; but that the holy Apoſtles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worſe then the Devill. So little cauſe have we to be impatient; when ſuch horrible blaſphemies are layd to our charge, when we conſider what honourable comparters we have in theſe our ſufferings. Yet ſee the vanity of this conſequence repreſented moſt evidently; For albeit the will of Gods decree be powerfull & effectuall and irrefiſtable, and conſequently every thing decreed thereby ſhall come to paſſe powerfully, effectually, irrefiſtibly, yet this reſpects onely the generality of the things eveniency, not the manner how. For onely things neceſſary ſhall by this irrefiſtible wil of God, come to paſſe neceſſarily: But as for contingent things, they by the ſame irrefiſtable will of God ſhall come to paſſe alſo; but how? not neceſſarily but contingently; that is with a poſſibility of not coming to paſſe. Now the free actions of men are one ſort of contingent things. They therefore ſhall infallibly come to paſſe alſo by vertue of Gods irrefiſtable will; but how? Not neceſſarily but contingently, that is with a poſſibility of not coming to paſſe in generall as they are things contingent: And in ſpeciall they ſhall come to paſſe not contingently onely but freely alſo; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwiſe. Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of theſe actions. For if they are good and ſo farre as they are good they come to paſſe by Gods working of them, but if they are evill, and ſo farre as they are evill they come to paſſe onely by Gods permitting; according to that of *Auſtin*. *Non aliquid ſit niſi omnipotēs fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo.* *Not any thing comes to paſſe, but God willing it either by ſuffering it (to wit in caſe it be evill) or himſelfe working it (to wit in caſe it*

Cont. Julianus
1. 5. c. 3.

be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Bishop, and Bishops, and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine what/soever should come so passe in time; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather.* Farther consider it is confessed by all, that God concurs in producing the act of sinne, as an efficient cause thereof not morall, but naturall. And Aquinas himselfe, though he denies that, *Voluntas Dei est malorum*, Because indeed as *Hugo de Sancto Victore* observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case *Voluntas approbans; his Will approving it, and loving it.* And so it is justly denyed that *God doth will evill things*, speaking of the evill of sinne. Yet Aquinas professeth, and disputes and proves that *Actus peccati est a Deo, the Act of sinne is from God.* Like as the Act of walking is from the soule, though the lamenes in walking ariseth from some disease in the legge. Now the Devill concurs not in this manner to any act of sin; neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient, but onely Morall by tempting and perswading. What therefore? shall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honesty, that by the confession of all men God is hereby made worse then the Devill? To what abominable courtes do the wilde witts and profane hearts of these men expose them? The greatest works of *Satan* in moving men to sin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them. Now these operations are also attributed to God. And like enough he doth usually performe them, not by the ministry of his holy Angels, but by the Ministry of *Satan* and his Angells of Darkenesse, as we read. 1. *Kings* 22. v. 21. 22. 23. *Joh*: 13. 27. *Acts* 5. 3. What then shall the Devill so farre possesse our hearts as to break forth into such intolerable blasphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad, or worse then the Devill. The providence of God I willingly confesse is wonderfull, and mysterious in this, like unto the Nature of God, to be adored rather then pryed into. So this providence to be dreaded rather then for satisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be searched into. Yet all confesse that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleased him, and rebuke *Satan* and restraine the power, and stop the course of sin, and prevent occasions leading thereunto, but he will not, and why? But because he knowes it becomes his almighty power and wisdom infinite, rather *ex malis bene facere, quam malum esse non sinere*, To worke good out of evill, then not at all to suffer evill. Lastly what meanes this Authour to carry himselfe so as to betray so strange ignorance in mitigating *Satans* operation in tempting unto sin; as if this were not sufficient to make him the Authour of sin. Especially considering the reason that moves him hereunto, which is meereley the delight that he takes in dishonouring God, and being a desperate spirit himselfe to make as many as he can partakers of the same desperate condition. For *cupiant perditū perdere*, sayth Cyprian, *cū sint ipsi pēnales, querunt sibi ad pēnam comites*; being damned themselves they desire to damne as many as they can: And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day, they desire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling, and sucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out. For as the Historian observes. *Maligna est calamitas, & cum suo supplicio crucietur, acquiescit alieno; Calamity makes a man of a spightfull nature, and when himselfe is tormented, he takes content in this that others suffer with him.* And as the Oratour observes, *Nullum adversarium magis metuas, quam qui non potest vivere, potest occidere.* No adversary more to be feared, then he who cannot live himselfe, yet can kill another. This makes a coward resolute; when he must needs dye, he will fight like a mad man, and kill all he can. I say what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head, as if it were without question; That he is not the Authour of sinne, who onely is a Morall cause thereof, but rather he that is the naturall efficient: whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary. As namely *Dominicus Soto* in his first booke of nature and grace chap. 18. *Although* (sayth he) *there are many that thinke it hard to explicate, how in the hatred of God, which hath an inward and indivisible malignity, God can be the cause of the entity, but not of the fault: Yet this is not so hard to be understood.* Then he proceeds to shew how this may be. First laying for his ground what it is to be the cause of sinne, thus; *In morall actions he is altogether, and is judged to be the cause, who by a law, or help, or counsell or favour or perswasion moves any one either to good or evill.* Observe I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour supposeth without all proofe. For in the judgement of *Dominicus Soto*, he onely is to be accounted the cause

of another mansinne, who is the morall cause thereof, as by tempting, counselling, perswading thereunto, And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner. *But as for God he by all these wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honest, and none at all to evill.* Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone; but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamanca, as Molina confesseth in his disputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jesuite were of another opinion. Yet Vasquius the Jesuite professeth that he was ever of the same minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamanca in this; In his 129 disputation upon the first part of his Summes. As for Prosper he hath no such argument. But first observe the Objection whereunto he answereth, was made against the Doctrine of Austin; as the Authour acknowledgeth. Whence it followeth that looke how this Authour chargeth our doctrine, after the same manner was the doctrine of Austin charged above 1200 yeares agoe; let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Austin in this particular, and the congruity of this Authours spirit in charging us with the spirit of the Semipelagians in charging Austin after the same manner. Secondly consider the objection there made 'tis this. *Quod quando incestant Patres filias, & matres filios; vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat, quia ira Deus predestinavit, ut fieret.* When father commit incest with their Daughters, and mothers with their sonnes. Or when servants kill their Lords; therefore this comes to passe, because God hath so predestinated that it should come to passe. Consider, in this objection the fault of these abominable courses is not layd upon those that commit them, but onely upon God; as if Gods predestination did worke in such a manner, as to compell men or women to commit such and such abominations. And so Prosper conceives the Argument to proceed, as if this were their intention. And accordingly makes answer. *Si Diabolo objiceretur quod talium facinorum ipse Author, ipse esset incentor,* were it objected to the Devill that he were the Authour of such sinnes, and did inflame men to the committing of them (which indeed is the Devills course and not Gods) yet I thinke, sayth he, that the Devill might in some sort disburthen himselfe of this crimination, & talium scelerum patresores de ipsorum voluntate vinceret, and make it appeare that their owne Wills were the committers of such sinnes. *Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum.* Because though he tooke pleasure in the fury of sinners, yet might he justifie that he forced no man to sinne. After the same manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galles; *Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit,* God by his power compells men to sin. And as touching the notion of predestination it is true the Antients used that onely in reference to those things which were wrought by God. *Nihil ergo talium* (to wit of wicked actions) *negotiorum Deus predestinavit ut fieret.* Predestination being onely *Enchirid. c.* of such things, which come to passe by Gods working of them. Yet the same Austin 95. professeth that such things which come to passe by Gods permission (of which kind are all manner of sinnes) even those came to passe God willing the, though not by Gods predestinating of them. And as touching Senacherib who was slaine by his owne sonnes; the Lord professeth saying, *I will cause him to fall by the sword in his owne land.* And upon Amaziah the Priest of Bethel the judgment was pronounced from the Lord, *Thy wife shall be an harlot* And whatsoever comes to passe it is Gods will it should come to passe, sayth Austin, how much more that which comes to passe in the way of judgment.

2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carryeth himselfe any thing more handsomly in that. *If God be the Authour of sinne he cannot be the punisher of sin.* This argument is better shaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in justice the punisher of that whereof himselfe is the Authour. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the same sinne whereof he was the Authour, which was not expressed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magistrates are sinners, yet the punishers of sinne in others, yea of the same kind of sinne. As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God, and that justly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sinne? It is well knowne, that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit sinne, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unlesse God permit sinne, it cannot be committed by any, *Nosceret, saith Austin, ficos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. Quam vero innumera-bilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, qua utique si voluisset nulla ratione permitteret. Cere-*

De auxili. 1. 1.
c. 2. num. 7.

lib. 2. Digres.
7.

tainely if we suffer those, over whom we have power, to commit sinne, we shall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the sinnes which he suffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, so that by no means they should cōe to passe. Or is he the Authour of sinne who is the efficient cause of the act of sinne? It is *Aquinas* his doctrine, that, the act of sinne is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cause; and it is commonly received to be the first cause in the kind of efficient, subordinate to none, and all other subordinate to him. Nay more then this *Scotus* professeth, and after him the *Dominicans*; that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though sinfull) as touching the substance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwise then to come to passe agreeably to their nature; necessary acts necessarily, free acts freely. So *Barmardine* maintaines that God necessitates the will of the creature; but how? To performe acts thereof freely. Suppose they did maintaine that God in his omnipotency did impose a necessity upon our wills, as *Snarez* imputes to our Divines that they so teach. Yet in this case *Snarez* the Jesuite will justify them, that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction, or that doth exceed God's omnipotency. Neither did I ever meet any colour of reason, why God might not as wholly determine the will to any free act thereof, as concurre with the will to the producing of the same act. And that in the concurrence of God and man to the same act, the first cause should be in subordination to the second; or the second cause not in subordination to the first, is against all reason, and obnoxious to manifold contradiction, as I have shewed in my *Vindicia*. Whereas for God to move a creature to every act of his congruously to his nature, and so to determine him, is most agreeable to reason, and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction. And yet notwithstanding I see noe sufficient reason to conclude these determinations, as touching things naturall, such as is the substance of every naturall act, there being a power to performe that in a naturall Agent. Of supernaturall acts the case is different. It seemes to me enough, that God will have this or that evill come to passe by his permission. For when God created the world out of nothing; what transient action of God can be imagined, when there was no matter at all for any such transient action to worke upon; God's will was sufficient to have that to exist which before had no being: And why may not the will of God be sufficient for the existence of the motion of each creature after it hath existence? But supposing these determinations of the creatures wills to be necessary, if God will not determine them to good what will follow hereence? Surely nothing but evill; unlesse man can determine himselfe to that which is good without God. For as for simple concurrence without subordination in working, as I said before, that cannot be affirmed without palpable and grosse contradiction, as I have proved in the digression formerly mentioned, proceed we yet farther. I know nothing doth more intimately concerne God's secret providence in evill, then the hardning of the creature to disobedience. Now the Scripture which is the very word of God, and the dictates of the Holy Ghost doth plainly and expressely teach, that albeit God commanded *Pharaoh* to let *Israell* goe, yet withall he hardened his heart that he should not let *Israell* goe for a long time, which refusall of his was wilfull and presumptuous disobedience. In like sort as touching obedience and disobedience to the Gospel, the Apostle tells us plainly that, *God hath mercy on whom he will*, to performe the one, and whom he will he hardeneth, thereby exposing them to the other. And hereupon this objection is made, *Why then doth God complaine* (to wit, of man's disobedience) *for who hath resisted his will?* And we know what answer the Apostle makes hereunto. *O man who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power of the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour, another unto dishonour?* Now will any sober Christian conclude hereence that because, God hardened *Pharaoh* that he should not let *Israell* goe, therefore he is the Authour of sinne. The Lord hath bid *Shimei* to curse *David*. Consider what *Austine* writes upon this. *Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis sapiens & intelligit? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur; sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam; in hoc peccatum iudicio suo iusto & occulto inclinavit, ideo dictum est, Dixit ei Dominus. How said the Lord to this man that he should curse David; Who is wise and he shall understand? For he said this not by commanding *Shimei* so to doe, in which case his obedience had been commanded; but in as much as *Shimei's* will, through his own vitiousnesse being evill, the Lord inclined it to this sinne, by his just and secret judgment. Thus saith he, The Lord useth the hearts of the wicked to the praise and benefit of the good: so he used *Judas* betraying *Christ*: so he made use of the *Jewes* crucifying *Christ*. And how great good did he procure therehence to all believers? Who also useth the *Devell* who is worst of all, yet he makes best use of him to exercise and prove the*

the faith and piety of the godly: So he wrought in the heart of Absalom to refuse the counsell of Achitophill, and make choice of that counsell which was nothing profitable. Who may not well tremble in the contemplation of those Divine judgments, whereby the Lord workes in the hearts of wicked men whatsoever he will, yet rendring unto them according to their merits. Then he proceeds to give other instances of Scripture to manifest God's working in the hearts of men, and when he hath done, he concludes in this manner: *Hic & talibus testimoniis divinarum eloquiorum satis quantum existimo, manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumque, voluerit sive ad bona pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique, suo aliquando occulto, semper autem iusto.* By these and such like testimonies of Divine Scripture, I take it to be sufficiently manifested, that God doth worke in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whithersoever he will, either to those things that are good, of his mercy, or to such things that are evill, for their deserts, in the way of judgment, which is sometimes known, sometimes secret, but alwayes just. And all this he shewes, to be wrought by God without prejudice to the freedome of their wills. And why should David pray after this manner. *Lord incline mine heart to thy testimonies, and not to covetousnesse*; If it were not in God's power to incline the hearts of men to covetousnesse? Yet I trust no sober Christian will conclude from this prayer of David, that God by executing such a power is the Author of sinne. Lastly this argument is drawne from God's justice, so is the third, which is to confound rather then to distinguish the reasons produced by him. We say that God cannot possibly be the Author of sinne, the necessity of his nature stands in opposition thereunto. For first sin hath no cause efficient but deficient only, as long agoe it hath been delivered by Austin. 2ly, a cause deficient or defective is either in a culpable manner, or in a manner nothing culpable. As for example, that Agent is defective culpably, that either omits the doing of that which he ought to doe; or omits to doe it after that manner which he ought to doe it: now I say it is impossible that the divine nature can be defective either of these waies, and consequently it is impossible that he should be the Author of sin, whereas he saith this is Prosper's argument it is untrue. He saith indeed it is against reason, that God who damnes the Devill should will that any man should be a Servant to the Devill: but forthwith he expounds himselfe. 1. Expounding what that condition is of being the Devills servants, whereof the objection did proceed. Now the objection was this, That the greatest part of men were created for this, that they should doe, not the will of God, but the will of the Devill: Now this objection saith Prosper proceeds from the Pelagians: *Qui Ada peccatum transisse in omnes diffitentur, who deny the sin of Adam to have passed unto all.* So that, to doe the will not of God, but of the Devill, is to be in the state of naturall corruption, and under the power of originall sinne, whereby they are not God's servants, but the Devills; this is not the condition of God's children in the state of Grace. Now Prosper shewes how originall sinne passeth over all, not by the will of God; and secondly, how it passeth over all by the will of God: Not by the will of God instituent; but by the will of God judicante: His words are these. *Hæc servitium non est institutio Dei, sed iudicium.* This slavery of sinne which came upon all by Adam's sinne is not God's institution but his judgment. As much as to say it came not upon a man by God's first creation, but by his judgment upon him, because of his first transgression; so that if divine judgment be the will of God; it is apparent Prosper is so farre from denying that slavery to have come upon all men by the just will of God, as that he expressly acknowledgeth it. It is true as Fulgentius saith, that God is not the Authour of sinne, but the revenger of it. And it is as true that it is as just with God to punish sinne with sinne, as Scripture justifies; as St Austin observes, and improveth at large divers Scriptures to this purpose, in his fifth Book against Julian the Pelagian, and third chap. Tertullian in saying, he is not to be accounted the Authour of sin, who is the forbider, yea the condemner of it, falls directly upon the same ground that Dominicus Soto, with the Divines of Salamanca, and Vasquez the Jesuites, in explicating what that is which makes me to be the Authour of a morall action; as namely, by commanding, by counselling it, and perswading it; and indeed condemnation is but consequent to a law forbidding this or that. Now it is apparent that God in this respect ought to be accounted the Authour of every good action, but of none that is evill. For he commands only that which is good, and counsellet and perswadeth thereunto, but forbiddeth and disswadeth every thing that is evill. Of this no notice at all is taken by this Authour, neither taketh he any care to shew what that is, that maketh any agent justly to be accounted the Authour of sinne.

3 His third reason is all one with the former as drawne from God's justice and holinesse and his being Judge of the world. For it is the property of the Judge to condemne transgressours

transgressours, whereupon his former Argument insisted, and that also was drawne from Gods justice. But I remember well what the *Poet* coupleth together when he saith,

Accessit fervor capiti numerusq; lucernis.

Honesty retaines the Creature from being the Authour of sinne not his nature, he being *peccabilis* by nature, but so is not God; It is impossible absolutely for him to be found defective any way in a culpable manner. He may withhold Grace from any man, I speak of Grace preservative from sinne. Neither is he unjust herein, for he is bound to none. At length he comes to prove the erimination laid upon his adverstaries, as followeth.

Sect. 2.

M. Mason's Ad-
dit. p. 25. 26. 27.
28.

But this opinion doth soe For albeit the writers that have defended it (*Piscator* and a few more of the blunter sort excepted) have never said directly and in *terminis*, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered these things; from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence that he is so.

Comment in Jo.
c. 15. v. 2.

For they say. 1. That, as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable. Those poore soules which lye under it must necessarily be damned. It is saith *Marlorate* a firme and stable truth, that the man whom God in his eternall counsell hath rejected, though he doe all the works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

Piscat. cont.
Shulm. p. 29.
Thej. 25.

2. That without sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed.* God, saith *Piscator*, did create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall; for otherwise he could not have attained those his principall ends. He means the manifestation of his justice in the condemnation of Reprobates; and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. *Maccovius* also saith the same. If sinne had not been, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much as to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been.

Maccov. dif. 17.
pag. 11.

Zanch. l. 5. de
nat. Dei c. 2. de
prædest. part. 4.
resp. ad post. arg.
prope finem.

3. That God decreed that Reprobates must unavoidably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed, and they damned. We grant saith *Zanchy*, that Reprobates are held so fast under Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish; and a little after he saith, We doubt not therefore to confesse, that there lieth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchangeable reprobation a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning to death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly.

Calv. l. 3. Instit.
c. 24. Sect. 14.

Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednelle of their own hearts, and partly because they are raised up by the unsearchable judgment of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of *Piscator*. Reprobates are precisely appointed to this evil, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne: And therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.

Pisc. resp. ad
dupl. Vorst. part.
1. p. 220.

4. That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne. So he procures their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding of sinne, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistible and secret working on their hearts, to sinfull actions. *Calvin* saith, that men and Devills and Reprobate men are not only held fast in Gods fetters, so as they cannot doe what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle *ad obsequia præstanda*, to doe as he would have the: & in the next chapter these are the words, that men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing to action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many cleare testimonies. In that Section following he saith. And surely unless God did worke inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he takes away wisdom from the wise. In these two chapters that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew that God doth not only behave himselfe privatively in procuring the sinnes of men, but doth also put forth powerfull and positive acts, in the bringing of the to passe.

Calv. instit. l. 1.
c. 17. Sect. 11.

And in the second book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by forsaking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardneth them, & that he saith commeth a great deale nearer to the propriety of Scripture phrases, namely, by stirring up by stirring up the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoiding their sinnes, but must of necessity commit them. Thus they teach; and therefore by just consequences they make God the Authour of sinne; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations.

Ibid. c. 18. Sect.
1.

Instit. l. 2. c. 4.
Sect. 3.

Deut. 2. 30.

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Answer.

Poets tell us there was a time when *Giants* on earth set themselves to fight against God in heaven; & because the place of his habitation was out of their reach, they laid mountaine upon mountaine hill upon hill, *Pelion* upon *Ossa*, that so they might make their approaches unto him, & beseige him in his own fastnes: this fable is a monumēt of the shipwrack of that truth among heathen-men, which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word. For when after the great *Déluge* in the dayes of *Noah*, men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth, they consulted how they might fortify themselves against the like inundation for the time to come, and thereupon encouraged themselves saying, *Goe to let us build us a City and a town, whose top may reach unto the*

Heaven

Heaven that we may get us a name, least we be scattered upon the whole earth. But how did the Lord deale with these presumptuous adventurers? The Poet's faign that Jupiter destroyed them with his thunderbolts; and as for one of them *Typhoeus* by name, a proud fellow, he laid him fast enough under the hill *Ætna* in Sicily, where he breaths out smoak & fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe somewhat bigger then a good Caliver. But the Scripture tels us, how that for their saying, *Goe too, let us build. &c.* the Lord answered them with a *Come on, let us goe downe and there confound their language, that every one perceiue not one anothers speech.* This Author herhaps is but a Pygmie for bodily presence, yet he may be a Gyant for his wit, and found *Διουαχην* to fight against God in a spirituall way in the opposing of his truth. As *Gamaliel* sometimes aduised the high Priest with his counsell to take heed, lest they were found even fighters against God. It is true this Author no doubt perswades himselfe that he fights for God, in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of sin. But let not the simple Reader be deluded with shewes, but seriously consider whither all this doe, which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election: which is so much the more foule, because he doth it underhand; as conscious to himselfe of his owne impotency to impugne it openly, or fearing the generall opposition of our Church against him, & therefore he practiseth to undermine it. And this I have found to be his course diuers years agoe in his private undertakings to draw profelytes unto him, namely to decline the point of grace, & of election, to deale only upon Reprobation, and there to put his concurrent to begin, as if he would have a young Divine to inform a *Se-xagenarian*, as I have seen under his own hand. But see the hand of God upon him in confounding his language, as when he stands for *Reprobation evitable & avoidable*, & reproacheth his adversaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable & unavoidable. This is the phrase of his Schoole. For I do not remember to have met with it any where, but in him, & his disciples: Now what man of common sense doth not observe this phrase to be applicable only to things that are to come; but of a contingent nature; so that they may be avoyded & declined; but by no means applyable to things already done, & that more then many thousand years agoe. For what sober man could heare with patience another discourse of the avoidable nature of *Noah's* flood now in these daies, & to maintain that it is at this day avoidable: what fustian like to this? Might he not as well take liberty to discourse of the *Æquinoctiall* pasticrust? It was wont to be said, that this alone God himselfe could not perform; namely to cagle that which is done to be not done. As *Aristotle* in his *Eth* relates a saying of one *Agatho* to that purpose. Now reprobation is confessed by all to be of the same age with election; & election was as the Apostle tels us, performed by God before the foundation of the world. And is not this Author then besides himselfe, when he pleads for evitable & avoydable Reprobation. But albeit this Author makes the worst of our opinions and expressions, yet I will not requite him by making the worst of his, that were base & inglorious, and to be overcome. I will therefore hearken to the Apostles counsell where he saith, *Be not overcome with evill, but overcome evill with good.* I will make the best of his, and according to the distinction of God's will used in Schooles; as it is taken either *quoad actum volentis*, or *quoad res volitas*, as touching the act of him that willeth, or the things willed. So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making such a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we willingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the absolutenes of God's decree. We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland, that *God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordain whatsoever should in time come to passe, yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away, but established rather.* So that whereas we see some things come to passe necessarily, some contingently; so God hath ordained that all things shall come to passe that do come to passe; but necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a possibility of not comming to passe. For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content my selfe with the article of Ireland, for this *Aquinas* thus distinguisheth. For having proposed this question, *Whether the Will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed.* To this question this Author with whom I deale would answer affirmatively, saying, it doth impose a necessity on all such things, or at least obrude such an opinion upon us; & himselfe undoubtedly thinks that in case Gods will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed thereby, both which are utterly untrue, & this last utterly denied by *Aquinas*. For first, every will of God is absolute in the judgment of *Aquinas*, which I prove thus,

1. p. quest. 19.
art. 8.

1. p. 19. art. 5.
et quest. 23.
art. 5. Corp.

Aquin. 1. p. q.
19. art. 8. concl.

1. p. q. 23. art. 3.
in corp. Includit
voluntatem per-
mittendi aliquē
cadere in culpam
et inferendi
damnationis po-
nam pro culpam.

Añ. 4. 28.

thus ; That will which hath noe cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Authour will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of *Aquinas* therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. *Divina voluntas non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit.* And in the body of that question thus he writes, *The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the distinction of God's Will. For when a cause is effectually and powerfull to worke, the effect followeth the cause, not only so farre as to be brought to passe, but also as touching the manner of its coming to passe. Therefore seeing the will of God is most effectually, it not only followeth that those things come to passe, which God will have come to passe, but that they come to passe after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to passe. Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot faile, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may faile in working, from which effects are brought to passe contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe; but how? Not allwaies necessarily or contingently. And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more cleare; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evil cause delight in confusion, and feare nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace, which is joyned with the permission of sinne: Or damnation for sinne, according to that on *Aquinas*, Reprobation includes the Will of permitting sinne, & inflicting damnation for sinne. Now both the permission of sinne, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to passe freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is noe actual transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have noe power to performe every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernaturall, as the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But noe sinfull act is supernaturall, all such are naturall. Now it is confest on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of originall sinne, yet he hath still power and free will to performe any naturall act, and accordingly he hath free power to abstaine from it. So that *Judas* had free will to abstaine from betraying his Master; After he had betrayed him, he had free power to abstaine from destroying himselfe; so that as these finnes of his for which he was damned were avoidable by him, in like manner his damnation for these finnes was avoidable. And albe- it God had determined that *Judas* by Divine permission should betray his Master, and destroy himselfe, according to that of *Austin*, *Judas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini; Judas was ordained to betray his master.* And that of the Apostles jointly, *Of a truth against thy holy Son Jesus both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered to doe what thy hand, and thy counsell had before determined to be done.* *Añ. 4. 28.* Yet herehence it followes only, that it was necessary (to wit, upon this supposition, namely, of the Divine ordinance.) that these things should come to passe, namely, both *Judas* his betraying of Christ, and *Herods* mocking of him, and *Pilates* condemning him, and the peoples crying out away with him, together with their preferring of *Barrabas* a murderer before him, and the Souldiers crucifying him. But how came it to passe? Not necessarily, but contingently, that is in this Authours phraze evitably and avoidably, inas- much as it was joyned with an absolute possibility to come to passe otherwise; Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God. For both *Judas* had free will to abstaine from betraying him, and *Herod* with his *Herodians* could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him, and *Pilate* from condemning him, and the Preists and people from conspiring against him; and the Souldiers from crucifying him, only they had no power to abstaine from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner, as no man else hath power to abstaine from any evill in a gracious manner, without grace: Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God, and a love of God to the very contempt of our selves, and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evill, is acceptable with*

with God unto eternall life, unlesse it proceed from this faith and this love. That which is here produced out of *Marlorate* is a strange speech, and such as I never read or heard from any before: and such, as whereof I can give no tolerable construction. And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with? It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absolutenesse of Reprobation, doth withall maintaine an apostacy from grace, which we do not. If *Marlorate* had any such opiniō he sings therein to himself, & to his own Muses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damne any man otherwaies then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance? Had he spoken of Good works morall only, it is true any hypocrite is capable of them; and none taste deeper of Damnation then hypocrites. But as for the worke of true faith & true repentance; it is the generall profession of our Divines, that as faith and the spirit of repentance once given, never faile, so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life, and free him from condemnation. But any thing serves this Authors turn to vent his stomack: And I am perswaded, there is not one more of all our Divines that he can shew to concurre with *Marlorat* in this. And if there were is it fit their improvident & inconsiderate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not, but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety? *Brentius apud Marloratum in illud; Joh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet, &c. Caterum hac sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quā solet argute, magis quam reverenter de predestinatione disserere, & pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi pessimè vivat. Nullum item à Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optimè vivat; se itaque velle pro suā libidine vivere. Ut ut enim sollicitè labores, non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere. Respondet hic Christus, Omnem palmitem, &c. quod dicitur. Quid ad te de occultā Dei predestinatione? Hoc tu videris, ut tu in me maneat, & fructum feras, reliqua dispensationi & prudentiae Dei committenda sunt. Nam etiamsi videaris ad aeternam salutem predestinatus, non tamen fructum feras; abijcieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus palmes.* He instances in *Saul*, then whom there was not a better man in *Israel*. That which is here cited out of *Marlorat* his *Expositio Ecclesiastica*, it is set down as in *Calvin's* Commentary: but no such thing is found in *Calvin*. And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking. And *Marlorat's* own exposition succeeds in a few words thus. *Qua ideo dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suā salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas & ignavia ab hominibus tollatur.* And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this, though a great C. as if it were *Calvin's* comes in between; and it begins thus. *Certum est enim decretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse; quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agat, & retrahet sententiam semel decretam.* Then follows the passage here alleadged; and at the heels of it these words: *Time igitur, & in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum assequaris.* Undoubtedly *Marlorat* approves of *Brentius* his exposition, otherwise he would not have placed it in his *Expositio Ecclesiastica*. Now *Brentius* brings in the very saying for which *Maldonat* is criminated; as the objection of some carnall person. Therefore when *Marlorat* seems to justifie such a saying, it must be in another sense; and that either of good workes in shew, of which *Brentius* also observed; that such might have been found in *Saul*: Or of workes in distinction from faith. And accordingly he concludes with exhortation *fear*: that is not to be secure, how good soever his workes are; but to have an eye to God and trust only to him, that so he may obtain salvation through *Jesus Christ*. *Calvin in Joh. 15. 6. Crescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quā à Christo resecta, sūt quia sicuti initium vigoris ab ipso est ita & continuus tenor. Non quod ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari: sed quia multa hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent & virent, qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini frustrantur.* They are said to to wither like a branch cut off, such as are cut off from *Christ*: because like as the beginning of their vigour is from him, so also their continuance. Not that at any time it falleth out that any of Gods Elect is cut off, but because many Hypocrites carry a faire shew for a time as if they were green and flourishing, who afterwards in rendring fruit make void the Lords Expectation.

2. The decree of Reprobation, as touching one part of it, cannot be executed without sin; For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin, so that there is no place for damnation, where sinne and that as a meritorious cause preceeds not. I had thought this Authour needed not to runne out to *Piscator* and *Maccovius* for prooofe of this; neither *Arminius* nor the Authour is of any other opinion I am confident, then

that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any, without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned. But there is another part of Reprobation. For as *Aquinas* speaks, it includes the will of permitting sin. Now the execution of this decree, which consists in the permitting of sin, doth not require the precedency of sinne. For when God first permitted the Angels to fall, this permission of his did not require any precedency of sinne in them; nor the permission of *Adam* to fall; it cannot be said without manifest contradiction, that it did. For before the first sinne there was no sinne. *Piscator* saith that, *God created men for this very purpose that they might fall*; he saith, *hoc consilio*, which is as much as to say, *with this purpose, not for this purpose*; to wit, *to permit them to fall*; And God purposing this, purposed that they should fall by his permission. For *Arminius* confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that, *Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum*. It must needs be that no argument shall persuade him to will that, which God permits him to will. And that it is good that evil should come to passe by God's permission, both *Austine* hath affirmed, & *Bellarmino* subscribed. And shall it not be lawfull for God to will that which is good? Undoubtedly neither justice punishing, nor mercy pardoning, can be manifested without sin, either to be punished, or pardoned, or both: neither is it credible to me that this Authour thinks otherwise. And is not the manifestation of God's mercy on some, and his justice on others, the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind, and consequently by the most received rules of Schooles first intended, even before the permission of sinne? For if the permission of sinne were first intended, then by the same rule of Schooles, it should be in the last place executed; that is, God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some, and punishing others, and afterwards suffer them to sinne; such is the learning and judgments of these Divines. And as for the foresight of sin, it is apparent, that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it; and more then that, it presupposeth the fruition of it. Now it is well knowne, that sinne in its own nature is meerly possible. How comes it to passe, that from the condition of a thing meerly possible, it hath passed into the condition of a thing future? This cannot be done without a cause; and that cause must be eternall; for the effect was eternall. For from everlasting sinne was future; for from everlasting God knew it to be future. Now there is nothing everlasting, but God himselfe, therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing meerly possible in its own nature, became future. And therefore, either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof, or by his will and decree. Not by his knowledge, for that rather supposeth the to be future, then makes them such. It remaines therefore that the will of God, and that alone makes every future thing to passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible, into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting. Let this Authour satisfie this argument, and I will ease him of all further paines, and lay down the bucklers before him.

3. It is untrue that by our Doctrine Reprobates doe unavoidably sinne. I have already demonstrated the contrary. For as I said, *Malum semper habitat in alieno fundo*, every actuall sinne is a naturall act; a worke of grace may be supernaturall as touching the substance of the act, so is not the worke of sinne, but allwaies naturall. Now no Christian that I know affirms that a man in the state of sin is bereaved of free will in things naturall. Nay we generally confesse, he hath free will in things morall, only as touching things spirituall he hath no freedome left therein: therefore as I said before, *Judas* might have naturally forborne to betray his Master; naturally forborne to destroy himselfe. If some object, the common opinion of Divines is, that in a state of nature there is *noe libertie* for sinne. I answer, first out of *Aquinas*, that this is to be understood of sinne in generall, not of any in particular: *Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit*. Though a man that is reprobated of God cannot obtaine Grace, (for how should he obtaine it if God will not give it? will they say that Grace is given according unto workes?) yet that he falls into this or that sinne, this is a contingent thing, and proceeds from his own free will. So say I every sinfull act committed by man in the state of naturall corruption, is committed freely in such sort that he might have abstained from it, but I doe not say that he could abstain from it in a gracious manner. But whether he doth that which is good, he doth it not in a gracious manner, so that still he sinneth more or lesse, and all by reason that as yet he hath neither faith in God, nor love of God, which are the fountaines of all gracious actions, both in doing that which is good, and in abstaining from that which is evill. As for *Zanchi's* saying, *That God holds Reprobates so fast that they cannot but sinne*. This act of God is no other then his denying them grace to breake of their finnes by repentance, and

*Thom: 1. part
q. 23. art. 3.
ad tertium.*

to, turne unto God. Now the Apostle professeth that as, *God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth others, even whom he will*, in denying this grace unto them. And make what objection he shapes hereupon, *thou wilt say then why doth he yet complaine?* (to wit of men's disobedience: for of nothing else doth the Lord complaine.) *For who hath resisted his will?* Observe the chaines wherewith God holds them fast irresistably, to wit the chaines of obduration. Let the Authour therefore charge St. Paul as well as Zanchy for making God the Authour of sinne, and indeed he might have abounded in passages out of holy Scripture alleadged to the same end, whereunto he alleadgeth these out of our Divines; yea and Papists too. But *Piscator, Zanchy, and Calvine*, these are his proper markes to shoo te at, ever since he learnt in his age to correct the errorrs of his youth in taking frivolous exceptions against *Bellarmino*. As for a necessity of sinning brought upon all by the sinne of *Adam*. *Arminius* acknowledgeth it, and this *Arminius* is acknowledged by *Corvinus* in his answer to *Lilennus*. Only God takes it away from his Elect at the time of their calling and regenerating, and leaves it upon the rest; and who can say black to the eye for this? Will we not give him libertie to have mercy on whom he will; and harden whom he will? Then let us fly in the face of *Paul* as well as *Calvine & Zanchy* for so plainly teaching this. The hardnesse of men's hearts is the immediate cause why they obey not God's word; But there is another cause also that our Saviour takes notice of, and that is this; That God doth not regenerate them, or hath not elected them. Of this our Divines may well take notice, because *Moses* before hath done the like. The Israelites profited neither by hearing of God's word, nor by the seeing of his mighty workes. I say by none of these did they profit unto repentance; and what was the reason hereof? Surely the hardnesse of their hearts, as *Moses* signifies, *Thou art a stiffe-necked people*. Yet he takes notice of another cause and that is this, *Yet the Lord hath not given our hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare unto this day*. So our Saviour in the Gospell, *He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God*. Now to be raised up in *Calvin's* Phrase, *to illustrate God's glory in their damnation*, is no other then to be broughe forth into the world, and not to be borne of God, that is, to have the grace of regeneration denied them, and consequently to be suffered to goe on in their finnes; and lastly to be damned for their sinne, to the manifestation of the glory of God's justice. *Solomon* saith as much, *The Lord made all things for himselfe*, that is for the manifestation of his glory, *even the wicked against the day of evill*. And St. Paul Rom:9 *by shewing mercy towards some*, signifies how God formes some after one manner; by hardening others he formes them after another manner comparing the 18.v. with the 20. And in the 21. He justifies God in this, and that in reference to different ends, which are the manifestation of his glory different waies, saying, *Hath not God power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour, and another unto dishonour*. And verse 22. *What if God to shew his wrath and to make his power known, suffered with long patience the vessells of his wrath prepared to destruction*. v. 23. *And that he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory*? What one of our Divines expresseth himselfe in this argument more fully, or more liably to carnall exceptions following the judgment of flesh and blood, then St. Paul doth in this? Here by the way as touching *Piscator*, I must fetch after mine answer in his behalfe, to that which in the entrance to this Section was delivered of him, and overseen by me. For this Authour confessing that our writers have never said directly in *terminis*, that *God is the cause of sinne*, which introduction of his is the very same which *Bellarmino* useth, opposing our Divines on this very argument, *lib. 2. De amissione gratie & statu peccati. cap. 4.* Afterwards by a parenthesis brings in an exception of *Piscator*, and *some other of the blunter sort*, without naming one of them. And though he name *Piscator* yet he quotes no place; for if he had, he should withall direct his Reader to the grounds whereupon *Piscator* affirms this, namely that, *God is the cause of man's fidelity*. And it is the very place formerly mentioned in the e words. *He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not because ye are not of God*. now what reasonable mā can deny, but that it is a sin not to heare God's words; then doth not our Saviour plainly professe, that the true cause hereof is, because they are not of God? Now if to be of God in this place doth signifie God's Election, then the cause of their finnes hereby is made God's not electing of them. But if this phrase, *To be of God*, signifie God's regenerating of them, as I thinke it doth, then God's not regenerating of them is made the cause of this their disobedience in not hearing God's word's; and indeed the evill of sinne hath noe efficient cause but deficient only, as *Austine* hath delivered long agoe. And God is not bound to any, either to elect him, or regenerate him; so

Deut. 9.6.

Deut. 29.3.4.

Prov. 16.4.